CIVIL  WAR  TIMES 


1861-1865 


BY 

DANIEL  WAIT    HOWE 

Author  of  The  Puritan  Republic 


The  broken  soldier,  kindly  bade  to  stay, 
Sate  by  his  fire  and  talk'd  the  night  away, 
Wept  o'er  his  wounds  or  tales  of  sorrow  done, 
Shoulder'd  his  crutch  and  show'd  how  fields  were  won. 
— Goldsmith. 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


COPYRIGHT   1902 
THE   BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 


TO 

THE  SOLDIERS 

FEDERAL  AND  CONFEDERATE 

OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

THIS  VOLUME  IS 

INSCRIBED 


>s. 


PREFACE 

In  an  address  to  the  New  England  Society  of  New 
York,  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  said :  "The  story  of 
the  Pilgrims  may  be  told  for  a  thousand  anniversaries 
and  the  next  year  it  will  be  fresh  again."  So  it  is 
with  the  story  of  the  Civil  War.  Notwithstanding 
the  passing  years,  it  retains  all  its  interest,  especially 
for  those  who  bore  arms  on  either  side.  The  surviving 
veterans  never  tire  of  telling  the  story  or  of  hearing  it 
told,  and  its  fascination  is  such  as  to  lend  a  charm  to 
even  the  most  unpretentious  narrative  of  the  conflict  in 
which  they  took  part. 

Macaulay  said  that  he  intended  to  write  a  history  of 
England  that  would  make  the  lady  in  her  drawing- 
room  lay  down  the  latest  novel  and  take  up  his  book, 
and  he  accomplished  his  purpose.  The  time  has  not 
yet  come,  nor  has  the  historian  appeared,  for  writing 
a  history  of  the  Civil  War.  No  man  now  living  can 
write  it  with  the  impartiality  that  should  characterize 
the  historian,  and  no  historian  could  now  write  such 
a  history  without  rekindling  the  embers  of  passion  and 
prejudice  still  smoldering  beneath  the  ashes  of  the 
conflict  that  once  glowed  with  such  fierce  heat. 

When  the  time  comes  for  writing  the  history  of  the 
(v) 


VI  PREFACE 

Civil  War  the  historian  will  find  a  wealth  of  materials 
from  which  to  construct  a  history  far  more  fascinating 
than  Macaulay's  and  infinitely  more  interesting  than 
the  distorted  history  conveyed  in  diluted  doses  through 
the  pages  of  so-called  historical  novels.  It  will  be  suf- 
ficient honor  for  the  author  of  a  volume  like  this  if 
he  has  contributed  even  a  little  to  the  history  that  is 
to  be  written. 

The  general  scope  of  this  volume  is  indicated  by 
the  table  of  contents  and  a  very  full  index.  The  state- 
ments in  the  text  are  supported  by  a  liberal  citation  of 
authorities,  a  table  of  which  precedes  the  general  index. 
The  military  operations  described  are  chiefly  those  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  in  describing  them 
I  have  avoided,  as  far  as  possible,  the  use  of  technical 
military  terms  not  generally  understood  by  civilians. 
In  the  appendix  will  be  found  tables  showing  the 
organization  of  that  army  during  the  most  important 
battles  and  campaigns  in  which  it  participated. 

I  claim  no  credit  for  discovering  such  facts  relating 
to  the  Civil  War  as  any  one  may  find  by  an  industrious 
examination  of  official  records  and  histories  open  to 
all.  Nor  do  I  pretend  to  knowledge  of  facts,  outside 
the  official  records,  such  as  officers  of  high  rank  and 
those  intimately  associated  with  them  may  have  ac- 
quired. The  highest  rank  I  attained  was  that  of  cap- 
tain, and  my  associates  in  the  army  were  chiefly  among 
the  line  officers  and  enlisted  men.  My  relations  to 
these,  however,  were  such  as  gave  me  greater  famil- 
iarity than  that  generally  possessed  by  officers  of 


PREFACE  Vll 

higher  rank  with  the  daily  life  and  thoughts  of  a  pri- 
vate soldier  and  with  his  views  of  military  life  and 
events.  Moreover,  the  knowledge  that  I  acquired  of 
the  battles  and  campaigns  in  which  I  participated, 
limited  as  were  my  means  of  knowing  anything  about 
them  at  the  time  beyond  what  I  saw  and  heard,  has 
given  me  clearer  ideas  of  many  matters  in  connection 
with  them  than  I  could  have  acquired  by  any  amount  of 
reading.  I  fully  realize,  however,  that  I  am  quite  as 
liable  as  others  to  make  mistakes  in  attempting  to 
record  personal  observations  of  events  that  occurred 
so  long  ago,  and  I  claim  such  indulgence  on  this  ac- 
count as  I  would  freely  accord  to  those  whose  recollec- 
tion of  the  same  events  may  not  coincide  writh  mine. 

The  political  conditions  and  the  military  movements 
of  the  Civil  War  period  were  intimately  connected, 
and  the  questions  growing  out  of  them  have  given  rise 
to  great  diversity  of  opinion — some  of  them  to  acri- 
monious controversy.  A  colorless  narrative  of  that 
period,  ignoring  these  questions,  would  be  of  little 
value  or  interest.  On  the  other  hand,  a  mere  partisan 
discussion  of  them  would  be  equally  unprofitable  and 
uninteresting.  Therefore,  when  expressing  my  opin- 
ion on  any  of  these  controverted  questions,  I  have  done 
so  without  reserve,  endeavoring,  however,  to  write  as 
fairly  and  impartially  as  is  possible  for  one  who  took 
an  active  part  in  either  war  or  politics  during  the  Civil 
War  times,  and  who  has  intelligence  enough  to  ripen 
into  a  conviction. 

We  wish  to  forget  the  animosities  of  the  Civil  War 


Vlll  PREFACE 

period,  but  not  the  heroism  of  those  who  bore  arms 
on  either  side  of  the  bloody  conflict.  That  is  now  the 
common  inheritance  of  all  Americans.  The  soldiers, 
Federal  and  Confederate,  to  whom  I  have  inscribed 
this  volume,  first  learned  on  the  field  of  battle  to  re- 
spect their  adversaries.  No  eulogy  can  do  justice  to 
those  of  either  side  which  ignores  the  heroic  achieve- 
ments of  those  who  fought  against  them.  I  trust  that 
the  soldiers  of  the  South  who  may  chance  to  see  this 
book  will  read  it  with  the  same  generous  feelings  that 
inspired  a  soldier  of  the  North  in  writing  it. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  volume  I  have  been  great- 
ly aided  by  General  Henry  V.  Boynton,  Colonel  Wil- 
liam F.  Fox,  Colonel  Thomas  L.  Livermore,  and  Mr. 
Jacob  Piatt  Dunn  of  the  Indianapolis  Sentinel,  and 
especially  by  Mr.  Charles  R.  Williams  of  the  Indian- 
apolis News,  who  has  already  placed  me  under  great 
obligations  by  assisting  me  in  preparing  The  Puritan 
Republic.  All  these  well-known  writers  hold  decided 
views  that  probably  do  not  coincide  throughout  with 
mine,  and,  therefore,  I  deem  it  justice  to  exonerate 
them  from  any  responsibility  for  my  own  conclusions. 
My  daughter,  Lucy  Howe,  has  helped  me  very  much 
in  revising  the  manuscript  for  publication. 

DANIEL  WAIT  HOWE. 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  October,  1902. 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 
The  Three  Months'  Picnic,  1-14 

CHAPTER  II 
Further  Development  of  the  Great  Conflict,  I5~55 

CHAPTER  III 
Camp,  March  and  Battle,  56-96 

CHAPTER  IV 
Seeing  Real  War;  the  March  from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  97-105 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Battle  of  Stone's  River,  106-122 

CHAPTER  VI 
Six  Months  in  Camp  at  Mnrfreesboro,  123-155 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Chattanooga  Campaign  and  the  Battle  of  Chicka- 

mauga,  156-200 

(ix) 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 
The  Siege  and  the  Battles  of  Chattanooga,  210-241 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  East  Tennessee  Campaign,  242-267 

CHAPTER  X 

Negro  Soldiers  in  the  Civil  War,  268-282 

CHAPTER  XI 
The  Atlanta  Campaign,  283-304 

CHAPTER  XII 
Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee,  305-329 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  End  of  an  Unimportant  Military  Career,  33O~334 

CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Story  Told  by  the  Statistics,  335~355 

CHAPTER  XV 
Revisiting  Chattanooga  and  Chickamauga,  356-367 

Appendix,  369-390 

Index  to  Citations,  39i~393 

General  Index,  395~42i 


CIVIL  WAR  TIMES 

CHAPTER  ONE 

THE  THREE   MONTHS'    PICNIC 

I  come  of  a  family  always  loyal  to  country.  One  of 
my  ancestors,  Colonel  Thomas  Howe,  of  Marlborough, 
Mass.,  was  prominent  in  King  Philip's  War ;  two  oth- 
ers, Captain  Eliakim  Howe  and  his  son  Otis  were  in 
the  New  Hampshire  militia  in  the  Revolutionary  War, 
and  my  grandfather,  Captain  Nathan  Howe,  served  in 
a  New  York*  regiment  in  the  War  of  1812.  When  the 
Mexican  War  broke  out  my  father  was  dead  and  I, 
his  only  child,  was  about  five  years  old. 

From  the  time  it  was  known  that  Lincoln  had  been 
elected  President,  the  nation  was  in  a  ferment  of  ex- 
citement. The  papers  were  full  of  rumors  of  the  seces- 
sion of  the  southern  states  and  of  the  warlike  prepara- 
tions already  begun.  Among  the  citizens  of  Indiana 
were  many  whose  ancestors  had  come  from  Kentucky, 
Virginia,  and  other  southern  states,  and  who  were 
bitterly  hostile  to  Lincoln.  Nor  was  there  entire 
unanimity  among  those  who  had  supported  him  as  to 
the  proper  course  to  be  pursued  in  the  event  of  the 

(i) 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

secession  of  the  southern  states,  and  many,  influenced 
by  the  early  opinions  of  Horace  Greeley,  were  in  favor 
of  letting  them  go  in  peace.  A  great  many  others 
thought  that  the  talk  of  war  was  but  the  vainglorious 
boasting  of  southern  fire-eaters.  Few  suspected  that 
such  a  bloody  contest  as  that  which  followed  was  so 
near  at  hand. 

In  the  early  months  of  1861  I  was  in  Indianapolis 
attending  a  course  of  law  lectures  given  to  a  small 
class  by  Judge  Samuel  E.  Perkins,  then  one  of  the 
judges  of  the  Indiana  Supreme  Court.  It  was  during 
this  time  that  Lincoln  passed  through  that  city  on 
his  way  to  Washington  to  be  inaugurated.  A  great 
crowd  assembled  and  listened  to  him  as  he  spoke  from 
the  balcony  of  the  Bates  House.  I  remember,  as  .if  it 
were  yesterday,  his  tall,  lank  form  towering  above 
those  about  him  while  he  delivered  his  brief  address. 
It  was  but  little  more  than  four  years  until  the  funeral 
train  passed  through  the  city  bearing  his  body  back  to 
his  old  home. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  lecture  course,  I  returned 
to  my  home  in  Franklin,  the  county  seat  of  Johnson 
county,  and  I  had  been  there  only  a  few  days  when  the 
whole  country  was  startled,  as  if  by  the  shock  of  an 
earthquake  at  midnight,  by  the  news  of  the  firing  on 
Fort  Sumter.  This  was  followed  at  once  by  the  procla- 
mation of  the  President  calling  for  75,000  volunteers. 
Those  who  do  not  remember  the  situation  can  form 
some  idea  of  it  from  the  contemporaneous  accounts  in 
the  newspapers.  Lincoln  had  received  a  majority  of 


THREE    MONTHS      PICNIC  3 

the  electoral,  but  not  of  the  popular,  vote,  and  would 
not  have  been  elected  at  all  but  for  the  split  between 
the  Breckinridge  and  Douglas  wings  of  the  Democ- 
racy. If  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  "fired  the 
southern  heart,"  it  fired  the  northern  heart  as  well. 
There  was  at  once  a  shifting  of  position  and  a  new 
alignment  of  political  parties.  There  were  few  left 
among  the  Republicans  of  the  North  who  advocated 
letting  the  southern  states  go  their  way.  Conspicuous 
among  the  great  papers  that  helped  to  mold  public 
opinion  in  the  North  was  Harper's  Weekly,  which  had 
not  favored  the  election  of  Lincoln.  Its  issue  of  April 
27,  1861,  contained  President  Lincoln's  proclamation 
and  an  editorial  in  which  it  said : 

"War  is  declared.  President  Lincoln's  proclama- 
tion, which  we  publish  above,  is  an  absolute  proclama- 
tion of  war  against  the  Gulf  states.  The  die  is  now 
cast,  and  men  must  take  their  sides,  and  hold  to  them. 
No  one  who  knows  anything  of  the  southern  people 
supposes  for  a  moment  that,  having  gone  so  far  as  to 
bombard  a  United  States  fort  and  capture  it,  they 
will  now  succumb  without  a  fight.  No  one  who  has 
seen  the  recent  manifestations  of  popular  sentiment 
in  the  North  can  doubt  that  the  northern  blood  is  up, 
and  that  they  will  listen  no  more  to  talk  of  compro- 
mise, truce,  or  treaty,  until  they  are  fairly  beaten. 

"Let  us  then  forbear  puling,  and  look  the  situation 
in  the  face.  There  are  some  among  us  still  who  whine 
about  the  evils  of  civil  war.  These  are  they  who,  with 
a  burglar  in  their  house,  his  hand  on  the  throat  of 
their  wife  or  daughter,  would  quote  texts  on  the  love- 
liness of  Christian  forbearance  and  charity.  Nobody 


4  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

— outside  of  lunatic  asylums — doubts  that  civil  war  is 
an  enormous  calamity.  On  this  point  all  are  agreed. 
But  as  it  has  actually  begun,  and  exists,  what  is  the 
use  of  deprecating  it  ?  What  should  we  think  of  a  doc- 
tor who,  summoned  to  visit  a  half-dying  patient, 
should  wring  his  hands  hopelessly  and  bewail  the  ma- 
lignancy of  disease?" 

Its  next  issue  of  May  4,  1861,  contained  another 
editorial  in  which  it  said : 

"It  is  not  now  a  question  of  slavery  or  anti-slavery. 
It  is  not  even  a  question  of  Union  or  disunion.  The 
question  simply  is  whether  northern  men  will  fight. 
Southerners  have  rebelled  and  dragged  our  flag  in  the 
dirt,  in  the  belief  that,  because  we  won't  fight  duels  or 
engage  in  street  brawls,  therefore  we  are  cowards. 
The  question  now  is  whether  or  no  they  are  right." 

These  utterances  exactly  sounded  the  keynote  of 
northern  sentiment.  No  paper  was  more  loyal  to  the 
Federal  government  or  more  zealous  for  a  vigorous 
prosecution  of  the  war,  and  its  able  editorials  and  the 
striking  illustrations  of  Thomas  Nast  exercised  a  pow- 
erful influence  in  shaping  northern  sentiment. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  attitude  of  Kentucky 
was  uncertain.  The  sympathies  of  the  governor, 
Beriah  Magoffin,  were  wholly  with  the  seceding  states, 
and  to  President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops  he  had  an- 
swered that  "Kentucky  will  furnish  no  troops  for  the 
wicked  purpose  of  subduing  her  sister  southern  states." 
It  was  Magoffin's  purpose  to  force  Kentucky  to  secede, 


THREE    MONTHS      PICNIC  5 

or,  failing  in  that,  to  assume  the  position  of  "armed 
neutrality."  The  farce  planned  by  Magoffin  was  not 
successful  in  the  land  of  Henry  Clay  and  soon  ran  its 
course,  but,  while  it  lasted,  Indiana  was  practically  a 
border  state.  It  was  fortunate  for  the  state  and  for 
the  Union  cause  that  at  this  time  there  was  in  the  office 
of  governor  a  man  of  unquestioned  loyalty,  of  tre- 
mendous energy,  and  of  indomitable  will.  In  the  four 
years  that  followed,  the  name  of  Oliver  P.  Morton 
became  a  household  word  throughout  the  United 
States.  No  governor  in  any  northern  state  met  with 
more  bitter  opposition;  none  worked  for  the  success 
of  the  Union  cause  with  more  untiring  energy,  or 
looked  after  the  welfare  of  the  soldiers  of  his  own 
state  with  more  watchful  and  careful  solicitude. 

Morton  was  then  in  the  prime  of  vigorous  manhood 
— a  man  of  .far-seeing  sagacity,  of  great  endurance,  of 
dauntless  courage ;  a  man  who  could  have  taken  Crom- 
well's place  in  England,  and  who  needed  all  of  Crom- 
well's force  of  character  to  fill  the  place  of  governor 
of  Indiana.  Clearly  foreseeing  from  the  beginning 
the  magnitude  of  the  Rebellion  and  the  tremendous 
efforts  that  must  be  made  to  suppress  it,  he  often 
chafed  under  what  he  thought  to  be  the  puny  and  tardy 
measures  of  the  Federal  government.  When  the  Fed- 
eral authorities  were  too  slow  in  supplying  arms  for 
the  Indiana  troops,  he  bought  them  on  his  own  respon- 
sibility. When  the  government  became  short  of  am- 
munition, he  established  at  Indianapolis  an  arsenal  for 
its  manufacture,  soon  having  600  men  employed, 


O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

and  ammunition  enough  for  the  Indiana  troops  and 
some  to  spare  to  the  government.  When  the  legisla- 
ture in  1863  adjourned,  after  refusing  to  make  any 
appropriation  to  carry  on  the  state  government,  he 
borrowed  money  sufficient  for  two  years  without  clos- 
ing a  single  state  institution  and  without  stopping  the 
organization  of  a  single  regiment. 

The  President's  proclamation  calling  for  75,000  vol- 
unteers was  issued  April  15  and  six  three-months' 
regiments  with  4,683  men  were  required  of  the  state 
of  Indiana.  Within  a  week  12,000  men  had  responded 
— twice  as  many  as  could  then  be  armed.  The  four 
three-year  regiments  required  under  the  President's 
call  of  May  3  were  raised  at  once,  and  ten  more  besides 
in  advance  of  the  call  in  July,  and  before  January  i, 
1862,  Indiana  had  60,000  troops  in  the  field. 

The  Morgan  raid  found  Indiana  almost  destitute  of 
armed  soldiers,  but  within  twenty-four  hours  after 
Morgan  had  touched  her  borders  15,000  men  were  has- 
tening to  Indianapolis;  and  before  two  days  had 
passed  Morton  had  30,000  assembled  to  repel  the  in- 
vaders. 

No  orator  ever  lived  in  Indiana  whose  speeches  had 
such  weight  as  those  of  Morton.  He  never  attempted 
to  be  funny;  he  never  indulged  in  the  "spread-eagle" 
style  of  oratory;  he  never  resorted  to  the  tricks  prac- 
tised by  the  modern  professional  "spell-binder."  But 
under  his  sledge-hammer  logic  all  opposition  went 
down  as  the  gates  of  Torquilstone  went  down  under 
the  blows  of  Richard  the  Lion-hearted.  Probably  no 


THREE    MONTHS     PICNIC  7 

one  speech  ever  delivered  in  America  left  such  a  deep 
impress  upon  the  public  mind  as  Morton's  Masonic 
Hall  speech  in  1866.  I  once  heard  a  prominent  Dem- 
ocrat say  that  this  one  speech  determined  the  election 
in  the  state  for  that  year.  No  Republican  could  add 
strength  to  it;  no  Democrat  could  answer  it. 

Morton's  care  for  the  Indiana  troops  in  the  field 
was  proverbial  throughout  all  the  armies.  Surgeons 
and  nurses  were  sent  by  him  to  every  battle-field. 
Often  he  went  himself  to  give  his  personal  attention  to 
the  care  of  the  wounded.  His  strong  hand  was  the 
chief  support  of  the  Indiana  Sanitary  Commission, 
whose  special  business  it  was  to  care  for  the  sick  and 
wounded  soldiers  in  the  hospitals.  No  regiment  passed 
through  Indianapolis,  either  going  to  or  returning 
from  the  front,  that  did  not  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his 
provident  hospitality.  His  kind  and  sympathetic  feel- 
ing for  his  suffering  fellow  men  was  not  limited  to 
soldiers  of  the  Union  armies.  It  extended  to  the  Con- 
federate prisoners  confined  at  Indianapolis,  and  no- 
where in  the  North  were  they  more  humanely  treated. 

His  vigilance  was  marvelous.  Nothing  escaped  his 
keen  watchfulness.  Not  a  plot  against  the  government 
was  concocted  in  Indiana  that  he  did  not  ferret  out; 
hardly  a  meeting  of  the  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle 
or  Sons  of  Liberty  was  held  of  whose  proceedings  he 
did  not  know.  On  one  occasion  a  prominent  citizen 
of  Indianapolis  called  on  him  to  assure  him  that  the 
reports  of  an  alleged  treasonable  meeting  held  the 
night  before  were  exaggerated,  and  that  he,  the  visitor, 


8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

would  certainly  have  heard  of  the  proceedings  if  they 
were  such  as  had  been  reported;  whereupon  Morton 
almost  paralyzed  him  by  at  once  pulling  out  of  a 
pigeon-hole  a  stenographic  account  of  the  proceedings, 
including  a  full  report  of  the  visitor's  own  treasonable 
speech. 

He  was  omnipresent;  now  buried  in  the  details  of 
the  work  of  carrying  on  the  state  government,  or  pre- 
paring troops  for  the  field;  now  going  about  the  state 
making  speeches  and  infusing  into  the  people  some  of 
his  own  enthusiasm;  now  visiting  battle-fields  and 
camps  at  the  front — wherever  he  was  most  needed  dur- 
ing the  war  he  was  always  to  be  found.  It  was  chiefly 
to  his  untiring  efforts  that  Indiana  enjoys  the  distinc- 
tion of  having  furnished  to  the  Federal  armies  over 
seventy-four  per  cent,  of  the  entire  fighting  population 
of  the  state.  No  obstacles  stopped  him;  his  tremen- 
dous energy  overcame  them  all ;  no  disasters  dismayed 
him — they  only  strengthened  his  courage  and  inspired 
him  with  renewed  determination.  He  will  live  in  his- 
tory as  the  greatest  war  governor  of  his  time. 

Morton's  response  to  the  President's  proclamation 
was  instantaneous,  and  the  call  to  arms  was  heard  in 
every  town  and  village  in  Indiana.  At  once  old  party 
affiliations  were  broken  and  the  question  no  longer 
was  whether  a  man  were  a  Republican  or  a  Democrat, 
but  whether  he  stood  for  or  against  the  Union.  A 
great  meeting  was  called  at  Franklin,  patriotic  ad- 
dresses were  made,  and  preparations  were  at  once 
begun  to  enlist  a  company  of  volunteers.  I  was  then 


THREE  MONTHS'  PICNIC  9 

living  at  home  with  my  mother  and  my  stepfather, 
Samuel  P.  Oyler.  There  were  only  three  of  us.  It 
was  felt  that  either  my  stepfather  or  I  should  enlist; 
my  mother  would  not  decide  between  us,  so  we  both 
enlisted. 

The  quota  of  the  company  was  filled  almost  as  fast 
as  the  men  could  write  their  names.  We  did  not  wait 
for  uniforms,  but  were  all  rigged  out  in  red  shirts. 
The  loyal  ladies  of  the  town  presented  us  with  a  beau- 
tiful silk  banner  and  we  were  ready  to  march.  My 
stepfather  was  elected  captain  and  I  was  elected  pri- 
vate, a  rank  which  I  retained  throughout  the  three- 
months'  service.  Another  little  fellow  and  I,  being 
the  two  smallest  men  in  the  company,  were  assigned 
to  the  position  of  rear  guard — which  I  think  we  filled 
with  due  regard  to  the  responsibility  and  the  honor 
attached  to  it.  The  fashion  was  then  to  dignify  each 
local  company  with  some  distinctive  appellation  indi- 
cating the  warlike  character  of  its  members,  and  I  have 
an  indistinct  recollection  that  we  were  known  as  "The 
Franklin  Tigers." 

When  the  day  arrived  for  us  to  take  the  train  to 
Indianapolis,  our  company  was  marshaled  in  the  pub- 
lic square,  and,  preceded  by  fife  and  drum,  we  marched 
through  the  streets  to  the  railroad  station.  It  was  a 
great  day  for  the  staid  old  town.  All  the  people  were 
out,  and  thousands  gathered  from  the  country  round- 
about. In  the  crowds  that  thronged  the  sidewalks 
along  the  line  of  march  were  some  tender-hearted 
women  who  wept,  but  most  of  the  spectators  and  the 


IO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

volunteers  wore  smiling  faces.  It  was  generally 
thought  that  the  flurry  would  soon  blow  over.  Sew- 
ard,  in  whose  sagacity  we  had  unbounded  confidence, 
predicted  that  the  war  would  end  in  sixty  days. 

Arriving  at  Indianapolis  we  went  into  camp,  and 
the  Franklin  company  became  Co.  H  of  the  7th 
Ind.  Vols.,  of  which  Ebenezer  Dumont  was  commis- 
sioned colonel  and  Captain  Oyler,  major.  We  re- 
mained in  Indianapolis  only  long  enough  to  receive 
arms  and  uniforms,  diligently  employing  the  interval 
before  our  departure  in  drilling ;  and  then  the  regiment 
was  sent  to  what  is  now  West  Virginia,  crossing  the 
Ohio  at  Bellaire  and  going  into  camp  near  Webster. 
From  there  we  marched  in  a  few  days  to  Philippi, 
which  was  captured  with  a  great  flourish.  The  "Bat- 
tle of  Philippi"  was  described  in  bombastic  style  by  the 
northern  press,  and  Lander's  ride  down  the  hill  was 
supposed  to  rank  next  to  the  mad  plunge  of  General 
Israel  Putnam  in  Revolutionary  times.  The  truth  is 
that,  to  quote  from  the  old  nursery  rhyme,  describing 
the  fierce  assault  of  the  youthful  soldiers  upon  a  flock 
of  geese,  "we  routed  them,  we  scouted  them,  nor  lost  a 
single  man."  Not  a  man  was  killed  on  either  side. 
Colonel  Kelly  of  the  Federal  forces  was  wounded ;  one 
unfortunate  Confederate  had  his  leg  taken  off  by  a 
stray  cannon-ball;  two  or  three  others  were  slightly 
wounded  and  all  the  rest  precipitately  fled — in  army 
phrase  they  "skedaddled" — and  probably  lived  to  fight 
another  day. 

There   were   many  incidents  of  the  three-months' 


THREE  MONTHS'  PICNIC  n 

campaign  that,  at  the  time,  made  a  deep  impression 
upon  my  mind,  but  most  of  them  have  been  obliter- 
ated by  the  more  significant  events  of  the  three-years' 
service.  My  first  experience  on  picket  was  at  Webster. 
I  was  stationed  in  a  dense  wood,  and  it  poured  down 
rain  all  night.  It  was  so  dark  that  I  could  scarcely 
see  my  hand  before  me.  About  midnight  a  vivid  flash 
of  lightning  suddenly  revealed  a  man  approaching 
within  ten  feet  of  me.  This  was  a  trying  ordeal  for  a 
boy  who  had  not  been  in  service  a  month,  and  who 
had  not  been  in  the  enemy's  country  more  than  a  week, 
and  I  am  not  ashamed  to  say  now  that  I  was  nearly 
frightened  out  of  my  wits.  But  I  had  enough  courage 
left  to  call  out  "Halt!  who  goes  there?"  and  I  do  not 
recall  anything  in  my  life  that  was  such  a  relief  to  me 
as  the  quick  response,  "A  friend  with  the  countersign." 
It  was  at  Philippi  that  I  first  heard  the  "long  roll," 
a  peculiar  rolling  beat  of  the  drum  betokening  immi- 
nent danger,  and  calling  instantly  to  arms  every  sol- 
dier that  hears  it.  Its  effect  upon  an  army  is  more 
startling  than  the  cry  of  "fire"  at  midnight.  In  this 
instance  it  turned  out  to  be  a  false  alarm. 

While  at  Philippi  another  incident  occurred  which 
I  have  never  forgotten.  Co.  H  had  been  totally 
stripped  one  night  of  all  its  cooking  utensils  by  ma- 
rauders from  another  company.  There  was  not  a 
skillet  nor  a  frying-pan  nor  a  coffee-pot  left  in  the 
whole  company.  The  next  day  the  captain's  son  and 
I  obtained  a  pass  permitting  us  to  visit  Philippi. 
There  was  not  much  to  be  seen — the  most  prominent 


12  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

public  buildings  being  the  court-house  and  the  county 
jail  which  had  been  used  by  the  Confederates  as  a 
guard-house  while  they  occupied  the  town.  Nearly 
all  the  inhabitants,  most  of  whom  were  known  to  be 
violent  "secesh,"  had  fled.  Passing  a  deserted  house 
it  occurred  to  us  that  here  was  a  good  chance  to  re- 
pair the  losses  of  Co.  H;  so  we  entered  the  house 
and  filled  an  empty  sack  with  cooking  utensils.  But 
we  had  no  sooner  passed  through  the  gate  than  we 
were  seized  by  a  provost  guard,  stripped  of  our  booty 
and  hurried  off  to  jail  where  we  were  kept  in  durance 
vile  until  night,  and  then  dismissed  with  a  severe  repri- 
mand and  an  admonition  that  if  ever  detected  commit- 
ting a  similar  offense  we  were  liable  to  be  instantly 
shot.  This  was  during  the  period  when  McClellan 
and  other  Union  generals  seemed  to  be  far  more  solicit- 
ous to  protect  the  property  of  Confederates  than  they 
were  to  protect  the  property  of  those  loyal  to  the  gov- 
ernment. It  is  but  justice  to  them  to  add  that  this 
policy  seemed  for  a  time  to  meet  the  approval  of  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  who  still  clung  to  the  hope 
that  some  compromise  could  be  patched  up  by  which 
their  erring  southern  brethren  might  be  coaxed  back 
into  the  Union. 

The  summer  was  spent  chiefly  in  camp  on  a  hill 
overlooking  Philippi.  The  weather  was  hot,  and  when 
not  drilling  we  sought  the  friendly  shade  of  the  great 
chestnut  trees  that  were  so  abundant  in  that  locality. 
The  regiment  was  engaged  in  a  few  insignificant  skir- 
mishes, then  dignified  by  the  press  in  grandiloquent 


THREE    MONTHS      PICNIC  13 

descriptions  as  "battles" ;  but  the  only  real  battle  of 
any  consequence  in  which  it  was  engaged  was  that  at 
Carrick's  Ford.  That  was  my  first  battle.  Before 
reaching  the  ford  we  had  repeatedly  crossed  Cheat 
river,  a  mountain  stream  with  a  very  swift  current 
and  about  waist  deep,  the  bottom  of  which  was  cov- 
ered with  slimy  boulders.  I  had  twice  slipped  and 
fallen,  and  I  had  gone  clean  under  and  rolled  over  on 
the  bottom,  gun  and  all.  On  getting  to  shore  I  had 
tried  in  vain,  by  putting  dry  powder  in  the  tube,  to 
make  my  musket  go  off.  I  also  tried  to  pull  the  load, 
but  the  attempt  was  equally  vain.  Probably  it  made 
little  difference,  for  my  gun  was  an  old  Harper's  Ferry 
musket  that  nearly  dislocated  my  shoulder  every  time 
I  fired  it,  and  was  almost  as  dangerous  to  the  man  be- 
hind as  to  the  man  in  front  of  it.  But  I  remained  in 
the  ranks  antf  went  through  the  battle,  feeling  as  proud 
as  anybody  when  it  was  over.  General  Garnett,  the 
Confederate  commander,  was  killed  there.  I  passed 
by  the  place  where  he  lay  dead  and  thought  he  was 
one  of  the  finest  looking  officers  I  had  ever  seen. 

Our  term  of  enlistment  expired  the  latter  part  of 
July  and  we  started  home.  On  our  return  we  stopped 
for  a  night  at  Bellaire,  Ohio,  and  there  I  first  heard 
the  dismal  tidings  of  the  disaster  that  had  overtaken 
the  Union  army  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  Young 
and  inexperienced  as  I  was,  I  understood  its  sig- 
nificance. It  meant  that  going  to  war  was  no  longer 
like  going  to  a  picnic,  as  we  thought  when  we  volun- 
teered, but  that  a  mighty  effort  must  be  made  by  the 


14  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

North  or  the  Union  would  be  shattered  and  broken 
forever.  I  had  not  yet  learned,  nor  had  the  nation  yet 
learned,  the  truth  of  the  saying  of  General  Sherman, 
that  "War  is  hell." 

The  three-months'  service,  though  somewhat  of  a 
picnic  when  compared  with  the  three-years'  service, 
nevertheless  produced  very  important  results  not  at 
once  apparent.  One  of  the  most  important  was  that 
the  three-months'  men  gained  a  fair  knowledge  of  the 
manual  of  arms  and  of  company  and  regimental  evo- 
lutions, and  learned  some  of  the  rudiments  of  a  sol- 
dier's education.  A  great  many  again  enlisted  for 
three  years ;  many  who  did  so  became  officers,  and  the 
military  experience,  limited  as  it  was,  acquired  in  the 
three-months'  service,  was  of  great  value  in  enabling 
them  to  drill  and  discipline  the  troops  over  whom  they 
were  placed  in  command. 


CHAPTER  TWO 

FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  GREAT  CONFLICT 

The  disaster  of  Bull  Run  occurred  on  July  21,  1861. 
Its  eff<yt_was  t<">  throw  the  North  jritO  a  p^nir.  The 
venerable  General  Scott,  then  seventy-five  years  of  age, 
was  general-in-chief.  The  next  day  General  George 
B.  McClellan  was  called  to  Washington  to  take  charge 
of  the  defense  of  the  city  and  he  arrived  there  July 
26.  The  Confederates,  as  much  elated  as  the  people 
of  the  North  were  depressed,  at  once  moved  up  to  the 
Potomac,  stopped  navigation,  and  virtually  blockaded 
the  national  capital. 

At  Washington  the  authorities,  civil  and  military, 
were  in  constant  dread  of  an  attack  that  might  result  in 
the  capture  of  the  capital  and  an  invasion  of  the  coun- 
try north  of  it.  Still  the  mass  of  people  of  the  North 
did  not  yet  fully  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  the  prep- 
arations necessary  to  suppress  the  Rebellion.  Even 
the  Secretary  of  War,  as  late  as  October,  1861,  had  no 
conception  of  the  stupendous  proportions  into  which 
the  conflict,  then  scarce  six  months  old,  was  destined 
to  expand. 

"About  this  time,"   says  Mr.   Foulke,1   "Secretary 

1  Life  of  Morton,  vol.  I,  p.  147. 

(15) 


l6  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Cameron  stopped  at  Indianapolis,  on  his  way  from 
St.  Louis  to  Washington,  and  in  company  with  Sena- 
tor Chandler,  took  supper  with  Morton  at  the  govern- 
or's mansion.  He  was  quite  talkative  and  laughed 
heartily  at  Sherman's  idea  that  it  would  take  two  hun- 
dred thousand  men  to  recover  the  Mississippi  states. 
He  made  no  secret  of  his  belief  that  Sherman  was 
crazy,  and  unfit  for  any  military  command.  He  de- 
rided Sherman's  notions  of  the  need  of  cavalry  and 
artillery  as  old-fashioned  and  silly,  and  was  boyish  in 
his  fun  over  the  'Minie  rifle,'  and  over  improved  arms 
generally.  The  old  smooth-bore  musket,  in  the  hands 
of  well-disciplined  infantry,  he  regarded  as  the  best 
kind  of  arms.  Morton  listened  to  this  talk  in  silence." 

We  can  well  understand  why  Morton  listened  in 
silence,  and  no  doubt  in  amazement,  to  such  twaddle 
at  such  a  time  from  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Moreover  the  slavery  question  continued  to  be  a 
disturbing  element,  "and  military"  operations  were  in- 
terfered with  by  political  considerations  and  by  the 
jealousies  of  generals.  The  senseless  clamor  expressed 
in  the  cry  of  "On  to  Richmond,"  which  led  to  the  dis- 
astrous defeat  at  Bull  Run,  again  urged  an  advance 
of  the  Union  armies  and  led  to  another  defeat  on 
October  2ist  at  Ball's  Bluff,  and  soon  after,  on  Novem- 
ber i,  1 861,  General  Scott  was  succeeded  as  general- 
sin-chief  by  General  McClellan. 

The  disasters  at  BulT"Run  and  Ball's  Bluff  only 
deepened  the  conviction,  long  before  entertained  by 
Morton  and  others  of  far-seeing  sagacity,  that  the 
Rebellion  would  not  blow  over  in  sixty  days  as  Seward 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  I/ 

had  predicted.  It  also  became  apparent  that  it  was 
not  wise  policy  to  enlist  men  for  a  term  so  short  that 
their  period  of  service  would  expire  before  they  had 
acquired  more  than  the  rudiments  of  a  military  edu- 
cation, and  that  the  regular  army  could  not  be  de- 
pended upon,  as  General  Scott  had  supposed,  to  sup- 
press the  Rebellion.  Many  of  its  officers  sympathized 
with  the  South,  and  those  who  resided  there,  with  a 
few  notable  exceptions,  accepted  commissions  in  the 
Confederate  army.  There  were  not  enough  left  of 
those  loyal  to  the  Federal  government  to  officer  the  new 
regiments.  It  was  useless  to  expect  to  fill  the  regi- 
ments necessary  to  be  raised  by  recruiting  for  the  reg- 
ular army.  The  men  of  the  North  were  eager  to  enlist 
but  they  preferred  to  serve  with  their  neighbors  and 
under  officers  whom  they  knew.  I  doubt  whether  ten 
men  in  my  company  in  the  three-years'  service  .could 
have  been  induced  to  enlist  in  the  regular  army. 
It  was  upon  the  volunteers  that  the  Federal  govern- 
ment was  forced  to  rely  for  the  material  with  which 
to  make  up  the  rank  and  file. 

Therefore  on  May  3,  1861,  President  Lincoln  issued 
another  call  for  volunteers,  and  under  this  call,  and  the 
acts  of  Congress  confirming  and  supplementing  it, 
500,000  men  were  required.  There  was  not  much  diffi- 
culty in  getting  the  men.  Indeed,  under  this  call  and 
the  acts  of  Congress  supplementing  it,  over  700,000 
volunteered,  of  whom  over  657,000  enlisted  for  three 
years.  The  first  serious  trouble  arose  in  equipping 
2 


1 8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

them  for  active  service.  It  had  been  difficult  to  arm 
and  equip  the  75,000  three-months'  troops,  and  it  was 
only  by  almost  superhuman  exertions  that  Governor 
Morton  had  been  able  to  send  to  the  front  the  six 
three-months'  regiments  contributed  by  Indiana.  No 
preparations  had  been  made  by  the  Federal  govern- 
ment or  by  any  state  for  such  a  war  as  had  now 
burst  forth.  Long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the 
militia  organizations  in  most  of  the  northern  states  had 
been  practically  abandoned.  Governor  Chase  of 
Ohio  had  made  vigorous  efforts  to  reorganize  the  mi- 
litia system  of  that  state.  Whitelaw  Reid  says  :2 

"In  this,  as  in  his  political  views,  he  was  in  advance 
of  his  times.  In  every  state  west  of  the  Alleghanies 
the  militia  had  fallen  into  undisguised  contempt.  The 
old-fashioned  militia  musters  had  been  given  up;  the 
subject  had  been  abandoned  as  fit  only  to  be  the  fertile 
theme  for  the  ridicule  of  rising  writers  and  witty 
stump  orators.  The  cannon  issued  by  the  government 
were  left  for  the  uses  of  political  parties  on  the  occa- 
sion of  mass  meetings  or  victories  at  the  polls.  The 
small  arms  were  scattered,  rusty,  and  become  worth- 
less. In  Chicago  a  novel  drill  had  been  an  inducement 
for  the  organization  of  the  Ellsworth  Zouaves;  and 
here  and  there  through  the  West  the  young  men  of  a 
city  kept  up  a  military  company;  but  these  were  the 
exceptions.  Popular  prejudice  against  doing  military 
duty  was  insurmountable,  and  no  name  for  these  ex- 
ceptional organizations  so  struck  the  popular  fancy 
as  that  of  "the  Cornstalk  Militia." 

1  Ohio  in  the  War,  vol.  i,  p.  19. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  19 

An  effort  was  made  by  Chase's  successor  to  continue 
the  policy  inaugurated  by  the  former,  but  with  little 
success.  "And  yet,"  quoting  again  from  Reid,  "the 
organization  of  Ohio  militia  was  far  superior  to  that 
existing  in  any  of  the  states  to  the  westward.  All  of 
them  combined  did  not  possess  so  large  a  militia  force 
as  the  First  Ohio  Regiment,  then  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  King,  of  Dayton." 

General  Cox3  has  given  a  graphic  account  of  the 
military  condition  of  the  great  state  of  Ohio  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Rebellion.  Governor  Dennison  on  the 
first  call  for  troops  summoned  to  his  aid  Captain 
George  B.  McClellan,  then  a  railway  superintendent. 
General  Cox  says : 

"The  next  morning  McClellan  requested  me  to  ac- 
company him  to  the  state  arsenal,  to  see  what  arms 
and  material  might  be  there.  We  found  a  few  boxes 
of  smooth-bore  muskets  which  had  once  been  issued 
to  militia  companies  and  had  been  returned  rusted 
and  damaged.  No  belts,  cartridge-boxes,  or  other  ac- 
coutrements were  with  them.  There  were  two  or 
three  smooth-bore  brass  field-pieces,  6-pounders,  which 
had  been  honey-combed  by  firing  salutes,  and  of  which 
the  vents  had  been  worn  out,  bushed  and  worn  out 
again.  In  a  heap  in  one  corner  lay  a  confused  pile  of 
mildewed  harness  which  had  been  once  used  for  artil- 
lery horses,  but  was  now  not  worth  carrying  away. 
There  had  for  many  years  been  no  money  appropriated 
to  buy  military  material  or  even  to  protect  the  little 

3  Article  on  War  Preparations  in  the  North;  Battles  and  Lead- 
ers of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  I,  p.  84. 


2O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  state  had.  The  Federal  government  had  occasion- 
ally distributed  some  arms  which  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  independent  uniformed  militia,  and  the  arsenal 
was  simply  an  empty  store-house.  It  did  not  take 
long  to  complete  our  inspection.  At  the  door,  as  we 
were  leaving  the  building,  McClellan  turned,  and, 
looking  back  into  its  emptiness,  remarked,  half  hu- 
morously and  half  sadly,  'A  fine  stock  of  munitions 
on  which  to  begin  a  great  war !' ' 

Scanty  as  were  Ohio's  military  supplies  they  far  sur- 
passed those  of  Indiana  and  of  most  of  the  northern 
states.  In  Indiana  there  was  not  the  semblance  of  a 
state  militia  organization.  Even  the  "cornstalk"  mus- 
ters had  almost  passed  out  of  mind.  There  were  not 
muskets  enough  in  the  whole  state  to  arm  a  single  regi- 
ment, to  say  nothing  of  uniforms,  tents,  knapsacks  and 
the  other  equipments  essential  to  actual  military  serv- 
ice. Now  500,000  men  were  not  only  to  be  raised 
but  equipped.  Not  only  were  they  to  be  equipped  but 
they  were  to  be  drilled  and  disciplined,  to  be  organized 
in  regiments,  brigades,  divisions,  corps,  and  armies, 
and  officers  were  to  be  found  competent  to  command 
all  these  military  organizations.  The  work  to  be  done 
was  of  stupendous  magnitude.  The  first  of  the  great 
armies  organized  in  the  North  was  that  for  the  defense 
of  Washington,  and,  whatever  may  be  said  of  General 
McClellan,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  country  owes 
to  him  a  great  debt  for  his  untiring  labor  in  fashioning 
from  the  crude  material  with  which  he  was  supplied 
that  great  army  afterward  known  as  the  Army  of  the 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  21 

Potomac.  Looking  back  over  the  history  of  the  Civil 
War,  nothing  in  it  is  so  wonderful  as  the  transforma- 
tion in  so  short  a  time  of  the  men  taken  from  the 
fields,  the  shops  and  other  civil  pursuits,  wholly  inex- 
perienced in  war,  into  trained  soldiers,  and  the  crea- 
tion in  both  North  and  South  of  armies  such  as  were 
never  before  known  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

The  most  difficult  task  of  all  was  not,  as  had  been 
expected,  to  find  the  men  and  the  arms  and  equipments 
for  them,  but  to  find  the  generals  able  to  lead  these 
great  armies  to  victory.  As  in  many  professions,  other 
than  that  of  arms,  the  education  acquired  in  the 
schools,  indispensable  as  it  may  be  to  success,  must  be 
supplemented  by  the  experience  acquired  in  actual 
practice,  and  not  infrequently  it  turns  out  that  the 
bright  man  at  recitations  utterly  fails  to  fulfil  the  ex- 
pectations raised  by  his  success  as  a  scholar.  And  so 
it  was  with  many  of  the  West  Point  generals.  More- 
over, the  best  of  the  generals  developed  by  the  war 
had  much  to  learn  in  the  field.  It  is  no  discredit  to 
them  that  all  made  some  mistakes.  Marshal  Turenne 
once  said :  "When  a  man  boasts  that  he  has  never 
made  mistakes  in  war,  he  convinces  me  that  he  has  not 
been  long  at  it."  The  weeding  out  of  political  gener- 
als, the  failure  of  one  •  after  another  of  those  appointed 
to  command  the  great  armies,  went  on  during  four 
years  and  cost  the  North  heavily  in  money  and  in 
lives;  in  the  end,  however,  generals  were  found  "fit 
to  stand  by  the  side  of  Caesar  and  give  direction." 

Shortly    after    the    Ball's    Bluff    disaster    another 


22  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

event  of  great  importance  occurred.  Captain  Wilkes, 
commander  of  the  San  Jacinto  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  had  seized  the  Trent,  a  British  mail  steamer, 
in  the  Bahama  channel,  and  forcibly  taken  from  her 
Mason  and  Slidell,  Confederate  commissioners  on  their 
way  to  Europe.  They  were  brought  to  the  United 
States  and  imprisoned  in  Fort  Warren,  near  Boston. 
There  were  some  mitigating  circumstances,  but  it  is 
now  generally  conceded  that  the  seizure  was  a  plain 
violation  of  international  law.  It  immediately  stirred 
up  a  great  ferment  both  in  England  and  in  America. 
It  very  nearly  caused  Great  Britain  to  declare  war 
against  the  Federal  government,  or  at  least  to  recog- 
nize the  Southern  Confederacy.  Either  course  at  that 
time  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  Union  cause.  There 
was  nothing  to  do  but  promptly  return  the  Confeder- 
ate commissioners.  This  was  done,  and  upon  Secre- 
tary Seward  devolved  the  delicate  task  of  pacifying 
the  English  government  and  at  the  same  time  mollify- 
ing the  wrath  of  those  in  the  North  who  have  never 
got  beyond  the  idea  that  twisting  the  tail  of  the  British 
lion  is  the  acme  of  American  statesmanship.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  Seward  accomplished  his  task  with 
consummate  diplomatic  skill. 

When  Congress  met  in  December,  1861,  one  of  its 
first  acts  was  the  appointment  of  a  joint  committee 
consisting  of  three  members  of  the  Senate  and  four  of 
the  House,  thereafter  known  as  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  of  which  Senator  Wade  of  Ohio 
was  made  chairman.  He  continued  to  serve  as  such 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  23 

during  the  war.  We  are  told  by  eminent  historians4 
that  this  committee 

"was  for  four  years  one  of  the  most  important  agen- 
cies in  the  country.  It  assumed,  and  was  sustained 
by  Congress  in  assuming, 'a  great  range  of  prerogative. 
It  became  a  stern  and  zealous  censor  of  both  the  army 
and  the  government;  it  called  soldiers  and  statesmen 
before  it,  and  questioned  them  like  refractory  school- 
boys. It  claimed  to  speak  for  the  loyal  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  this  claim  generally  met  with  the 
sympathy  and  support  of  a  majority  of  the  people's 
representatives  in  Congress  assembled.  It  was  often 
hasty  and  unjust  in  its  judgments,  but  always  earnest, 
patriotic  and  honest;  it  was  assailed  with  furious  de- 
nunciation and  defended  with  headlong  and  indiscrim- 
inating  eulogy;  and  on  the  whole  it  must  be  said  to 
have  merited  more  praise  than  blame." 

One  of  the  first  matters  investigated  by  the  commit- 
tee was  the  humiliating  affair  at  Ball's  Bluff.  The  in- 
vestigation is  a  fair  illustration  of  the  difficulties  un- 
der which  the  Federal  generals  labored  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war.  The  country  was  smarting  under  the 
disaster  and,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  a  scapegoat  was 
demanded  and  General  Stone  was  the  unfortunate  vic- 
tim selected.  He  was  suspected  of  having  held  trea- 
sonable correspondence  with  the  enemy  and,  by  an 
order  issued  from  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
he  was  arrested  and  imprisoned  for  six  months  in 
Fort  Lafayette.  No  formal  charges  were  filed,  but  a 

4Nicolay  and  Hay:  Abraham  Lincoln,  vol.  5,  pp.  150-1. 


24  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

secret  investigation  was  held  by  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War.  He  was  not  permitted  to  con- 
front the  witnesses  against  him,  nor  was  he  informed 
what  testimony  they  had  given ;  in  vain  he  demanded 
a  hearing;  in  vain  he  demanded  a  copy  of  the  charges 
against  him.  At  last  such  a  commotion  was  raised 
over  the  arbitrary  proceedings  by  which  he  was  de- 
prived of  his  liberty  that  the  authorities  were  compelled 
to  release  him.  No  one  now  doubts  his  loyalty  and  it 
has  since  been  shown  that  the  evidence  upon  which  he 
was  imprisoned  was  totally  unworthy  of  credit.  The 
case  stands  as  a  striking  illustration  of  the  necessity, 
even  in  time  of  war,  of  jealously  guarding  the  individ- 
ual liberty  of  the  citizen.5 

Before  the  meeting  of  Congress  in  December,  1861, 
General  McClellan  had  gathered  together  the  greatest 
army  ever  known  in  America.  It  is  true  that  it  was 
not  made  up  of  veteran  soldiers,  but  neither  was  the 
Confederate  army  under  the  command  of  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  confronting  Washington.  Mc- 
Clellan's  troops  were  as  well  disciplined  and  as  well 
equipped  as  Johnston's,  and  numbered  twice  as  many. 
But  McClellan's  army  had  been  in  camp  for  five  months 
and  had  made  no  advance  nor  any  sign  of  an  advance. 
The  whole  country  was  impatient  at  this  delay  and  the 
demand  in  the  North  was  loud  and  emphatic  for  a 

5  A  full  account  of  this  remarkable  case  will  be  found  in  Elaine's 
Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  vol.  i,  pp.  381-395.  See  also  Lt.-Col. 
Richard  B.  Irwin,  article  on  Ball's  Bluff,  etc.,  in  Battles  and  Lead- 
ers of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  2,  p.  123. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  25 

more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  One  of  the 
first  changes  made  in  response  to  this  demand  was  the 
resignation  of  Simon  Cameron  as  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  appointment  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton  as  his  suc- 
cessor. All  efforts  to  induce  McClellan  to  move  had 
so  far  proved  unavailing.  Even  Lincoln's  patience  had 
been  exhausted,  and  in  an  interview  with  Generals 
McDowell  and  Franklin,  January  10,  1862,  he  said 
in  his  homely  way  that  "if  something  was  not  soon 
done  the  bottom  would  be  out  of  the  \vhole  affair ;  and 
if  General  McClellan  did  not  want  to  use  the  army  he 
would  like  to  borrow  it,  provided  he  could  see  how  it 
could  be  made  to  do  something."6 

Under  the  constitution  Lincoln,  by  virtue  of  his 
office,  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  armies  and  na- 
vies of  the  United  States.  He  was,  however,  totally 
destitute  of  military  education.  Appreciating  his  de- 
ficiencies in  this  respect  he  diligently  studied  books  of 
strategy,  pored  over  the  reports  of  the  department  com- 
manders, familiarized  himself  with  maps,  and  in  every 
way  sought  to  understand  the  military  situation. 
The  generals  with  whom  he  consulted  were  surprised, 
or  pretended  to  be  surprised,  at  his  familiarity  with 
technical  military  learning  and  with  the  acuteness  of 
his  suggestions.  He  discussed  with  McClellan  and 
other  generals  not  only  their  own  plans  for  the  advance 
to  Richmond,  but  some  which  he  himself  had  con- 
ceived. At  a  later  date  he  undertook  to  unfold  a  fa- 

8  Swinton :  Campaigns  of  Army  of  Potomac,  p.  80. 


26  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

vorite  plan  to  Grant.  Grant  tells  us  that  he  "listened 
respectfully."  He  did  not  tell  Lincoln,  but  he  tells 
the  readers  of  his  Memoirs,7  why  Lincoln's  scheme 
was  impracticable,  and  adds  this  brief  and  character- 
istic sentence:  "I  did  not  communicate  my  plans  to 
the  President,  nor  did  I  to  the  Secretary  of  War  or  to 
General  Halleck." 

The  chief  need  now  of  the  Union  cause  was  the  want 
of  a  competent,  responsible  head  with  intelligence  to 
direct,  and  power  to  enforce  the  conduct  of  mili- 
tary operations  comformably  to  some  general  sys- 
tematic plan.  After  the  appointment  of  the  Commit- 
tee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  and  of  Stanton  as  Sec- 
retary of  War,  McClellan  was  general-in-chief  in  name 
only.  All  his  plans  were  subjected  to  the  scrutiny  not 
only  of  the  President  but  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War  and  of  Stanton,  whose  influence 
in  military  operations  was  now  more  powerful  than 
that  of  President,  committee,  and  general-in-chief 
combined.  The  difficulties  incident  to  such  divided 
responsibility  and  conflicting  counsels  were  intensified 
when,  on  March  12,  1862,  McClellan  was  deprived  of 
authority  as  general-in-chief  and  his  command  was 
limited  to  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  For 
four  months  after  that  date  there  was  no  general-in- 
chief  of  the  Federal  armies  and  each  department  com- 
mander was  left  to  work  out  his  own  plans  without  ref- 
erence to  those  of  other  commanders,  modified  only 

7  Vol.  2,  p.  123. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  2*J 

by  such  orders  as  came  from  Washington.  It  was 
not  until  July  n,  1862,  when  General  Henry  W.  Hal- 
leek  was  appointed  general-in-chief,  that  there  was  a 
responsible  head  of  the  Federal  armies. 

Three  of  the  men  already  mentioned  became  very 
prominent  in  the  Civil  War — Stanton,  Halleck,  and 
McClellan.  Stanton,  the  new  Secretary  of  War,  was 
a  man  of  great  intellectual  strength,  of  sterling  hon- 
esty, of  boundless  energy,  and  of  vast  executive 
ability.  Though  of  Quaker  descent  he  was  a  man  of 
the  type  of  Oliver  Cromwell.  Men  of  this  type  are 
necessary  in  great  emergencies,  but  the  very  qualities 
that  make  them  valuable  are  also  apt  to  make  them 
at  times  arbitrary  and  tyrannical.  Stanton  had 
been  Attorney-general  under  President  Buchanan  and, 
according  to  McClellan,  was  wont,  before  he  became 
Secretary  of  War,  to  speak  of  Lincoln  as  the  "original 
gorilla,"  shocking  McClellan  by  the  virulence  with 
which  he  abused  the  President,  his  administration, 
and  the  Republican  party.  But,  after  becoming  Sec- 
retary of  War,  he  speedily  developed  into  the  most 
radical  of  the  Radicals.  He  favored  the  policy  of 
emancipation  long  before  the  proclamation  was  issued 
and  was  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  the  arming  of 
the  negroes.  He  was  a  man  who  brooked  no  oppo- 
sition and  whose  dislikes  were  relentless  and  enduring. 
He  assumed  toward  Lincoln  the  attitude  of  a  self-con- 
stituted guardian  rather  than  that  of  a  subordinate 
officer,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  was  often  exas- 


28  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

perated  by  Lincoln's  seeming  irresolution  and  disgust- 
ed with  his  jests.8 

It  is  probable  that  Halleck  while  general-in-chief 
was  little  more  than  Stanton's  scribe.  The  latter  soon 
became  hostile  to  McClellan  and  to  Rosecrans.  His 
injustice  to  Thomas  before  the  battle  of  Nashville 
has  never  been  satisfactorily  explained,  nor  has  it  ever 
been  forgotten  by  the  friends  of  that  illustrious  com- 
mander. In  Grant  Stanton  at  last  found  a  general 
whose  iron  will  and  stubborn  tenacity  of  purpose  were 
superior  to  his  own.  Grant's  opinion  of  Stanton  is 
expressed  without  any  circumlocution.  He  says  :9 

"Owing  to  his  natural  disposition  to  assume  all 
power  and  control  in  all  matters  that  he  had  anything 
whatever  to  do  writh,  he  boldly  took  command  of  the 
armies,  and,  while  issuing  no  orders  on  the  subject, 
prohibited  any  order  from  me  going  out  of  the  ad- 
jutant-general's office  until  he  had  approved  it.  This 
was  done  by  directing  the  adjutant-general  to  hold  any 
orders  that  came  from  me  to  be  issued  from  the  ad- 
jutant-general's office  until  he  had  examined  them  and 

8  Stanton's  virulent  hostility  to  Lincoln  before  entering  the 
cabinet  and  his  subsequent  relations  to  him  are  clearly  shown  by 
McClure  in  his  chapter  on  Lincoln  and  Stanton  in  Lincoln  and 
Men  of  War  Times.  In  his  Ohio  in  the  War,  vol.  I,  p.  1029, 
Whitelaw  Reid  says  of  Stanton :  "He  was,  throughout  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's administration,  all-powerful.  It  was  with  reference  to 
some  strong-willed  action  of  Mr.  Stanton's,  in  opposition  to  his 
own  wishes,  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  reply  to  a  personal  appeal  for 
aid,  made  the  jocose  remark,  so  often  quoted,  that  he  (Lincoln) 
had  very  little  influence  with  this  administration." 

8  Memoirs,  vol.  2,  p.  105. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  29 

given  his  approval.  He  never  disturbed  himself, 
either,  in  examining  my  orders  until  it  was  entirely 
convenient  for  him;  so  that  orders  which  I  had  pre- 
pared would  often  lie  there  three  or  four  days  before 
he  would  sanction  them.  I  remonstrated  against  this 
in  writing,  and  the  Secretary  apologetically  restored 
me  to  my  rightful  position  of  general-in-chief  of  the 
army.  But  he  soon  lapsed  again  and  took  control 
much  as  before." 

\ 

And  again,  comparing  Stanton  with  Lincoln,  Grant 
says  of  the  former  :10 

"Mr.  Stanton  never  questioned  his  own  authority 
to  command,,  unless  resisted.  He  cared  nothing  for 
the  feeling  of  others.  In  fact  it  seemed  to  be  pleas- 
anter  to  him  to  disappoint  than  to  gratify.  He  felt  no 
hesitation  in  assuming  the  functions  of  the  executive, 
or  in  acting  without  advising  with  him.  If  his  act  was 
not  sustained,  he  would  change  it — if  he  saw  the  mat- 
ter would  be  followed  up  until  he  did  so." 

Throughout  Grant's  Memoirs  it  is  easy  to  perceive 
the  trouble  he  experienced  with  both  Stanton  and  Hal- 
leek.  Probably  no  enemy  in  front  ever  caused  him  so 
much  annoyance  as  did  these  two  Federal  officials  in 
the  rear.  During  the  four  months,  from  March  12 
to  July  n,  1862,  when  the  Union  armies  were  without 
a  general-in-chief,  Stanton  was  virtually  military  dic- 
tator, for  his  imperious  will  was  too  strong  to  be 
curbed  by  Lincoln.  Whatever  his  abilities  in  other  di- 

10  ibid.,  p.  536. 


3O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

rections,  he  did  not  havfe  the  military  education  quali- 
fying him  to  direct  the  operations  of  the  armies  in  the 
field,  and  McClellan  maintains,  and  with  some  rea- 
son, that  the  disasters  following  the  Peninsular  cam- 
paign were  in  no  small  part  due  to  Stanton's  ignorant 
and  arbitrary  interference. 

Consistently  with  the  policy  of  inconsistency,  which 
seemed  at  "the  time  to  govern  the  military  plans  of  the 
Federal  authorities  at  Washington,  Halleck,  who  had 
demonstrated  his  utter  incompetence  to  accomplish 
anything  with  an  army  of  100,000  men  in  his  own  de- 
partment, had  been  appointed  general-in-chief  of  all 
the  Federal  armies.  Only  two  excuses  have  ever  been 
offered  for  his  appointment :  That  General  Scott  fa- 
vored him  as  his  successor,  and  that  it  was  desired  to 
give  General  Grant  full  command  of  Halleck's  depart- 
ment where  it  was  thought  the  latter's  jealousy 
of  Grant's  rising  fame  was  keeping  him  in  the  back- 
ground. Whatever  were  the  motives  for  Halleck's 
appointment  as  general-in-chief,  there  is  now  almost 
entire  unanimity  respecting  his  unfitness  for  the 
place.  McClellan  says  of  him  i11 

"Of  all  men  whom  I  have  encountered  in  high  posi- 
tion, Halleck  was  the  most  hopelessly  stupid.  It  was 
more  difficult  to  get  an  idea  through  his  head  than  can 
be  conceived  by  any  who  never  made  the  attempt.  I 
do  not  think  he  ever  had  a  correct  military  idea  from 
beginning  to  end.'' 

11  McClellan' s  Oivn  Story,  p.  137. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  3! 

Swinton,12  a  less  prejudiced  witness  than  McClellan, 
speaks  of  Halleck  as  "the  incalculable  obstruction  of 
the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  the  intolerable  annoyance 
of  every  general  commanding  th*e  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac.'' Halleck's  jealousy  of  Grant  became  apparent 
at  an  early  period.  Soon  after  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson,  Grant  went  to  Nashville  to  consult  with 
General  Buell,  whereupon  Halleck  sent  to  McClellan, 
then  general-in-chief,  a  dispatch  containing  this  out- 
rageous charge : 

"I  have  had  no  communication  with  General  Grant 
for  more  than  a  week.  He  left  his  command  without 
my  authority  and  went  to  Nashville.  His  army  seems 
to  be  as  much  demoralized  by  the  victory  of  Fort  Don- 
elson as  was  that  of  the  Potomac  by  the  defeat  of  Bull 
Run.  It  is  hard  to  censure  a  successful  general  im- 
mediately after  a  victory,  but  I  think  he  richly  deserves 
it.  I  can  get  no  returns,  no  reports,  no  information  of 
any  kind  from  him.  Satisfied  with  his  victory,  he  sits 
down  and  enjoys  it  without  any  regard  to  the  future. 
I  am  worn  out  and  tired  with  this  neglect  and  ineffi- 
ciency. C.  F.  Smith  is  almost  the  only  officer  equal  to 
the  emergency." 

Afterward,  Halleck  wrote  Grant  that  his  conduct 
had  occasioned  "very  serious  complaint  at  Washing- 
ton," and  tried  to  make  him  believe  that  it  was  his  own 
interference  in  his  behalf  that  saved  him  from  the  dis- 
grace of  an  arrest.  Halleck's  downright  duplicity  in 

12  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  170. 


32  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

this  affair  is  very  clearly  exposed  by  both  Grant  and 
McClellan. 

Sherman  was  even  more  incensed  than  Grant 
against  both  Stanton  and  Halleck.  His  preliminary 
negotiations  with  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  just  at 
the  end  of  the  war  have  since  been  fully  explained,  but 
at  the  time,  largely  through  the  distorted  construc- 
tion of  them  by  Stanton,  they  excited  great  indignation 
in  the  North  against  Sherman,  causing  that  great  sol- 
dier much  mortification.  Shortly  before  that  time 
Halleck  had  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  De- 
partment of  Virginia  with  headquarters  at  Richmond, 
and  he  took  it  on  himself  to  send  a  dispatch  to  Stanton 
containing  this  extraordinary  suggestion : 

"The  bankers  here  have  information  to-day  that  Jeff 
Davis'  specie  is  moving  South  from  Goldsborough  in 
wagons  as  fast  as  possible.  I  suggest  that  orders  be 
telegraphed  through  General  Thomas  that  Wilson 
obey  no  orders  from  Sherman,"  etc. 

Thereupon  Stanton  sent  a  dispatch  to  Thomas,  April 
27,  1865,  reciting  Halleck's  dispatch  and  adding  this: 

"You  were  some  days  ago  notified  that  the  President 
disapproved  Sherman's  proceedings  and  were  directed 
to  disregard  them.  If  you  have  .not  already  done  so, 
you  will  issue  immediate  orders  to  all  officers  in  your 
command,  directing  them  to  pay  no  attention  to  any 
orders  but  your  own  or  from  General  Grant,"  etc.13 

13  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  104,  pp.  483-4- 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  33 

The  insulting  character  of  this  order  conveying,  as 
it  did,  a  scandalous  insinuation  against  Sherman's  loy- 
alty, will  be  better  understood  when  it  is  remembered 
that  Generals  Thomas  and  Wilson  were  at  that  time 
subordinate  officers  under  General  Sherman,  and  that 
he  and  his  victorious  army,  after  the  conspicuous  ser- 
vices they  had  rendered  the  Union  cause,  were  then 
on  their  way  to  Washington.  Grant  tells  how  Sher- 
man resented  Halleck's  insult:14 

"It  was  during  this  trip  that  the  last  outrage  was 
committed  upon  him.  Halleck  had  been  sent  to  Rich- 
mond to  command  Virginia,  and  had  issued  orders 
prohibiting  even  Sherman's  own  troops  from  obeying 
his,  Sherman's,  orders.  Sherman  met  the  papers  on 
his  return,  containing  this  order  of  Halleck,  and  very 
justly  felt  indignant  at  the  outrage.  On  his  arrival 
at  Fortress  Monroe  returning  from  Savannah,  Sher- 
man received  an  invitation  from  Halleck  to  come  to 
Richmond  and  be  his  guest.  This  he  indignantly  re- 
fused, and  informed  Halleck,  furthermore,  that  he  had 
seen  his  order.  He  also  stated  that  he  was  coming  up 
to  take  command  of  his  troops,  and  as  he  marched 
through  it  would  probably  be  as  well  for  Halleck  not  to 
show  himself,  because  he  (Sherman)  would  not  be  re- 
sponsible for  what  some  rash  person  might  do  through 
indignation  for  the  treatment  he  had  received." 

Grant  also  says15  that  at  the  grand  review  in  Wash- 
ington after  the  close  of  the  war,  Sherman  "showed 

14  Memoirs,  vol.  2,  p.  529. 
islbid.,  p.  534- 
3 


34  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

his  resentment  for  the  cruel  and  harsh  treatment  that 
had  unnecessarily  been  inflicted  upon  him  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  by  refusing  to  take  his  extended  hand." 
At  that  time  Halleck,  at  least,  who  had  just  emerged 
from  a  year's  obscurity  at  Washington,  had  become  a 
very  insignificant  figure  in  comparison  with  the  illus- 
trious soldier  who  had  completed  a  triumphant  march 
through  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  and  Stanton  was 
no  longer  the  military  dictator  that  he  had  been  for 
over  three  years. 

As  general-in-chief  Halleck  conducted  military  op- 
erations at  long  range  from  Washington — never  ap- 
pearing on  a  field  of  battle,  but  sending  telegraph  dis- 
patches and  voluminous  letters,  planning  on  paper  vast 
campaigns  utterly  impossible  of  execution  in  the  field, 
and  so  hampering  all  the  generals  in  front  as  to  make 
it  impossible  for  them  to  execute  any  plans  of  their 
own. 

Of  McClellan  it  is  safe  to  say  that  there  are  few  at 
this  day  that  question  his  loyalty,  of  which  there  was, 
during  the  war,  a  widespread  suspicion.  Of  his  mil- 
itary abilities  and  operations  it  is  perhaps  not  possible, 
even  at  this  day,  to  form  a  just  and  impartial  estimate. 
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  he  was  constantly 
embarrassed  and  thwarted  by  the  orders  that  he  re- 
ceived from  Washington  and  by  the  relentless  hos- 
tility of  Stanton.  This  is  clear  from  the  evidence 
that  he  himself  has  furnished.16  In  view  of  the  con- 

18  See  McClellan's  Own  Story. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  35 

stant  interference  with  his  plans,  the  wonder  now  is 
that  he  accomplished  as  much  as  he  did.  That  he 
himself  felt  stung  to  desperation  by  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  persecution  of  Stanton  is  indicated  by  his 
remarkable  dispatch  to  the  latter  June  28,  1862,  in 
which  he  said : 

"If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I 
owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other  persons  in  Wash- 
ington. You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this 
army." 

When  McClellan  took  command  of  the  troops  at 
Washington  immediately  after  the  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  he  found  the  city  full  of  stragglers  and  round 
about  it  regiments  camped  indiscriminately  here  and 
there  without  even  a  brigade  organization,  or  general 
organization  of  any  kind;  without  any  systematic 
fortifications  or  defenses,  and  even  without  pickets  on 
some  of  the  roads  leading  to  the  capital.  McClellan 
took  these  unorganized  troops,  together  with  the  raw 
recruits  that  wen.  afterward  added,  organized,  trained, 
and  disciplined  them,  and  out  of  them  fashioned  the 
magnificent  Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  took  that 
army  again  and  with  it  won  a  great  victory  at  Antie- 
tam;  he  had  never  shown  so  much  vigor  and  general- 
ship as  he  exhibited  immediately  before  and  during 
this  battle,  and  at  the  time  when  he  was  finally  re- 
moved from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
he  had  the  unbounded  confidence  of  all  the  officers  and 
men  under  his  command. 


36  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

But  McClellan's  great  faults  as  a  general  were  that 
he  never  ceased  preparing  for  a  forward  movement, 
and  that  he  was  perpetually  exaggerating  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  in  his  front.  The  chief  drawback,  how- 
ever, to  his  success  as  a  general  was  a  delusion  of 
which  he  was  possessed  that  he  had  been  predestined 
from  all  eternity  to  be  a  Moses  and  Washington  com- 
bined and  to  go  down  to  posterity  as  the  savior  of  his 
country,  his  memory  surrounded  with  a  halo  of  glory 
and  his  fame  forever  growing  more  resplendent. 
Therefore  he  undertook  not  only  to  conduct  the  mili- 
tary operations  entrusted  to  him,  but  to  advise  Lincoln 
how  to  discharge  his  duties  as  President.  In  a  long 
letter  to  the  latter,  dated  July  7,  1862,  he  said : 

"Neither  confiscation  of  property,  political  execu- 
tion of  persons,  territorial  organization  of  states,  or 
forcible  abolition  of  slavery  should  be  contemplated 

for  a  moment Military  arrests  should  not  be 

tolerated  except  in  places  where  active  hostilities  exist, 
and  oaths  not  required  by  enactments  constitutionally 

made  should  be  neither  demanded  nor  received 

Military  power  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with 
the  relations  of  servitude,  either  by  supporting  or  im- 
pairing the  authority  of  the  master,  except  for  repress- 
ing disorder,  as  in  other  cases."17 

In  the  same  letter  he  assured  Lincoln:  "A  decla- 
ration of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery,  will 
rapidly  disintegrate  our  present  armies." 

17  McClellan's  Own  Story,  p.  497. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  37 

Such  sentiments  ill  suited  the  radical  element  then 
in  control  of  the  Republican  party,  but  greatly  elated 
those  in  the  North  who  were  denouncing  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  as  an  Abolition  crusade  and  who  were 
loudly  complaining  of  arbitrary  arrests.  The  radical 
leaders  of  the  Republican  party  could  not  believe  that 
a  man  with  such  sentiments  as  those  advocated  by  Mc- 
Clellan  was  fit  to  lead  the  armies  of  the  Union  to  vic- 
tory, and  their  conviction  of  his  unfitness  was  strength- 
ened by  his  acceptance  in  1864  of  the  nomination  for 
President  on  a  "Peace  at  any  price"  platform. 

It  is  probable,  however,  that  future  generations,  un- 
influenced by  the  intense  political  prejudices  that 
swayed  McClellan's  contemporaries,  will  judge  him 
more  leniently.  The  spirit  of  justice  that,  after  many 
years,  brought  about  the  vindication  of  General  Fitz- 
John  Porter  may  be  depended  upon  to  correct,  as  far  as 
it  is  possible  to  correct  the  errors  of  the  past,  whatever 
injustice  may  have  been  done  to  McClellan.  In 
McClellan's  Own  Story  he  has  made  a  strong  defense 
against  many  of  the  aspersions  that  at  an  early  period 
were  accepted  by  his  political  opponents  as  undoubted 
facts.  His  admirers,  however,  will  probably  never 
succeed  in  convincing  the  American  people  that  if  he 
had  been  given  all  the  men  and  all  the  opportunities 
that  Grant  had,  he  would  ever  have  accomplished  what 
Grant  accomplished. 

The  wonder  is  that  under  such  conflicting  and  in- 
competent management  the  Union  cause  did  not  speed- 


38  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

ily  fall  to  pieces.  It  did  not,  because  military  opera- 
tions in  the  South  were  conducted  under  still  greater 
difficulties.  The  South,  from  the  beginning,  was  in- 
ferior to  the  North  in  men,  in  munitions  of  war,  and 
in  material  resources.  It  excelled  the  North,  however, 
in  its  abundant  yield  of  political  generals,  but  this 
proved  to  be  a  constant  source  of  weakness.  More- 
over, if  the  generals  of  the  North  were  perplexed  with 
the  interference  of  Stanton  and  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  the  southern  generals  were  still 
more  harassed  by  the  perpetual  interference  of  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  who  affords  a  striking  illustration  of  the 
truth  of  the  saying  that  "a  little  learning  is  a  danger- 
ous thing."  Priding  himself  on  being  a  West  Point 
graduate  and  puffed  up  with  exaggerated  notions  of 
his  military  acquirements,  he  imagined  himself  pro- 
foundly versed  in  the  art  of  war.  Acting  on  this  as- 
sumption, he  constantly  thwarted  the  plans  of  all  the 
Confederate  generals,  addling  the  weaker  and  confus- 
ing the  stronger,  by  suggestions  and  advice  springing 
from  his  conceited  superiority  as  a  military  strategist. 
With  the  extraordinary  vanity  of  Davis  was  com- 
bined an  uncontrollable  propensity  to  boast  of  the  an- 
ticipated results  of  his  military  schemes,  thus  betray- 
ing to  the  enemy  in  advance  plans  which  a  careful  gen- 
eral would  have  taken  all  pains  to  conceal.  On  several 
occasions  the  Federal  generals  gained  the  first  and  most 
reliable  information  of  proposed  movements  of  the 
Confederate  armies  from  the  boastful  speeches  of 
Davis  as  reported  in  the  southern  newspapers.  It  was 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  39 

in  this  way  that  Grant  was  advised  of  the  purpose  of 
Longstreet's  advance  against  Burnside,  and  Sherman 
of  Hood's  proposed  invasion  of  Tennessee.  A  south- 
ern historian,  speaking  of  the  withdrawal  of  Long- 
street's  corps  during  the  siege  of  Chattanooga,  says : 

"This  extraordinary  military  movement  was  the 
work  of  President  Davis,  who  seems,  indeed,  to  have 
had  a  singular  fondness  for  erratic  campaigns.  His 
visits  to  every  battle-field  of  the  Confederacy  were  om- 
inous. He  disturbed  the  plans  of  his  generals ;  his  mil- 
itary conceit  led  him  into  the  wildest  schemes ;  and  so 
much  did  he  fear  that  the  public  would  not  ascribe  to 
him  the  hoped-for  results  of  the  visionary  project,  that 
his  vanity  invariably  divulged  it,  and  successes  were 
foretold  in  public  speeches  with  such  boastful  plain- 
ness, as  to  put  the  enemy  on  his  guard  and  inform  him 
of  the  general  nature  of  the  enterprise."18 

The  same  author,  in  speaking  of  Davis's  visit  to 
Hood's  army  after  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  says : 

"The  catastrophe  moved  President  Davis  in  Rich- 
mond, and  mortified  the  vanity  that  had  so  recently 
proclaimed  the  security  of  Atlanta  under  the  command 
of  Hood.  He  determined  to  visit  Hood's  new  lines, 
to  plan  with  him  a  new  campaign,  to  compensate  for 
the  loss  of  Atlanta,  and  to  take  every  possible  occasion 
to  raise  the  hopes  and  confidence  of  the  people.  It  is 
remarkable  that  the  visits  of  the  Confederate  President 
to  the  armies  were  always  the  occasions  of  some  far- 
fetched and  empirical  plan  of  operations,  and  were  al- 

18  Pollard :  The  Lost  Cause,  p.  456. 


4-O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

ways  accompanied  with  vapors  and  boasts  that 
unduly  exalted  the  public  mind.  Mr.  Davis  never 
spoke  of  military  matters  without  a  certain  ludicrous 
boastfulness,  which  he  maintained  to  the  last  event  of 
the  war.  It  was  not  swagger  or  affectation ;  it  was  the 
sincere  vagary  of  a  mind  intoxicated  with  conceit  when 
occupied  with  a  subject  where  it  imagined  it  found  its 
forte,  but  where  in  fact  it  had  least  aptitude.  Mr. 
Davis,  as  a  military  commander  or  adviser,  was  weak, 
fanciful  to  excess,  and  much  too  vain  to  keep  his  own 
counsels.  As  he  traveled  toward  Hood's  lines,  he 
made  excited  speeches  in  South  Carolina  and  Georgia. 
At  Macon  he  declared  that  Atlanta  would  be  recov- 
ered ;  that  Sherman  would  be  brought  to  grief ;  and 
that  this  Federal  commander  'would  meet  the  fate  that 
befell  Napoleon  in  the  retreat  from  Moscow.'  These 
swollen  assertions,  so  out  of  character,  were  open  ad- 
vertisements to  the  enemy  of  a  new  plan  of  opera- 
tions."19 

If  Davis  had  ever  heard  it,  he  evidently  did  not  ap- 
preciate the  pith  of  the  witty  saying  attributed  to  John 
Adams  who  is  reported  to  have  added,  after  comment- 
ing on  a  portrait  of  George  Washington :  "And  that 
old  wooden-head  made  his  fortune  by  keeping  his 
mouth  shut." 

Notwithstanding  the  unfavorable  conditions,  great 
success  attended  the  Union  cause  during  the  first  four 
months  of  the  year  1862.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
year  the  national  capital  was  deemed  secure.  Ken- 
tucky, Missouri,  Maryland,  and  West  Virginia  had 

"Ibid.,  p.  581. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  41 

been  kept  in  the  Union.  On  January  19  General 
Thomas  defeated  the  Confederates  in  an  engage- 
ment at  Mill  Spring,  in  which  the  Confederate  Gen- 
eral Zollicoffer  was  killed.  General  Grant,  aided  by 
flag  officer  Foote  and  his  gunboats,  captured  Fort 
Henry  February  7  and  Fort  Donelson  February  16, 
with  over  10,000  prisoners,  forty  cannon,  and  im- 
mense stores.  The  day  after  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Henry  a  permanent  footing  on  the  coast  of  North  Car- 
olina was  gained  at  the  battle  of  Roanoke  Island  by 
General  Burnside  and  the  navy  under  Commodore 
Goldsborough.  On  March  8  General  Curtis  defeated 
General  Price  at  Pea  Ridge,  and  the  next  day  the 
Monitor  practically  destroyed  the  Merrimac  in  Hamp- 
ton Roads.  In  the  month  of  April  a  great  battle,  re- 
sulting in  a  Union  victory,  had  been  fought  at  Shiloh, 
in  which  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  regarded  as 
the  greatest  of  Confederate  generals,  had  lost  his  life, 
and  in  the  same  month  Farragut  captured  New  Or- 
leans. In  some  portions  of  nearly  all  the  Confederate 
states  the  Federal  land  or  naval  forces  had  gained  a 
foothold. 

The  importance  of  these  victories,  coming  at  this 
time,  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  For  nearly  its  en- 
tire length  above  and  below  Vicksburg  the  Mississippi 
was  now  open  to  Federal  gunboats,  and  the  territory 
west  of  that  river  was  practically  cut  off  from  the  Con- 
federacy, while  the  possession  of  New  Orleans  was  of 
vast  importance  in  many  ways  to  the  Union  cause. 
The  drooping  spirits  of  the  North  revived,  President 


42  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Lincoln  issued  a  proclamation  for  a  special  Thanks- 
giving, and  so  clearly  did  events  point  to  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  war,  that,  for  a  time,  further  re- 
cruiting was  stopped  by  order  of  the  Federal  govern- 
ment, and  Governor  Morton  was  requested  to  cease 
purchasing  arms.20 

Before  the  year  was  half  gone  the  northern  skies 
were  again  overcast  with  the  shadow  of  disasters  that 
came  thick  and  fast.  While  the  western  armies  and 
the  navy  were  achieving  splendid  victories,  the  great 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  resting  idly  in  camp.  The 
fall  and  winter  of  1861  had  passed  and  the  spring  of 
1862  was  far  advanced,  and  still  that  magnificent  army 
had  done  nothing.  The  daily  dispatch  "All  quiet  on 
the  Potomac,"  at  first  conveying  a  cheering  assurance 
of  the  safety  of  the  national  capital,  now  excited  only 
derision,  and  was  accepted  as  further  proof  of  the  in- 
efficiency of  McClellan  and  his  army. 

McClellan  should  have  moved  on  February  22 — in- 
deed long  before  that  time.  The  northern  press,  the 
leading  members  of  Congress,  and  Stanton  and  Chase, 

20  This  order  for  the  discontinuance  of  recruiting  is  given  in  full 
in  McClellan' s  Own  Story,  p.  258.  It  was  issued  from  the  Adju- 
tant-General's office  April  3,  1862,  and  directed  that  "The  recruit- 
ing service  for  volunteers  will  be  discontinued  in  every  state  from 
this  date,"  and  that  "The  superintendents  of  the  Volunteer  Re- 
cruiting Service  will  disband  their  parties  and  close  their  offices, 
after  having  taken  the  necessary  steps  to  carry  out  these  orders." 
The  extraordinary  character  of  the  order  will  be  more  fully  ap- 
parent when  it  is  considered  that  it  was  issued  just  after  Mc- 
Clellan had  started  on  his  Peninsular  campaign  and  only  three 
days  before  the  beginning  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  43 

the  two  most  influential  members  of  the  cabinet,  were 
urgently,  almost  furiously  demanding  that  McClellan 
be  forced  to  advance  or  be  removed  from  command. 
Stanton  was  already  bitterly  hostile  to  McClellan. 
Chase  was  equally  so,  and  at  one  of  the  cabinet  meet- 
ings, to  which  McClellan  had  been  invited  for  a  dis- 
cussion of  his  plans,  bluntly  asked  him  whether  he  in- 
tended to  move  at  all  and,  if  so,  when.  Lincoln  still 
clung  to  McClellan,  but  was  continually  urging  him  to 
advance.  To  all  his  appeals  McClellan  pleaded  for 
more  reenforcements,  though  it  was  then  generally  be- 
lieved, and  is  now  known  to  be  the  fact,  that  McClellan 
had  twice  as  many  men  as  the  Confederate  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  was  in  his  front.  Finally, 
after  many  cabinet  meetings  and  councils  of  war,  in- 
terviews, and  consultations,  the 'Army  of  the  Potomac 
started  March  17  on  what  is  known  as  the  Peninsular 
campaign.  The  story  of  it  is  sorrowful  reading.  It 
lasted  about  three  months.  In  that  time  the  Federal 
army  had  been  in  sight  of  Richmond.  At  the  end  of  it, 
after  seven  days  of  battle,  it  had  retreated  to  the  river 
James,  arriving  at  Harrison's  Landing  July  3  with  a 
loss  of  over  15,000  men.  McClellan  laid  the  blame 
for  his  failure  upon  Stanton  and  Halleck,  while  they 
charged  it  to  him.  On  August  3  Halleck  ordered  Mc- 
Clellan to  abandon  the  Peninsula  altogether  and  to 
withdraw  his  army  to  Acquia  Creek.  Against  this  or- 
der McClellan  earnestly  protested,  but  his  protest  was 
not  heeded.  The  change  of  base  by  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  exposed  Washington  to  an  attack  by  the  Con- 


44  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

federate  armies,  and,  to  avert  this  danger,  the  troops 
scattered  over  northern  Virginia,  under  the  commands 
of  Fremont,  McDowell,  and  Banks,  about  50,000  in 
all,  were  hastily  patched  together  and  called  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  over  which  General  Pope,  suddenly  called 
from  the  West,  was  placed  in  command.  McClellan 
was  ordered  to  Washington  and  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac was  for  a  time  virtually  without  a  commander. 
Pope,  the  young  Lochinvar  who  had  so  unexpectedly 
come  out  of  the  West,  signalized  his  assumption  of 
command  by  an  address  characterized  by  Ropes  as  one 
of  the  most  "extraordinary  in  military  annals,"21  ex- 
traordinary alike  for  its  bombast  and  for  its  tone  of 
insult  to  the  eastern  soldiers  over  whom  he  had  taken 
command.  In  this  address,  together  with  much  like 
stuff,  Pope  said : 

"Let  us  understand  each  other.  I  have  come  to  you 
from  the  West  where  we  have  always  seen  the  backs 
of  our  enemies;  from  an  army  whose  business  it  has 
been  to  seek  the  adversary  and  to  beat  him  when  he 
was  found;  whose  policy  has  been  attack  and  not  de- 
fense  Meantime  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from 

your  minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am  sorry  to  find  in 
vogue  amongst  you.  I  Hear  constantly  of  taking 
strong  positions  and  holding  them — of  lines  of  retreat 
and  bases  of  supplies.  Let  us  discard  such  ideas." 

The  woeful  outcome  of  Pope's  boasts  made  them  all 
the  more  ridiculous.  The  Army  of  Virginia  lasted 

21  The  address  in  full  will  be  found  in  The  Army  Under  Pope, 
P-  173- 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  45 

only  about  two  months,  long  enough,  however,  to  be 
demolished  at  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run.  Pope 
afterward  complained  that  the  remnants  of  his  army 
had  been  so  scattered  by  McClellan  that  he  (Pope) 
could  not  tell  what  had  become  of  them.  The  Army 
of  Virginia  had  vanished  forever,  and  never  again  ap- 
peared in  the  list  of  Union  armies.  The  fragments  of 
it  which  escaped,  together  with  the  portions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  that  had  been  sent  to  reenforce 
it,  found  their  way  back  to  Washington  September  2. 
Again  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  the  trenches 
about  Washington,  confronted  by  the  army  of  Lee; 
the  cabinet  was  in  a  panic;  the  North  was  in  dread  of 
invasion;  Halleck  was  helpless;  and  Lincoln,  in  utter 
despair,  was  obliged  to  appeal  to  McClellan  to  save 
the  national  capital. 

On  March  n,  1862,  the  departments  formerly  com- 
manded by  Generals  Halleck,  Hunter  and  Buell  were 
merged  into  the  Department  of  the  Mississippi  in  order 
to  give  Halleck  control  of  all  the  armies  that  took  part 
in  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  after  the  battle  these  armies 
were  all  consolidated  into  one,  divided  into  the  right 
wing,  left  wing,  center,  reserve,  and  cavalry,  under  the 
respective  commands  of  Generals  George  H.  Thomas. 
Don  Carlos  Buell,  John  Pope,  John  A.  McClernand, 
and  Andrew  J.  Smith.  Halleck  assumed  chief  com- 
mand and  Grant  was  announced  as  second.  By  this 
contrivance  Grant  was  made  a  fifth  wheel  and  was  tem- 
porarily shelved. 

No  other  Federal  general  in  the  Civil  War  ever  had 


46  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

such  an  opportunity  as  that  now  afforded  Halleck. 
Had  Grant  been  in  his  place  it  is  possible  that  the  war 
might  have  been  brought  to  a  speedy  termination;  it 
is  at  least  highly  probable  that  its  duration  would  have 
been  greatly  shortened.  But,  unfortunately  for  the 
country,  Halleck  was  unequal  to  the  opportunity.  Al- 
though he  had  a  great  army  of  over  100,000  men, 
more  than  twice  that  of  the  Confederate  army  under 
Beauregard  confronting  him,  he  avoided  bringing  on 
a  general  engagement,  proceeded  to  advance  against 
Corinth,  about  twenty  miles  distant,  after  the  old  fash- 
ion of  gradual  approaches  by  parallels,  and  going 
along  at  a  snail's  pace  arrived  there  May  30  to  find 
that  the  Confederate  army  had  safely  retreated. 

For  a  few  days  the  North  was  fed  on  bombastic  dis- 
patches from  Halleck  to  the  effect  that  "General  Pope 
with  40,000  men  is  thirty  miles  south  of  Corinth  push- 
ing the  enemy  hard,"  and  that  "he  already  reports 
10,000  prisoners  and  deserters  from  the  enemy  and 
15,000  stand  of  arms  captured."  The  country  was 
chagrined  to  find  a  few  days  later  that  the  pleasing 
story  told  in  Halleck's  dispatches  was  a  hoax.  All 
the  blame,  however,  was  laid  on  Pope.  We  know 
now,  moreover,  that  Halleck's  orders  to  Pope- were  not 
to  press  the  Confederates  so  hard  as  to  bring  on  a 
battle. 

Halleck  next  proceeded  to  break  up  his  army  and  to 
scatter  over  the  country  the  various  parts  of  which 
it  had  been  composed,  Buell  being  ordered  to  advance 
into  east  Tennessee.  The  movement  which  Buell  was 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  47 

ordered  to  make,  a  very  important  one  if  pushed  with 
energy  and  celerity,  was  neutralized  by  the  condition 
imposed  upon  him  that,  as  he  marched,  he  should  re- 
pair the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad.  Buell 
strongly  protested  against  frittering  away  precious 
time  by  repairing  a  railroad  that  ran  parallel  to  the 
enemy's  lines,  which,  when  repaired,  could  not  be  de- 
pended upon  as  a  safe  line  of  communication,  but  his 
protests  were  overruled  by  Halleck. 

The  Confederates  had  now  determined  to  make  an- 
other effort  to  regain  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and, 
while  it  was  yet  uncertain  what  would  be  the  line  of 
advance,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  Confederate 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  intended  to  take  the  offensive. 
The  forerunners  of  the  projected  Confederate  advance 
were  the  forces  under  General  John  Morgan  and  Gen- 
eral Forrest,  which  soon  began  to  play  havoc  with 
Buell's  communications,  destroying  railroad  bridges, 
capturing  garrisons  and  creating  widespread  conster- 
nation in  Kentucky.  Before  the  middle  of  August  it 
became  apparent  that  Kentucky  was  to  be  invaded  by 
General  Kirby  Smith  through  Cumberland  Gap  and 
by  General  Bragg,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  marching 
north  toward  Louisville. 

Long  before  the  removal  of  either  McClellan  or 
Buell,  the  commanders  of  the  two  great  armies  in  the 
East  and  in  the  West,  the  people  of  the  North  had  be- 
gun to  distrust  both.  It  was  suspected  that  they  were 
lacking  in  the  earnest  devotion  to  the  Union  essential 


48  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

to  the  general  who  would  lead  its  armies  to  victory. 
The  great  commanders  who  were  to  do  this  were  yet 
in  the  background.  After  the  surrender  of  Fort  Don- 
elson  the  people  of  the  North  had  begun  to  talk  of 
"Unconditional  Surrender"  Grant,  who  was  beginning 
to  be  famous ;  but  Halleck  was  jealous  of  him  as  were 
other  generals ;  he  was  assailed  in  Congress  and  in  por- 
tions of  the  northern  press  for  his  conduct  of  the  bat- 
tle of  Shiloh,  and  his  former  victories  had  already  been 
overshadowed  by  his  repeated  failures  to  take  Vicks- 
burg.  The  newspapers  of  the  North  were  ridiculing 
his  attempts  to  dig  a  channel  that  would  allow  the  pas- 
sage of  vessels  around  Vicksburg  and  were  bitterly 
complaining  of  his  retention  in  command  of  his  army. 

Referring  to  these  failures  of  Grant,  and  to  Sher- 
man, his  most  trusted  subordinate,  one  of  the  coarsest 
and  most  reckless  of  the  newspapers  said  that  "the 
army  was  being  ruined  in  mud-turtle  expeditions  un- 
der the  leadership  of  a  drunkard,  whose  confidential 
adviser  was  a  lunatic."2 

Senator  Ben  Wade,  the  bluff,  honest,  but  impulsive 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  a  man  of  powerful  influence  in  Congress  and  in 
the  national  councils,  vehemently  urged  the  removal 
of  Grant,  at  the  same  time  giving  the  President  the 
cheerful  assurance  that  he  was  leading  the  government 
to  hell,  which  at  that  minute  was  not  a  mile  off.23 

22  Reid :  Ohio  in  the  War,  vol.  i,  p.  385. 

23  Lincoln  is  said  to  have  retorted:     "That  is  just  about  the  dis- 
tance between  the  Capitol  and  the  White  House." 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  49 

But  for  the  strong  support  of  Representative  Elihu  B. 
Washburne  and  the  steadfast  friendship  of  Lincoln, 
Grant  probably  would  have  been  relegated  during  the 
remainder  of  the  war  to  some  obscure  position  in 
which  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  display 
the  soldierly  qualities  that  afterward  placed  him  in  the 
front  rank  of  the  world's  great  commanders. 

Alexander  K.  McClure,  an  active  and  influential  Re- 
publican politician  of  Pennsylvania,  was  one  of  those 
who  urged  upon  Lincoln  the  removal  of  Grant  and  he 
has  given  us  an  interesting  account  of  it.24  He 
labored  with  Lincoln  from  1 1  o'clock  one  night  until 
i  o'clock  the  next  morning.  He  says : 

"I  pressed  upon  him,  with  all  the  earnestness  I  could 
command,  the  immediate  removal  of  Grant  as  an  im- 
perious necessity  to  sustain  himself.  As  was  his  cus- 
tom, he  said  but  little,  only  enough  to  make  me  con- 
tinue the  discussion  until  it  was  exhausted.  He  sat 
before  the  open  fire  in  the  old  Cabinet  room,  most  of 
the  time  with  his  feet  up  on  the  high  marble  mantel, 
and  exhibited  unusual  distress  at  the  complicated  con- 
dition of  military  affairs.  Nearly  every  day  brought 
some  new  and  perplexing  military  complication.  He 
had  gone  through  a  long  winter  of  terrible  strain  with 
McClellan  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  and  from 
the  day  that  Grant  started  on  his  southern  expedition 
until  the  battle  of  Shiloh  he  had  had  little  else  than 
jarring  and  confusion  among  his  generals  in  the  West. 
He  knew  that  I  had  no  ends  to  serve  in  urging  Grant's 

24  Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times,  pp.  179-80. 
4 


5O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

removal,  beyond  the  single  desire  to  make  him  be  just 
to  himself,  and  he  listened  patiently. 

"I  appealed  to  Lincoln  for  his  own  sake  to  remove 
Grant  at  once,  and  in  giving  my  reasons  for  it  I  sim- 
ply voiced  the  admittedly  overwhelming  protest  from 
the  loyal  people  of  the  land  against  Grant's  continuance 
in  command.  I  could  form  no  judgment  during  the 
conversation  as  to  'what  effect  my  arguments  had  upon 
him  beyond  the  fact  that  he  was  greatly  distressed  at 
this  new  complication.  When  I  had  said  everything 
that  could  be  said  from  my  standpoint,  we  lapsed  into 
silence.  Lincoln  remained  silent  for  what  seemed  a 
very  long  time.  He  then  gathered  himself  up  in  his 
chair  and  said  in  a  tone  of  earnestness  that  I  shall 
never  forget :  'I  can't  spare  this  man;  he  fights.' 
That  was  all  he  said,  but  I  knew  that  it  was  enough, 
and  that  Grant  was  safe  in  Lincoln's  hands  against  his 
countless  host  of  enemies." 

Sherman  had  ventured  to  predict  that  it  would  re- 
quire an  army  of  200,000  to  put  down  the  Rebellion 
in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  but  people  thought  he  was 
crazy. 

The  situation  in  Kentucky  was  alarming  and  boded 
ill  for  Indiana.  Beriah  Magoffin  was  still  governor  of 
that  state  and  it  was  well  known  that  he  would  gladly 
throw  open  the  gates  of  Kentucky  to  the  Confederate 
armies,  and  that  he  would  rejoice  to  see  them  cross  the 
Ohio  and  carry  war  and  desolation  into  the  states  north 
of  it.  In  Indiana  the  situation  was  critical.  Lincoln 
had  received  of  the  total  vote  cast  by  the  state  139,033, 
Douglas  115,509,  Breckinridge  12,295,  an^  Bell  5,306. 
Many  had  voted  for  Douglas  because  he  was  regarded 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  51 

as  the  regular  nominee  of  the  party,  but  their  sympa- 
thies were  with  Breckinriclge  and  his  political  doc- 
trines. The  great  body  of  Douglas  Democrats,  how- 
ever, following  the  example  of  their  distinguished  and 
patriotic  leader,  remained  loyal  to  the  Union  cause 
and  were  thereafter  known  as  War  Democrats.  Many 
of  them  enlisted  in  the  Union  armies  and  in  1862  were 
at  the  front.  But  of  the  Democrats  that  remained  at 
home,  a  number  of  influential  leaders  were  bitterly  hos- 
tile to  the  administration  and  to  the  further  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war,  and  they  had  a  large  following.  At 
a  great  mass  meeting  held  at  Indianapolis  January  8, 
1862,  Thomas  A.  Hendricks  openly  advocated  the  idea 
of  a  northwestern  Confederacy  which  should  cut  loose 
from  New  England  and  ally  itself  with  the  South. 
He  said : 

"The  first  and  highest  interest  of  the  Northwest  is 
in  the  restoration  and  preservation  of  the  Union  upon 
the  basis  of  the  constitution,  and  the  deep  devotion  of 
her  Democracy  to  the  cause  of  the  Union  is  shown  by 
its  fidelity  in  the  past ;  but  if  the  failure  and  folly  and 
wickedness  of  the  party  in  power  render  a  Union 
impossible,  then  the  mighty  Northwest  must  take 
care  of  herself  and  her  own  interests.  She  must 
not  allow  the  arts  and  finesse  of  New  England  to 
despoil  her  of  her  richest  commerce  and  trade  by  a 
sectional  and  selfish  policy — eastern  lust  of  power, 
commerce  and  gain."25 

25  Foulke's  Life  of  Morton,  vol.  I,  p.  176. 


52  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

It  is  pleasant  to  contrast  with  this  the  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Union  convention  held  at  Indiana- 
polis June  1 8,  1862.  One  of  the  speakers  was  Martin 
M.  Ray,  a  well-known  Democrat.  In  the  course  of  a 
patriotic  address,  he  said  : 

"Yes,  war  could  have  been  avoided  by  a  cowardly 
surrender  of  the  government  to  rebel  arms.  What 
difference  does  it  make  whether  it  costs  one  or  four 
millions  per  day  to  save  the  government,  since  it  must 
be  saved  at  any  price?  .  .  .  We  will  prosecute 
the  war  to  re-establish  the  supremacy  of  the  Federal 
constitution  under  Mr.  Crittenden's  resolution  at  the 
extra  session  of  Congress,  and,  if  slavery  must  perish 
in  the  conflict,  let  it  perish." 

The  Confederate  plan  was  that  General  Bragg 
should  invade  Kentucky,  march  on  Louisville,  destroy 
Buell's  communications,  and  force  his  army  back  to 
the  Ohio  river.  This  meant  that  the  invasion  of  Ken- 
tucky, if  successful,  would  be  speedily  followed  by  the 
invasion  of  Indiana  and  Ohio.  Indiana  had  gained 
some  idea  of  what  was  involved  in  an  invasion  by  a 
hostile  army,  when  in  July  a  band  of  Confederates 
crossed  the  Ohio  and  sacked  the  town  of  Newburg, 
situated  on  the  river  a  few  miles  below  Evansville. 

The  loyal  citizens  of  Kentucky  were  appealing  to 
Governor  Morton  for  aid.  The  people  of  Indiana  were 
apprehensive  for  their  own  homes.  Not  a  moment  was 
to  be  lost.  The  President  had  called  for  300,000  more 
volunteers.  The  emergency  was  pressing.  The  diffi- 
culty of  raising  the  troops  required,  and  the  greater 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  53 

difficulty  of  equipping  them,  were  apparently  insur- 
mountable. But  nothing  daunted  Morton.  He  at 
once  began  the  work.  On  July  I2th  he  addressed  a 
great  war  meeting  at  Indianapolis,  and  all  over  the 
state  similar  meetings  were  held.  Volunteers  came 
forward  faster  than  they  could  be  mustered  into  serv- 
ice ;  a  new  mustering  officer  was  called  and  all  the  en- 
ergies of  the  state  government  were  taxed  to  the  ut- 
most. The  result  is  briefly  told  in  some  of  Morton's 
telegrams  as  given  by  Foulke  :26 

"Aug.  26.  The  Seventy-ninth  leaves  Tuesday;  will 
hurry  others.  Indiana  has  put  14,480  men  in  Ken- 
tucky up  to  Friday  last;  this  will  make  it  19,296  by 
Thursday  this  week.  This  includes  two  batteries." 

"Aug.  27.  Another  regiment  can  leave  to-morrow, 
one  leaves  this  evening." 

"Aug.  30.  The  Eighty-ninth  leaves  this  afternoon. 
The  Eighty-first  and  Eighty-second  will  be  armed  to- 
day. Two  regiments  will  start  to-morrow,  and  five 
more  will  be  ready  next  week." 

"Aug.  31.  The  Eighty-eighth  is  at  the  depot.  The 
Eighty-seventh  will  be  in  Louisville  to-morrow  morn- 
ing. Two  regiments  leave  to-day  and  two  more  to- 
night." 

Since  my  return  from  the  three-months'  service  I 
had  been  in  the  law  office  of  my  stepfather.  But  there 
was  little  law  business  and  my  heart  was  not  in  it. 
Inter  arma  leges  silent.  On  August  14  my  stepfather 
and  I  closed  our  law  office  and  again  enlisted,  this  time 

26  Life  of  Morton,  vol.  I,  p.  187. 


54  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

"for  three  years  or  during  the  war,  unless  sooner  dis- 
charged." The  company  in  which  we  enlisted  started 
in  a  few  days  for  Indianapolis,  where  it  became  Co. 
I  of  the  79th  Indiana.  I  was  commissioned  first 
lieutenant  of  the  company,  my  stepfather,  lieut.-colonel 
of  the  regiment,  and  Frederick  Knefler,  colonel. 

My  company  was  recruited  chiefly  from  Johnson 
county  and  the  adjoining  county  of  Brown  and  was 
composed  in  large  part  of  men  who  had  come  from 
the  farm;  probably  twenty-five  were  from  Franklin 
and  smaller  towns ;  a  few  were  college  students,  school 
teachers,  and  professional  men.  Most  of  the  company 
were  twenty-one  years  old  or  younger  and  only  a  few 
of  them  were  married.  \Ye  were  mustered  into  service 
August  26,  and  on  the  2/th  six  companies,  under  com- 
mand of  Lieut. -Colonel  Oyler,  left  for  Louisville,  fol- 
lowed September  2  by  Colonel  Knefler  and  the  remain- 
ing four  companies. 

The  79th  Indiana,  though  its  losses  were  not  so 
great  as  those  of  many  other  regiments  in  the  Civil 
War,  nevertheless  gained  an  honorable  record.  It 
was  in  reserve  at  the  battles  of  Perryville  and  Frank- 
lin and  took  an  active  part  in  the  battles  of  Stone's 
River,  Chickamauga,  Missionary  Ridge  and  Nashville, 
and  participated  in  the  various  battles  of  the  Atlanta 
campaign  and  in  numerous  skirmishes  in  east  Tennes- 
see in  the  winter  of  1863.  Its  total  losses,  as  given  in 
Fox's  Regimental  Losses,  were  53  killed  and  died  of 
wounds,  and  149  died  of  disease,  in  prison,  etc.  It 
went  into  the  battle  of  Stone's  River  with  only  341 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    CONFLICT  55 

men  and  lost  121  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  At 
Chickamauga  it  participated  in  the  charge  and  capture 
of  a  Confederate  battery,  and  it  was  in  the  first  line 
of  Wood's  division  in  the  storming  of  Missionary 
Ridge. 

I  commanded  the  company  in  all  the  battles  in  which 
the  regiment  was  engaged  until  June  23,  1864,  when 
I  was  severely  wounded  at  Kenesaw^Mountain,  on  ac- 
count of  which  I  was  honorably  discharged  November 
10,  1864.  While  in  the  three-years'  service  I  never 
had  a  furlough,  never  was  absent  from  duty,  and  never 
was  in  a  hospital  until  after  I  was  wounded. 


CHAPTER  THREE 

CAMP,   MARCH  AND  BATTLE 

^  In  the  general  histories  of  the  Civil  War,  and  in  the 
histories  of  great  campaigns  and  battles,  we  get  much 
information  about  noted  generals,  military  strategy, 
and  tactical  maneuvers,  but  we  gain  a  very  imperfect 
idea  of  a  soldier's  daily  life.  Some  phases  of  it,  as 
seen  in  camp,  on  the  march,  and  in  battle,  deserve  fuller 
attention  before  going  further  in  this  narrative. 

When  it  was  expected  that  a  regiment  would  remain 
in  one  locality  for  a  considerable  period,  camp  was  reg- 
ularly laid  out  according  to  prescribed  military  regula- 
tions, with  narrow  lanes,  on  each  side  of  which  were 
the  tents  of  the  enlisted  men.  At  the  head  of  each 
lane  were  the  tents  of  the  line  officers,  the  captains  and 
lieutenants,  and  in  rear  of  them  were  those  of  the  regi- 
mental officers.  In  the  first  year  of  the  war,  tents  in 
the  shape  of  a  letter  A  were  furnished  for  the  enlisted 
men,  and  wall  tents  for  the  line  officers.  The  former 
were  secured  by  ropes  fastened  to  pegs  driven  into  the 
ground.  Small  trenches  were  dug  around  them  to  keep 
out  the  water  in  rainy  weather.  If  boards  could  be 
found  they  were  floored ;  otherwise  beds  were  made  on 
the  ground.  There  was  no  way  of  heating  them  and  in 

(56) 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  57 

cold  weather  the  fire  was  made  in  front,  the  men  sleep- 
ing with  their  feet  to  the  fire.  The  tents  of  the  officers 
were  provided  with  flies  which  were  erected  in  the  rear 
and  were  generally  used  as  a  sort  of  kitchen  in  which 
the  officers  ate  their  meals.  The  tents  of  the  regi- 
mental officers  were  similar  to  those  of  the  line  officers 
but  were  larger  and  better. 

The  enlisted  men's  tents  were  found  to  require  too 
many  wagons  to  haul  them  and,  in  1862,  what  were 
familiarly  known  in  the  western  army  as  "dog-tents" 
were  introduced,  the  7Qth  getting  its  first  supply  while 
in  camp  at  Murfreesboro.  Each  man  was  furnished 
with  a  piece  of  canvas  about  five  and  one-half  feet 
square  with  buttons  and  button-holes  so  placed  that 
three  pieces  could  be  buttoned  together,  two  of  them 
making  the  sides  and  one  the  back  of  the  tent.  They 
were  held  in  place  by  being  stretched  over  a  ridge  pole 
laid  on  top  of  two  forked  stakes,  and  fastened  at  the 
bottom  with  wooden  pins.  In  an  emergency  two  mus- 
kets with  fixed  bayonets,  stuck  in  the  ground,  served 
for  temporary  stakes.  When  so  put  together  these 
pieces  of  canvas  made  what  were  at  once  nicknamed 
"dog-tents."  As  they  were  not  more  than  four  feet 
high,  a  man  could  not  stand  in  them  nor  could  he  sit 
in  them  with  much  comfort.  But  when  lumber  suffi- 
cient could  be  found,  and  the  regiment  was  in  camp 
long  enough,  sides  and  rear  walls  were  constructed 
of  boards  or  logs  and  the  dog-tent  was  used  as  a  roof. 
Then  the  structure  was  dignified  by  the  title  "shebang," 
and  bunks  were  made  similar  in  size  and  shape  to 


5o  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

those  in  the  state-rooms  of  vessels.  Regiments  which 
were  fortunate  enough  to  remain  in  winter  quarters 
and  to  have  access  to  timber,  constructed  miniature 
log  houses,  eight  or  ten  feet  square,  in  shape  much 
like  those  of  the  early  western  pioneers,  having  stick 
chimneys — the  interstices  between  the  logs  being 
filled  with  clay.  These  were  palatial  structures  com- 
pared with  the  dog-tents.  The  79th  built  them  several 
times  while  in  east  Tennessee,  but  invariably,  as  soon  as 
completed,  the  regiment  was  ordered  to  march  and  was 
obliged  to  abandon  them.  Into  these  contracted  quar- 
ters five  or  six  men  could  manage  to  stow  themselves 
and  all  their  baggage,  arms,  and  cooking  utensils  and 
to  live  in  them  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  comfort, 
incredible  as  this  may  seem  to  people  in  good  circum- 
stances who  now  want  houses  of  eight  or  ten  or  more 
rooms,  and  think  they  can  not  live  comfortably  with 
less. 

The  daily  routine  of  camp  life  began  with  the  sound- 
ing of  the  reveille.  Then  the  men  rose,  dressed,  and 
responded  to  company  roll-call,  at  which  the  names  of 
those  assigned  from  the  company  for  police,  camp 
guard,  picket,  or  other  special  duty  were  announced. 
Next  came  the  drawing  of  rations,  which  were  obtained 
from  the  regimental  commissary  sergeant  by  the 
company  orderly  sergeants  and  distributed  by  them  to 
the  merho  When  it  was  possible  to  furnish  full  sup- 
plies, they  were  generally  abundant  and  good,  consist- 
ing usually  of  side-meat,  always  in  the  army  called 
"sow-belly,"  crackers,  always  called  "hardtack,"  coffee, 


CAMP,    MARCH    AXD    BATTLE  59 

and  sugar.  To  these  were  sometimes  added  beans, 
potatoes,  and  a  vile  compound  known  as  "desiccated 
vegetables."  But  such  princely  provisions  were  rarely 
distributed  unless  the  regiment  remained  in  camp  for 
a  considerable  time  and  there  was  easy  communication 
with  the  base  of  supplies. 

Cooking  in  camp  was  sometimes  done  by  a  company 
cook,  but  usually  the  men  were  divided  into  messes  of 
six  or  eight,  and  the  labor  of  getting  wood  and  water 
and  preparing  the  meals  was  apportioned  among  them 
as  they  might  agree.  Occasionally  a  company  officer 
messed  with  some  of  the  men,  but  usually,  when  in 
camp,  two  or  three  officers  united  and  employed  a 
colored  man  to  do  the  cooking.  Those  who  could  af- 
ford to  pay  the  prices,  which  were  usually  very  high, 
could  at  times  buy  of  regimental  sutlers  canned 
peaches,  jellies,  and  a  few  other  delicacies.  Boxes  of 
dainties  vrere  sometimes  sent  from  home  and  were  gen- 
erously shared  by  the  recipients  with  their  comrades. 
\Vhen  the  country  people  were  allowed  to  approach 
the  picket  stations,  these  became  trading  posts  for  the 
purchase  or  exchange  of  pies,  cakes,  and  other  eata- 
bles.^ One  day  while  on  picket  duty  near  McMinnville, 
Tennessee,  I  purchased  of  a  very  long  and  gaunt  coun- 
try woman  a  mince  pie.  I  had  not  tasted  one  since  I 
left  home  and  could  hardly  await  my  return  to  camp 
in  anticipation  of  the  feast  to  which  I  had  invited  some 
of  my  comrades.  I  \vas  not  more  amazed  when  a  boy, 
reading  for  the  first  time  in  the  old  nursery  rhyme  the 
wonderful  story  of  the  "four  and  twenty  blackbirds 


6O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

baked  in  a  pie"  which,  when  the  pie  was  opened,  at 
once  began  to  sing,  than  I  was  when  I  opened  the  pie 
I  had  bought  and  discovered  that  its  sole  contents  were 
two  pieces  of  fat  pork  from  which  the  woman  had  not 
even  removed  the  bristles.  My  disgust  at  finding  my- 
self such  a  victim  of  misplaced  confidence  was  not 
relieved  by  the  merriment  and  the  sallies  of  my  com- 
rades, who  seemed  to  relish  the  joke  more  than  they 
would  have  enjoyed  a  good  mince  pie. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  cooking  in  the  army  was 
not  done  according  to  the  rules  prescribed  in  approved 
cook  books.  Cooking  utensils  were  scarce;  the  mess 
that  had  a  camp  kettle,  a  coffee-pot,  a  frying-pan,  and 
a  few  tin  plates  and  cups,  was  well  provided.  Occa- 
sionally we  procured  at  some  country  house  an  old- 
fashioned  "Dutch  oven" — a  large  iron  skillet  with  a 
lid — and  the  services  of  a  "contraband"  who  knew 
how  to  bake  beans  and  corn  pone,  and  then  we  enjoyed 
a  feast  that  could  not  be  surpassed. 
— »  We  fared  best  in  summer  when  young  corn  and 
berries  were  in  season.  No  soldier  that  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  Pikeville,  Tennessee,  in  the  summer  of 
1863,  will  ever  forget  the  delicious  roasting  ears  and 
blackberry  cobblers  with  which  the  memory  of  the 
place  will  always  be  associated.  The  recipe  for  making 
a  blackberry  cobbler  was  very  simple.  The  six  or 
eight  men  in  a  mess  put  all  their  blackberries,  all  their 
crackers,  and  all  their  sugar  into  a  camp  kettle,  filled 
it  with  water,  and  let  it  come  to  a  boil,  then  stirred 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  6 1 

the  contents  with  a  bayonet  or  stick,  and  it  was  ready 
to  serve.  I  do  not  recall  that  any  of  it  was  ever  left. 

Drills  and  inspections  occurred  with  more  or  less 
frequency,  as  the  necessity  for  them  required.  Usually 
there  was  a  company  drill  in  the  forenoon  and  a  regi- 
mental drill  in  the  afternoon.  In  the  intervals  between 
drills  and  inspections  the  men  were  required  to  put 
their  arms  and  quarters  in  good  condition.  The  chief 
military  display  during  the  day  was  the  dress  parade. 
This  took  place  a  little  before  sundown.  The  whole 
regiment  was  formed  in  line;  the  buglers,  or  the  regi- 
mental band,  if  there  was  one,  marched  up  and  down 
in  front  of  the  regiment  playing  a  lively  tune,  generally 
"The  girl  I  left  behind  me."  Then  the  adjutant  gave 
the  order,  "Present  arms";  the  colonel  or  command- 
ing officer  of  the  regiment  acknowledged  the  salute 
and  perhaps  put  the  regiment  through  a  brief  exercise 
in  the  manual  of  arms;  orders  intended  for  the  regi- 
ment, if  there  were  any,  were  read ;  and  then  the  regi- 
ment was  dismissed  and  the  companies  marched  back 
to  their  respective  quarters. 

After  supper  the  men  spent  the  time  as  they  pleased, 
writing  letters,  playing  cards,  or  telling  stories,  until 
tattoo  was  sounded,  when  they  were  required  to  go  to 
their  quarters  and  attend  evening  roll-call.  The  last 
bugle  call  was  taps  or  "lights-out,"  after  which  every 
one,  unless  assigned  to  some  special  night  duty,  was 
expected  to  be  in  bed.  Then  the  soldier  lay  down  to 
sleep — "to  sleep !  perchance  to  dream"  of  his  home  in 
the  far  distant  North;  to  dream  that  he  was  again 


62  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

one  of  the  cheery  circle  gathered  about  the  family  fire- 
side, or  that  he  was  again  clasping  in  his  arms  the 
fond  wife  and  the  prattling  children  he  had  left;  to 
awake  in  the  morning  and  find  that  it  was  all  a  dream 
and  that  he  was  far  away  from  the  home  and  the  loved 
ones  that  he  might  never  see  again. 

All  did  not  sleep.  The  camp  guards,  under  the  com- 
mand of  an  officer  detailed  as  officer  of  the  day,  were 
stationed  near  the  camp  and  divided  into  three  reliefs, 
serving  alternately  four  hours  at  a  time,  and  these 
walked  the  beats  assigned  them  and  allowed  none  to 
pass  without  halting  and  giving  the  countersign  over 
the  point  of  a  bayonet. 

\It  was  on  the  vigilance  of  the  pickets,  however,  that 
the  security  of  the  army  at  night  depended,  especially 
when  the  enemy  was  in  the  near  vicinity.  )  They  were 
posted  far  enough  from  camp  to  give  timely  warning 
in  case  of  a  sudden  attack.  They  also  were  divided 
into  three  reliefs,  each  relief  serving  four  hours  at  a 
time.  Sometimes  the  picket  walked  over  a  beat  vary- 
ing in  length,  but  if  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy 
he  was  usually  stationed  by  a  tree  or  in  some  spot 
which  would  serve  at  once  to  conceal  him  from  the 
view,  and  to  shelter  him  from  the  bullets,  of  the  enemy. 
However  tired,  he  was  not  permitted  to  sleep.  Next 
to  desertion,  the  greatest  offense  of  which  a  soldier 
could  be  guilty  was  that  of  sleeping  on  his  post.  No 
matter  how  cold  it  might  be,  no  matter  how  pitiless  the 
blast,  no  matter  if  the  rain  came  down  in  torrents,  he 
must  stand  at  his  post  until  relieved.  To  stand  alone 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  63 

anywhere  for  four  hours  on  a  dark  night,  in  a  lonely 
spot,  would  try  the  nerves  of  most  men,  but  to  stand 
there  in  momentary  expectation  of  being  fired  on  by  an 
enemy  known  to  be  near  by  is  an  experience  the  full 
meaning  of  which  none  but  soldiers  can  appreciate. 
\  On  one  occasion  in  the  three-years'  service,  when  I 
was  acting  as  officer  of  the  day  and  had  command  of 
a  picket  station,  I  narrowly  escaped  being  shot.  I  did 
not  hear  the  first  challenge  and  a  frightened  picket 
aimed  at  me,  but  his  gun  snapped.  Fortunately,  before 
he  could  aim  again,  I  succeeded  in  making  myself 
known  to  him.  j 

Pay-day  was  of  course  an  important  day  in  the  army. 
In  anticipation  of  it  the  muster-rolls  wrere  prepared, 
showing  the  amount  due  to  each  man,  and  when  the 
paymaster  arrived  the  money  was  speedily  distributed. 
Most  of  it  was  sent  home  by  the  men  for  the  use  of 
their  families,  or  to  be  invested  or  kept  until  their  re- 
turn. It  was  usually  sent  by  some  one  going  North 
on  furlough,  or  by  some  visitor  or  sutler;  but  after 
the  first  year's  service  much  of  it  was  sent  by  what 
was  known  as  the  "allotment  roll"  plan.  During  the 
last  year  that  I  was  in  the  service  there  was  little  op- 
portunity to  spend  money,  if  I  had.  had  ever  so  much, 
for  we  were  on  the  march  most  of  the  time,  sutlers 
were  scarce,  and  there  was  little  to  buy  in  the  country 
through  which  we  passed ;  so  I  invested  most  of  my 
pay  in  government  5-20  bonds,  which  proved  to  be  a 
very  good  investment,  for  with  the  proceeds  of  them 


64  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

I  paid  my  way  through  the  Albany  Law  School  and 
had  enough  left  to  buy  a  very  good  law  library. 

The  first  pay  I  received  in  the  three-years'  service 
was  in  government  paper  money.  I  do  not  remember 
ever  having  seen  a  piece  of  gold  or  silver  after  leaving 
Louisville  in  the  fall  of  1862.  The  small  scrip,  the 
ten  and  twenty-five  and  fifty  cent  bills  issued  by  the 
government,  were  looked  on  with  suspicion,  and  it 
was  difficult  to  pass  them  among  the  people  of  the 
South  with  whom  I  came  in  contact.  Long  before  the 
close  of  the  war  they  refused  to  receive  Confederate 
bills  at  almost  any  discount,  but  I  never  knew  a  "green- 
back" to  be  refused.  This  was  a  silent  but  significant 
proof  of  the  belief  of  the  great  mass  of  the  southern 
people,  at  least  in  the  regions  through  which  I  trav- 
eled, that  the  North,  if  it  did  not  succeed  in  the  contest 
of  arms,  would  at  least  redeem  its  financial  obligations. 
The  great  medium  of  exchange  was  coffee.  A  grain 
of  coffee  was  next  in  value  to  a  grain  of  gold,  and  the 
soldiers  could  exchange  coffee  for  almost  everything 
that  the  people  of  the  South  had  to  sell. 

Next  to  the  arrival  of  the  paymaster,  the  event  most 
eagerly  anticipated  was  the  arrival  of  the  mail.  When 
in  camp  for  a  considerable  time  the  mails  came  with 
something  like  regularity.  Occasionally  some  one  who 
had  been  home  on  furlough  returned,  bringing  letters 
and  papers.  The  letters  were,  of  course,  read  with  the 
most  eager  interest,  for  they  brought  news  directly 
from  home  and  from  those  nearest  and  dearest  to  the 
soldier.  After  the  letters  the  papers  were  read  and 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  65 

passed  around.  The  local  papers  were  of  greatest  in- 
terest to  those  from  the  town  or  county  where  they 
were  published,  and  usually  contained  letters  from  sol- 
diers in  the  various  regiments  having  representatives 
from  the  place.  Of  the  newspapers  most  highly  appre- 
ciated in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  composed 
largely  of  troops  from  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  the 
Cincinnati  Gazette  and  the  Cincinnati  Commercial 
were  the  most  popular.  Whitelaw  Reid,  now  editor 
of  the  New  York  Tribune,  was  one  of  the  war  corre- 
spondents of  the  Gazette.  He  wrote  under  the  nom  de 
plume  "Agate."  I  had  seen  him  in  the  three-months' 
campaign  in  West  Virginia,  a  young,  handsome,  dar- 
ing-looking man.  He  was  one  of  the  best,  if  not  the 
best,  of  the  war  correspondents  during  the  Civil  War. 
"Mack"  (J.  B.  McCullagh),  the  correspondent  of  the 
Commercial,  was  also  a  popular  writer. 

This  leads  me  to  say  something  of  reading  in  the 
army.  I  do  not  recall  that  Hamerton  in  his  delightful 
book  on  Intellectual  Life  says  anything  of  the  cultiva- 
tion of  literary  tastes  in  the  army.  Certainly  the  facili- 
ties for  literary  studies  were  not  numerous ;  still,  some 
books,  generally  novels,  were  obtainable.  I  read  the 
Wandering  Jew  while  in  the  hospital  on  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  I  account  for  the  deep  impression  it 
made  on  the  theory  that  I  was  so  thirsty  for  something 
to  read  that  I  absorbed  every  word  of  it.  I  have  often 
thought  of  Lowell's  remark  about  books  '"suitable  to 
a  desolate  island,"  in  connection  with  a  copy  of  Blair's 
5 


66  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

Rhetoric  which  I  picked  up  in  the  road.  It  had  prob- 
ably been  pillaged  from  some  farm  house  and  thrown 
away.  A  great  many  people  nowadays  have  never 
heard  of  Blair's  Rhetoric.  A  few  old  and  wrinkled 
pedagogues  may  remember  it,  but  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  no  one  at  this  day  could  be  coaxed  into  reading 
it  for  amusement.  I  had  not  seen  a  book  or  even  a 
newspaper  for  weeks,  and  I  positively  affirm  that  I 
took  the  book  with  me  on  picket  and  read  it  entirely 
through  with  absorbing  interest,  just  as  a  starving  man 
would  devour  a  dry  crust. 

One  of  the  prominent  characters  of  camp  life  was 
the  army  sutler.  He  took  a  great  many  risks  and  was 
obliged  to  charge  high  prices.  I  doubt  if  many  sut- 
lers in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  made  a  fortune. 
The  sutler  carried  in  stock  some  clothing,  combs  and 
brushes,  playing  cards,  some  canned  goods,  and  a  gen- 
eral but  small  assortment  of  such  articles  as  the  soldiers 
would  be  likely  to  need  most.  Sometimes  he  kept 
wines  and  liquors,  but  the  regulations  were  generally 
such  as  made  it  difficult  for  the  enlisted  men  to  pur- 
chase intoxicants. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  soldier's  life  in 
camp  was  an  endless  monotony  of  work  and  drill. 
When  not  on  duty  the  men  amused  themselves  in  pitch- 
ing quoits,  playing  ball  or  cards,  in  reading,  in  visit- 
ing their  friends  and  acquaintances  in  other  regiments, 
and  in  various  other  ways.  There  was  considerable 
gambling  in  the  army,  but  not  a  great  deal  in  the  regi- 
ment to  which  I  belonged.  There  was  also  considera- 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  67 

ble  drunkenness,  but  it  prevailed  to  a  greater  extent, 
in  proportion  to  the  numbers,  among  the  officers  than 
among  the  men,  because  it  was  much  more  difficult  for 
the  latter  to  procure  liquor.  The  "canteen,"  so  much 
discussed  in  connection  with  the  Spanish  and  Philip- 
pine wars,  was  unknown  in  the  Civil  War. 

The  hospital  service  in  the  army  was  as  good  as 
could  have  been  expected  under  the  circumstances,  es- 
pecially in  the  general  hospitals  such  as  those  at  Nash- 
ville, Louisville,  and  Washington.  But  even  in  these 
the  accommodations  for  the  sick  and  wounded  would 
have  been  totally  inadequate  without  the  aid  of  the 
loyal  people,  and  especially  the  loyal  women,  in  the 
North.  In  nearly  every  town  and  village  in  the  North 
there  were  local  organizations  of  the  Sanitary  Commis- 
sion or  the  Christian  Commission,  in  which  noble 
women  met  and  prepared  bedclothing  and  bandages 
for  the  sick  and  wounded  and  such  delicacies  a,s  would 
tempt  their  appetites  and  forwarded  them  to  the  hos- 
pitals. Moreover,  great  numbers  of  patriotic  women 
volunteered  their  services  as  nurses,  soothing  with 
woman's  gentle  touch  and  cheering  with  woman's  gen- 
tle presence  the  suffering  soldier  lying  helpless  on  his 
cot.  I  have  before  me  a  little  pamphlet  written  by  one 
of  these  nurses,  Mrs.  Francena  Howe  Brock,  of  Low- 
ell, Mass.,  recounting  her  three-months'  experience  in 
the  Campbell  Hospital  at  Washington.  She  says : 

"The  heroic  attempts  of  women  to  supplement  the 
supplies  of  the  government  and  afford  kindly  help  to 
the  sick  and  wounded,  through  the  Christian  and  Sani- 


68  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

tary  Commissions,  will  ever  stand  out  in  history  as 
one  of  the  brightest  pages  of  our  Civil  War. 

"Their  gifts  were  poured  out  with  lavish  generosity, 
and  their  services  in  the  front  were  given  with  un- 
selfish heroism. 

"On  many  a  hospital  bed,  the  fever-scorched  patient 
had  on  the  clean,  white  garment,  made  by  the  loyal 
women  of  the  North,  while  on  the  beds  of  the  conva- 
lescents, quilts  covered  with  mottoes  and  texts  of  Scrip- 
ture gave  comfort  and  words  of  cheer." 

Every  soldier  will  endorse  the  truth  of  this  state- 
ment. Nor  should  we  forget  the  noble  work  of  the 
Catholic  Sisters  of  Mercy.  In  nearly  every  hospital 
their  sweet  faces  were  seen  as  they  moved  quietly 
about,  ministering  with  equal  fidelity  to  those  of  their 
own  or  of  another  faith.  But  in  the  field  hospitals 
the  facilities  for  taking  care  of  the  sick  were  limited, 
and  a  rugged  constitution  was  the  main  dependence 
upon  which  the  patients  could  rely  for  recovery. 

Two  diseases  that  at  home  rarely  leave  permanent 
bad  results  were,  from  the  impossibility  of  proper 
diet  and  treatment,  productive  of  dangerous  conse- 
quences in  the  army.  One  was  diarrhea  which,  when 
it  assumed  a  chronic  form,  as  it  frequently  did,  was 
almost  as  fatal  and  became  as  much  dreaded  as  con- 
sumption. The  other  was  measles,  a  simple  disease 
under  proper  medical  treatment,  but  one  which  in  the 
army  often  left  the  victim  with  impaired  eyesight  or 
other  permanent  disability.  Another  disease,  common 
in  the  army,  was  nostalgia  or  home-sickness.  There 
it  assumed  a  well-defined  form  and  undoubtedly  caused 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  69 

or  greatly  aggravated  other  diseases.  Malingering,  or 
the  feigning  of  disease  in  order  to  shirk  duty  or  to 
avoid  danger,  is  common  in  all  armies,  and  in  the 
British  army  is  severely  punished.  It  was  undoubtedly 
largely  practised  in  the  Federal  and  Confederate 
armies. 

In  noting  the  features  of  life  in  camp,  the  "contra- 
bands" must  not  be  forgotten.  This  was  the  term  al- 
ways applied  to  the  negroes.  Some  came  from  the 
North  but  most  of  them  were  picked  up  in  the  South. 
They  were  generally  employed  as  cooks  and  servants 
for  the  officers.  In  a  subsequent  chapter,1  the  employ- 
ment of  negroes  as  soldiers  will  be  considered. 

Life  in  camp  and  life  on  the  march  were  quite  dif- 
ferent. Generally  the  order  to  break  camp  and  prepare 
to  march  came  very  unexpectedly  to  the  line  officers 
and  enlisted  men  and  there  was  not  much  time  for 
preparation.  If  it  came  in  the  night  it  was  usually  to 
prepare  to  march ,  the  next  morning  at  daybreak. 
Sometimes  the  order  came  to  break  camp  and  prepare 
to  march  at  once,  and  it  was  astonishing  how  soon  a 
regiment  could  pack  up  and  get  into  line  ready  to 
move. 

If  it  was  expected  merely  to  go  on  some  short  expe- 
dition and  to  return  to  the  same  camp  the  tents  were 
left  standing  in  charge  of  a  guard,  and  the  men  carried 
with  them  only  such  baggage  as  was  indispensable. 
But  when  it  was  not  expected  to  return  to  the  same 

1  Chap.  X. 


/O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

camp  the  preparations  involved  the  abandonment  of 
everything  that  could  not  be  taken.  The  officers'  va- 
lises, company  kettles,  extra  ammunition,  and  what- 
ever could  be  so  disposed  of  were  put  into  wagons. 
When  the  7Qth  started  on  its  first  march  each  company 
had  a  wagon;  as  the  war  progressed  only  one  wagon 
was  allotted  to  a  regiment  and  into  this  was  put  every- 
thing that  was  to  be  hauled.  Those  who  were  too 
sick  to  march  were  sent  to  the  hospital  or  put  into 
ambulances. 

The  soldier  on  the  march  carried  his  arms  and  am- 
munition. These  consisted  of  musket  and  bayonet,  a 
belt  to  which  was  attached  a  leather  ammunition-box, 
containing  generally  forty-two  rounds  of  cartridges, 
and  a  leather  scabbard  holding  his  bayonet.  His  pro- 
visions were  carried  in  a  canvas  or  oil-cloth  haversack 
suspended  over  his  shoulder  by  straps ;  in  like  manner 
he  carried  a  canteen  holding  about  three  pints  of  water. 
Each  soldier  was  provided  with  a  piece  of  oil-cloth,  a 
blanket,  and,  later  on,  a  piece  of  dog-tent.  Generally 
these  were  all  rolled  together  and  the  ends  tied,  mak- 
ing a  roll  in  the  shape  of  a  horse  collar,  and  this  was 
thrown  over  the  neck  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  carried 
on  one  side.  Into  their  knapsacks  the  men  crowded 
all  they  felt  able  or  inclined  to  carry.  Those  of  new 
recruits  were  always  stuffed  with  enough  to  start  a 
small  store,  but  soldiers  speedily  learned  that  they 
could  do  without  much  which,  at  first,  had  been 
thought  indispensable,  and  the  contents  of  a  veteran's 
knapsack  were  usually  very  scanty — a  change  of  un- 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  /I 

derclothing,  a  house-wife  with  some  pins,  needles,  and 
buttons,  a  small  supply  of  writing-paper  and  a  photo- 
graph or  two,  being  about  all  that  he  carried.  V 

In  the  last  two  years  of  the  three-years'  service,  the 
line  officers  on  the  march  fared  little  better  than  the 
men.  Every  captain  was  obliged  to  carry  his  own  oil- 
cloth, blanket,  piece  of  dog-tent,  haversack,  and  can- 
teen, and  also  his  own  knapsack  if  he  wished  to  take 
any  extras. 

When  everything  was  in  readiness  to  move  the  bugle 
sounded  the  assembly  and  the  regiment  took  its  place 
in  the  column.  In  a  long  column  consisting  of  several 
divisions,  it  was  very  much  easier  to  march  in  front, 
and  for  this  reason,  on  a  march  of  several  days'  dura- 
tion, the  regiment  at  the  head  of  the  column  dropped 
the  next  day  to  the  rear.  There  are  few  more  pictur- 
esque sights  than  a  considerable  body  of  troops — a 
corps  or  a  division — on  the  march  over  a  good  road 
on  a  clear  day.  Stretched  along  the  road  you  see  a 
moving  column,  with  waving  banners  and  gleaming 
guns,  the  general  and  regimental  officers  in  brilliant 
uniforms  mounted  on  spirited  steeds,  the  artillery  roll- 
ing along,  cavalrymen  occasionally  dashing  by — all 
indicative  of  the  strength  and  grandeur  of  the  death- 
dealing  powers  of  an  army  when  loosed  in  battle. 
X^The  men  always  marched  in  columns  of  fours  and 
no  attempt  was  made  to  step  in  unison,  but  all  speedily 
adopted  what  was  known  as  the  route  step.  The  dis- 
tance traveled  was  usually  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  a 
day,  according  to  the  weather  and  the  roads,  but  much 


72  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

longer  distances  were  covered  on  forced  marches.  The 
weather  and  the  condition  of  the  roads  determined  the 
character  of  the  march,  not  only  as  to  distance  traveled, 
but  as  to  the  comfort  of  the  men.  When  the  weather 
was  fine  and  the  roads  were  good  the  men  enjoyed 
the  march.  But  nearly  all  our  marching  in  east  Ten- 
nessee in  the  winter  of  1863  was  done  in  cold,  rainy 
weather  and  over  miserable  roads.  To  march  all  day 
in  the  rain  over  a  muddy  road  and  then  to  pass  the 
night  on  the  damp  ground  was  not  a  pleasant  experi- 
ence. More  than  once  I  laid  two  rails  together  so  as 
to  make  a  sort  of  trough,  elevating  one  end  of  the 
trough  in  order  to  keep  it  off  the  ground,  and  slept 
in  it  all  night  with  my  oil-cloth  over  me  and  my  hat 
over  my  face  to  protect  me  from  a  drizzling  rain) 

One  of  the  most  common  incidents  of  a  march  over 
a  muddy  road  was  the  stalling  of  a  baggage  or  an  am- 
munition wagon.  On  such  occasions  the  drivers  were 
apt  to  indulge  in  profanity.  Indeed,  it  was  commonly 
believed  that  in  a  very  bad  case  an  expert  swearer  was 
absolutely  indispensable  to  start  an  obstinate  team  of 
mules.  There  was  one  man  in  the  79th  who  was  sent 
for  by  all  the  drivers  in  the  brigade  when  all  other 
attempts  to  get  a  wagon  out  of  a  mud-hole  had  failed. 
This  man  would  at  once  take  the  lines,,  crack  his  whip, 
and  fire  off  a  volley  of  profane  expletives  sufficient  to 
make  one's  hair  stand  on  end  and  to  scare  any  mule 
ever  hitched  to  an  army  wagon.  I  advance  no  scien- 
tific theory  on  the  subject,  but  simply  record  the  fact 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  73 

that  he  always  succeeded  in  starting  the  mules  and  get- 
ting the  wagon  out  of  the  hole. 

The  monotony  of  a  long  march  was  relieved  in  vari- 
ous ways.  New  scenery  was  opening  at  every  step. 
No  house  was  passed  that  did  not  excite  some  com- 
ment ;  no  rustic  appeared  by  the  roadside  that  was  not 
plied  with  questions  or  jocularly,  though  not  unkindly, 
bantered.  Often  a  song  was  started  and  taken  up, 
company  by  company,  until  the  whole  regiment  joined 
in  it.  The  79th  picked  up  near  Louisville  a  ven- 
erable contraband  familiarly  known  as  "Uncle  John." 
If  he  had  any  other  name  I  have  forgotten  it.  He  re- 
mained with  the  regiment  until  its  return,  was  elected 
an  honorary  member  of  the  reunion  organization,  and 
died  in  Indianapolis.  He  had  a  great  repertory  of  old 
plantation  songs,  one  of  them  ending  with  this  refrain  : 

"God'y  he  delivered  Daniel,  Daniel,  Daniel, 
God'y  he  delivered  Daniel, 
Why  not  deliver  me." 

I  do  not  remember  the  rest  of  the  song,  but  I  recall 
that  often  when  we  were  on  the  march,  and  so  fagged 
that  we  could  hardly  drag  one  foot  after  the  other, 
some  one  would  start  the  song  and  it  would  be  taken 
up  by  companies  and  regiments  until  the  whole  brigade 
was  singing  it,  and  we  would  forget  that  we  were  tired. 
C  Foraging  by  individual  soldiers  on  the  march  was 
strictly  prohibited,  but  the  prohibition  was  construed 
with  more  or  less  leniency,  according  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  commanding  officers,  and  there  were  usually 


74  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

some  opportunities  on  the  march  for  the  men  to  replen- 
ish their  scanty  supply  of  provisions.  Guards  were 
generally  stationed  at  the  farmhouses  along  the  line 
of  march,  but  a  friendly  guard  over  a  smoke-house 
rarely  observed  his  comrades  in  the  rear  of  it  dexter- 
ously poking  the  shoulders  and  jowls  off  the  hooks 
with  their  bayonets.  The  temptation  to  pick  up  a  stray 
turkey  or  chicken  was  one  too  strong  to  be  resisted 
by  the  most  conscientious  soldier.  Moreover,  the  law 
of  self-defense  received  a  very  liberal  construction  in 
the  army;  it  was  universally  allowed  to  be  lawful  to 
kill  a  hog  or  a  sheep  that  manifested  a  disposition  to 
bite,  and,  strange  to  say,  all  the  hogs  and  sheep  in  the 
South  exhibited  such  a  belligerent  disposition. 

The  cavalrymen  and  the  artillerymen  always  had 
the  advantage  of  the  infantrymen  in  foraging.  When, 
as  often  happened,  nothing  to  eat  could  be  picked  up 
on  the  line  of  march,  the  soldier  was  reduced  to  the 
supplies  in  his  haversack.  It  did  not  take  long  for 
him  to  cook  a  meal.  There  were  no  tedious  courses. 
A  pot  of  coffee  was  soon  boiled,  and  a  piece  of  side- 
meat,  stuck  on  the  end  of  a  ramrod  and  held  over  the 
coals,  was  soon  broiled.  I  never  relished  the  most 
sumptuous  banquet  as  I  did  the  cup  of  coffee,  the  slice 
of  side-meat  and  the  piece  of  cracker  that  I  used  to 
eat  on  the  march. 

The  stragglers  were  familiar  figures  on  the  march. 
Some  were  not  strong  enough  to  keep  up,  especially 
on  a  hard  march,  but  most  of  them  were  men  that  pur- 
posely lagged  behind  to  do  a  little  foraging  on  their 


CAMPj    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  75 

own  account  or  for  plunder.  They  were  not  all  skulk- 
ers, but  the  skulkers  were  always  among  the  stragglers 
if  a  battle  was  imminent.  Straggling  prevailed  in  all 
the  armies,  Federal  and  Confederate,  but  more  in  some 
regiments  than  in  others.  There  was  comparatively 
little  in  regiments  whose  officers  enforced  attendance 
at  roll-call  and  other  regulations  designed  to  prevent  it. 
Care  was  usually  taken  to  stop  the  day's  march  at 
some  spot  convenient  to  water  and  wood.  Sometimes 
the  commanding  officers  were  so  considerate  as  to  halt 
the  troops  near  a  rail  fence  and  then  the  command  to 
stack  arms  and  break  ranks  was  hardly  repeated  be- 
fore the  entire  fence  around  a  twenty-acre  field  had 
disappeared  as  if  by  magic  and  almost  in  an  instant 
thousands  of  camp-fires  were-  brightly  burning.  Then 
was  heard  the  sound,  so  familiar  to  all  old  soldiers,  of 
pounding  coffee.  (The  coffee  issued  to  the  soldiers  in 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  browned  but  not 
ground,  and  coffee-mills  were  unknown.  So  the  coffee 
was  put  into  tin  cups,  placed  on  a  smooth  stump  or 
stone,  and  beaten  with  the  butt  end  of  a  bayonet,  as  a 
druggist  pulverizes  drugs  in  a  mortar.  Supper  being 
ready  it  was  speedily  dispatched  and  then  the  soldiers 
gathered  about  the  camp-fires.  These  were  the  real 
camp-fires.  The  incidents  of  the  day  were  recalled; 
former  battles  and  skirmishes  were  discussed;  story 
after  story  went  round ;  sometimes  a  song  was  started 
in  which  all  joined;  and  thus  the  tired  soldiers  tried 
to  forget  the  hardships  of  the  past  and  the  dangers  of 
the  future./''  Is  it  cause  for  wonder  that  the  friendships 


76  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

formed  about  these  camp-fires  knit  together  more 
strongly  than  iron  bands  those  who  have  survived  ? 

The  7Qth  Ind.  was  many  times  under  fire  and  took 
an  active  part  in  several  memorable  battles,  and  it  so 
happened  that  I  participated  in  three  of  the  most  noted 
— Stone's  River,  Chickamauga,  and  Missionary  Ridge. 
I  have  attempted  a  general  description  of  them  in  the 
following  pages  and  many  such  descriptions  have  al- 
ready been  written,  but  I  doubt  whether,  from  these, 
a  reader  that  never  saw  a  battle  would  get  a  very  dis- 
tinct idea  of  how  it  appeared  to  those  engaged.  It 
may  not  be  amiss,  therefore,  to  attempt  a  more  specific 
description. 

No  two  battles  of  the  Civil  War  were  alike,  yet  there 
were  many  features  common  to  all.  Various  circum- 
stances combined  to  determine  just  when  and  where  a 
general  engagement  should  be  brought  on  by  one  or 
the  other  of  the  opposing  forces,  and  which  should 
take  the  initiative. 

In  nearly  all  the  battles  that  I  witnessed  it  was  im- 
possible to  see  the  greater  part  of  either  of  the  oppos- 
ing armies  from  one  point.  At  Stone's  River  the 
greatest  number  of  the  Confederates  that  I  could  see 
at  any  time  were  those  in  Breckinridge's  division  on 
Friday  afternoon;  at  Chickamauga  the  greatest  num- 
ber I  saw  together  were  the  forces  of  Longstreet  as 
they  came  up  toward  Snodgrass  Hill ;  at  the  storming 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  however,  I  could  see  all  the  Fed- 
eral troops  that  participated  in  the  assault.  During 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  the  whole  country  in  which  it 


77 

was  conducted  was  covered  with  such  a  heavy  growth 
of  timber  and  underbrush  that,  from  any  particular 
point  in  the  lines,  only  a  small  portion  of  either  army 
could  be  seen. 

Usually  for  some  days  before  a  great  battle  there 
was  considerable  maneuvering  for  position,  always 
conducted  in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  the  most  available 
positions  for  attack  or  defense,  and,  on  the  part  of  the 
attacking  army,  to  deceive  the  enemy  concerning  the 
point  where  it  was  intended  to  strike  the  hardest  blow. 
The  duty  of  "developing  the  enemy,"  as  it  was  called, 
fell  chiefly  upon  the  cavalry,  but  sometimes  a  recon- 
naissance in  force  was  made  by  advancing  considerable 
bodies  of  infantry  until  the  position  of  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  could  be  ascertained.  The  character  of 
the  ground,  and  the  disposition  of  troops  during  the 
night  often  made  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  ascertain 
the  exact  position  of  the  enemy,  or  to  determine  when 
and  where  the  first  attack  would  be  made.  A  striking 
illustration  of  this  was  seen  in  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  each  army  on  Friday  night  having  been  ig- 
norant of  the  precise  location  of  the  other. 

It  would  seem  hardly  possible  for  an  army  to  be 
surprised  by  an  attack  from  an  enemy  known  to  be  in 
the  vicinity,  yet  such  surprises  sometimes  occurred, 
as  at  Shiloh  and  at  Stone's  River.  In  each  case  the 
surprise  very  nearly  resulted  in  the  total  rout  of  the 
Federal  army.  Night  attacks  were  rare  because  in  the 
dark  there  was  so  much  danger  that  the  attacking 


78  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

party  would  fire  on  troops  of  its  own  side  or  be  fired 
on  by  them. 

"No  troops  will  stand  a  flanking  fire  and,  when  ex- 
posed thereto,  they  must  retreat  or  speedily  change 
front.  This  is  very  apt  to  throw  them  into  confusion, 
as  it  is  difficult  to  make  new  formations  under  the  gall- 
ing fire  of  an  advancing  enemy ;  therefore  it  is  the  ob- 
ject of  every  general  to  post  and  maneuver  his  troops 
in  such  a  way,  if  possible,  as  to  turn  the  right  or  the 
left  flank  of  the  enemy. 

When  neither  a  surprise  nor  a  flank  movement  is 
practicable,  another  device  is  to  mass  a  heavy  body  of 
troops,  make  a  sudden  dash  and  break  through  some 
weak  point  in  the  enemy's  lines,  thus  throwing  them 
into  confusion,  at  the  same  time  concealing,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  strength  of  the  assaulting  force  and  di- 
verting attention  from  the  point  where  the  attack  is 
to  be  made  by  feint  movements  in  other  quarters. 
\  The  private  soldier  had  little  to  do  to  prepare  for 
battle.  He  stripped  himself  of  his  knapsack  and  all 
superfluous  baggage,  saw  that  his  gun  was  in  order 
and  that  his  ammunition-box  was  filled.  The  main 
attacking  columns  were  generally  preceded  by  a  line 
of  skirmishers  posted  a  short  distance  in  front.  The 
skirmishers  advanced,  followed  by  the  men  in  the  main 
columns,  until  they  were  checked  by  a  superior  force 
of  the  enemy,  when  they  fell  back  or  halted  until  their 
own  main  lines  came  up  and  then  took  their  places  in 
them.  ^ 

The  army  anticipating  an  attack  generally  fortified 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  79 

its  position  as  much  as  possible.  The  value  of  breast- 
works was  speedily  recognized.  Those  constructed  by 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  to  oppose  the  advance 
of  General  Sherman  were  so  strong  that  the  forces 
behind  them  would  have  been  able  to  resist  suc- 
cessfully a  direct  assault  by  four  or  five  times  their  own 
number.  Even  temporary  breastworks,  such  as  could 
be  erected  in  a  night,  composed  of  logs  and  rails  two 
or  three  feet  high,  with  a  trench  behind  them  one  or 
two  feet  deep,  or  even  without  a  trench,  gave  the 
troops  behind  them  a  great  advantage,  especially 
against  a  column  compelled  to  travel  a  considerable 
distance  over  an  open  field  in  front  in  order  to  reach 
them.  Behind  such  breastworks  a  line  of  men,  armed 
with  modern  Mauser  rifles,  could  probably  resist  a 
direct  attack  in  front  by  an  army  ten  times  their  own 
in  number. 

When  breastworks  were  to  be  charged,  the  charge 
was  usually  preceded  by  a  brisk  cannonading,  followed 
by  a  rapid  advance  of  the  attacking  force  in  such  num- 
bers as  to  exhaust  the  fire  of  those  behind  the  works, 
before  reenforcements  could  reach  them.  Such  charges 
were  usually  very  destructive  to  the  attacking  party, 
especially  when  exposed  to  the  fire,  at  short  range,  of 
the  men  behind  the  breastworks  arid  also  to  the  fire  of 
cannon  loaded  with  grape-shot  and  canister. 

Next  to  charging  breastworks,  the  duty  requiring 
the  greatest  bravery  was  that  of  charging  a  battery. 
If  infantry  could  advance  within  musket  range  of  the 
artillerymen  and  horses,  the  charge,  especially  if 


8O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

against  a  single  battery,  was  usually  successful  in  either 
capturing  the  battery  or  compelling  it  to  retreat,  be- 
cause, unless  well  supported  by  infantry,  the  men  and 
horses  were  soon  killed  or  disabled.  But  dreadful  loss 
of  life  usually  resulted  when  a  charging  column  was 
forced  to  advance  over  a  considerable  space  before  com- 
ing within  musket  range  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  The 
general  reader  who  sees  accounts  of  men  "marching 
up  to  the  cannon's  mouth"  is  apt  to  believe  that  this 
is  a  poetic  stretch  of  imagination.  But  it  is  not.  Such 
scenes  were  often  witnessed  during  the  Civil  War. 
Time  and  again  there  were  charges  by  both  Federal 
and  Confederate  troops  in  which  men  marched  straight 
up  to  the  cannon's  mouth  and  bayoneted  the  artillery- 
men. 

Perhaps  the  most  trying  position  in  which  a  soldier 
can  be  placed  is  to  be  exposed  to  artillery  fire  when  so 
situated  that  he  can  neither  advance  nor  fire  in  return. 
In  a  charge  he  is  carried  forward  by  the  very  mo- 
mentum of  the  column  and  is  inspired  by  the  enthusi- 
asm kindled  by  the  charge  itself;  when  he  is  firing  in 
return  he  has  at  least  something  to  divert  his  mind 
from  dwelling  solely  on  his  own  personal  danger;  but 
when  he  is  compelled  to  stand  or  lie  still  and  can  do 
nothing  but  await  the  coming  of  a  cannon  ball,  he  is 
in  a  situation  requiring  the  courage  of  the  bravest 
man.  General  Sheridan  in  his  Memoirs,2  describing 
his  division  in  such  a  position  at  Stone's  River,  says 

2  Vol.  i,  p.  234. 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  8l 

that  the  "torments  of  this  trying  situation  were  almost 
unbearable."  In  a  reconnaissance  made  on  Sunday, 
September  13,  1863,  preceding  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  the  79th  Ind.  was  for  a  few  minutes  posted  on 
the  top  of  a  ridge  in  a  field,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  Con- 
federate battery  about  half  a  mile  distant  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  field.  The  battery  almost  at  once  got 
the  range  of  our  colors,  and  one  ball  passed  under  the 
horse  of  the  lieutenant-colonel  who  happened  to  be  im- 
mediately behind  the  colors.  We  could  see  the  smoke  of 
the  cannon  an  instant  or  so  before  we  could  hear  the 
sound  of  the  discharge  and  then  another  instant  elapsed 
before  the  ball  came  along.  We  were  all  lying  flat 
on  the  ground  with  our  heads  toward  the  cannon  and  I 
distinctly  remember  that  every  time  I  saw  the  smoke 
I  thought  of  the  possibility  that  the  ball  might  hit  my 
head.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  when  the  or- 
der was  given  to  fall  back  behind  the  brow  of  the  ridge 
it  was  obeyed  with  the  utmost  alacrity. 
J  Bayonet  charges  were  not  uncommon  nor  were  hand 
to  hand  contests,  but  I  think  there  were  comparatively 
few  instances  in  which  opposing  forces  fought  each 
other  solely  with  bayonets.  The  statistics  collected  by 
Colonel  Fox  show  a  very  small  percentage  of  bayonet 
wounds.  What  generally  happened  when  a  bayonet 
charge  was  ordered  is  illustrated  in  a  dialogue  given 
by  Piatt  :3 

3  General  George  H.  Thomas,  p.  14. 
6 


82  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

"  'Do  you  mean  to  say,'  asked  a  civilian  of  a  veteran 
officer  who  had  seen  many  fierce  fights  in  Europe,  'that 
bayonets  are  never  crossed  in  battle  ?' 

"  'Oh,  no !  I  don't  say  that.  What  I  asserted  was 
that  I  had  heard  of  such  but  never  saw  it,  and  I  have 
my  doubts  whether  it  ever  occurred.' 

"  'Well,  when  a  charge  of  bayonets  is  ordered,  what 
happens,  how  does  it  end?' 

"  'Why,  if  the  other  fellows  don't  run  away,  we 
do." 

In  the  pictures  of  battles  the  officers  are  usually  de- 
picted in  full  uniform,  generally  on  prancing  steeds, 
and  always  far  in  advance  waving  their  swords  aloft 
and  beckoning  their  men  forward.  Now  this  would 
be  a  very  ridiculous  position  for  an  officer  to  take,  be- 
cause it  would  expose  him  not  only  to  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  but  to  the  fire  of  his  own  men.  The  army  reg- 
ulations required  the  officers,  on  the  formation  of  a  line 
of  battle,  to  take  their  places  in  the  rear  of  the  line. 
An  officer  whose  bravery  or  vanity  induced  him  to  ex- 
pose his  rank  to  the  enemy  was  certain  to  be  made  a 
special  target. 

sf  The  men  particularly  aimed  at  in  battle  were  the  of- 
ficers, especially  those  of  high  rank,  if  they  could  be 
distinguished,  the  artillerymen,  and  those  bearing  the 
regimental  colors ;  but  most  of  the  firing  was  at  ranks 
or  masses  of  men,  just  as  one  would  shoot  into  a  flock 
of  blackbirds.  The  old  soldier,  however,  generally 
aimed  at  some  particular  person  and  with  a  view  of 
hitting  him.  The  difference  in  this  respect  between 
a  veteran  and  a  raw  recruit  is  illustrated  in  the  story 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  83 

told  by  General  Schofield4  the  substance  of  it  being  as 
follows :  A  new  recruit  after  a  battle  was  proudly  ex- 
hibiting to  a  veteran  his  empty  cartridge-box  and  boast- 
ing of  how  many  rounds  he  had  fired,  but  he  could  not 
tell  how  many  he  had  hit.  "And  how  many  rounds 
did  you  fire?"  asked  the  recruit.  "About  nineteen" 
was  the  reply.  "And  how  many  did  you  hit?"  "I 
think,"  said  the  veteran,  "that  I  hit  about  nineteen." 

^In  my  company  was  a  man  who  used  to  hunt  squir- 
rels in  the  woods  of  Brown  county,  and  who  could  hit 
one  in  the  top  of  the  tallest  tree.  He  was  the  most 
quiet  and  best-natured  man  in  the  company,  and  the 
coolest  I  ever  saw  under  fire.  Just  after  the  storming 
of  Missionary  Ridge  he  showed  me  a  bent  sapling  upon 
which  he  had  rested  his  gun  to  take  deliberate  aim,  and 
he  assured  me  that  he  hit  his  man  every  time.  I  have 
not  the  least  doubt  of  the  truth  of  his  statement.  ) 

The  sensation  of  being  under  fire,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, is  not  particularly  agreeable,  but  when  you 
know  that  the  bullets  are  not  aimed  especially  at  you, 
you  feel  that  the  danger  is  being  divided  in  some  way 
between  yourself  and  your  comrades ;  that  it  is  a  sort  of 
lottery  in  which  you  may  draw  a  bullet  or  you  may  es- 
cape and  others  may  be  hit.  But  it  is  altogether  dif- 
ferent when  you  know  that  some  one  is  taking  aim  at 
you  individually.  A  Frenchman  in  describing  a  tiger 
hunt  said :  "It  is  great  fun  to  hunt  ze  tigaire,  but 
when  ze  tigaire  hunt  you  it  is  fun  for  ze  tigaire." 

*  Forty-Six  Years  in  the  Army,  p.  142. 


84  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

There  is  nothing  very  funny  in  the  situation  when  some 
one  is  aiming  at  another,  but  if  there  is  any  fun  it  is 
not  relished  by  the  man  who  is  being  shot  at.  I  do 
not  know  how  many  times  I  may  have  been  aimed  at, 
but  I  am  sure  of  having  been  on  one  occasion.  This 
was  in  front  of  Rocky  Face  Ridge  in  the  Atlanta  cam- 
paign. I  was  on  the  skirmish  line,  picking  my  way 
over  the  rough  ground  and  through  the  underbrush, 
when  a  bullet  whizzed  past  and  cut  a  bush  near  my 
head.  There  was  no  volley  and  it  happened  that  no 
one  was  within  fifty  feet  of  me.  So  I  knew  that  some 
Confederate  sharpshooter  was  directing  his  attention 
to  me  individually.  He  would  probably  have  hit  me 
if  I  had  not  been  moving. 

The  last  year  of  the  war  witnessed  some  radical 
changes  in  the  method  of  fighting.  The  advance  of 
Grant  to  Richmond  as  well  as  that  of  Sherman  to  At- 
lanta was  through  a  thickly  wooded  country  in  which 
there  was  a  dense  growth  of  underbrush.  This  made 
it  difficult  to  use  in  battle  all  the  men  on  both  sides,  and 
also  made  it  difficult  for  the.  artillery  to  do  its  most  ef- 
fective work.  The  result  was  the  development  of  a 
style  of  warfare  similar  in  some  respects  to  that  prac- 
tised in  the  early  Indian  wars.  It  became  part  of  the 
education  of  every  soldier,  officer  as  well  as  private,  to 
take  advantage  of  every  tree,  log,  rock,  or  other  natu- 
ral barrier,  in  order  to  protect  himself  as  much  as  possi- 
ble in  an  advance  against  the  enemy. 

But  the  most  radical  changes  were  those  occasioned 
by  the  fact  that  the  armies  of  both  Lee  and  Johnston 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  85 

were  almost  continuously  on  the  defensive,  this  making 
it  necessary  for  them  to  construct  formidable  fortified 
lines.  When  driven  from  one  line  they  fell  back  to  an- 
other. The  fortifications  encountered  by  the  Federal 
troops  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  were  of  far  more  elab- 
orate character  than  any  which  they  had  previously 
met.  They  were  constructed  of  earth,  four  or  five  feet 
high  and  thick  enough  to  withstand  a  six  pound  cannon 
ball.  Over  the  top  of  these  was  a  head-log,  so  placed 
as  to  leave  an  open  space  of  about  six  inches  between 
the  lower  side  of  the  log  and  the  top  of  the  ridge.  Be- 
hind was  a  trench  about  a  foot  deep  in  which  the  men 
stood  while  loading,  entirely  concealed  from  view. 
When  ready  to  fire  they  stepped  out  of  the  trench  and 
fired  through  the  opening  under  the  log,  thus  exposing 
only  a  small  portion  of  their  persons.  Often  in  front 
of  these  breastworks  were  driven  stakes  with  sharp- 
ened ends,  pointing  outward,  and  sometimes  trees  were 
felled  in  front  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  embarrassing 
the  progress  of  a  charging  column. 

Even  with  such  weapons  as  were  in  use  during  the 
Civil  War,  one  man  behind  such  breastworks  equaled 
at  least  five  in  a  charging  column.  Experience  proved 
that  it  was  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life,  in  fact  little  short 
of  butchery,  to  attempt  to  take  such  breastworks  by  di- 
rect assault.  No  troops  in  the  world  could  hold  out  in 
a  charge  against  them,  if  they  were  defended  by  troops 
one-fifth  in  number  and  of  equal  valor,  especially  if  the 
assaulting  columns  were  compelled,  in  order  to  reach 
the  works,  to  advance  over  a  considerable  open  space 


86  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

in  front,  exposed  to  both  a  direct  and  enfilading  fire  of 
musketry  and  artillery.  Generally  men  would  charge 
even  against  such  works,  when  ordered  to  do  so,  for 
such  was  the  high  state  of  discipline  in  the  last  year  of 
the  war  that  soldiers  would  usually  go  \vhenever  and 
wherever  ordered,  refusing  only  when  it  became  evi- 
dent that,  if  such  assaults  were  persisted  in,  every  man 
in  the  assaulting  columns  would  be  killed. 

The  futility  of  attempting  to  take  strongly  fortified 
lines  by  direct  assault  was  clearly  shown  during  the 
Virginia  campaign  in  the  assault  at  Cold  Harbor.  In 
his  Memoirs  Grant  expresses  regret  that  it  was  made. 
The  uselessness  of  direct  assault  against  such  fortified 
lines  \vas  also  shown,  time  and  again,  in  the  Atlanta 
campaign,  as  at  Pickett's  Mill,  and  especially  in  the 
bloody  assault  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864, 
which  was  disapproved  by  Sherman's  subordinate  gen- 
erals and  afterward  admitted  by  him  to  have  been  a 
mistake.  In  his  account  of  the  assault  at  Pickett's 
Mill,  General  Cox  says : 

"The  attack  of  Hooker  at  New  Hope  Church  and 
this  of  Howard  at  Pickett's  Mill  were  both  made  in 
column  of  brigades  or  demi-brigades.  The  result  in 
both  cases  demonstrated  that  in  a  difficult  and  wooded 
country,  and  especially  against  intrenched  lines,  the 
column  had  little  if  any  advantage  over  a  single  line 
of  equal  front.  It  could  not  charge  with  the  en- 
semble which  could  give  it  momentum,  and  its  depth 
was  therefore  a  disadvantage,  since  it  exposed  masses 
of  men  to  fire  who  were  wholly  unable  to  fire  in  return. 
Since  the  office  of  breastworks  is  to  give  the  defense 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  87 

an  advantage  by  holding  the  assailant  under  fire  from 
which  the  defenders  are  covered,  the  relative  strength 
of  the  two  is  so  changed  that  it  is  within  bounds  to  say 
that  such  works  as  were  constantly  built  by  the  con- 
tending forces  in  Georgia  made  one  man  in  the  trench 
fully  equal  to  three  or  four  in  the  assault.  Each  party 
learned  to  act  upon  this,  and  in  all  the  later  operations 
of  the  campaign  the  commanders  held  their  troops  re- 
sponsible for  making  it  practically  good.  The  boasts, 
on  either  side,  that  a  brigade  or  division  repulsed  three 
or  four  that  attacked  it,  must  always  be  read  with  this 
understanding.  The  troops  in  the  works  would  be 
proved  to  be  inferior  to  the  assailants  if  they  did  not 
repulse  a  force  several  times  greater  than  their  own."5 

General  Schofield  also  gives  very  decided  testimony 
on  this  point.  He  says : 

"In  the  days  of  bayonet  successful  tactics  consisted 
in  massing  a  superior  force  upon  some  vital  point  and 
breaking  the  enemy's  line.  Now  it  is  the  fire  of  the 
musket,  not  the  bayonet,  that  decides  the  battle.  To 
mass  troops  against  the  fire  of  a  covered  line  is  simply 
to  devote  them  to  destruction.  The  greater  the  mass 
the  greater  the  loss — that  is  all.  A  large  mass  has  no 
more  chance  of  success  than  a  small  one.  That  this  is 
absolutely  true  since  the  introduction  of  breech-loaders 
is  probably  not  doubted  by  any  one;  and  it  was  very 
nearly  true  with  the  muzzle-loading  rifles  used  during 
our  late  war,  as  was  abundantly  demonstrated  on  many 


"Atlanta,  p.  80. 

6  Forty-Six  Years  in  the  Army,  pp.  i45~6- 


88  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

There  was  only  one  way  to  take  such  works,  and  that 
was  by  flanking  them.  This  required  an  attacking 
army  largely  superior  in  numbers  to  the  enemy,  so 
large  that  the  attacking  party  could  maintain  its  posi- 
tion in  front  of  the  works  and  still  have  enough  to 
threaten  the  enemy's  communication  and  thus  force  an 
evacuation.  This  was  Grant's  plan  in  the  Virginia 
campaign,  and  Sherman's  in  the  Atlanta  campaign. 
This  plan,  however,  while  it  largely  avoided  the  inevi- 
table and  useless  sacrifice  of  life  in  direct  assaults,  nev- 
ertheless required  obstinate  and  bloody  fighting  for  it 
was  necessary  continually  to  push  the  lines  of  the  at- 
tacking army  as  near  as  possible  up  to  those  of  the 
enemy.  When,  therefore,  an  advance  was  made 
against  fortified  lines,  either  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing them,  if  a  weak  place  could  be  found  in  them,  or 
for  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  lines  of  the  attacking 
army,  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for  holding  the 
ground  gained,  even  if  the  attempt  to  take  the  enemy's 
works  should  fail. 

Charging  columns  were  often  followed  by  men  with 
entrenching  tools  with  which  defensive  works  could  be 
speedily  constructed,  and  it  was  not  an  unusual  sight 
to  see  some  of  the  men  in  a  charging  column  carrying 
rails.  These  were  thrown  down  as  soon  as  a  halt  was 
made  and  then,  if  there  were  no  picks  and  spades,  the 
men  would  scoop  out  a  trench  behind  the  rail  pile  with 
their  bayonets  and  their  tin  dinner  plates,  and  thus 
construct  rude  breastworks  even  under  a  galling  fire. 
I  saw  this  done  at  New  Hope  Church  and  it  was  not 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  89 

an  uncommon  occurrence  in  the  Atlanta  and  Virginia 
campaigns. 

Of  course  there  was  grave  danger  that  those  en- 
gaged in  battle  might  be  either  killed  or  wounded,  and 
some  regiments,  as  shown  by  Colonel  Fox,  suffered  an 
appalling  loss  of  life.  The  artillery  in  battle  made  the 
greatest  noise,  but  comparatively  few  men  were  killed 
by  cannon-balls.  A  single  cannon-ball  rarely  hit  more 
than  one  man;  most  of  them  hit  no  one.  The  most 
deadly  work  of  artillery  was  when  it  fired  grape  and 
canister  at  short  range,  especially  at  dense  columns  of 
men,  or  at  a  line  exposed  to  an  enfilading  fire.  The 
greatest  danger  in  battle  was  that  of  being  killed  or 
wounded  by  a  musket-ball.  Considering  the  number 
of  musket-balls  fired  in  a  great  battle,  the  wonder,  at 
first  thought,  is,  not  how  many  were  killed  or  wounded 
by  them,  but  how  many  escaped  unhurt.  It  has  been 
said,  however,  that  it  takes  a  man's  weight  in  lead  to 
kill  him  in  battle,  and,  though  this  is  a  rough  guess,  I 
suppose  that  it  is  near  the  truth.  Generally  speaking, 
most  of  the  bullets  fired  in  battle  overshoot  the  mark ; 
many  just  miss;  some  go  through  the  clothing  only; 
of  those  which  hit  the  person,  many  inflict  only  flesh 
wounds  and  do  not  touch  a  vital  spot.7  The  explosion 
of  a  mine,  like  that  at  Petersburg,  causes  great  loss  of 
life,  but  there  were  few  such  catastrophes  in  the  Civil 
War. 

In  reading  of  battles  and  in  considering  the  inspir- 

7  See  Colonel  Fox,  The  Chance  of  Being  Hit  in  Battle,  Century 
Mag.,  vol.  36,  p.  93. 


9O  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

ing  motives  of  those  who  fought  them,  there  are  many 
things  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  personal  brav- 
ery of  the  combatants  is  of  course  an  important  ele- 
ment. This  has  always  been  a  distinguishing  quality 
of  the  American  soldier,  and  no  troops  in  the  world 
ever  exhibited  it  in  a  higher  degree  than  did  the  sol- 
diers on  both  sides  in  the  Civil  War.  I  do  not  mean 
by  this  the  dare-devil  courage  that  apparently  made 
many  men  reckless  of  life.  Of  this  there  were  many 
instances  also,  but  most  men  in  the  army  did  not  expose 
themselves  to  danger  from  mere  indifference  to  it.  I 
am  quite  sure  that  on  many  occasions,  if  I  had  had 
nothing  to  stay  me  but  my  courage,  I  should  have  run 
away  at  once  without  standing  upon  the  order  of  my 
going.  But  there  were  motives  and  feelings  other 
than  mere  personal  courage  that  inspired  the  soldier. 
An  honorable  pride  nerved  many  men  to  face  death 
rather  than  to  seek  safety  in  dishonorable  flight. 
Moreover,  there  was  something  in  the  highest  degree 
inspiring  in  a  great  battle.  Probably  some  of  the  in- 
spiration was  artificially  created,  or  at  least  stimulated, 
as  we  see  it  created  and  stimulated  in  an  exciting  polit- 
ical campaign  by  great  processions,  fire-works,  huzzas, 
and  other  artifices  well  known  to  politicians.  The  ex- 
ample of  a  general  rallying  his  troops,  as  General  Sher- 
idan rallied  his  at  Winchester,  seemed  to  impart  to  all 
who  saw  him  an  enthusiasm  that  spread  like  wild-fire. 
There  were  hundreds  of  such  instances,  less  noted  but 
equally  heroic  and  equally  inspiring,  in  the  Civil  War. 
\  It  was  characteristic  of  the  Confederates  that  they 


CAMP,,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  QI 

charged  with  what  came  to  be  well  known  as  the  Con- 
federate "yell."  It  was  apt  to  strike  terror  to  the  new 
recruit  who  heard  it  for  the  first  time,  but  his  veteran 
comrade  waited  until  the  advancing  hosts  came  within 
range  of  his  musket,  well  knowing  that  a  musket-ball 
was  far  more  effective  than  a  yell.\ 

In  my  opinion,  the  most  inspiring  motive  was  a  con- 
scientious sense  of  duty — the  same  feeling  that  in  all 
ages  has  inspired  martyrs  at  the  stake  or  on  the  scaf- 
fold. We  call  it  patriotism,  but  patriotism  is  only 
another  name  for  that  sense  of  duty  to  country  which, 
next  to  the  sense  of  duty  to  God,  is  the  highest  motive 
that  can  excite  men  to  heroic  deeds.  On  a  great  bat- 
tle-field everything  is  calculated  to  arouse  heroic  im- 
pulses in  even  the  ordinary  man.  The  most  philo- 
sophic person  catches  some  of  the  excitement  created 
by  a  fire-engine  tearing  along  the  street.  But  such  a 
sight  is  of  trifling  significance  compared  with  that  of  a 
battery  ploughing  along  a  rough  road,  or  through 
fields  and  woods,  bouncing  over  rocks,  logs  and 
ditches,  wheeling  into  position,  and  in  the  twinkling  of 
an  eye  opening  fire  with  deafening  roar  and  sheets  of 
flame  mowing  great  swaths  through  the  columns  of  an 
advancing  enemy. 

We  see  a  great  political  procession  go  by  with  wav- 
ing banners  and  loud  huzzas  and  we  can  not  help  catch- 
ing some  of  the  enthusiasm.  We  see  a  regiment  of 
militia  marching  with  gleaming  guns  and  martial  step ; 
we  hear  the  bugle  notes ;  and  the  sight  inspires  the  or- 
dinary spectator  with  something  of  military  ardor. 


92  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

An  audience  is  sometimes  stirred  to  its  depths  by  the 
mere  waving  of  a  flag.  An  old  soldier  at  a  regimental 
reunion,  even  after  a  third  of  a  century  has  passed,, can 
hardly  repress  the  tears  that  come  unbidden  at  the  un- 
folding of  a  battle-rent  flag,  typical  to  him  of  so  many 
hard-fought  battles  and  desperate  contests.  Is  it  cause 
for  wonder  that,  when  it  waves  over  him  in  battle,  it 
makes  him  almost  delirious  with  enthusiasm  ? 

But  it  is  impossible  to  impart  to  one  who  never  par- 
ticipated in  a  battle  the  feelings  of  the  soldiers  them- 
selves, when,  amidst  the  roar  of  cannon,  the  bursting 
of  shells,  and  the  flash  of  musketry,  opposing  hosts 
madly  rush  against  each  other  in  charge  and  counter- 
charge, "where  men  become  iron  with  nerves  of  steel," 
and  those  who  at  home  were  esteemed  the  most  quiet 
and  orderly  citizens,  become,  for  the  time,  animated 
with  almost  supernatural  courage  that  makes  them  ut- 
terly fearless  of  death. 

In  every  battle  were  seen  those  known  as  "skulkers." 
Despite  the  utmost  vigilance  of  the  officers,  they  would 
succeed  in  getting  to  the  rear,  and  to  all  who  passed 
they  would  tell  how  their  regiments  had  been  cut  to 
pieces  and  that  they  were  the  only  survivors  left  to  tell 
the  doleful  tale.  They  generally  had  a  sneaking  look 
and  were  easily  recognized  by  the  veteran  soldier,  who 
soon  came  to  know  them  by  sight  and  who  paid  little 
attention  to  their  extravagant  stories  of  carnage  in 
front.  These  were  the  men  who,  after  the  war,  were 
usually  found  on  street-corners  loudly  boasting  of  their 
prodigies  of  valor. 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  93 

Besides  the  ordinary  skulkers  there  were  the  consti- 
tutional cowards.  It  is  as  difficult  to  define  the  psycho- 
logical distinction  between  an  ordinary  skulker  and  a 
constitutional  coward  as  it  is  to  define  that  between 
an  ordinary  thief  and  a  kleptomaniac,  for  between  the 
skulker  and  the  constitutional  coward  there  were  in- 
numerable gradations.  But  a  well-defined  type  of  the 
latter  was  easily  recognized.  He  did  not  boast.  His 
face  in  time  of  battle  took  on  a  look  of  abject  terror 
pitiable  to  behold,  betokening  an  inward  unspeakable 
agony.  Men  of  this  type  could  be  found  in  almost 
every  regiment.  No  appeal  to  their  sense  of  duty, 
their  patriotism  or  pride  could  overcome  the  terror 
inspired  by  the  sound  of  battle.  I  have  seen  men  who, 
the  moment  the  firing  commenced,  began  to  tremble  like 
an  aspen  leaf,  with  the  perspiration  dripping  from  them 
in  great  drops.  An  officer  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
told  me  of  a  man  of  this  type  who,  when  situated  so 
that  he  could  not  run  away,  would  mechanically  load 
his  gun,  shut  his  eyes,  and  fire  into  the  air.  The  poor 
fellow  was  killed  after  all.  The  wise  and  humane 
officer  soon  acquired  the  experience  enabling  him  to 
differentiate  the  constitutional  coward  from  the  or- 
dinary skulker,  and  he  endeavored,  if  possible,  to  as- 
sign the  timid  soldier  to  some  duty  where  he  could  do 
better  service  than  he  was  able  to  do  on  the  firing  line, 
and  where  his  terror  would  not  demoralize  his  com- 
rades. 

To  speak  of  the  "amenities  of  war"  would  seem  to 
most  persons  like  using  a  misnomer,  and  yet  during  the 


94  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Civil  War  there  were  many  illustrations  of  a  fraternal 
feeling  between  the  combatants  such  as  probably  never 
existed  between  the  soldiers  of  opposing  armies  in  any 
other  war  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Those  who 
have  heard  the  eloquent  lecture  of  the  Confederate 
General  John  B.  Gordon,  recounting  some  of  his  war 
eminiscences,  will  remember  hearing  him  relate  how 
the  Confederate  and  Union  soldiers  fraternized  in  the 
eastern  armies,  and  how  on  one  occasion  the  Confed- 
erate soldiers  in  his  command  indignantly  insisted  that 
the  laws  of  hospitality  required  the  safe  return  of  the 
Union  soldier  who  had  been  surprised  while  making 
them  a  friendly  visit.  Substantially  the  same  fraternal 
feeling  existed  between  the  opposing  pickets  during 
the  siege  of  Chattanooga.  It  was  a  frequent  occur- 
rence for  them  to  meet  and  exchange  papers  and  have 
a  friendly  chat,  and  I  never  heard  that  the  laws  of  hos- 
pitality were  abused  by  the  soldiers  of  either  side. 

There  were  similar  courtesies  during  the  Atlanta 
campaign.  A  striking  exhibition  of  them  was  given 
at  Rocky  Face  Ridge.  The  79th  was  posted  about 
half  way  up  the  ridge,  and  at  one  time  the  pickets  had 
orders  to  keep  up  a  steady  fire  all  night  against  the 
Confederates  on  the  summit.  One  of  the  79th  pickets 
learned  in  some  way  that  a  Kentucky  Confederate  reg- 
iment, in  which  he  had  a  brother  or  a  brother-in-law, 
was  near  by.  He  communicated  the  fact  to  the  near- 
est Confederate  picket  who  kindly  volunteered  to  find 
his  relative  and  bring  him  to  the  Confederate  picket 
line ;  this  he  did.  and  the  79th  man  and  his  Confederate 


1 


CAMP,    MARCH    AND    BATTLE  95 

relative  talked  together  for  several  hours  from  be- 
hind their  respective  trees,  while  each  was  keeping  up 
a  steady  fire,  according  to  orders,  against  the  enemy's 
lines.  It  is  to  be  presumed,  .however,  that  they  took 
care  not  to  aim  at  each  others 

With  the  exception  of  the  assault  at  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, the  bloodiest  engagement  of  the  Atlanta  cam- 
paign, in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged,  was  that 
at  Pickett's  Mill,  May  27,  1864,  in  which  an  unsuc- 
cessful assault  was  made  on  the  Confederate  fortified 
lines.  In  this  assault  Wood's  division  of  the  4th 
corps  suffered  a  very  heavy  loss.  The  86th  Ind.,  one 
of  the  regiments  in  Wood's  division,  participated,  and 
its  colonel,  George  Dick,  was  severely  wounded.  It 
would  naturally  be  supposed  that  these  circumstances 
were  not  such  as  to  inspire  the  most  amicable  feelings 
in  the  combatants,  and  yet  in  the  History  of  the  86th 
Indiana?  is  recorded  this  singular  incident  which  oc- 
curred the  next  day  between  a  Confederate  picket  and 
one  of  the  86th  Indiana : 

"On  the  next  day,  the  28th,  the  boys  of  the  Eighty- 
sixth  and  the  Confederates  formed  a  'Board  of  Trade' 
on  a  small  scale  for  the  purpose  of  disposing  of  surplus 
coffee  on  the  one  hand  and  tobacco  upon  the  other. 
An  offer  to  'dicker'  coffee  for  tobacco  always  caught 
the  'Johnnies'  and  put  them  in  good  humor,  if  there 
were  no  officers  around.  On  the  other  hand  tobacco 
was  in  brisk  demand  in  the  Union  ranks.  When  there 
was  an  official  about  they  would  signal  not  to  come. 


96  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

but  as  soon  as  he  was  gone,  traffic  would  be  resumed. 
They  seemed  to  be  in  excellent  humor  over  their  great 
success  in  repelling  the  assault  of  the  previous  day. 
They  were  quite  willing  to  talk  of  the  campaign,  ex- 
pressing themselves  freely  in  regard  to  the  probable 
success  of  it  on  the  Union  part,  and  "lowed  they  had 
enough  for  another  killing  yet  in  ranks.' 

"At  one  of  these  meetings  an  interesting  discussion 
arose  between  Wat  Baker,  of  Company  H,  and  a  Con- 
federate. Snugly  ensconced  behind  two  logs  hid  from 
view  of  the  rebel  line,  the  discussion  began.  Baker 
was  an  oddity,  over  six  feet  in  height,  of  a  nervous  dis- 
position, jerky  in  manner  and  emphatic  in  speech. 
The  discussion,  as  related  by  Baker  afterwards,  ranged 
over  the  whole  subject  of  contention  between  the  North 
and  the  South — slavery  pro  and  con  was  argued,  se- 
cession and  coercion,  and  the  probable  success  of  the 
northern  armies  finally.  For  nearly  two  hours  these 
men  chatted  and  argued  every  phase  of  the  contest 
which  suggested  itself  to  their  minds." 


CHAPTER  FOUR 

SEEING  REAL   WAR;  THE   MARCH    FROM    LOUISVILLE  TO 
NASHVILLE 

As  already  stated,  six  companies  of  the  79th,  un- 
der command  of  Lieut.-Colonel  Oyler,  left  Indianapo- 
lis, August  27,  1862,  arriving  at  Louisville  and  going 
into  camp  the  same  day,  followed  on  September  2  by 
Colonel  Knefler  with  the  four  other  companies.  The 
regiment  remained  in  the  vicinity  of  Louisville  until 
the  first  of  October,  moving  from  one  camp  to  another 
but  not  remaining  very  long  in  any  of  them. 

Most  of  the  time  was  employed  in  drilling,  with  a 
"grand  review"  once  or  twice  a  week,  when  the  men, 
in  woolen  uniforms  and  carrying,  in  addition  to  their 
arms  and  accoutrements,  heavy  knapsacks,  marched 
twelve  or  fifteen  miles  through  the  streets  of  Louis- 
ville. The  weather  was  intensely  hot,  the  streets  were 
very  dusty,  and  many,  not  yet  inured  to  such  discipline, 
were  broken  down  before  leaving  Louisville.  These 
reviews  were  especially  hard  upon  the  raw  recruits  of 
the  79th  because,  while  their  comrades  in  other 
regiments  were  armed  with  Enfield  or  Springfield 
rifles,  the  79th  was  armed  with  Vincennes  rifles — guns 
nearly  twice  as  heavy  as  the  Enfields  and  having 

(97) 

7 


9  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

weighty  sword  bayonets  with  metal  scabbards.  On 
a  very  hot  day  during  one  of  these  idiotic  parades  more 
than  fifty  men  of  the  79th  were  prostrated  by  the  heat, 
from  the  effects  of  which  some  never  fully  recovered. 

While  at  Louisville  we  learned  something  of  camp 
life  and  something  of  picket  duty,  but  very  little  of  real 
war.  Only  the  Ohio  river  separated  most  of  the  reg- 
iment from  their  homes  in  Indiana  and  nearly  every 
day  they  were  visited  by  some  of  their  relatives  and 
friends.  Nevertheless  important  military  operations 
were  taking  place  in  Kentucky  during  our  stay  in 
Louisville.  General  Kirby  Smith  had  entered  eastern 
Kentucky  and  was  threatening  Cincinnati,  and  Gen- 
erals Bragg  and  Buell  were  on  a  race  to  Louisville.  On 
August  30,  1862,  the  battle  of  Richmond,  Kentucky, 
was  fought  and  the  Federal  troops  under  General  Nel- 
son, chiefly  raw  recruits,  were  defeated  and  routed. 
Nelson  came  on  to  Louisville  and  began  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  new  troops.  He  was  killed  there  by  General 
Jeff.  C.  Davis  for  an  unprovoked  and  flagrant  insult. 

For  a  time  there  were  rumors  that  Louisville  was 
about  to  be  attacked.  Breastworks  were  hastily 
thrown  up  and  the  indications  were  that  we  might  have 
a  battle  at  once;  but  Bragg,  after  halting  a  few  days 
at  Munfordsville,  turned  aside  and  went  to  Bardstown 
and  Buell  continued  his  march  to  Louisville.  I  was  on 
picket  duty  and  talked  with  many  of  Buell's  men  as 
they  passed.  Buell  and  Bragg  had  been  marching  for 
several  days  toward  Louisville,  and  at  Munfordsville 
the  two  armies  were  in  close  proximity,  but  each 


MARCH  THROUGH  KENTUCKY          99 

seemed  careful  to  avoid  bringing  on  a  battle.  I 
thought  at  the  time,  in  common  with  many  others  in 
and  out  of  the  army,  that  this  was  very  mysterious 
strategy,  but  since  then  it  has  been  satisfactorily  shown 
that  it  would  not  have  been  good  generalship  on  Gen- 
eral Buell's  part  to  risk  a  battle  before  reaching  Louis- 
ville.1 The  last  of  Buell's  army  arrived  September  29. 
The  next  day  an  order  came  relieving  him  and  appoint- 
ing General  Thomas  as  his  successor.  General 
Thomas,  with  that  loyalty  to  his  superiors  and  total 
absence  of  selfishness  which  at  all  times  characterized 
his  conduct,  earnestly  protested,  and  so,  for  the  time, 
Buell  was  retained,  with  Thomas  as  second  in  com- 
mand, and  on  October  i  he  marched  in  pursuit  of 
Bragg. 

The  new  troops  already  in  Louisville,  and  those  that 
came  soon  afterward,  about  22,000  in  all,  were  incor- 
porated into  the  army  as  rapidly  as  possible,  new  regi- 
ments being  brigaded  with  those  that  had  seen  actual 
service;  and  the  army  was  divided  into  first,  second, 
and  third  corps  under  the  commands  respectively  of 
Generals  Alexander  McD.  McCook,  Thomas  L.  Crit- 
tenden,  and  Charles  C.  Gilbert.  The  79th  Indiana  was 
assigned  to  General  Samuel  Beatty's  brigade  in  Van 
Cleve's  division  of  Crittenden's  corps.  The  other  reg- 
iments of  the  brigade  were  the  I9th  Ohio,  the  9th  and 
i  ith  Ky.  The  I9th  Ohio  and  the  9th  Ky.,  both  splen- 

1  See  General  Cist's  explanation  in  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
P-  73- 


IOO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

did  regiments  that  had  fought  at  Shiloh,  were  brigaded 
with  the  79th  Ind.  throughout  the  service. 

As  already  stated,  Buell's  army  left  Louisville  Octo- 
ber i.  Contrary  to  the  plans  of  Bragg,  who  now  in- 
tended to  avoid  giving  battle  in  Kentucky  and  who,  at 
the  time,  was  absent  in  Frankfort  assisting  in  the  in- 
stallation of  a  Confederate  "provisional  governor,"  a 
general  engagement  was  precipitated  at  Perryville. 
Kentucky,  October  8,  1862.  On  account  of  a  misun- 
derstanding of  existing  conditions,  the  battle  on  the 
Federal  side  was  fought  chiefly  by  McCook's  corps.  It 
resulted  in  nothing  of  importance  except  great  loss  of 
life  to  the  troops  engaged.  At  this  battle  Beatty's 
brigade  was  in  reserve,  the  men  had  been  ordered  to 
divest  themselves  of  their  knapsacks  and  \vere  in 
momentary  expectation  of  going  into  action,  when  it 
was  learned  that  Bragg  had  withdrawn  and  was  again 
in  retreat.  The  next  day  I  went  over  the  battle-field, 
seeing  many  of  the  dead  who  had  not  yet  been  buried 
and  many  mangled  bodies.  One  poor  man  was  almost 
cut  in  two  by  a  cannon-ball  which  had  gone  through 
his  body  near  his  waist.  I  observed  large  saplings  and 
limbs  that  had  been  cut  off  by  cannon-balls  and  great 
furrows  which  these  had  ploughed  in  the  ground. 

After  the  battle  we  marched  to  Crab  Orchard,  then 
to  the  Wild  Cat  battle-ground,  and  from  there  through 
Mt.  Vernon,  Somerset,  and  Glasgow,  reaching  Scotts- 
ville,  Kentucky,  November  6.  On  the  /th  we  passed 
over  the  Tennessee  line,  and  reached  Gallatin  on  the  8th. 
On  the  loth  we  crossed  the  Cumberland  river,  camping 


MARCH  THROUGH  KENTUCKY         IOI 

that  night  at  Silver  Spring,  about  eighteen  miles  from 
Nashville.  We  continued  in  camp  there  until  the  i8th, 
when  we  marched  toward  Nashville  and  remained  in 
that  vicinity,  changing  the  location  of  our  camp  sev- 
eral times,  until  we  started,  December  26th,  on  the 
march  to  Murfreesboro.  As  we  passed  the  Hermitage 
on  our  way  to  Nashville  the  men  gave  three  cheers  for 
"Old  Hickory."  He  had  said — and  nobody  doubted 
that  he  meant  what  he  said — that  "The  Union  must 
and  shall  be  preserved."  If  he,  instead  of  James 
Buchanan,  had  been  President  in  the  early  part  of 
1861,  the  "irrepressible  conflict"  might  have  been  post- 
poned, but  it  could  not  have  been  avoided.  The  con- 
test between  freedom  and  slavery  was  inevitable. 

On  October  24,  1862,  while  on  the  march  through 
Kentucky,  General  William  S.  Rosecrans  had  been  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  the 
Cumberland  and  the  troops  in  his  department  were  now 
designated  as  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  but  the 
name  by  which  the  army  was  popularly  known  was 
that  later  confirmed  by  general  orders  of  the  War  De- 
partment, viz. :  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Soon 
afterward  the  army  was  divided  into  the  right  wing, 
center,  and  left  wing,  under  the  commands  respectively 
of  Generals  McCook,  Thomas,  and  Crittenden. 

General  Buell  was  singularly  unfortunate.  Like 
McClellan  he  was  unpopular  with  the  people  and  with 
the  authorities  at  Washington,  but,  unlike  him,  he  was 
also  unpopular  with  a  large  part  of  his  own  army,  es- 


IO2  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

pecially  with  the  new  troops,  who  were  unaccustomed 
to  the  rigid  restraints  of  military  life  and  had  not  yet 
learned  the  value  of  military  training.  The  soldiers 
who  at  first  chafed  under  Btiell's  discipline  came  in 
time  to  realize  that  it  was  largely  by  reason  of  it  that, 
out  of  the  raw  materials  he  found,  he  was  able  to  lay 
the  foundation  of  the  splendid  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. His  unpopularity  with  the  people  of  the  North 
was  due  to  a  wide-spread  distrust  of  his  loyalty,  but 
the  injustice  of  this  is  now  generally  conceded.  Like 
every  other  prominent  Federal  general,  he  had  incurred 
the  hostility  of  Halleck,  and  the  immediate  cause  of  his 
removal  was  probably  his  refusal  to  acquiesce  in  a 
ridiculous  scheme  of  the  latter  which  contemplated 
Buell's  advance  into  east  Tennessee  through  Cumber- 
land Gap,  a  plan  that  would  have  compelled  him  to  re- 
ly upon  wagon  transportation  for  a  distance  of  240 
miles,  would  have  exposed  him  to  constant  danger  of 
having  his  communications  destroyed  and  the  different 
detachments  of  his  army  defeated  in  detail,  and  would 
likewise  have  left  both  Nashville  and  Louisville  open 
to  attack.  General  Cist,  a  military  critic  not  unfa- 
vorable to  Buell,  thus  sums  up  his  weakness  as  a  mili- 
tary commander  :2 

"Then,  again,  Buell's  earlier  military  training  in  the 
bureau  office  he  held  so  many  years  unfitted  him  for 
the  handling,  on  the  battle-field,  of  the  large  number  of 
troops  which  composed  his  command.  But  very  few 

'Army  of  the  Cumberland,  p.  76. 


MARCH  THROUGH  KENTUCKY         1 03 

generals  during  the  rebellion  were  able  to  successfully 
handle  on  the  battle-field  as  large  an  army  as  was  un- 
der Buell.  In  fact,  the  general  who  has  sufficient  tal- 
ent as  a  good  organizer  and  drill  master  to  enter  into 
the  details  necessary  to  bring  an  army  out  of  raw 
troops,  has  not  the  military  genius  required  to  handle 
a  large  army  in  fighting  and  winning  great  battles." 

One  of  the  very  qualities,  however,  that  made 
Thomas  a  great  general  was  his  familiarity  with  "all 
the  details  necessary  to  bring  an  army  out  of  raw 
troops."  Moreover,  Buell  was  constantly  hampered 
by  Halleck  and  it  is  impossible  at  this  day  to  determine 
what  he  might  have  accomplished  if  he  had  been  given 
the  men  and  the  opportunities  that  were  afterward  so 
lavishly  bestowed  upon  more  favored  generals.  This 
much  is  certain :  that  it  was  his  prompt  movement,  of 
his  own  accord,  that  ensured  the  Federal  victory  at 
Shiloh,3  and  that  many  of  his  suggestions  were  after- 
ward adopted  by  the  War  Department  and  carried 
into  successful  execution. 

Of  General  Rosecrans,  the  new  commander,  we  had 
heard  but  little,  but  that  little  was  favorable,  and  he 
soon  won  the  affections  of  his  army. 

3  Van  Home  in  Hist.  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  vol.  i,  pp.  103- 
105,  shows  conclusively  that  Halleck,  Grant  and  Sherman  were 
all  surprised  by  the  Confederate  attack,  and  that,  but  for  the 
timely  arrival  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under  Buell,  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  would  have  resulted  in  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  the 
Federal  army.  To  the  same  effect  see  Ropes'  Story  of  the  Civil 
War,  vol.  2,  pp.  67-69. 


IO4  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

I  do  not  find  in  my  diary  a  great  deal  pertaining  to 
our  march  through  Kentucky  that  would  be  of  general 
interest.  Much  of  the  country  through  which  we 
passed,  after  the  battle  of  Perryville,  was  rough  and 
broken  and  the  inhabitants  were  poor.  In  the  poorest 
portions,  however,  there  was  the  greatest  loyalty  to  the 
Federal  cause.  When  going  through  Somerset,  the 
county  seat  of  Pulaski  county,  I  was  told  that,  of  about 
3,000  voters  some  2,300  had  enlisted  in  the  Federal 
armies.  We  passed  the  battle-fields  of  Wild  Cat  and 
Mill  Spring,  but  we  saw  little  on  our  route  that  was  of 
special  interest.  During  a  considerable  portion  of  our 
march  through  Kentucky  there  was  continual  skir- 
mishing between  the  rear  guard  of  the  Confederate  and 
the  advance  guard  of  the  Federal  army,  and  the  79th 
was  several  times  under  fire,  losing  a  few  men  killed 
and  wounded,  but  there  was  no  battle  after  that  of 
Perryville.  Nevertheless  the  march  was  very  trying 
to  raw  recruits.  The  roads  were  rough  and,  on  ac- 
count of  a  long  drought,  water  was  scarce.  Much  of 
that  found  in  the  ponds  along  the  roads  was  unfit  to 
drink  and  caused  a  great  deal  of  diarrhea.  We  had 
already  learned  something — we  learned  a  great  deal 
more  afterward — about  a  soldier's  life  on  the  march. 

While  in  the  vicinity  of  Nashville  we  learned  more 
also  of  camp  life  than  we  had  learned  at  Louisville.  We 
were  now  in  the  enemy's  country,  Bragg's  army  was 
not  far  distant,  and  detachments  of  Confederate  cav- 
alry hovered  about  Nashville,  disputing  the  way  with 
every  forage  and  supply  train,  so  that  a  whole  brigade 


MARCH  THROUGH  KENTUCKY         IO5 

of  infantry  was  sometimes  required  to  guard  a  forage 
train.  The  closest  vigilance  was  demanded  of  the 
Federal  pickets  and  there  was  heavy  skirmishing  al- 
most every  day\l  In  addition  to  these  troubles  many  of 
the  regiment  sickened  and  died.  They  had  been  worn 
out  by  the  "grand  reviews"  in  Louisville  and  by  the 
hardships  of  the  march  through  Kentucky.  Several  of 
our  camps  near  Nashville  were  in  unhealthy  localities. 
Many  contracted  camp  fever  (a  species  of  typhoid), 
pneumonia,  and  chronic  diarrhea.  Ten  men  of  my 
company,  most  of  whom  had  left  home  apparently 
strong,  robust,  and  in  perfect  health,  died  in  the  month 
of  December,  1862.  ' 


CHAPTER  FIVE 

THE    BATTLE   OF    STONE'S    RIVER 

While  at  Nashville  the  army  was  again  reorganized, 
pursuant  to  an  order  of  General  Rosecrans  issued  No- 
vember 7,  1862 — Major-General  George  H.  Thomas 
commanding  the  center,  Major-General  A.  McD.  Mc- 
Cook  the  right  wing,  and  Major-General  Thomas  L. 
Crittenden  the  left  wing.  Beatty's  brigade  became  the 
ist  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  which  was  the  3d 
division  of  Crittenden's  corps. 

The  march  from  Nashville  to  Murfreesboro  was  be- 
gun December  26,  1862,  Crittenden's  corps  moving  by 
the  Murfreesboro  pike  and  bivouacking  that  night  near 
Lavergne.  Heavy  rains  and  a  dense  fog  retarded  the 
advance  on  the  next  day  and  none  was  made  on  the 
28th,  which  was  Sunday.  By  the  night  of  the  2Qth 
Crittenden's  corps  was  within  two  or  three  miles  of 
Murfreesboro.  It  was  now  evident  that  Bragg,  con- 
trary to  the  expectations  of  Rosecrans,  intended  to 
make  a  stand  north  of  Murfreesboro,  and  that  a  battle 
was  to  be  fought.  On  December  30  the  time  was  em- 
ployed by  both  armies  in  getting  the  troops  into  the 
various  positions  to  which  they  were  assigned. 

Murfreesboro  is  a  town  on  the  Nashville  and  Chat- 
(106) 


BATTLE    OF    STONE  S    RIVER  IO/ 

tanooga  railroad,  about  thirty  miles  southeast  of  Nash- 
ville. Stone's  river,  after  passing  the  town,  flows  in 
a  northwesterly  course  and  separates  the  main  portion 
of  the  battle-field  from  the  town,  the  south  end  of  the 
battle-field  being  about  two  miles  west  of  the  town. 
The  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad  and  the  Nash- 
ville and  Murfreesboro  turnpike  run  in  a  northwest  di- 
rection and  nearly  parallel  with  the  river,  crossing  it  a 
short  distance  west  of  the  town  and  intersecting  about 
500  yards  beyond  the  river.  The  intersection,  which 
makes  two  acute  angles,  is  about  one-half  mile  west  of 
the  river.  The  Wilkinson  turnpike  runs  westerly 
through  the  southern  portion  of  the  battle-field ;  about 
one  and  one-half  miles  south  of  this  pike,  and  nearly 
parallel  with  it,  is  the  Franklin  road.  When  the  bat- 
tle was  fought  a  considerable  portion  of  the  ground 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Federal  right  was  covered  with  a 
dense  growth  of  cedar  thickets. 

General  Bragg,  supposing  the  Federal  army  to  be 
largely  superior  to  his  own  in  numbers,  and  expecting 
to  be  attacked,  had  formed  his  lines  originally  for  de- 
fense, but  by  December  30  he  determined  that  he  would 
himself  take  the  initiative  and  deliver  battle  the  next 
day.  General  Polk  commanded  the  right  wing  and 
General  Hardee  the  left  wing  of  the  Confederate  army, 
all  of  it  being  on  the  west  side  of  Stone's  river  ex- 
cept Breckinridge's  division  which  was  the  extreme 
right  and  was  on  the  east  side  of  the  river.  Mc- 
Cown's  division  was  on  the  extreme  left,  with  Cle- 
burne's  division  in  rear  of  it ;  next  was  Withers's  divis- 


108  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

ion,  with  Cheatham's  in  rear  of  it,  and  next,  and  across 
the  river,  was  Breckinridge's  division. 

All  the  Federal  army  on  the  night  of  December  30 
was  west  of  Stone's  river,  the  final  formation  that 
night,  counting  by  divisions  from  right  to  left,  being 
as  follows :  Johnson's,  Davis's  and  Sheridan's  of  the 
right  wing,  then  Negley's  division  of  the  center  with 
Rousseau's  in  reserve,  and  then  Palmer's  and  Wood's 
divisions  of  the  left  wing.  It  was  intended  to  put 
Van  Cleve's  division  on  the  extreme  left  the  next  morn- 
ing. The  extreme  right  brigade  of  the  Federal  army 
was  Willich's  of  Johnson's  division,  extending  to  the 
Franklin  road ;  the  extreme  left  was  Hascall's  brigade 
of  Wood's  division,  extending  to  Stone's  river;  Sher- 
idan's left  connected  with  Negley's  right  on  the  Wil- 
kinson pike ;  Palmer's  left  and  Wood's  right  connected 
at  the  Nashville  pike;  Hascall's  brigade  of  Wood's 
division,  the  extreme  left,  was  next  to  the  river. 

The  general  direction  of  the  Federal  line  conformed 
to  that  of  the  Confederates,  except  that  there  was  a 
considerable  distance  between  the  north  ends  of  the 
two  battle-fronts,  while  the  lines  of  Johnson's  division 
were  only  a  few  hundred  yards  distant  from  the  Con- 
federate lines,  and  that  the  Confederate  left  extended 
a  considerable  distance  beyond  the  Federal  right.  Mc- 
Cook's  lines,  in  conforming  to  those  of  the  Confeder- 
ates in  his  front,  were  considerably  broken. 

The  plans  of  both  Rosecrans  and  Bragg  were  identi- 
cal in  this,  that  each  had  arranged  to  begin  battle  early 
on  the  morning  of  the  3ist  by  an  advance  of  his  left, 


BATTLE    OF    STONES    RIVER 

wheeling  to  the  right — Rosecrans  with  the  expectation 
of  advancing  on  Murfreesboro  and  getting  into  the 
rear  of  Bragg's  army,  and  Bragg  with  the  intention 
of  doubling  back  the  Federal  right  across  the  Nash- 
ville turnpike  and  cutting  off  retreat  to  Nashville. 

General  Rosecrans,  on  the  night  of  the  3Oth,  observ- 
ing the  position  of  McCook's  lines,  had  suggested  a 
reformation  of  them,  but  no  change  was  made.  The 
urgent  necessity  of  a  change  was  disclosed  when  it  was 
discovered  during  the  afternoon  that  the  Confederate 
left  extended  considerably  beyond  Johnson's  division, 
thus  exposing  the  Federal  right  to  great  danger  of  be- 
ing flanked.  In  his  report  of  the  battle,  McCook  states 
that  this  information  was  conveyed  to  Rosecrans. 
Nothing  was  done,  however,  except  to  order  fires  built 
still  farther  to  the  right  "to  deceive  the  enemy,  making 
them  believe  we  were  massing  troops  there."  It  does 
not  appear  that  the  enemy  was  deceived,  certainly  not 
after  daylight  the  next  morning.  McCook,  however, 
called  a  conference  of  his  division  commanders  and  the 
brigades  of  Willich  and  Kirk  were  ordered  to  the  right 
of  his  line  "to  protect  the  right  flank  and  guard  against 
surprise  there."  As  the  dangerous  situation  of  the 
Federal  right  was  known,  it  is  clear  that  "some  one 
had  blundered." 

Early  on  the  morning  of  December  3ist,  Van  Cleve's 
division  was  ordered  to  cross  Stone's  river  and  to  be- 
gin the  attack  on  Breckinridge,  with  the  expectation 
of  carrying  out  Rosecrans's  original  plan,  which  was 
for  "Crittenden  to  cross  Van  Cleve's  division  at  the 


IIO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

lower  ford,  covered  and  supported  by  the  pioneer  brig- 
ade and  to  advance  on  Breckinridge ;  Wood's  division 
to  follow  by  brigades,  crossing  at  the  upper  ford,  and, 
moving  on  Van  Cleve's  right,  to  carry  everything  be- 
fore them  into  Murfreesboro."  We  waded  Stone's 
river  in  water  over  waist  deep,  but  before  Van  Cleve's 
and  Wood's  divisions  had  time  to  "carry  everything 
before  them,"  according  to  order,  or  even  to  fire  a  gun, 
ominous  tidings  came  from  the  right  where  the  "carry- 
ing all  before  them"  at  this  stage  of  the  battle  was 
being  done  exclusively  by  the  Confederates  under  Gen- 
eral Hardee. 

Bragg  had  himself  opened  the  battle  on  our  right  at 
6:30  A.  M.  To  the  blunder  of  not  reforming  Mc- 
Cook's  lines  were  added  still  greater  blunders.  Al- 
though the  dangerous  situation  of  the  Federal  right 
was  known,  General  Johnson's  headquarters  were  a 
mile  or  more  in  rear  of  his  division.  Willich,  discov- 
ering the  imminent  peril  confronting  him,  instead  of 
sending  an  orderly,  had  himself  gone  to  the  division 
headquarters  to  make  a  report  and  had  ordered  his 
brigade  to  breakfast.  Some  of  the  artillery  horses 
were  unhitched  from  the  cannon  and  had  been  taken  to 
water.  McCook,  it  is  said,  was  shaving  when  the  at- 
tack began. 

This  was  the  situation  when  Cleburne's  and  Mc- 
Cown's  divisions  under  General  Hardee,  rapidly  ad- 
vancing a  little  after  daylight,  fell  upon  Johnson's  di- 
vision. It  has  been  asserted  that  this  division  was  not 
surprised.  •  If  there  was  no  surprise  there  was  some- 


BATTLE    OF    STONE  S    RIVER  III 

thing  worse.  Willich's  and  Kirk's  brigades  were  at 
once  enveloped  by  the  overlapping  Confederate  lines. 
Willich  himself  was  captured  while  trying  to  join  his 
brigade  and  before  he  could  give  a  single  order,  and 
Kirk  was  mortally  wounded.  So  sudden  and  fierce 
was  the  Confederate  advance  that  three  hundred  and 
fifty  of  Kirk's  brigade  and  over  seven  hundred  of  Wil- 
lich's were  taken  prisoners.  Both  brigades  were 
thrown  into  utter  confusion  and  were  swept  from  the 
field  with  a  loss  of  eleven  guns.  Colonel  Baldwin, 
commanding  the  remaining  and  reserve  brigade  of 
Johnson's  division,  had  barely  time  to  form  it  in  line  of 
battle  when  it  was  enveloped  by  the  Confederate  lines, 
extending  far  beyond  the  right  flank,  and  was  also 
driven  back  just  in  time  to  avoid  being  surrounded  and 
captured,  when  it  took  position  on  the  right  of  Davis's 
division. 

The  exulting  troops  of  Cleburne's  and  McCown's  di- 
visions, now  reenforced  by  those  of  Withers's,  and 
later  by  those  of  Cheatham's,  fell  in  turn  upon  Davis's 
and  Sheridan's  divisions  and  for  several  hours  these 
two  made  a  heroic  effort  to  maintain  their  position,  re- 
peatedly repelling  the  assaults  of  the  Confederate  col- 
umns. At  last,  however,  Davis  was  also  forced  back, 
and  then  Sheridan,  the  latter  reforming  on  the  right  of 
Negley.  Four  Confederate  divisions  were  now  massed 
and  hurled  against  the  divisions  of  Negley  and  Sheri- 
dan, and  in  making  and  repelling  these  assaults  oc- 
curred the  fiercest  fighting  of  the  day.  After  four 
hours  of  fighting,  and  after  his  troops  had  exhausted 


112  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

their  ammunition,  Sheridan's  division  was  again  com- 
pelled to  fall  back. 

The  Federal  army  was  now  in  a  most  desperate 
situation  and  it  was  evident  that  it  could  be  saved  only 
by  establishing  a  new  line  of  battle.  The  position  se- 
lected for  this  purpose  was  on  the  high  ground  west  of 
and  near  to  the  Nashville  pike.  But  it  was  necessary 
first  to  establish  a  temporary  line  strong  enough  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  the  artillery  could  be 
saved  and  the  troops  posted  on  the  new  line.  The  tem- 
porary line  selected  was  a  depression  in  the  open 
ground  in  rear  of  the  cedar  thickets,  and  to  this  line 
General  Thomas  now  ordered  Negley's  and  Rousseau's 
divisions  to  retire. 

The  formation  of  a  new  line  of  battle  in  face  of  the 
enemy  is  always  a  dangerous  maneuver.  The  move- 
ment ordered  by  General  Thomas  was  especially  haz- 
ardous. Each  of  the  three  divisions  on  the  right  of 
Negley  had  been  overlapped  and  enveloped  by  the  Con- 
federate lines,  compelled  to  change  front,  and  then  to 
fall  back,  and  two  of  them  had  been,  for  a  time, 
almost  completely  disorganized.  Flushed  with  victory 
and  confident  of  success,  the  Confederate  hosts  were 
now  swarming  about  Negley's  and  Rousseau's  divi- 
sions in  front  and  in  rear,  so  that  neither  could  fall 
back  to  the  temporary  line  except  by  cutting  its  way 
through  the  Confederate  lines.  The  movement  or- 
dered by  Thomas  was  a  desperate  one,  but  on  its  suc- 
cessful execution  depended  the  safety  of  the  Federal 


BATTLE    OF    STONES    RIVER  113 

army,  while  its  failure  involved  obvious  defeat  and 
probable  annihilation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

Rousseau's  division  cut  its  way  through  the  Confed- 
erate lines  to  the  position  designated  for  the  temporary 
line,  but,  in  doing  this,  it  was  compelled  to  fight  the 
enemy  in  front  and  in  rear  at  the  same  time.  Negley's 
division  was  now  left  in  a  very  precarious  situation, 
with  swarms  of  Confederates  in  front  and  rear  and  on 
its  right  flank,  and  it,  too,  was  compelled  to  cut  its 
way  through  with  a  loss  of  six  guns.  So  closely  was 
it  pressed  on  all  sides  that  at  one  time,  two  of  the 
brigades,  Miller's  and  Stanley's,  were  compelled  to 
face  to  the  rear  and  charge  the  pursuing  enemy,  thus 
holding  them  in  check  until  the  new  line  was  reached. 
Palmer's  division,  hotly  engaged  at  the  time  of  Neg- 
ley's withdrawal,  was  now  still  more  severely  pressed, 
but  by  most  heroic  fighting  repulsed  the  Confederates, 
preserved  its  organization,  and  established  itself  on 
the  new  line. 

The  offensive  movement  planned  by  Rosecrans  as 
the  ruling  one  was  now  out  of  the  question.  His  su- 
preme object  now  was  to  save  his  army  from  annihila- 
tion. It  was  plain  that  its  salvation  depended  on  main- 
taining the  temporary  line  until  the  permanent  one 
was  securely  established.  It  was  equally  plain  to  the 
Confederates  that  if  they  could  break  the  temporary 
line  their  success  was  certain,  and  victory  seemed  to 
be  almost  within  their  grasp.  Against  the  temporary 
line,  therefore,  the  most  desperate  assaults  were  made 


114  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

by  the  Confederates,  which  were  resisted  with  equal 
desperation  by  those  who  realized  that  it  must  be  held 
at  all  hazards. 

As  already  stated,  Van  Cleve's  division  had  crossed 
the  river  early  in  the  morning  for  the  purpose  of  par- 
ticipating in  the  attack  on  Breckinridge's  division,  but 
had  scarcely  completed  the  crossing  when  the  news 
came  of  the  disaster  to  the  right.  Price's  brigade  was 
left  to  guard  the  ford,  Fyffe's  was  sent  to  fight  off  the 
Confederate  cavalry  which  had  attacked  our  trains,  and 
Beatty's  was  ordered  to  hasten  to  the  Federal  right. 
The  distance  to  be  traveled  was  two  or  three  miles  but 
the  brigade  went  on  double  quick,  arriving  at  the 
moment  Rousseau  was  being  most  sorely  pressed,  and 
took  position  on  his  right,  where  for  a  short  time  it  be- 
came the  extreme  right  of  the  Federal  army  and  so  con- 
tinued until  Fyffe's  and  Harker's  brigades  came  up  and 
took  position  on  Beatty's  right. 

I  could  see,  as  we  marched  to  position,  that  a  great 
disaster  had  befallen  our  army.  Artillery,  ammunition 
wagons,  ambulances,  and  men,  apparently  in  a  con- 
fused mass,  were  hurrying  to  the  rear,  while  tremen- 
dous volleys  of  musketry  were  heard  in  the  cedar  thick- 
ets in  front  of  us.  Shells  were  bursting  on  every  hand, 
cannon-balls  were  cutting  their  way  through  the  thicket 
and  ploughing  up  the  ground,  and  dead  men  and 
horses  in  great  numbers  were  scattered  over  the  open 
fields  near  the  pike.  All  this  plainly  indicated  how 
sorely  our  army  was  being  pressed,  and  the  desperate 
character  of  the  conflict  in  which  we  were  about  to 


BATTLE    OF    STONE^S    RIVER  I  [  j, 

take  part.  The  captain  of  my  company  was  absent 
on  sick  leave,  the  second  lieutenant  had  resigned,  and 
I,  a  mere  boy,  was  the  only  commissioned  officer  pres- 
ent. Not  a  man  in  the  company  had  ever  been  in  battle, 
if  I  except  the  little  affair  in  which  I  took  part  at  Car- 
rick's  Ford.  But  not  a  single  man  flinched. 

There  was  no  time  to  be  lost  and  Beatty's  brigade 
was  at  once  thrown  into  a  cedar  thicket  on  the  right 
of  Rousseau's  division,  the  igth  Ohio  and  the  Qth 
Ky.  forming  the  front  line  and  the  ,79th  Ind.  and 
the  nth  Ky.  the  rear  line.  As  already  stated,  the  two 
regiments  in  front  had  fought  at  Shiloh.  There  were 
no  better  in  the  service,  and  the  bravery  and  coolness 
with  which  they  held  their  ground  furnished  an  in- 
spiring example  to  the  men  of  the  79th. 

While  in  this  position  General  Rosecrans  rode  up, 
remaining  on  horseback  while  he  gave  some  directions 
to  Colonel  Knefler,  inspiring  us  with  confidence  by 
the  coolness  with  which  he  sat  on  his  horse  while 
the  bullets  were  flying  all  about  him.  I  was  not  ten 
feet  distant  and  watched  the  commanding  general  with 
eager  interest.  After  a  few  minutes  he  rode  away  to 
another  part  of  the  field  and  not  long  after  a  cannon- 
ball  took  off  the  head  of  Garesche,  his  chief  of  staff, 
who  was  by  his  side. 

Presently  the  men  in  the  front  line,  who  had  begun 
firing  as  soon  as  they  took  their  position,  exhausted 
their  ammunition;  and  then  the  79th  Ind.  and  the  nth 
Ky.  passed  through  their  ranks,  while  the  men  of  the 
front  line  took  our  former  position  in  the  rear.  Nearly 


Il6  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

all  day  the  battle  raged  in  that  cedar  thicket.  The 
awful  roar  of  cannon  and  musketry  almost  paralyzed 
with  fright  the  wild  denizens  of  the  forest.  The  birds 
twittered  and  flitted  about  in  dumb  terror  and  the 
rabbits  ran  aimlessly  hither  and  thither.  In  his 
Memoirs  General  Sheridan  makes  note  of  a  frightened 
rabbit  that  skipped  from  back  to  back  of  his  men  as 
they  lay  on  the  ground,  running  in  this  way  over  the 
backs  of  a  whole  regiment.  I  did  not  see  anything 
that  day  however  that  excited  my  pity  more  than  a 
poor  old  horse  between  the  lines,  shot  through  and 
through  and  unable  to  move,  though  still  able  to  stand, 
and  exposed  to  every  volley.  Sometimes  we  would 
advance  a  few  hundred  yards  and  then  would  be  driven 
back;  again  we  would  advance  and  again  be  driven 
back,  but  at  the  close  of  the  day  we  held  substantially 
the  same  position  that  we  had  taken  in  the  morning, 
and  that  night  we  lay  on  our  arms  near  the  place 
where  we  had  first  gone  into  battle. 

During  the  afternoon  the  permanent  line  of  battle 
had  been  firmly  established  on  the  high  ground  near  the 
railroad,  extending  from  the  railroad  on  the  right  to 
Stone's  river  on  the  left,  formed  by  divisions  from 
right  to  left  in  the  order  following:  Davis's,  Sheri- 
dan's, Van  Cleve's,  Rousseau's,  and  Palmer's,  with 
Wood's  division  in  reserve  on  the  right  and  Negley's 
on  the  left.  Against  this  new  line  charge  after  charge 
was  made,  the  most  bloody  fighting  in  the  afternoon 
being  for  the  possession  of  Round  Forest,  the  key  to 
the  left.  But  Palmer  continued  to  hold  it  against  every 


BATTLE    OF    STONE'S    RIVER  I  I/ 

assault.  The  last  assault  on  the  right  and  center  of 
the  new  Federal  line  was  repulsed  chiefly  by  Van 
Cleve's  division  and  Harker's  brigade  of  Wood's  divi- 
sion and  by  Stanley's  cavalry. 

The  night  was  very  cold,  we  had  twice  waded 
Stone's  river  in  water  waist  deep;  our  clothes  were 
still  wet,  and  we  had  no  fires.  During  the  night  I  be- 
came so  nearly  frozen  that  I  was  forced  to  get  up  and 
walk  about.  At  almost  every  step  I  stumbled  against 
a  dead  man.  It  caused  a  strange  sensation,  but  did  not 
prevent  me  from  lying  down  again  in  the  midst  of  the 
dead  and  sleeping  soundly  for  a  few  hours. 

The  result  of  the  first  day's  fighting  was  not  en- 
couraging to  the  Federal  soldiers.  Twenty-eight 
pieces  of  artillery  had  been  captured  by  the  Confeder- 
ates; General  Sill  had  been  killed,  General  Kirk  had 
been  mortally  wounded,  and  General  Willich  was  a 
prisoner.  Many  other  officers  had  been  killed  or 
wounded.  Sheridan  had  lost  seventy-two  officers,  and 
the  brigade  of  regulars,  twenty-two.  Seven  thousand 
men  had  been  lost  from  the  ranks.  The  Federal  line 
on  the  right  had  been  driven  back  fully  a  mile  from  the 
position  it  occupied  when  the  battle  began.  The  supply 
trains  sent  back  to  Nashville  had  been  attacked  at  La- 
vergne  and  part  of  them  burned.  The  Confederate 
cavalry  had  gone  entirely  around  the  Federal  army 
during  the  day,  attacking  trains,  and  the  roads  be- 
tween Murfreesboro  and  Nashville  were  filled  with 
frightened  teamsters,  skulkers,  and  stragglers.  The 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been  saved  from  destruc- 


Il8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

tion  chiefly  by  the  wonderful  generalship  of  General 
Thomas. 

That  night  a  council  of  war  was  held  in  a  little 
dimly-lighted  log  cabin.  It  was  a  weird  New  Year's 
eve  party.  The  question  of  retreat  to  Nashville  was 
discussed  and  urged  by  some.  When  it  was  submitted 
to  General  Thomas  his  laconic  reply  was  "This  army 
can't  retreat,"  and  it  did  not.  Rosecrans,  having  as- 
certained that  there  was  enough  ammunition  for  an- 
other day,  determined,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of 
Bragg,  to  remain  on  the  field  and  continue  the  battle. 

Bragg  felt  confident  on  the  night  of  the  3ist  that 
Rosecrans  would  not  risk  another  battle,  but  would 
retreat  to  Nashville,  and  little  was  done  by  the  former 
on  January  ist  beyond  a  few  demonstrations  made  to 
ascertain  whether  Rosecrans  was  preparing  to  retreat 
and  some  attacks  upon  the  Federal  trains.  The  com- 
manders of  both  armies  occupied  the  day  chiefly  in 
reforming  their  lines,  both  preparing  to  resume  the 
offensive  the  following  day  if  the  other  did  not. 

By  this  time  the  Federal  lines  had  been  entirely 
reformed  and  preparations  were  made  on  January  2d 
to  repel  an  anticipated  Confederate  attack  on  the  Fed- 
eral left.  During  the  afternoon  Van  Cleve's  division, 
now  under  command  of  General  Samuel  Beatty,  Van 
Cleve  having  been  wounded,  had  again  been  ordered 
to  the  left,  and  again  had  waded  Stone's  river  and 
taken  position  in  an  open  field  between  the  river  and 
the  woods  where  lay  Breckinridge's  division,  the  right 
of  the  Confederate  army.  Price's  brigade  was  on  the 


BATTLE    OF    STONE^S    RIVER  1 19 

right  next  to  the  river ;  Fyffe's  on  the  left,  and  Beatty's, 
now  commanded  by  Colonel  Grider,  in  reserve.  Next 
on  the  left  of  Van  Cleve's  division  was  Grose's  brigade 
of  Palmer's  division.  These  were  the  only  Federal 
troops  on  the  east  side  of  the  river.-  Negley's  division 
was  posted  in  reserve,  in  rear  of  them,  on  the  west  side 
of  the  river. 

About  4  P.  M.,  after  an  ominous  stillness  of  an  hour 
or  more,  Breckinridge's  division  suddenly  emerged 
from  the  woods  on  the  other  side  of  the  field,  advanc- 
ing in  five  or  six  columns.  Halting  a  moment,  the 
lines  were  formed  as  if  for  dress  parade.  On  the  right 
could  be  seen  some  general  officer  on  a  white  horse 
and  we  could  distinctly  hear  the  command,  "Forward, 
double-quick,  guide  center,  march !"  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  charge  at  Missionary  Ridge  it  was  the  most 
magnificent  spectacle  that  I  saw  during  my  entire  serv- 
ice. Onward  came  the  advancing  columns,  cheering 
as  they  came.  When  within  two  or  three  hundred 
yards  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  the  men  of  that  division, 
who  had  been  lying  flat  on  the  ground  just  behind  the 
crest  of  a  little  knoll,  rose  and  fired  a  tremendous  vol- 
ley. It  did  not  seem  to  make  the  slightest  impres- 
sion. Instantly  the  fire  was  returned,  and  almost  at 
the  same  moment  the  front  line  of  Breckinridge's  divi- 
sion fell  back  behind  the  second,  disclosing  four  pieces 
of  artillery,  dragged  by  hand  and  hitherto  concealed 
between  the  two  front  lines.  The  artillery  at  once 
opened  fire,  and  Van  Cleve's  division  was  forced  back 
across  the  river.  A  little  while  before,  by  order  of 


I2O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

General  Rosecrans,  in  anticipation  of  this  attack,  fifty- 
eight  cannon  had  been  massed  near  the  river  on  a  small 
hill  which  commanded  the  entire  open  field.  As  soon 
as  Van  Cleve's  division  was  out  of  range,  these  fifty- 
eight  cannon,  loaded  with  grape  and  canister,  opened 
their  dreadful  fire.  The  cannonading  was  the  most 
terrific  that  I  heard  during  the  war  and  the  destruction 
was  dreadful,  as  shown  by  the  official  reports  of  the 
losses  of  the  regiments  in  Breckinridge's  division. 

Three  times  the  Confederates  recoiled  under  the  ter- 
rible fire,  but  rallied  and  again  advanced.  Some 
reached  the  brink  of  the  river  and  a  few  crossed  it, 
falling  almost  in  front  of  the  Federal  artillery.  No 
braver  charge  was  made  during  the  war.  I  do  not  ex- 
cept even  the  celebrated  charge  of  Pickett's  division 
at  Gettysburg.  But  no  troops  could  long  stand  such 
a  death-dealing  fire  as  that  to  which  Breckinridge's 
division  was  now  exposed. 

By  this  time  Miller's  brigade  of  Negley's  division 
and  a  part  of  Stanley's  of  the  same  division,  under 
command  of  Colonel  John  F.  Miller,  crossed  the  river 
and  poured  volley  after  volley  into  the  retreating  Con- 
federates, pursuing  them  and  capturing  four  pieces  of 
the  New  Orleans  Washington  Light  Artillery.  Other 
Federal  troops  rapidly  followed  and  the  Confederates 
abandoned  the  field,  leaving  it  covered  with  dead  and 
wounded..  That  was  virtually  the  end  of  the  battle. 
There  was  a  little  skirmishing  the  next  day,  but  on  the 
night  of  January  3  Bragg  retreated.  The  dead  were 


BATTLE    OF    STONES    RIVER  121 

buried  on  the  4th  and  on  the  5th  the  Federal  army 
occupied  Murfreesboro. 

The  battle  of  Stone's  River  is  one  of  the  most  strik- 
ing illustrations  given  during  the  war  of  snatching 
victory  out  of  defeat.  The  surprise  at  Shiloh  well- 
nigh  caused  the  annihilation  of  the  Federal  army  on 
the  first  day  of  the  battle,  but  the  reenforcements 
brought  by  Buell  turned  the  scale  the  next  day.  At 
Stone's  River,  however,  the  victory  on  the  last  day 
was  won  without  reenforcements  and  after  the  army 
had  lost  twenty-eight  pieces  of  artillery.  But  the  most 
remarkable  feature  of  the  battle  was  one  that  had  no 
parallel  in  any  other  of  the  Civil  War:  the  successful 
formation  of  a  new  line  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  after 
half  the  army  had  been  driven  from  position  and  when, 
in  order  to  form  it,  the  troops  had  to  fight  their  way 
through  the  lines  of  the  enemy  enveloping  them  in 
front  and  rear.  The  losses  were  enormous,  consid- 
ering that  nearly  all  of  them  occurred  in  one  day  and 
in  about  one  hour  of  another.1 

1  General  Cist,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  p.  127,  states  the  total 
numbers  engaged  as  follows: 

Infantry.        Artillery.  Cavalry.  Total. 

Federal  37,977              2,223                3.2OO  43,400 

Confederate   39,304              1,662                5,638  46,604 

Cist  also  states  the  losses  as  follows : 

Killed.        Wounded.  Missing.  Total. 

Federal  1,553              7,245                2,800  n,598 

Confederate (K.  and  IV.)  9,000                1,125  10,125 


122  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

The  figures  above  vary  slightly  from  those  given  by  Colonel 
Fox  and  Colonel  Livermore — the  latter  stating  the  numbers  en- 
gaged as  follows : 

Federal    41,400 

Confederate  34,732 

and  the  losses  as  follows  : 

Killed.        Wounded.        Missing.        Total. 

Federal   1,667  7,543  2,626  1 1,846 

Confederate  1,294  7,945  2,500  H,739 

It  is  entirely  safe  to  say  that  each  army  lost  out  of  the  total 
engaged  at  least  25  per  cent,  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  and 
at  least  20  per  cent,  in  killed  and  wounded.  Shepherd's  regular 
brigade  of  Rousseau's  division,  of  1,566  engaged,  lost,  chiefly  on 
Dec.  31  in  killed  and  wounded,  26  officers  and  611  enlisted  men, 
or  a  total  of  637,  making  its  percentage  of  loss  nearly  40  per  cent. 
Donelson's  (Confederate)  brigade  of  Cheatham's  division  lost, 
chiefly  on  Dec.  31,  of  1,529  engaged,  108  killed,  575  wounded  and 
17  missing,  a  total  of  700,  or  more  than  45  per  cent.  In  the  attack 
at  Round  Forest  one  regiment  of  this  brigade,  the  i6th  Tenn., 
lost  207  of  402  engaged,  and  another,  the  8th  Tenn.,  lost  306  of  424 
engaged. 

In  Breckinridge's  report  of  the  Friday  engagement  he  states 
that  it  occupied  only  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes,  and  that  he  lost 
about  1,700  men  of  4,500  taken  into  action.  There  was  a  bitter 
controversy  between  him  and  Bragg,  in  which  the  latter  main- 
tained that  Breckinridge  had  as  many  as  6,000  in  action  and  that 
he  lost  only  1,338.  The  loss  was  very  heavy  even  if  based  on 
Bragg's  statement;  it  was  frightful  if  based  on  that  of  Breckin- 
ridge. 

The  79th  went  into  action  Dec.  31  with  341,  rank  and  file,  and  in 
the  two  days,  Dec.  31  and  Jan.  2,  it  lost  n  killed,  74  wounded  and 
36  missing.  Few  of  the  missing  were  captured  in  the  battle. 
Some  of  those  reported  as  missing  were  afterward  found  to  have 
been  killed  or  wounded,  and  a  considerable  number,  including  two 
of  my  company,  were  sick  men  captured  by  the  Confederate  cav- 
alry in  ambulances  or  in  the  field  hospitals  near  Lavergne. 


CHAPTER  SIX 

SIX    MONTHS   IN    CAMP    AT    MURFREESBORO 

Probably  the  darkest  period  in  the  North  during 
the  Civil  War  was  the  first  half  of  the  year  1863. 
In  every  quarter  the  Union  cause  appeared  to  be  drag- 
ging. Nowhere  were  there  visible  any  preparations 
for  an  advance  of  the  Federal  armies. 

Harper's  Weekly  of  January  17,  1863,  contained  an 
editorial  entitled,  "Have  We  a  General  Among  Us?" 
beginning  with  this  sentence :  "They  say  at  Washing- 
ton that  we  have  some  thirty-eight  to  forty  major-gen- 
erals and  nearly  three  hundred  brigadiers,  and  now  the 
question  is  have  we  one  man  who  can  fairly  be  called  a 
first-class  general  in  the  proper  meaning  of  the  term  ?" 
The  article  discusses  the  merits  and  prospects  of  vari- 
ous generals.  Prophesying  is  always  a  risky  business, 
but  prophecy  concerning  the  coming  general  in  a  great 
war  is  particularly  hazardous.  Sheridan  and  Thomas 
are  not  mentioned  in  the  list  as  even  among  the  possi- 
bilities. Concerning  Sherman  it  was  briefly  said : 
"General  W.  T.  Sherman  is  making  his  record  at 
Vicksburg;  hitherto  he  has  been  known  as  a  capable 
officer  and  a  far-seeing  man."  Of  Grant  the  editor 
spoke  somewhat  doubtingly,  as  follows : 

"Ulysses  Grant  has  given  evidence  of  enterprise, 
(123) 


124  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

determination  and  personal  gallantry  which  have  stood 
him  in  good  stead.  He  was  very  fortunate  at  Fort 
Donelson.  Whether  his  record  at  Shiloh — where  he 
would  have  been  destroyed  but  for  accidents  beyond 
his  control — will  bear  the  test  of  inquiry,  is  a  question 
yet  undetermined." 

The  writer  of  the  editorial  concluded  that  "At  the 
present  moment,  however,  the  most  promising  of  our 
soldiers  is  William  S.  Rosecrans."  All  this  goes  to 
confirm  Livy's  statement  concerning  the  uncertainty 
of  war,  "Nusquam  minus,  quam  in  bello,  eventus  re- 
spondent."* 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  continued  disaster 
had  attended  the  Union  armies  in  the  East.  General 
McClellan  had  been  superseded,  November  7,  1862, 
in  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  Gen- 
eral Burnside,  who  on  December  13,  1862,  had  led 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  a  trap  at  Fredericksburg 
from  which  it  barely  escaped  annihilation  by  reason 
of  the  unaccountable  forbearance  of  General  Lee. 
Soon  after  that  Burnside  was  superseded  by  Hooker, 
who,  in  May  following,  succeeded  in  getting  the  army 
across  the  Rappahannock  again;  but,  at  a  moment 
when  he  supposed  the  Confederate  army  to  be  in  full 
retreat,  it  suddenly  emerged  from  the  dense  forests, 
fell  upon  the  right  of  the  Federal  army  and  threw  it 
into  a  stampede,  from  which  it  was  rescued  only  by  the 
most  heroic  righting  of  the  remainder,  and  again  that 

1  Events  less  correspond  to  men's  expectations  in  war  than  in 
any  other  case  whatever. 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  125 

great  army  was  withdrawn  with  immense  loss  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Rappahannock. 

Early  in  June  the  victorious  Lee  had  begun  to  move 
for  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  and  a  great  battle 
was  imminent,  involving  the  fate  of  Washington  and 
fraught  with  the  greatest  danger  to  the  Union  cause. 
At  this  critical  time,  most  inopportune  for  changing 
commanders,  Hooker  was  superseded  by  Meade.2 

Since  the  battle  of  Stone's  River  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  been  inactive  at  Murfreesboro.  Gen- 
eral Banks  with  a  small  army  was  besieging  Port  Hud- 
son but  the  garrison  on  July  I,  after  having  success- 
fully repelled  two  assaults,  was  still  defiantly  refusing 
to  surrender  and  Banks  was  in  imminent  danger  of  an 
attack  by  the  Confederate  General  Richard  Taylor. 
Grant  had  Pemberton  penned  up  in  Vicksburg,  but 
the  first  of  July  found  the  Confederate  army  still  in 
its  works  and  no  one  in  the  North  knew  how  long 
it  would  continue  to  hold  out. 

Halleck  was  still  posing  as  general-in-chief,  concoct- 
ing vast  strategic  movements  and  disapproving  the 
plans  of  all  the  Union  generals.  Grant,  indeed,  had 
outwitted  him,  defeated  the  Confederate  forces  con- 
fronting him  and  invested  Vicksburg,  but  he  had  ac- 
complished this  only  by  cutting  loose  from  his  former 
base  and  getting  entirely  out  of  reach  of  Halleck's 
letters  and  dispatches.  It  was  characteristic  of  Hal- 

2  Soon  afterward,  by  Halleck's  order,  Hooker  was  further  hu- 
miliated by  being  placed  under  arrest  for  visiting  Washington 
without  leave. 


126  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

leek  to  keep  all  the  generals  in  the  field  in  hot  water, 
but  after  Rosecrans  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  an  incident  occurred  that  made  him  the 
special  object  of  Halleck's  displeasure.  One  of  the  lat- 
ter's  novel  military  conceptions  was  the  offer  of  a 
major-general's  commission  in  the  regular  army  to 
the  general  who  should  first  achieve  an  important  mil- 
itary success.  When  the  offer  was  submitted  to  Grant 
he  made  no  answer,  discreetly  refraining  from  express- 
ing any  opinion.  Rosecrans,  however,  whether  cor- 
rectly or  not,  interpreted  the  offer  as  grossly  improper 
and  wrote  Halleck  a  long  letter,  indignantly  denoun- 
cing "such  an  auctioneering  of  honors"  as  insulting 
and  degrading.  This  letter  undoubtedly  sealed  the  fate 
of  the  writer,  for  he  had  already  incurred  the  bitter 
hostility  of  Stanton  and  now  had  apparently  gone  out 
of  his  way,  not  merely  to  confirm  the  prior  dislike  of 
the  general-in-chief,  but  to  court  his  lasting  resentment. 
Grant,  however,  after  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg,  rose 
too  rapidly  in  public  esteem  to  be  suppressed  by  either 
Stanton  or  Halleck. 

During  this  period  the  soldiers  themselves  became 
restless  and  discontented,  not  because  their  loyalty  was 
waning,  but  because  so  little  progress  had  been  made 
after  nearly  two  years  of  war.  The  disastrous  de- 
feats of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Fredericksburg 
and  Chancellorsville  cast  a  gloom  over  the  spirits  of 
the  soldiers  of  the  West  as  well  as  those  of  the  East. 
Moreover,  there  was  much  dissatisfaction  in  the  army 
with  the  slow  progress  of  the  war  and  with  the  policy 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  I2/ 

of  the  Federal  administration.  Many  of  the  officers 
and  men  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  Demo- 
crats when  they  enlisted.  A  considerable  number  in 
my  company  were  Democrats.  I  was  a  Republican, 
but  not  an  Abolitionist,  when  I  entered  the  service. 
There  was  at  first  considerable  hostility,  even  in  the 
army,  to  the  emancipation  proclamation.  Most  of  the 
men  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  from  Ohio, 
Indiana  and  Illinois  and  at  this  time  affairs  in  these 
states  were  by  no  means  encouraging  to  the  soldiers  at 
the  front.  Moreover,  thousands  of  letters  were  received 
daily  from  disloyal  writers  at  home,  written  for  the 
express  purpose  of  creating  dissatisfaction  among  the 
soldiers  and  of  encouraging  desertions.  The  conse- 
quence was  that  during  the  early  part  of  1863  there 
were  many  desertions  from  all  the  Federal  armies.3 

3  The  morning  report  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  Jan.  31, 
1863,  showed : 

Aggregate  present  and  absent 326,750 

Aggregate  present 239,420 


Aggregate  absent 87,330 

Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  40,  p.  15.  Among  Hooker's  first  orders  on 
assuming  command  was  one  forbidding  the  sending  of  citizens' 
clothing  through  the  mails,  by  which  means  many  had  previously 
been  enabled  to  desert.  There  were  also  many  desertions  during 
this  period  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  A  return  of  that 
army  in  December,  1862,  showed  76,725  present  and  46,677  absent. 
From  the  official  returns  in  January,  1863,  it  was  estimated  that 
the  absentees  from  all  the  Federal  armies  numbered  8,987  officers 
and  280,073  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates.  This  ex- 
traordinary number  included  thousands  absent  without  leave,  and 
of  these  undoubtedly  a  great  many  were  actual  deserters. 


128  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

In  the  North  all  classes  were  chafing  under  the  enor- 
mous expenses  of  the  war,  the  great  increase  in  taxes, 
both  national  and  state,  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
draft.  Those  who  had  from  the  beginning  opposed 
the  war  grew  more  and  more  outspoken  and  defiant. 
The  emancipation  proclamation,  foreshadowed  in  Sep- 
tember, 1862,  but  not  issued  until  January  i,  1863, 
intensified  the  bitterness  of  those  who  denounced  the 
war  as  an  abolition  crusade,  and  the  enforcement  of 
the  draft  drove  them  to  frenzy.  Even  Republicans 
were  not  united.  A  radical  element,  which  was  con- 
stantly gaining  strength,  was  becoming  more  and  more 
impatient  with  what  it  denounced  as  the  halting  and 
vacillating  policy  of  President  Lincoln. 

The  grave  question  uppermost  in  men's  minds  was 
whether  the  Union  could  be  saved  at  all;  but,  slowly 
evolving  out  of  the  doubts  and  perplexities  of  the  situ- 
ation, and  beginning  to  assume  definite  shape,  was  an- 
other, destined  to  overshadow  all  other  questions, 
whether  it  were  best  to  try  to  save  the  Union  with 
slavery  or  to  try  to  save  it  without.  The  Radicals  de- 
clared that  it  must  be  saved  without  slavery,  but  Lin- 
coln hesitated  and  seemed  to  be  groping  his  way.  In 
a  letter  to  Horace  Greeley  August  22,  1862,  he  said:4 

"My  paramount  object  is  to  save  the  Union,  and 
not  either  to  save  or  destroy  slavery. 

"If  I  could  save  the  Union  without  freeing  any 
slave,  I  would  do  it — if  I  could  save  it  by  freeing  all 

4  Greeley :  American  Conflict,  vol.  2,  p.  250. 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  129 

the  slaves,  I  would  do  it — and  if  I  could  do  it  by  free- 
ing some  and  leaving  others  alone,  I  would  also  do 
that. 

"What  I  do  about  slavery  and  the  colored  race,  I 
do  because  I  believe  it  helps  to  save  this  Union;  and 
what  I  forbear,  I  forbear  because  I  do  not  believe  it 
would  help  to  save  this  Union." 

By  September  22,  1862,  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to 
cross  the  Rubicon,  and  on  that  day  he  issued  a  proc- 
lamation announcing  his  intention  of  declaring  the 
freedom  of  all  slaves  in  every  portion  of  the  United 
States  in  rebellion  January  i,  1863.  The  great  mass 
of  voters  in  the  North,  however,  were  not  yet  abreast 
of  this  advanced  idea.  The  fall  elections  in  1862  went 
heavily  against  the  administration,  and  large  opposi- 
tion majorities  were  piled  up  in  the  great  states  of  New 
York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  Indiana.  Even  Illi- 
nois, the  President's  own  state,  gave  an  enormous 
majority  against  him,  while  in  almost  all  the  other 
northern  states  the  Republican  majorities  were  cut 
down. 

In  New  York  Horatio  Seymour  was  elected  gov- 
ernor— a  pronounced  opponent  of  every  measure  of  the 
administration  essential  to  a  vigorous  prosecution  of 
the  war.  His  influence  was  seen  some  months  later 
when  the  opponents  of  the  draft,  taking  advantage 
of  the  absence  from  the  state  of  the  troops  that  had 
gone  to  repel  Lee's  invasion  of  the  North,  raised  a 
howling  mob  which  roamed  through  the  city  of  New 
9 


I3O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

York  for  three  days,  burning  colored  orphan  asylums 
and  recruiting  offices,  hanging  negroes,  dragging 
through  the  gutters  the  mangled  corpses  of  murdered 
Union  soldiers,  and  winding  up  its  carnival  of.  lawless- 
ness by  assembling  to  listen  to  an  address  of  the  gov- 
ernor. In  his  speech,  while  counseling  moderation, 
he  addressed  the  members  of  the  mob  as  his  "friends," 
assuring  them  that  he  was  their  friend.  It  is  needless 
to  add  that  these  utterances  of  the  distinguished 
speaker  were  received  by  his  bloodthirsty  hearers  with 
uproarious  applause. 

No  governor  was  elected  in  Indiana,  but  a  legis- 
lature was  chosen  which,  in  every  possible  way,  mani- 
fested its  hostility  to  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war. 

Throughout  the  North  there  were  secret  political 
organizations,  under  various  names,  inimical  to  the 
Federal  administration.  Some  of  them  had  existed 
prior  to  1863,  the  members  afterward  adopting  suc- 
cessively the  names  of  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle, 
American  Knights,  and  Sons  of  Liberty.  In  the  rural 
regions  many  of  them  dyed  their  homespun  clothes 
in  the  juice  of  the  butternut,  and  hence  became  gener- 
ally known  as  "Butternuts,"  a  name  which  came  to  be 
well  understood  as  indicative  of  hostility  to  the  prose- 
-cution  of  the  war.  These  treasonable  organizations 
were  most  numerous  and  active  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illi- 
nois, Kentucky,  and  Missouri,  but  nowhere  were  they 
more  lawless  and  rampant  than  in  Indiana.5  All  were 

8  Their  names,  objects,  and  purposes  are  elaborately  set  forth  in 
the  report  of  Judge  Advocate  General  Holt,  submitted  to  the 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  13! 

designed  to  aid  the  cause  of  the'  Rebellion.  In  all  the 
states  named,  lodges  were  organized  with  elaborate 
rituals,  signs,  grips,  and  pass-words.  Early  in  the  year 
1863  the  members  began  to  arm  and  to  practise  In 
military  drills.  There  is  now  no  means  of  ascertain- 
ing their  exact  numerical  strength,  but  it  has  been  esti- 
mated that  by  March  i,  1864,  they  had  340,000  men 
capable  of  being  mobilized  into  an  effective  military 
force. 

The  general  purpose  of  these  organizations  was  to 
aid  the  Rebellion  by  every  practicable  means  and  to 
embarrass  the  Federal  government  by  the  circulation 
of  treasonable  publications,  by  furnishing  such  intelli- 
gence as  might  be  serviceable  to  the  Confederates,  by 
supplying  them  with  arms  and  ammunition,  by  de- 
stroying the  property  of  the  government  and  of  loyal 
citizens,  by  co-operating  with  the  Confederates  in  raids 
and  invasions,  but  more  especially  by  encouraging  de- 
sertions from  the  Federal  armies,  protecting  deserters 
from  arrest,  discouraging  enlistments,  and  resisting 
the  draft. 

Secret  emissaries  were  sent  to  the  armies  at  the 
front,  and  thousands  of  letters  were  written  to  incite 
discontent  among  the  soldiers  and  to  induce  them  to 
desert.  When  a  deserter  was  arrested  after  his  arrival 
at  home,  he  was  released  on  writ  of  habeas  corpus  if 
a  disloyal  judge  could  be  found  to  issue  the  writ.  In 

Secretary  of  War  Oct.  8,  1864.  No  soldier  who  reads  the  report 
even  at  this  late  day  can  repress  his  indignation.  See  also  Benn 
Pitman's  Indiana  Treason  Cases. 


132  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

some  localities  in  Indiana  the  Federal  officers  making 
arrests  were  openly  attacked  and  fired  on,  and  a  num- 
ber of  enrolling  officers  were  shot.  In  Blackford 
county  the  court-house  was  attacked  and  all  the  records 
pertaining  to  the  draft  were  destroyed.  Nowhere  were 
the  "Knights"  more  defiant  than  in  the  counties  of 
Johnson  and  Brown,  from  which  my  company  was 
chiefly  recruited.  Eight  hundred  of  them  rode  through 
the  streets  of  Franklin  one  night,  shouting  hurrahs 
for  Jeff  Davis,  and  at  one  time  1,500  armed  men 
camped  near  Edinburg  for  the  avowed  purpose  of 
seizing  some  men  who  were  in  the  custody  of  military 
officers. 

The  Indiana  legislature  which  met  on  the  8th  day 
of  January,  1863,  was  wholly  controlled  by  these  op- 
ponents of  the  Federal  government.  It  refused  to  re- 
ceive Governor  Morton's  message  and  one  branch 
passed  a  resolution  thanking  Governor  Seymour  of 
New  York  for  the  "exalted  and  patriotic  sentiments" 
contained  in  his  message  to  the  New  York  legislature, 
in  which  the  chief  measures  of  the  Federal  administra- 
tion in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  were  denounced  as 
unconstitutional,  tyrannical  and  despotic,  but  which 
was  prolific  of  suggestions  between  the  lines  far  more 
inimical  to  the  Union  cause  than  those  openly  ex- 
pressed.6 It  was  only  because  the  Republican  mem- 

6  A  resolution  was  first  introduced  in  the  Indiana   House  of 
Representatives,  Jan.  13,  1863,  by  Bayless  W.  Hanna,  as  follows : 
"Resolved,  That   this   House  adopt  the  exalted  and   patriotic 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  133 

bers  left  in  a  body,  thus  breaking  a  quorum,  that  the 
legislature  was  prevented  from  passing  a  bill  designed 

sentiments  contained  in  the  message  lately  delivered  to  the  Legis- 
lature of  New  York  by  his  Excellency,  Horatio  Seymour." 

No  action  was  taken  on  this  resolution,  but  on  Jan.  15  Marcus 
A.  O.  Packard  introduced  another,  passed  the  same  day  by  a  vote 
of  52  to  35,  as  follows : 

"Resolved,  by  the  House,  the  Senate  concurring,  That  the 
thanks  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  State  of  Indiana  are  due 
and  are  hereby  tendered  to  the  Hon.  Horatio  Seymour,  Governor 
of  New  York,  for  the  able  and  patriotic  defense  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  laws,  and  liberties  of  the  American  citizen,  contained  in 
his  late  message  to  the  Legislature  of  that  State,  and  particularly 
for  his  just  and  high  appreciation  of  the  interests,  position,  and 
patriotism  of  the  great  Northwest ;  and  that  we  assure  him  that 
the  conservative  people  of  our  own  beloved  State  are  looking 
with  deep  solicitude  and  confidence  to  his  executive  action,  be- 
lieving that  they  will  find  in  it  a  firm  and  determined  resistance 
to  the  encroachments  of  a  despotic  administration  upon  the  lib- 
erties of  the  American  people,  as  well  as  a  bold  defense  of  the 
independent  sovereignty  of  the  several  States  of  this  Union,  and 
that  such  action  will  receive  the  warm  sympathies  and  hearty  co- 
operation of  all  the  conservative  citizens  of  this  State. 

"Resolved,  That  the  Speaker  of  the  House  be  directed  to  for- 
ward copies  of  these  concurrent  resolutions  to  his  Excellency, 
Governor  Seymour,  and  the  Legislature  of  that  State." 

When  the  resolution  reached  the  Senate  it  was  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Federal  Relations,  but  it  seems  that  no  further 
action  upon  it  was  taken.  See  House  Journal  for  1863,  pp.  68, 
92-3;  Senate  Journal  for  1863,  pp.  112-113;  Brevier  Legislative 
Reports,  vol.  6,  p.  49.  The  message  of  Governor  Seymour,  con- 
taining the  "exalted  and  patriotic  sentiments"  so  highly  extolled, 
was  delivered  to  the  New  York  Legislature  Jan.  7,  1863,  and  is 
found  in  Assembly  Documents  for  1863,  No.  2.  It  censured  the 
Federal  administration  for  authorizing  martial  law,  suppression 
of  newspapers,  and  arbitrary  arrests,  denounced  the  emancipation 
proclamation  as  "impolitic,  unjust  and  unconstitutional,"  and 


134  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

to  strip  Governor  Morton  of  all  military  power  and  to 
transfer  it  to  a  board  of  state  officers,  three  of  whom 
were  members  of  the  Sons  of  Liberty,  a  measure  that, 
if  passed,  would  probably  have  precipitated  civil  war 
at  once  in  Indiana. 

The  Indiana  soldiers  were  watchful  spectators  of 
all  these  proceedings  and  deluged  the  legislature  with 
their  protests.  Those  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land were  numerous  and  emphatic.7  The  soldiers  re- 
charged that  the  Federal  War  Department  had  set  aside  the 
authority  of  the  judiaary  and  overridden  the  laws  of  the  state, 
had  treated  its  laws,  courts  and  officers  "with  marked  and  public 
contempt,"  and  had  "insulted  its  people  and  invaded  its  rights." 
It  contained  an  elaborate  argument  in  support  of  "State  Rights," 
and  affirmed  that  "the  North  can  not  hold  the  southern  states  in 
subjection  without  destroying  the  principles  of  our  government." 
It  also  urged  "immediate  attention  to  the  inequality  and  injustice 
of  the  laws  under  which  it  is  proposed  to  draft  soldiers  for  the 
service  of  the  general  government"  and  condemned  the  exemp- 
tions allowed  to  the  "favored  classes"  while  "the  only  son  of  the 
widow,  or  the  sole  support  of  a  family,  may  be  forced  into  a  dis- 
tant and  dangerous  service."  It  also  elaborated  at  great  length 
the  intimate  natural  relations  between  "the  great  central  and 
western  states,"  showing  that  "the  people  of  the  West  must  have 
the  markets  of  the  southwestern  states  to  bring  back  their  pros- 
perity" and  that  "they  must  be  reunited,  politically,  socially  and 
commercially  to  the  valley  of  the  lower  Mississippi."  The  mes- 
sage was  undoubtedly  the  chief  incentive  to  the  bloody  draft 
riots,  which  a  few  months  later  disgraced  the  city  of  New  York, 
and  probably  furnished  the  chief  arguments  used  at  a  later  period 
in  the  western  states  by  those  who  advocated  the  project  of  a 
northwestern  confederacy. 

7  They  were  printed  in  pamphlet  form,  entitled  "Proceedings  of 
the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Indiana  Regiments  in  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  on  the  Memorial  and  Resolutions  to  the  In- 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  135 

spected  the  brave  foemen  who  stood  in  their  front,  but 
they  never  quite  forgave  their  enemies  in  the  rear  who 
were  trying  to  stab  them  in  the  back. 

As  if  to  cap  the  climax  of  misfortune  to  the  Union 
cause  in  Indiana  and  Ohio,  the  Confederate  General 
John  Morgan  planned  a  raid  into  these  states  in  the 
latter  part  of  June.  Gathering  a  mounted  force  of 
about  2,400  men,*  he  crossed  the  Cumberland  July  2, 
and  the  Ohio  July  8,  invading  Indiana  first  and  then 
Ohio.  The  raid,  as  originally  planned  and  as  approved 
by  General  Bragg,  was  intended  as  a  diversion  to  arrest 
or  embarrass  the  threatened  advance  of  Burnside  into 
east  Tennessee  and  of  Rosecrans  against  Bragg,  and 
was  to  be  confined  to  the  state  of  Kentucky.  The  blun- 
der of  crossing  the  Ohio  was  that  of  Morgan  himself. 

Had  the  invasion  been  made  with  a  great  army,  able 
to  hold  its  own,  the  result  might  have  been  vastly  dif- 
ferent; but  it  was  made  with  a  comparatively  insig- 
nificant force,  constantly  in  danger  of  capture.  The 
appearance  of  a  foe  on  their  own  soil  and  threatening 
their  own  homes  and  firesides  instantly  inspired  with 
new  zeal  and  determination  the  loyal  citizens  of  the 
invaded  states,  strengthened  the  patriotism  of  those 

diana  Legislature,  with  the  votes  and  signatures  of  the  officers 
of  the  6th,  isth,  I7th,  22d,  2Qth,  34th,  32d,  37th,  38th,  3Qth,  4Oth, 
42d,  44th,  sist,  57th,  s8th,  72d,  73d,  75th,  79th,  82d,  86th,  and  loist 
Regiments."  When  the  memorial  was  presented  to  the  Senate  it 
was  laid  upon  the  table,  with  an  order  to  print  5,000  copies, 
Senate  Journal  for  1863,  p.  302.  Copies  were  printed,  but  none 
were  included  in  any  of  the  bound  volumes  of  the  legislative  pro- 
ceedings. Some,  however,  have  been  preserved. 


136  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

who  had  been  wavering,  and  everywhere  solidified  the 
Union  sentiment.  It  did  not,  however,  as  Morgan  had 
probably  been  led  to  expect  from  the  loud  boasts  of 
the  Sons  of  Liberty,  arouse  any  warlike  ardor  in  the 
Butternuts  of  Indiana  and  Ohio,  who  shrank  with  hor- 
ror from  the  idea  of  exposing  themselves  to  the  bullets 
of  either  side.  They  would  not  fight  and  Morgan's 
raid  ended  in  ignominious  failure  and  in  his  own  cap- 
ture. The  patriotism  inspired  by  the  invasion,  the 
ease  with  which  it  was  repelled,  and  the  inglorious 
ending  of  it,  all  combined  to  elate  those  friendly  to  the 
Union  cause  and  to  chagrin  and  dishearten  those  who 
were  unfriendly  to  it.  It  did  more  than  any  victory 
that  had  been  won  in  the  field  to  strengthen  the  Union 
cause  in  Indiana  and  Ohio.  Nevertheless  the  raid, 
while  it  lasted,  created  wide-spread  consternation 
among  the  people  and  the  soldiers  of  the  invaded 
states  and  throughout  the  North. 

For  nearly  six  months  after  the  battle  of  Stone's 
River,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  remained  in  camp, 
Van  Cleve's  division  being  stationed  near  Murfrees- 
boro.  During  the  months  of  January,  February,  and 
March  the  weather  was  generally  very  cold  and  dis- 
agreeable. Afterward  there  was  warmer  weather  but 
'the  rains  continued.  About  every  other  night  the  79th 
was  on  picket  and  on  these  nights  it  nearly  always 
rained.  This  made  it  hard  for  the  men,  especially  as 
no  fires  were  allowed  at  the  picket  stations  and  there 
was  little  or  no  shelter.  Probably  for  the  double  pur- 
pose of  guarding  against  surprise  and  to  discipline  the 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  137 

troops,  they  were  required  every  morning  to  stand  at 
arms  for  an  hour  before  daylight  and  this  was  not  a 
pleasant  duty  when  they  stood  in  the  rain  and  mud. 
During  the  first  three  months  of  our  stay  at  Murfrees- 
boro  there  was  a  great  deal  of  sickness ;  thousands  died 
of  disease  and  the  hospitals  were  full.  At  one  time 
during  this  period  the  79th,  which  left  Louisville  Octo- 
ber i,  1862,  with  920  men,  had  only  175  present  for 
duty.  So  frequent  were  desertions  during  this  period 
that  it  became  necessary  to  resort  to  the  extreme  pen- 
alty of  military  law.  I  witnessed  the  execution  of  a 
deserter  while  at  Murfreesboro,  and  it  left  an  impres- 
sion which  is  as  vivid  now  as  if  made  only  yesterday. 
The  man  was  a  member  of  a  Kentucky  regiment;  he 
had  been  tried  by  court-martial  and  condemned  to 
death.  On  the  day  fixed  for  the  execution  the  whole 
division  was  ordered  out  and  was  so  formed  as  to  make 
three  sides  of  a  square.  In  the  open  side  of  the  square 
a  grave  had  been  dug.  At  the  time  set  the  funeral  pro- 
cession entered  the  square,  preceded  by  a  band  playing 
a  dead  march ;  following  the  band  came  the  coffin,  and 
behind  it  marched  the  condemned  man  in  his  shirt 
sleeves  with  his  hands  tied  behind  him  and  a  guard 
on  each  side;  then  came  the  detail  of  twelve  men  se- 
lected to  shoot  him.  Half  the  guns  were  loaded  with 
ball  and  half  with  blank  cartridges,  but  none  of  the 
detail  knew  how  his  own  was  loaded.  As  the  pro- 
cession passed  the  grave  the  coffin  was  deposited  over 
it  and  the  deserter  was  seated  on  the  lid.  The  twelve 
men  who  were  to  do  the  shooting  were  then  drawn  up 


138  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

about  thirty  feet  in  front  of  him ;  at  the  word  of  com- 
mand they  fired,  and  the  man,  shot  through-  with  sev- 
eral bullets,  instantly  fell  over  dead  on  the  coffin.  It 
was  the  most  dreadful  sight  I  ever  saw,  far  more  dread- 
ful than  anything  I  ever  witnessed  in  battle. 

By  the  first  of  April  the  weather  had  become  warm 
but  the  rains  continued,  the  rainy  season  being  extraor- 
dinary even  in  that  region,  making  the  roads  almost 
impassable  and  rendering  a  forward  movement  im- 
practicable. With  warmer  weather  sickness  decreased 
and  the  men  improved  both  in  health  and  in  spirits. 
Work  on  the  fortifications  was  pushed  with  unremit- 
ting zeal,  great  forts  were  constructed,  mounted  with 
heavy  siege  guns,  and  immense  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion and  provisions  were  collected.  We  felt  confident 
of  our  ability  to  hold  our  works  if  Bragg  should  at- 
tempt to  attack  us.  Bragg  probably  never  had  such 
an  idea.  Indeed  it  was  much  easier  to  go  around  Mur- 
freesboro,  as  Hood  did  when  he  marched  to  Nashville. 

Our  life  while  in  camp  at  Murfreesboro  became  mo- 
notonous and  irksome.  There  wrere  drills,  inspections, 
picket  duty  and  working  on  fortifications.  Occasion- 
ally we  escorted  a  supply-train  or  were  detailed  to  go 
on  a  foraging  expedition  and  now  and  then  we  were 
stirred  by  rumors  of  intended  attacks  by  the  enemy 
which  never  resulted  in  anything  more  than  slight 
skirmishes  between  our  pickets  and  the  Confederate 
cavalry.  When  not  on  actual  duty  we  whiled  away  the 
time  as  best  we  could  in  reading,  writing  letters  and 
in  such  amusements  as  camp  life  permitted.  Long  be- 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  139 

fore  we  left  Murfreesboro  we  learned  enough  of  the 
war  to  understand  that  the  Rebellion  would  never  be 
suppressed  by  armies  inside  of  fortifications  and  that 
we  must  meet  the  Confederate  armies  in  the  field. 

While  there  I  was  for  a  time  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand of  Co.  E  of  the  79th  whose  officers  were  all 
wounded  or  sick,  and  was  offered  the  captaincy  of  it 
but  declined,  preferring  to  remain  with  the  men  of  my 
own  company,  many  of  whom  I  had  induced  to  enlist. 

I  can  not  describe  the  incidents  of  our  stay  at  Mur- 
freesboro better  than  by  giving  some  extracts  from  my 
army  diary.  These  are  given  just  as  they  were  writ- 
ten forty  years  ago,  and,  I -believe,  convey  a  fair  idea 
of  our  life  in  camp  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  of  our 
daily  thoughts  at  that  time.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
add  that  my  opinions  of  men  and  events,  as  expressed 
or  implied  in  what  I  wrote  then,  underwent  many 
changes  even  before  the  close  of  the  war. 

JANUARY,   1863. 

10. — Wrote  to  mother  to-day.  Also  one  to  Jeff. 
[The  Franklin  Jeffersonian.]  Received  a  letter  from 
home.  Felt  quite  unwell  this  night.  Weather  pleas- 
ant and  men  occupied  in  writing  or  in  boiling  their 
clothes.  Found  myself  reenforced  by  a  number  of 
"gray  backs."  For  the  first  time  in  two  weeks,  had  an 
opportunity  of  changing  clothes. 

12. — Visited  Louisville  Legion  and  6th  Ind. 
Friends  all  safe  and  well.  They  confirm  the  reports 


I4O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

of  the  complete  surprise  of  Johnson's  division.  There 
seems  to  be  a  general  feeling  of  discontent  among  of- 
ficers and  men.  They  are  discouraged  at  the  slowness 
of  the  war. 

14. — Detailed  officer  of  guard.  Guard  taken  off  in 
consequence  of  a  very  heavy  rain  at  3  P.  M.  It  rained 
harder  than  I  have  witnessed  it  since  I  have  been  in 
Tennessee.  A  dismal  sleet  followed  in  the  morning. 
Lieut.-Colonel  Oyler  and  Walter  Hunter  arrived  to- 
day. Also  several  ladies  from  Indianapolis  as  volun- 
teer nurses. 

15. — Very  cold  to-day;  so  cold  that  it  is  almost  im- 
possible to  keep  warm.  Ladies  must  think  soldiering 
a  horrid  business,  taking  this  weather  for  a  specimen. 

1 6. — Went  out  on  picket.  My  Co.  [E]  being  sta- 
tioned at  the  house  formerly  occupied  by  a  

Spence,  now  in  the  rebel  army,  I  had  an  opportunity  of 
seeing  what  havoc  war  makes  upon  wealth  and  refine- 
ment. I  saw  before  me  a  house  once  elegantly,  even 
luxuriously,  furnished,  now  stripped  of  books,  pictures, 
furniture,  and  nothing  left  but  bare  walls.  Got  myself 
a  volume  of  Cicero's  orations. 

21. — Ordinary  routine  of  camp  resumed.  Policing 
and  company  drill  as  in  former  times.  Haven't  enough 
men  for  battalion  and  the  men  don't  take  any  interest 
in  company  drill,  so  we  usually  stack  arms,  sit  .down 
and  amuse  ourselves  in  any  way  except  drill.  Pleas- 
ant but  muddy. 

25. — Relieved  at  2  p.  M.  Weather  damp  and  dis- 
agreeable. There  is,  I  find,  a  general  anxiety  among 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  14! 

the  men  to  go  home.  They  can  not  fail  to  see  that  we 
are  wanting  in  a  vigorous  policy  and  vigorous  generals 
to  carry  it  out.  Desertions  are  frequent  and  affairs 
in  Indiana  are  anything  but  encouraging. 

26. — Strolled  around  camp  busily  employed  in  doing 
nothing.  The  sad  diminution  of  our  regiment  does 
not  tend  to  create  cheerfulness.  We  started  from 
Louisville  with  920  men.  We  have  now  in  camp 
about  250,  of  whom  about  175  only  are  fit  for  duty. 
Where  are  they? 

31. — Relieved  at  i  P.  M.  Weather  mild.  A  block- 
ade of  mud  stops  up  all  avenues  to  camp.  The  rain 
and  mud  in  the  South  (I  speak  of  what  I  have  seen) 
are  far  more  disagreeable  than  the  snow  and  cold  of  the 
North.  There  is  much  sickness  now  in  the  army.  Men 
are  dying  off  by  thousands.  Disease  kills  far  more 
than  the  sword.  Few  men  who  go  to  the  hospital  are 
ever  fit  for  duty.  So  well  known  is  this  fact  that  there 
is  a  great  aversion  to  hospitals,  and  many  refuse  to 
go  until  their  disease  gets  a  firm  hold  on  them.  The 
men,  too,  many  of  them,  become  despondent  and  give 
up  too  easily.  I  am  convinced  that  much  sickness  in 
the  army  begins  with  pining  for  home  and  continually 
thinking  of  home  until  the  patient  loses  his  appetite, 
and  his  system  becomes  so  reduced  as  to  invite  disease. 

FEBRUARY,  1863. 

i. — Regt.  detailed  to  work  on  the  fortifications. 
They  are  very  formidable — consisting  of  heavy  breast- 


142  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

works  with  numerous  forts,  so  situated  as  to  sweep 
with  an  enfilading  fire  almost  every  assailable  point. 
Whisky  was  issued  to  the  men  after  their  day's  work 
was  over,  and  it  had  the  "desired  effect." 

4. — Picket.  The  night  was  particularly  severe. 
The  rain  began  in  the  afternoon  and  during  the  night 
turned  into  a  driving  sleet.  An  attack  seems  to  be  ap- 
prehended, as  a  new  order  forbids  any  fires  at  night 
and  demands  of  the  pickets  the  utmost  vigilance  gen- 
erally. It  is  reported  that  we  received  twenty-four 
pieces  from  Nashville. 

6. — To-day  our  brigade  started  at  6  A.  M.  on  a 
forage  expedition  and  returned  at  3  P.  MV  having  se- 
cured our  forage  without  molestation.  Marched  alto- 
gether some  twelve  miles.  Day  clear  and  pleasant. 
Boys  brought  in  a  number  of  white  deer.  [Sheep.] 

7. — Remained  in  camp.  Orders  to  make  prepara- 
tions to  go  to  Nashville  as  an  escort  for  provision  train 
with  two  days'  rations  and  forty  rounds  of  cartridges. 
Ours  the  only  regiment  detailed. 

8. — Started  at  6  A.  M.  Train  consisted  of  about 
seventy  wagons.  The  effective  force  of  the  escort  about 
175  men,  the  men  riding  in  the  wagons.  Roads  pretty 
good  to  Lavergne,  but  desperate  after  that.  Saw  re- 
mains of  the  train  burned  there  a  few  weeks  ago  and 
was  thankful  it  wasn't  ours.  The  road  is  strongly 
guarded.  Reached  N.  at  4  P.  M. 

9. — Spent  the  day  in  looking  around.  Visited  the 
convalescent  camps,  hospitals,  state  capitol,  boat-land- 
ing, and  other  places  of  interest.  About  thirty  boats 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  143 

are  at  the  landing,  among  them  the  Jacob  Strader,  on 
which  I  went  aboard.  Regiment  quartered  at  court- 
house and  got  full  of  "gray  backs." 

ii. — Started  at  daylight  and  moved  about  two 
miles  when  we  halted  and  waited  for  the  pontoons 
which  didn't  come  up ;  so  we  camped  for  the  night  and 
I  got  a  nice  rest.  I  haven't  heard  of  the  pontoons 
since,  and  I  reckon  they  are  there  yet  waiting  for  the 
mud  to  dry.  Jo.  Applegate  accompanied  us  in  search 
of  McKane. 

12. — Got  under  way  at  daylight  and  made  camp  at 
3  P.  M.  The  men  were  very  tired  as  the  road  was  very 
muddy  and  slippery.  The  trip  cost  me  some  two  dol- 
lars in  sole  leather.  A  good  supper,  however,  put  all 
right.  Found  Lieut.  Robinson  in  camp. 

14. — Picket.  Nothing  occurred  of  interest  except  a 
slight  skirmish  between  one  of  our  forage  trains  on  the 
Lebanon  pike  and  a  squad  of  rebel  cavalry.  It  didn't 
amount  to  anything,  however.  It  rained  to-night  as 
usual. 

15. — Relieved  at  10  A.  M.  After  getting  into  camp, 
whisky  rations  were  issued,  which  of  course  were  very 
acceptable.  By  the  way,  teetotalers  are  scarce  in  the 
army,  especially  in  wet  weather.  An  alarm  was  raised 
at  9  P.  M.  or  near  and  the  regiment  called  out  under 
arms,  after  which  the  men  went  to  bed. 

1 8. — Picket.  Line  has  been  advanced  a  mile  and 
a  half  from  camp.  The  orders  are  that  there  shall  be 
neither  fires  nor  sleep  on  out-post.  Picket  is  now  re- 


144  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

duced  to  a  high  state  of  efficiency.  Cleared  off  to- 
night. 

21. — Picket.  Rained  furiously  and  the  water 
caused  me  to  speedily  evacuate  my  first  shanty.  Rain 
ceased  after  dark.  Sometime  after  dark  Colclaser 
[quartermaster]  brought  out  whisky  rations.  If  ever 
whisky  was  acceptable,  it  was  to  us  drowned  rats. 
Nothing  unusual  during  night.  Letter  from  H.  C.  B. 

23. — Did  not  do  anything  to-day.  Weather  prom- 
ises rain.  Wrote  to-day  to  mother  and  to  W — .  No 
news  to-day  relative  to  our  future  movements.  Get 
mails  and  papers  now  quite  regularly.  The  late  Fed- 
eral conscription  act  pleases  me  very  much.  Prospects 
now  look  brighter. 

MARCH,  1863. 

i. — By  a  new  order  men  are  required  to  stand  to 
arms  about  an  hour  before  daylight  until  further  or- 
ders. "Everything  quiet  on  Stone's  river." 

5. — To-day  we  were  paid  up  to  the  3ist  of  October, 
1862.  Are  in  hopes  to  be  paid  up  to  the  ist  of  Febru- 
ary, 1863,  in  a  few  days.  Payment  occasioned  great 
rejoicing  among  the  men. 

6. — Picket.  I  had  command  of  stations  3  and  4. 
Rained  incessantly  all  night.  I  got  drenched  from 
head  to  foot.  Felt  unwell  and  did  not  eat  a  bite  while 
on  picket. 

22. — Very  unpleasant  weather.  Don't  get  any  let- 
ters except  from  mother.  We  drill  now  four  hours  per 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  145 

day.  The  duties  of  the  men  have  been  somewhat 
lighter  for  a  few  days.  They  are  on  [picket]  once  in 
four  or  five  days.  Get  mails  and  papers  regularly. 

25. — Officer  of  guard  to-day;  noticed  elm  trees  in 
leaf  for  the  first  time  this  season.  Although  the  season 
is  so  far  advanced  I  don't  see  any  signs  of  cultivation. 
This  whole  country  will  probably  remain  a  waste  till 
the  end  of  the  war.  We  are  now  continually  excited 
by  rumors  of  our  intended  attack  by  the  enemy. 

26. — Didn't  do  anything  to-day  out  of  ordinary 
camp  routine.  We  drill  four  hours  per  day  and  have 
three  roll  calls.  Rumors  of  an  attack  are  still  plenty. 
For  several  days  we  have  been  throwing  up  rifle-pits 
near  the  picket  line.  We  hear  of  skirmishes  along  the 
line  daily.  The  men  are  in  good  spirits  and  confident 
of  the  issue. 

28. — Nothing  of  importance  except  that  our  brigade 
got  dog-tents. 

29. — The  great  topic  to-day  is  the  dog-tents.  Each 
tent  is  designed  for  three  men  and  consists  of  three 
pieces  of  cotton,  each  about  six  feet  square  which  are 
joined  by  means  of  buttons  and  holes.  There  are  no 
poles  or  pins.  They  must  be  made.  There  are  ropes, 
however,  to  stretch  with. 

31. — Relieved  [from  picket  duty]  at  10  A.  M. 
Nothing  of  importance  to-day.  Last  night  very  rainy, 
turning  off  cold.  The  rumors  continue  of  the  near 
presence  of  the  enemy.  The  indications  now  are  that 
we  shall  remain  here  until  the  reduction  of  Vicksburg 
10 


146  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

or  repulse  of  the  rebels  in  [illegible]  will  allow  Grant 
or  Burnside  or  both  to  co-operate  with  Rosecrans. 
The  great  amount  of  provisions  accumulating  here,  the 
elaborate  fortifications,  mounting  on  them  of  heavy 
siege  guns,  the  activity  in  operations  of  other  depart- 
ments, go  to  prove  that  we  shall  not  move  soon.  Mean- 
while the  army  is  daily  and  "wonderfully  improving  its 
discipline  and  acquiring  an  abiding  faith  in  Rosecrans. 
The  men  do  not  seem  much  affected  by  political  excite- 
ment at  home.  It  is  true  that  the  majority  would  will- 
ingly see  slavery  go  by  the  board  if  it  stood  in  the  way 
of  peace.  But  at  the  same  time  many,  if  not  a  ma- 
jority would  be  perfectly  willing  for  the  slaves  to  re- 
main in  slavery  if  that  would  end  the  war.  The  fact 
is —  [remainder  of  sentence  illegible.] 

APRIL,   1863. 

i. — I  believe  an  effort  is  making  to  abolitionize  the 
army.  The  chaplain  has  in  the  past  week  distributed 
a  great  number  of  abolition  pamphlets  published  by  the 
American  Reform  [Society.] 

5. — Nothing  out  of  way  in  camp.  Rumors  of  at- 
tack have  subsided.  Everything  now  indicates  that  we 
shall  stay  here  for  several  weeks,  if  not  months.  The 
impression  seems  to  be  gaining  ground  that  the  rebel- 
lion will  be  subdued  by  fall  or  Christmas. 

8. — Men  in  camp  seem  in  better  health  and  spirits 
than  ever  before.  Their  time,  when  not  on  duty,  is  oc- 
cupied in  healthful  amusements  such  as  ball,  pitching 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  147 

quoits,  tossing  cannon-balls,  &c.  A  great  change  is 
visible  every  way  in  the  last  six  weeks.  Got  a  letter 
from  Ben  Williams. 

9. — Got  up  this  morning  stiff  from  the  violent  exer- 
cise I  took  yesterday  in  playing  ball.  Adorned  our 
company  street  to-day  with  cedars.  Gives  it  a  very 
tasty  appearance.  Everything  very  quiet  in  camp 
nowadays.  Weather  warm. 

10. — Everything  has  assumed  a  kind  of  monoto- 
nous domestic  way ;  that  is,  there  is  no  more  excitement 
about  attacks,  advances,  moving,  etc.  Still  the  men 
are  enjoying  themselves  better  than  ever  and  there  is 
a  great  deal  less  sickness.  Weather  pleasant  with 
indications  of  an  approaching  warm  spell. 

13. — Picket.  Had  command  of  post  i,  station  I. 
From  20  to  30  women  and  children  (negroes)  have 
congregated  at  a  house  just  outside  our  lines  on  the 
pike,  who  are  in  a  starving  condition.  They  have  run 
away  from  their  masters  or  their  masters  have  run 
away  from  them  and  they  all  refused  to  come  in  our 
lines.  This  is  only  an  example  of  worse  to  follow  a 
protracted  war. 

15- — Very  disagreeable,  rainy  day.  Several  offi- 
cers to-day  put  under  temporary  arrest.  Four  offi- 
cers besides are  now  under  arrest.  Lieut.  

for  neglect  of  duty  on  picket;  Lieut.  for  drunk- 
enness on  guard,  etc. ;  Capt.  and  Lieut.  for 

singing  and  laughing  in  a  low  tone  after  taps. 

1 6. — About  midnight  last  night  camp  was  aroused 
and  orders  issued  to  march  with  three  days'  rations  and 


148  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

100  rounds  to  the  man.  Started  at  about  3  this  morn- 
ing and  went  to  old  camp  on  Stone's  river  on  Lebanon 
pike.  Our  brigade  and  part  of  another  with  a  battery 
of  eight  guns  composed  the  force.  We  brought  noth- 
ing along  but  knapsacks  and  purp  tents.  Don't  know 
object  in  coming. 

17. — This  is  our  first  experience  with  our  dog-tents. 
They  are  very  convenient  and  are  growing  in  favor. 
This  place  has  improved  since  we  left.  The  trees  are 
out  and  the  prospect  from  the  hill  delightful.  The  hill 
has  been  strengthened  by  a  sort  of  a  fort  and  rifle-pits, 
Weather  very  warm.' 

1 8. — The  commander  of  the  post  here  has  impressed 
a  number  of  contrabands  to  work  on  fortifications. 
They  take  hold  quite  readily  and  say  they  belong  to  the 
ist  Tennessee.  They  have  a  great  desire  to  be  consid- 
ered soldiers.  Nothing  remarkable.  Days  hot  and 
mornings  very  cold. 

19. — Were  paid  yesterday  up  to  March.     I  received 
$208.65.     Have  more  money  than  I  know  what  to  do  » 
with.     From  some  cause  the  paymasters  decline  adopt- 
ing Goodwin's  allotment  roll  plan.     A  good  many  of  '* 
the  boys  will,   I  think,   send  money  home  by  Moore. 
But  a  good  many  of  the  regiment  have  already  begun 
to  gamble. 

22. — Nothing  of  importance  occurred  to-day.     The 
weather  is  now  quite  warm,  disagreeably  so  along  the  , 
middle  of  the  day.     The  men  go  on  duty  about  every 
other  day.     They  have  plenty  to  do  in  the  way  of  po- 
licing, cleaning  guns  and  clothes,  etc.     They  appear. 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  149 

nevertheless,  to  be  in  fine  spirits.  Homesickness  is  not 
nearly  so  prevalent  as  it  was  some  time  back. 

23. — Picket.  In  command  of  station  2.  Instruc- 
tions on  picket  more  stringent  than  ever.  Was  visited 
ten  different  times  while  on.  This  station  has  two 
commissioned  and  seven  non-commissioned  officers 
and  sixty  privates.  My  detachment  composed  of  men 
from  79th  Ind.  and  i9th  Ohio.  All  quiet.  Elected 
company  cooks  to-day  by  general  order. 

24. — Relieved  at  10  A.  M.  Had  battalion  drill  this 
afternoon  for  the  first  time  since  leaving  Nashville. 
John  Eaton  [sutler]  arrived  with  a  stock  of  goods. 
Also  Frank  Jelleff  from  Franklin.  Weather  quite 
warm. 

25. — Had  officers'  school  to-day.  Capt.  put 

under  arrest  to-day.  Erected  a  clapboard  kitchen  and 
an  awning  over  our  company  table.  It  adds  much  to 
appearance  of  company  quarters.  Every  company 
now  has  to  have  company  cooks  who  cook  according 
to  furnished  recipes.  To-day  for  the  first  time  a  com- 
pany fund  was  distributed.  Co.  I  got  $15.25. 

26. — Visited  to-day  by  Capt.  Herriot  and  Ord. 
Brown.  Very  quiet  and  still  in  camp.  Sunday  is  now 
in  the  army  as  at  home ;  a  day  of  rest  as  far  as  practica- 
ble. By  a  general  order  no  work  not  absolutely  neces- 
sary is  to  be  done  on  Sunday. 

27. — Everything  quiet  in  camp.  Everybody  ap- 
pears to  be  settling  down  into  the  belief  that  we  shall 
stay  here  some*  time  and  we  are  making  preparations 
accordingly.  Boxes  of  good  things  from  home  come 


I5O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

to  the  regiment  daily  to  enliven  and  cheer  the  hearts 
of  the  soldiers.     Batchelor  started  home. 

29. — To-day  turned  over  our  old  tents  and  put  up 
the  "purps."  They  are  put  up  three  together  and  all 
on  one  side  of  the  street.  The  cedars  were  also  set  out 
to-day.  We  have  a  nice  camp  now.  Great  pains  are 
taken  to  preserve  cleanliness.  Policing  is  done  very 
thoroughly  and  large  and  commodious  covered  sinks 
dug. 

MAY,  1863. 

5. — On  picket  in  command  of  station  i.  Was 
complimented  by  corps  officer  of  day.  Occasional  rain 
during  the  day.  An  improvement  has  been  lately 
adopted  in  the  picket  system.  A  mounted  courier  is 
now  kept  at  an  important  station.  The  whole  picket 
system  is  now  reduced  almost  to  a  state  of  perfection. 
Had  a  severe  headache  all  day  and  night. 

7. — There  was  great  cheering  and  rejoicing  last 
night  over  Hooker's  supposed  victory.  All  day  the 
most  exaggerated  reports  of  Hooker's  success  have 
been  floating  through  camp.  All  eyes  are  now  turned 
toward  the  Potomac  army.  To-day  was  as  disagree- 
able as  I  almost  ever  experienced.  Cold,  rainy,  and 
discomforting.  Enough  to  give  Mark  Tapley  the 
blues. 

8. — To-day  it  is  said  that  Hooker  has  completely  cut 
the  rebel  communications  and  is  only  waiting  for  the 
30,000  reenforcements  that  are  coming  up  to  fall  upon 
and  annihilate  the  rebels.  Of  course  we  are  all  on  our 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  151 

heads  with  excitement.  Cleared  up  this  afternoon  and 
there  is  a  promise  of  fine  weather.  Regimental  trou- 
bles pretty  near  a  boil. 

9. — There  are  rumors  to-day,  which  seem  to  be  of  a 
credible  character,  that  Hooker  has  retired  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock  and  is  again  in  his  old  camp 
at  Falmouth.  It  is  said  the  whole  affair  was  a  mere 
cavalry  raid  by  Stoneman.  I  am  almost  prompted  to 
say  fizzle !  fizzle !  fizzle ! 

10. — Sunday.  Had  company  inspection.  Men 
looked  remarkably  neat  and  clean.  A  very  perceptible 
change  has  come  over  them,  inducing  them  to  manifest 
a  good  deal  of  pride  in  personal  cleanliness.  The  or- 
der excusing  five  men  from  picket  and  camp  guard 
most  distinguished  for  soldierly  appearance  has,  so  far, 
been  highly  beneficial.  Day  beautiful.  Nothing  defi- 
nite from  Hooker.  Wrote  to .  • 

ii. — Nothing  of  importance  to-day.  The  weather 
is  becoming  very  uncomfortably  warm  and  the  men  go 
out  into  the  woods  in  front  of  camp  to  sleep  during  the 
heat  of  the  day.  After  sundown  they  amuse  them- 
selves in  playing  cards,  marbles,  boxing,  dancing,  etc. 
Everybody  is  in  good  spirits  and  seems  disposed  to  be 
as  merry  as  possible. 

12. — Officer  of  guard.  Was  very  busy  all  day. 
Our  camp  now  presents  a  beautiful  appearance  but  does 
not  equal  the  iQth  Ohio  which  excels  in  everything. 
We're  improving  fast  though.  The  first  brigade  drill 
for  our  brigade  took  place  to-day.  I  could  not  attend. 

13. — Had  regimental  inspection  to-day.     After  that 


152  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

we  had  brigade  drill,  the  first  I  was  ever  on.  I  was 
much  pleased.  The  news  from  the  Rappahannock  is 
beautifully  dubious  and  magnificently  vague.  I  am 
prepared  for  a  grand  "let  down."  After  Hooker, 
who  ?  A  brigade  camp  guard  was  organized  to-day. 

14. — Company  was  occupied  all  day  in  raising  tents, 
building  an  arbor  for  the  company  table  and  improv- 
ing quarters  generally.  Our  company  quarters  look 
actually  enticing.  The  tents  are  only  made  for  three 
but  are  large  enough  for  five  when  raised  with  boards. 
The  streets  are  neatly  graded  and  ornamented  with 
cedars.  Commodious  slops  and  wash  sinks,  kitchen, 
etc. 

1 6. — Hooker  seems  to  have  very  quietly  subsided. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  now  resumed  its  proper 
function,  awaiting  a  forward  move.  But  somehow  it 
doesn't  get  along  very  fast.  For  two  years  that  army 
has  been  on  the  eve  of  going  somewhere  and  doing 
something  but  never  doing  it.  We  of  the  West  will 
have  to  whip  the  rebels  after  all. 

17. — Usual  Sunday  inspection.  Men  remarkably 
neat  and  clean.  Batchelor  returned  to-day.  Brings 
very  favorable  news  from  home.  Very  hot  and  noth- 
ing stirring.  The  flies  are  growing  exceedingly  trou- 
blesome. The  pertinacity  with  which  they  dispute 
possession  of  the  victuals  is  truly  remarkable. 

1 8. — I  don't  know  what  to  fill  out  this  journal  with. 
There  is  a  dearth  of  news  here.  The  weather  is  hot, 
the  flies  terrible,  and  everybody  in  his  hole  during  the 
heat  of  the  day.  Soldiering  has  become  a  systema- 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  153 

tized  business  now  and  is  pretty  much  the  same  thing 
every  day. 

19. — What  will  be  done  next?  Hooker  in  Fal- 
mouth,  Rosecrans  taking  it  easy  and  making  much  ado 
about  nothing,  Grant  bobbing  around,  nobody  knows 
what  at.  It  looks  to  me  as  if  nobody  is  in  any  hurry 
about  closing  up  the  war,  but  that  the  North,  confident 
of  its  power,  is  preparing  to  eat  up  the  rebels  by  piece- 
meal. I  hardly  look  for  a  great  battle  soon. 

22. — Completed  and  sent  off  ordnance  reports  this 
morning.  This  has  been  a  tedious  job.  I  now  have 
a  prospect  of  a  little  ease.  For  the  last  three  or  four 
days  we  have  had  no  brigade  drill,  but  instead  two 
battalion  drills — one  in  the  morning  before  breakfast 
and  one  after  dress  parade.  Fact  is  we  have  had  an 
easy  time  for  a  week. 

26. — Picket  to-day  in  command  of  station  4.  Lost 
my  way  twice  in  trying  to  find  out-post  i.  The  senti- 
nels of  out-post  i  are  stationed  on  the  side  of  the  field 
from  which  the  rebels  emerged  on  Friday  of  the  battle. 
Everything  looks  as  natural  as  life,  or  rather  death,  for 
such  was  that  field  to  many  a  poor  soldier.  Was  vis- 
ited only  once  during  the  night.  Lizards  and  ticks 
abound  in  the  woods. 

27. — Nothing  unusual  occurred  last  night.  The  re- 
lief this  morning  was  nearly  an  hour  behind  time,  hav- 
ing missed  the  way  and  traveled  about  four  miles  be- 
fore they  found  us.  Didn't  get  a  letter  to-day,  which 
disappointed  me  much ;  I  don't  think  I'll  write  to  any- 
body for  six  months. 


154  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

29. — Had  squad  drill  this  afternoon  and  battalion 
after  supper.  That  was  about  all  of  importance. 
There  was  some  talk  of  our  going  to  Knoxville,  but 
that  has  played  out.  The  General  has  recommended 
the  drawing  of  two  months'  supplies  of  clothing,  etc., 
which  I  suppose  indicates  something,  though  it's 
"mighty  onsartain.""  Rained  like  blazes  last  night. 

30. — Rained  nearly  all  day.  A  partial  inspection  of 
the  guns  was  made  to-day  with  the  object  of  exchang- 
ing our  present  for  Springfield  rifles.  Very  quiet  in 
camp  and  not  much  prospect  of  a  move.  Grant  has 
not  taken  Vicksburg  yet.  It  begins  to  look  like  the 
Fredericksburg  humbug.  What  if  he  don't  take  it? 
Good  for  three  years  I  am  afraid. 

31. — Day  opens  cloudy  but  cool  and  pleasant.  Had 
regimental  inspection  at  5  P.  M.  Our  company  looked 
particularly  fine.  Lieut.  Taylor  of  the  2ist  Ills.,  Gen. 
Grant's  old  regiment,  was  over  to-day.  He  used  to  be 
a  student  at  Franklin  [College,  Ind.] — is  now  adju- 
tant of  a  convalescent  regiment.  He  vindicates  Grant 
from  all  aspersions  but  didn't  convince  me  of  his  abili- 
ties as  a  general. 

JUNE,   1863. 

8. — Wrote  to  —  and  — .  Gave  them  both  particu- 
lar fits  for  not  writing  more  promptly.  The  forward 
move  seems  to  have  played  out.  It  is  high  time  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  doing  something.  Six 
months  in  one  place  won't  do.  The  science  of  "how 


SIX    MONTHS    AT    MURFREESBORO  155 

not  to  do  it"  seems  to  have  been  again  inaugurated 
with  improvements.  Weather  clear. 

13. — Drill  this  morning.  Put  in  the  day  as  usual 
in  cleaning  up.  Eaton  brought  some  cherries  and 
raspberries  which  a  person  could  luxuriate  on  at  25 
cents  per  pint.  Went  to  river  this  evening  and  had  a 
good,  nice  bath.  We  go  to  the  railroad  bridge  about 
three-fourths  mile  distant  from  camp.  Awfully  hot 
to-day.  Wm.  Jacobs,  Co.  C,  was  killed  yesterday  by 
an  accidental  shot. 

1 6. — Ordered  to  march  out  to  witness  the  execution 

of  a  deserter,  Wm.  Minix,  private,  Co.  ,  Qth  Ky., 

for  desertion.  The  whole  division  turned  out.  We 
were  on  the  ground  by  8.  The  troops  formed  three 
sides  of  a  square.  The  prisoner  was  brought  in  at 
about  9.  The  procession  was  as  follows:  ist  the 
band,  2d  the  guard,  3d  the  coffin  and  bearers,  4th  the 
prisoner,  5th  the  detail  to  shoot  him.  The  sentence 
was  executed  between  9  and  10.  The  whole  affair  was 
very  impressive  and  solemn. 

23. — Officer  of  guard.  Pleasant  day.  Rumors  that 
the  army  marches  to-morrow.  Impression  that  our 
division  remains.  Wagons  coming  in  all  night  from 
the  Lebanon  pike.  The  movement  has  begun. 

24. — Day  opens  with  a  drizzling  rain.  This  morn- 
ing discovers  all  the  troops  gone  but  our  division.  At 
3  P.  M.  struck  tents  and  moved  over  near  the  fortifica- 
tions southwest  of  town  about  a  mile  from  our  old 
camp.  Rained  all  day. 


CHAPTER  SEVEN 

THE    CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN    AND    THE    BATTLE    OF 
CHICKAMAUGA 

The  country  was  becoming  impatient  because  of  the 
long  stay  at  Murf reesboro ;  the  soldiers  there  were  also 
becoming  restive.  It  was  plain  to  all  that  we  must  go 
outside  our  camp  to  meet  the  enemy.  Naturally  the 
next  objective  point  for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  Chattanooga.  There  was,  however,  but  one  line 
of  railroad  between  Nashville  and  Chattanooga ;  great 
mountain  ranges  were  to  be  crossed  before  getting  to 
the  latter  point ;  and  it  was  a  most  difficult  problem  how 
to  procure  supplies  for  the  army  on  its  way  to  Chatta- 
nooga and  after  it  should  get  there.  It  was,  there- 
fore, deemed  advisable  to  defer  the  forward  movement 
until  the  roads  should  become  better,  and  until  the  rip- 
ening corn  should  afford  the  necessary  forage;  so  it 
was  not  begun  until  the  latter  part  of  June,  1863. 

Bragg's  army  was  then  posted  north  of  Duck  river, 
the  infantry  in  a  strongly  fortified  position  between 
Shelbyville  and  Wartrace,  with  cavalry  flanks  at  Mc- 
Minnville  on  the  right  and  Spring  Hill  and  Columbia 
on  the  left,  his  chief  depot  of  supplies  being  at  Tulla- 
homa. 

The  forward  movement  from  Mnrfreesboro,  known 
(156) 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  157 

as  the  "Tullahoma  campaign,"  began  June  23,  and  in 
the  brief  period  of  nine  days  resulted  in  the  evacuation 
by  Bragg  of  Tullahoma  without  a  great  battle  and  with 
slight  loss  to  the  Federal  army.  But  Bragg's  army 
was  still  in  the  field  and  the  stronghold  of  Chattanooga 
was  yet  to  be  won.  To  capture  it  would  require  long 
and  arduous  marches  over  a  barren  and  broken  coun- 
try destitute  of  necessary  supplies,  the  constant  deple- 
tion of  the  advancing  army,  already  113  miles  from 
Nashville,  its  secondary  base,  by  the  withdrawal  of 
troops  to  guard  its  communications  in  the  rear,  and  un- 
doubtedly the  fighting  of  a  great  battle  against  all  the 
troops  that  could  be  assembled  to  defend  a  point  of 
such  vital  importance  to  the  Confederacy. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  knew  very  little 
about  the  character  of  the  country  over  which  such  a 
march  must  be  made,1  but  they  were  clamorous  for  an 
immediate  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
and  preparations  for  it  were  now  pushed  with  all  possi- 
ble celerity. 

Bragg  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Chatta- 
nooga and  the  main  body  of  his  army  was  there  or 
in  the  near  vicinity.  Detachments  guarded  all  the 
available  crossings  of  the  Tennessee  for  considerable 
distances  above  and  below  that  point,  and  Forrest's 
cavalry  kept  watch  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  Rose- 
crans  had  his  headquarters  at  Winchester,  Tennessee, 
where  were  also  those  of  the  2Oth  Army  Corps;  the 

1  See  Cox's  Military  Reminiscences,  vol.  I,  p.  541. 


158  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

1 4th  and  2ist  corps  were  posted  at  different  points  be- 
tween Winchester  and  McMinnville  and  west  of  the 
Cumberland  Mountains;  while  the  reserve  corps  was 
disposed  in  the  rear  at  various  points  north  of  Duck 
river.  The  primary  base  of  supplies  was  Louisville, 
connected  by  only  a  single  railroad  with  Nashville,  the 
secondary  base. 

To  take  Chattanooga  either  by  direct  assault  or  by 
siege  was  plainly  impracticable.  The  only  practicable 
plan  was  to  force  the  evacuation  of  it  by  Bragg's  army, 
and  to  accomplish  this  it  was  necessary  to  get  in  the 
rear  of  the  army  and  threaten  its  communications. 
There  were  two  ways  of  doing  this :  To  cross  the  Ten- 
nessee river  above  Chattanooga  or  to  cross  it  below. 
Rosecrans's  plan  was  to  cross  below  but  to  divert 
Bragg's  attention  by  making  a  feint  of  crossing  above. 
To  execute  this  plan  required  sending  a  considerable 
force  across  the  Cumberland  Mountains  and  Walden 
Ridge  and  making  demonstrations  indicating  an  in- 
tent to  cross  the  river  above  Chattanooga  while  the 
main  body  of  the  army  was  crossing  below. 

The  Tennessee  is  a  deep  and  wide  river,  and  at 
Bridgeport,  where  it  was  intended  to  construct  a 
bridge,  it  is  over  a  half  mile  wide.  Crossing  the  river 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy  was  not  an  easy  undertaking, 
but  far  more  serious  obstacles  would  confront  the  army 
after  a  crossing  had  been  effected ;  for  it  would  then  be 
necessary,  in  order  to  get  in  rear  of  Chattanooga,  to 
cross  Raccoon  Mountain  and  Lookout  Mountain,  two 
precipitous  ranges,  having  few  passes  with  wide  inter- 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  159 

vals  between,  and  next  Missionary  Ridge,  a  lower 
range.  It  also  involved  cutting  loose  from  Stevenson, 
Alabama,  the  proposed  new  base  of  supplies,  and 
marching  with  at  least  twenty-five  days'  rations  and 
enough  ammunition  for  two  battles. 

Rosecrans  had  an  army  of  about  60,000  men  with 
which  to  start  on  such  a  stupendous  undertaking.  He 
pleaded  with  the  Washington  authorities  for  reenforce- 
ments  and  especially  for  more  cavalry.  When  Sher- 
man, in  May,  1864,  started  on  his  Atlanta  campaign 
through  the  already  exhausted  Confederacy,  begin- 
ning, moreover,  at  Chattanooga  where  Rosecrans  left 
off,  he  was  supplied  with  a  magnificent  army  of  more 
than  100,000  men.  Rosecrans  also  urged  that  he 
should  be  supported  by  such  forward  movements  of 
other  Federal  armies  as  would  protect  his  flanks  and 
prevent  Confederate  concentration  against  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland.  When  Sherman  began  his  At- 
lanta campaign  Grant  also  began  his  campaign  against 
Richmond,  leaving  Lee  no  men  to  spare  to  reenforce 
the  army  confronting  Sherman.  Indeed,  it  seems  now 
that  a  movement  so  important  as  that  contemplated  by 
Rosecrans  should  have  been  made  only  in  connection 
with  a  simultaneous  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, that  of  Burnside  in  east  Tennessee,  and  that  of 
Grant  at  Vicksburg.  But  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  then  inactive  and  had  been  since  the  battle  of  Get- 
tysburg. Grant,  soon  after  the  surrender  of  Vicks- 
burg, had  suggested  to  the  authorities  at  Washington 
that  a  portion  of  the  force  under  his  command  be  sent 


l6o  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

against  Mobile,  a  movement  which  would  have  aided 
Rosecrans  by  compelling  the  withdrawal  of  detach- 
ments from  Bragg's  army,  while,  as  it  was,  reenforce- 
ments  were  sent  to  Bragg.  But  Grant's  suggestions 
were  unheeded.  Burnside  had  been  busy  in  looking 
after  General  John  Morgan  and  did  not  reach  the  vi- 
cinity of  Knoxville  until  August  26.  He  never  was 
near  enough  to  Rosecrans  to  render  him  any  assistance 
and  as  soon  as  he  appeared  in  east  Tennessee  Buckner's 
corps  was  withdrawn  and  sent  to  reenforce  Bragg.2 

A  deaf  ear  was  turned  to  all  the  appeals  of  Rose- 
crans. He  had  sent  General  Rousseau  to  Washing- 
ton with  letters  to  President  Lincoln,  to  Halleck,  and 
to  Stanton,  urging  the  necessity  of  giving  him  the  aid 
essential  for  a  movement  so  important  as  that  designed 
to  take  and  hold  Chattanooga.  Rosecrans  was  some- 
what given  to  making  complaints,  but  in  this  instance 
his  appeals  seem  to  have  been  well  grounded.  Lin- 
coln sent  him  a  kind  letter;  Stanton  did  not  answer 
and  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  would  be  damned 

2  Halleck,  as  usual,  sought  to  shift  the  blame  for  his  own  fail- 
ures on  some  other  person,  and  on  Sept.  22,  1863,  he  sent  a  dis- 
patch to  General  Burnside,  saying:  "I  fear  your  delay  has 
already  permitted  Bragg  to  prevent  your  junction."  To  this 
Burnside  sent  a  caustic  answer  emphatically  denying  that  he  had 
been  guilty  of  any  delay  and  showing  that  he  had  obeyed  all 
orders  to  the  letter,  and  that  from  the  time  when  his  troops  first 
entered  east  Tennessee  it  had  been  impracticable  to  effect  a  junc- 
tion with  Rosecrans.  See  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  52,  pp.  785,  904; 
Cox:  Military  Reminiscences,  vol.  i,  pp.  530-541. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  l6l 

if  he  gave  Rosecrans  another  man.3  Halleck  sent  the 
following  dispatch  August  5,  1863 :  "The  orders  for 
the  advance  of  your  army,  and  that  its  progress  be  re- 
ported daily,  are  peremptory."  Not  a  man  was  sent 
to  Rosecrans,  nor  was  his  movement  supported  by  that 
of  any  other  Federal  army. 

The  advance  to  Chattanooga  began  August  i6th. 
The  2  ist  Army  Corps  crossed  the  Cumberland  Moun- 
tains into  the  Sequatchie  Valley ;  two  brigades  of  that 
corps  then  crossed  Walden  Ridge  into  the  Tennessee 
Valley,  and  these,  with  Wilder's  brigade  and  Minty's 
cavalry,  at  once  proceeded  to  stir  up  a  lively  commo- 
tion in  front  of  and  above  Chattanooga.  Camp-fires 
were  lighted  on  the  ridge,  bugles  were  blown  at  numer- 
ous fords,  Chattanooga  was  shelled  from  across  the 
river,  and  various  demonstrations  were  made  indicat- 
ing a  purpose  to  cross  the  Federal  army  at  some  point 
above  Chattanooga.4 

So  successful  was  the  feint  that  Bragg  was  complete- 
ly deceived  and  withdrew  from  Bridgeport  the  only 

3  See  Rosecrans's  testimony  before  Committee  on  Conduct  of 
the  War ;  Report  of  Committee  on  Rosecrans's  Campaign,  p.  28.  . 

4  The  official  report  of  General  Daniel  H.  Hill,  in  command  of 
the  place,  fairly  illustrates  the  manner  in  which  the  Yankee  in- 
vaders were  regarded  in  the   South.     He   says :     "On   fast    day 
(August),   while  religious   services  were  being  held  in   Chatta- 
nooga, the  Yankees  appeared  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  and 
commenced   shelling  the  town  without  giving  any  notice.     Our 
pickets  and  scouts,  if  any  were  out,  had  given  no  warning  of  the 
Yankees'  approach.     Some  women  and  children  were  killed  and 
wounded  by  this  not  unusual  act  of  atrocity  of  our  savage  foe." 

II 


l62  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

brigade  that  had  been  guarding  against  the  crossing  of 
the  Federal  army  at  that  point.  Meanwhile  the  main 
body  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  concentrated 
with  as  much  secrecy  as  possible,  near  Bridgeport,  and 
by  September  4  all  the  army  had  crossed  the  Tennessee 
at  that  point  and  others  near  by,  and  by  the  6th  was  in 
the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga.  Bragg  began  the  evacu- 
ation of  the  place  September  7  and  had  completed  the 
withdrawal  of  the  main  body  of  his  army  by  the  even- 
ing of  the  8th.  On  that  day  there  were  rumors  of  the 
evacuation  and  on  the  day  following  Beatty's  brigade 
of  Van  Cleve's  division  ascended  Lookout  Mountain 
at  Nickajack  Trace  and  advanced  to  the  point,  about 
twelve  miles  distant,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  truth  of 
the  rumor.  It  was  found  that  the  Confederates  had 
abandoned  both  Lookout  Mountain  and  Chattanooga, 
and  on  the  same  day  the  Federal  troops  entered  Chat- 
tanooga as  the  rear  guard  of  Bragg's  army  was  leav- 
ing. Thus  by  skilful  strategy  Chattanooga  had  been 
gained  without  a  battle,  or  even  a  considerable  skir- 
mish, after  the  evacuation  of  Tullahoma.  The  79th 
Ind.  had  made  another  long  march,  crossing  the  Cum- 
berland Mountains  and  passing  down  the  beautiful 
Sequatchie  Valley,  seeing  on  the  way  magnificent 
mountain  scenery  whose  grandeur  often  evoked  the  en- 
thusiastic cheers  of  the  passing  troops.  We  were  now 
in  Chattanooga,  but  the  great  battle  for  its  permanent 
occupation  was  yet  to  be  fought. 

Much  has  been  written  about  the  battle  of  Chicka- 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  163 

manga,  containing  a  vast  deal  of  misinformation.5 
No  battle  in  the  Civil  War  was  more  stubbornly  fought 
on  both  sides  than  was  that  of  Chickamauga.  Con- 
sidering the  number  of  men  engaged,  it  was  by  far  the 
bloodiest,  and  was  characterized  from  first  to  last  by 
exhibitions  of  bravery  on  both  sides  not  surpassed  in 
any  battle  in  history.  No  writer  of  fiction  ever  por- 
trayed anything  equal  to  the  reality.  No  orator  could 
ever  find  language  adequate  to  describe  the  heroic 
achievements  on  that  bloody  field.  The  monuments, 
the  tablets,  the  dumb  batteries  that  stand  there  now, 
remind  those  who  participated  in  the  conflict  of  the 
dreadful  carnage,  but  can  not  convey  to  one  that  did 
not  witness  it  the  faintest  conception  of  the  battle. 
The  field  marks  a  contest  between  the  highest  types  of 
American  soldiery. 

Moreover,  no  battle  of  the  Civil  War  more  clearly  il- 
lustrates upon  what  slender  chances  victory  depends. 
Looking  back  at  the  mistakes  of  both  sides,  one  can 
now  easily  see  how  the  absence  of  some  of  them  might 
have  turned  the  scale,  and  caused  either  the  defeat 
of  the  Confederate,  or  the  total  annihilation  of  the 
Federal  army.  To  understand  fully  that  memorable 

5  The  most  intelligible  accounts  of  the  battle,  valuable  chiefly 
because  written  by  eye-witnesses,  and  accompanied  by  maps  essen- 
tial to  an  understanding  of  it,  will  be  found  in  Van  Home's 
History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Cist's  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, Turchin's  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  Piatt's  George  H. 
Thomas,  and  Boynton's  Chickamauga  National  Military  Park. 
The  official  reports  of  the  battle  are  contained  in  Rebellion  Rec- 
ords, ser.  Nos.  50.  51. 


164  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

battle  it  is  necessary  to  have  in  mind  the  operations 
of  the  ten  days  or  more  preceding  it. 

Complete  success  had  attended  the  movement 
against  Chattanooga  and,  as  already  stated,  the  town 
had  been  occupied  by  General  Rosecrans's  army  Sep- 
tember 9,  1863,  without  serious  resistance  and  with 
little  loss  of  life.  Thus  far  it  seemed  that  the  strategy 
by  which  the  gateway  to  the  South  had  been  secured 
was  beyond  criticism,  and  so  it  was  regarded  by  the 
military  authorities  at  Washington. 

Bragg  was  apparently  in  full  retreat.     Rosecrans, 
thinking  that  he  did  not  intend  to  stop  north  of  Dalton 
or  Rome  in  Georgia,  and  elated  by  his  own  easy  tri- 
umph, instead  of  concentrating  his  already  widely  sep- 
arated corps,  as  Thomas  urgently  advised,6  ordered 
them  to  continue  in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  enemy.     On 
the  morning  of  the  Qth  Rosecrans  dispatched  to  Crit- 
tenden,and  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  to  McCook, 
that  Bragg  had  evacuated  Chattanooga  and  was  in 
full  retreat,  directing  the  former  to  push  forward  with 
five  days'  rations  in  vigorous  pursuit,  and  the  latter 
to  move  rapidly  upon  Alpine  and  Summerville,  inter 
cept  Bragg's  retreat,  and  attack  on  his  flank.     The  d 
visions  of  Thomas's  corps  were  already  far  south  o 
Chattanooga,  but  as  late  as  9  145  P.  M.  on  Septembe 
10,  Rosecrans,  in  a  dispatch  to  Thomas,  expressed  hi 
impatience  that  his  advance  had  not  been  more  rapic 
and,  in  entire  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  Bragg's  arm 

'  See  Van  Home :  Life  of  George  H.  Thomas,  p.  104. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  165 

was  even  then  concentrated  at  Lafayette,  gave  Thomas 
peremptory  orders  that  his  movement  on  Lafayette 
"should  be  made  with  the  utmost  promptness." 

Halleck,  as  general-in-chief,  was  still  conducting 
military  operations  by  telegraph  from  Washington. 
He,  too,  seems  to  have  been  somewhat  dazed  by  the 
success  of  his  own  strategy,  and  to  have  been  revolv- 
ing in  his  mind  some  stupendous  plan  for  an  "ad- 
vance into  Georgia  or  Alabama  or  into  the  valley  of 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina,"  as  indicated  in  his  dis- 
patches of  September  n  to  Burnside  and  Rosecrans. 
Until  Halleck's  plan  could  be  more  fully  matured, 
Burnside  was  to  "hold  the  gaps  of  the  North  Carolina 
mountains"  and  Rosecrans  "the  mountain  passes  on 
the  west  and  Dalton  or  some  other  point  on  the  rail- 
road, to  prevent  the  return  of  Bragg's  army."  From 
such  dreams  there  was  a  sudden  and  rude  awakening. 
It  came  first  to  Rosecrans.  McCook  on  his  way  to 
Alpine  had  entirely  missed  the  Confederate  army.  He 
had  sent  out  several  detachments  on  the  8th  and  9th 
to  scour  the  country  in  search  of  the  whereabouts  of 
Bragg's  army,  but  no  traces  of  it  had  been  found. 
On  the  loth,  however,  he  discovered  that  if  he  had 
gone  to  Summerville  he  would  probably  have  been 
surrounded  by  it.  When  Crittenden  reached  Ringgold 
he  found  that  there  had  been  some  grievous  misunder- 
standing of  Bragg's  whereabouts.  Negley's  division 
of  Thomas's  corps,  in  its  hot  chase,  almost  tumbled 
headlong  into  the  midst  of  Bragg's  army  at  Me- 


1 66  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Lemore's  Cove,  but  fortunately  discovered  its  peril 
in  time  to  escape. 

Halleck's  air-castles  were  undermined  more  slowly, 
by  gradual  approaches,  to  use  a  military  phrase.  From 
the  tales  related  to  him  by  deserters,  who  were  probably 
sent  expressly  to  tell  them,  he  was  induced  to  believe 
that  Bragg,  instead  of  making  preparations  to  give 
battle  himself,  was  sending  reenforcements  to  Lee. 
On  September  13  Halleck  learned  that  a  portion  of 
Lee's  army  had  gone  somewhere;  the  next  day  it  was 
reported  that  it  was  Longstreet's  corps  that  had  gone. 
But  where  had  Longstreet  gone?  There  were  various 
suppositions.  He  might  have  gone  to  Petersburg; 
he  might  have  gone  to  Norfolk.  At  any  rate,  Halleck 
wisely  conjectured  that  he  would  "soon  strike  a  blow 
somewhere."  By  and  by  it  occurred  to  him  that  possi- 
bly Longstreet  had  gone  to  reen force  Bragg,  and  then 
the  telegraph  was  put  to  work  again  and  frantic  dis- 
patches were  sent  at  once  in  every  direction  to  Grant, 
to  Sherman,  to  Hurlbut,  to  Burnside,  to  hurry  to 
Rosecrans  the  reenforcements  that  should  have  been 
sent  months  before — as  if  armies  hundreds  of  miles 
away  could  be  put  in  motion  in  an  instant. 

It  was  indeed  true  that  a  grave  mistake  had  been 
made  concerning  Bragg's  movements.  He  had  re- 
treated only  a  short  distance.  Taking  advantage  of 
the  broken  and  mountainous  character  of  the  country, 
well  adapted  to  concealing  his  movements,  he  had  re- 
tired into  the  rocky  fastnesses  of  northern  Georgia  and 
was  secretly  massing  his  troops  in  the  vicinity  of  La- 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  167 

fayette,  hiding  behind  Pigeon  Mountain  and  await- 
ing the  opportunity  to  strike  and  crush  in  detail  the 
widely  separated  columns  of  Rosecrans's  army  as  they 
debouched  from  the  mountain  passes,  and  to  cut  off 
retreat  by  the  Lafayette  road,  the  only  available  route 
from  that  region  back  to  Chattanooga. 

General  Rosecrans,  as  late  as  September  n,  seems 
to  have  doubted  the  truth  of  the  reports  that  Bragg 
was  concealing  his  army  within  striking  distance.  By 
that  time  the  true  condition  of  affairs  had  been  ascer- 
tained. The  situation  of  the  Federal  army  was  very 
critical.  Bragg  had  been  reenforced  by  General  John- 
ston with  15,000  men  and  by  Buckner's  corps,  which 
had  been  withdrawn  from  east  Tennessee,  and  his 
army  was  massed  nearly  opposite  the  center  of  the 
Federal  army  whose  right  and  left  flanks  were  forty 
miles  apart  and  separated  by  mountain  ranges  permit- 
ting the  passage  of  troops  only  through  passes  or  de- 
files few  and  far  between.  McCook's  corps  was  at 
Alpine,  fifty  miles  south  of  Chattanooga,  and  could 
effect  a  junction  with  the  other  corps  only  by  long 
and  difficult  marches.  The  intervening  country  was 
rough  and  broken  and  covered  with  a  dense  growth 
of  trees  and  underbrush.  The  Federal  commanders 
were  imperfectly  acquainted  with  the  mountainous  re- 
gion into  which  Rosecrans  had  been  inveigled,  but 
with  every  road  and  path  and  mountain  pass  the  Con- 
federates were  familiar. 

Moreover,  in  his  hot  pursuit  of  the  Confederates 
Rosecrans  had  left  Chattanooga  uncovered,  thus  ex- 


1 68  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

tending  an  invitation  to  Bragg,  which  he  was  not  slow 
to  accept,  to  intervene  between  that  place  and  the  Fed- 
eral army  and  so  cut  off  its  retreat.  Besides  this  Rose- 
crans  had  so  scattered  his  corps  that  they  were  no 
longer  in  supporting  distance  and  were  nearer  to 
Bragg's  army  than  they  were  to  each  other.  The  divi- 
sions of  the  different  corps  were  also  disunited.  Crit- 
tenden's  corps,  to  use  a  military  phrase,  was  "in  air." 
There  was  no  hope  of  reenforcements  for  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland.  The  only  hope  was  that  it  might 
unite  in  time  to  meet  the  forces  gathering  for  its  de- 
struction. 

This  was  Bragg's  great  opportunity.  Had  he  been 
a  Grant  or  a  Lee  he  would  have  seized  it  promptly  and 
inflicted  a  crushing  blow  on  the  Federal  army.  But 
he  was  neither  a  Grant  nor  a  Lee.  If  the  Confederate 
commander  was  unequal  to  the  occasion,  his  subordi- 
nates were  still  more  so  and  delayed  carrying  out  his 
orders  until  the  golden  opportunity  had  slipped  past. 
For  this,  after  the  battle,  Generals  Polk,  D.  H.  Hill, 
and  Hindman  were,  at .  General  Bragg's  request,  re- 
lieved of  their  commands. 

Negley's  division  was  in  an  exceedingly  critical  sit- 
uation. It  had  crossed  Lookout  Mountain  through 
Stevens's  Gap,  twenty-six  miles  south  of  Chattanooga, 
and  on  September  8  was  opposite  Dug  Gap  on  the 
west  side  of  Pigeon  Mountain,  Negley  not  then  know- 
ing that  Bragg's  whole  army  was  on  the  east  side. 
There  was  another  gap — Catlett's — a  little  north  of 
Dug  Gap,  and  another — Blue  Bird  Gap — a  little  south 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  169 

of  it,  and  Negley's  division  was  in  imminent  danger 
of  an  attack  in  front,  on  both  flanks,  and  in  the  rear. 
The  situation  was  quickly  perceived  by  Bragg  and  on 
the  evening  of  the  8th  he  ordered  General  Hindman 
to  attack  Negley's  division  at  once  and  Hill  to  support 
Hindman.  Hill  failed  to  obey  the  order  and  reported 
a  flimsy  excuse,  but  Hindman  marched  ten  miles 
and  halted  within  three  miles  of  Negley,  where, 
according  to  Bragg's  order,  he  was  joined  by  Buck- 
ner  on  the  loth.  When  these  three  Confederate 
generals  came  together  they  held  a  council  of  war, 
determined  that  Bragg's  order  was  impracticable, 
and  deliberately  waited  for  further  orders.  Addi- 
tional troops  were  then  sent  to  support  Hindman 
until  30,000  troops  were  massed  for  the  contem- 
plated attack,  but  there  was  one  hitch  after  another 
until  Negley  had  safely  got  away  and  had  fallen  back 
to  Stevens's  Gap. 

Having  thus  failed  to  crush  Thomas's  corps,  Bragg 
next  attempted  to  concentrate  against  that  of  Critten- 
den,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  i  ith  he  ordered  General 
Polk  to  begin  the  attack  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill. 
In  order  to  inspire  Polk  with  enthusiasm  he  said  to 
him :  "This  presents  a  fine,  opportunity  of  striking 
Crittenden  in  detail,  and  I  hope  you  will  avail  your- 
self of  it  at  daylight  to-morrow.  This  division  crushed 
and  the  others  are  yours ;  we  can  then  turn  on  the  force 
in  the  Cove.  Wheeler's  cavalry  will  move  on  Wilder 
so  as  to  cover  your  right.  I  shall  be  delighted  to  hear 
of  your  success."  Notwithstanding  these  alluring  as- 


17°  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

surances  of  future  glory,  Polk  that  night  reported 
that  he  had  taken  a  strong  position  for  defense  and 
asked  for  reenforcements.  Bragg  sent  a  peremptory 
order  to  Polk  not  to  defer  the  attack,  and  the  next 
morning  went  himself  with  Buckner's  corps  to  see 
that  it  was  made,  when  he  found  that  Polk's  troops 
had  not  budged  and  that  Crittenden  had  got  his  divi- 
sions together  and  had  recrossed  the  Chickamauga.  If 
there  is  still  surviving  a  Confederate  that  sincerely 
mourns  the  failure  of  the  "lost  cause,"  he  must  writhe 
in  agony  when  he  reads,  even  at  this  late  day,  of  the 
blunders  of  Bragg  and  his  subordinates,  and  thinks 
of  what  "might  have  been." 

Owing  partly  to  the  celerity  and  skill  of  the  Federal 
generals  and  in  part  to  the  failure  of  his  subordinates 
to  carry  out  his  plans,  Bragg's  attempts  to  destroy 
Thomas's  and  Crittenden's  corps  had  been  foiled,  as 
already  stated,  but  there  was  still  left  the  opportunity 
to  turn  Rosecrans's  left  flank,  get  possession  of  the 
Lafayette  road,  and  thereby  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
Federal  army  to  Chattanooga,  and  to  this  object  all 
Bragg's  operations  were  now  directed. 

Every  day  the  situation  of  the  Army  of. the  Cum- 
berland became  more  critical.  Immense  reenforce- 
ments were  being  hurried  to  Bragg.  In  addition  to 
those  of  Johnston  and  Buckner,  two  divisions  of  Long- 
street's  corps  were  sent  from  the  east  and  every  militia- 
man of  northern  Georgia  that  could  carry  a  gun  was 
pressed  into  service.  By  the  time  the  battle  opened 
Bragg  had  an  army  conservatively  estimated  at  67,000 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  171 

arrayed  against  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  10,000 
less  in  numbers. 

It  was  now,  as  Rosecrans  expressed  it  in  his  report, 
"a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  effect  the  concentration 
of  the  army."  Crittenden's  corps  had  been  pulled  to- 
gether and  brought  within  supporting  distance  of 
Thomas's.  But  McCook  was  still  afar  off.  To  form 
a  junction  with  Thomas  and  Crittenden  he  would 
have  been  obliged  to  travel,  by  the  most  direct  route, 
about  forty  miles ;  he  took  a  wrong  road  and  traveled 
a  distance  of  fifty-seven  miles,  marching  day  and  night 
over  roads  almost  impassable,  crossing  mountains  and 
overcoming  obstacles  apparently  insurmountable. 
With  Wellington  it  was  "Oh  for  night  or  Bliicher!" 
With  Rosecrans  it  was  "Oh  for  night  or  McCook!" 
Every  day,  every  night,  every  hour,  was  precious. 
By  September  17  McCook  had  joined  Thomas  and 
the  three  Federal  army  corps  were  in  supporting  dis- 
tance but  they  were  not  yet  in  position  to  avert  the  im- 
pending danger.  Bragg  had  his  army  in  readiness  for 
a  general  advance,  and,  had  it  been  made  on  the  I7th, 
it  would  undoubtedly  have  been  successful,  as  the  Fed- 
eral army  was  not  then  in  a  position  to  prevent  the 
Confederate  army  from  getting  possession  of  the  La- 
fayette road.  Various  delays  occurred,  but  finally,  on 
the  evening  of  September  17,  Bragg  ordered  a  gen- 
eral attack  to  be  made  the  following  day. 

Delays  again  intervened  and  it  was  late  in  the  after- 
noon when  the  Confederate  heads  of  columns  appeared 
at  Reed's  and  Alexander's  bridges.  Generals  Wilder 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

and  Minty  made  a  heroic  resistance,  fighting  off  the 
advancing  Confederates  and  yielding  inch  by  inch  and 
so  retarding  Bragg's  advance  that  another  day  was 
gained.  But  the  Federal  army,  though  now  united, 
was  not  yet  in  the  position  that  it  must  occupy  to  be 
able  to  defeat  Bragg's  purpose.  To  accomplish  this 
it  was  necessary  to  make  still  further  dispositions 
which  could  not  safely  be  made  in  the  daytime.  All 
night  long  Thomas's  corps  was  marching  to  the  left; 
but  the  Federal  lines  had  not  been  formed,  nor  had 
Thomas's  troops  reached  the  positions  designated  for 
them,  when  the  battle  opened  on  the  morning  of  the 
iQth.  Indeed,  the  situation  was  such  that  Rosecrans 
was  unable  to  present  a  continuous  battle-front  until 
the  close  of  the  day.  Thomas's  and  McCook's  corps 
had  been  marching  all  the  night  of  the  i8th  from  Mc- 
Lemore's  Cove.  Of  Thomas's  four  divisions  Baird's 
and  Brannan's  had  reached  the  Kelly  field  about  sun- 
rise on  the  1 9th  and  the  former  had  been  posted  on  the 
extreme  left  with  the  latter  on  the  right  of  it ;  Negley's 
was  at  Glass's  Mill,  about  two  miles  southeast  of 
Crawfish  Spring.  Of  Reynolds's  division,  'Wilder's 
brigade  was  west  of  the  Lafayette  road  and  near  the 
widow  Glenn's  house,  and  the  two  other  brigades  were 
marching  to  reach  the  positions  designated  for  them. 
The  three  divisions  of  Crittenden's  corps  were  at  Lee 
and  Gordon's  Mill,  Wood  on  the  right,  Van  Cleve 
next,  and  Palmer  on  the  left;  the  left  of  the  latter 
extending  about  a  mile  north  of  the  mill.  Davis's, 
Johnson's,  and  Sheridan's  divisions  of  McCook's  corps 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA 

had  reached  Crawfish  Spring  and  were  there  awaiting 
further  directions.  Granger's  reserve  corps  was  con- 
centrated early  in  the  morning  at  McAfee's  Church, 
about  two  miles  east  of  Rossville. 

On  the  morning  of  the  iqih  Bragg's  army  was 
formed  for  battle,  which  had  been  ordered  to  begin 
at  7  A.  M.  by  an  attack  on  Crittenden's  corps,  supposed 
by  Bragg  to  be  the  Federal  left.  The  Confederate 
army  was  composed  of  the  infantry  corps  of  Polk, 
Hill,  Buckner,  Walker,  and  part  of  Longstreet's  ( com- 
manded by  Hood),  with  Forrest's  and  Wheeler's  cav- 
alry corps.  Folk's  corps  included  the  divisions  of 
Cheatham  and  Hindman ;  Hill's  those  of  Cleburne  and 
Breckinridge ;  Buckner's  those  of  Stewart  and  Preston ; 
Walker's  those  of  Walker  (commanded  by  Gist)  and 
Liddell;  Longstreet's  (commanded  by  Hood)  those  of 
Hood  (commanded  by  Law)  and  Bushrod  Johnson; 
Forrest's  those  of  Armstrong  and  Pegram,  and  Wheel- 
er's those  of  Wharton  and  Martin.  At  the  opening 
of  the  battle  these  divisions  were  east  of  and  facing 
the  Lafayette  road,  ranged  from  right  to  left  as  fol- 
lows :  Forrest's  cavalry  on  the  right  near  Jay's  Mill ; 
McLaws,  Bushrod  Johnson,  Stewart,  and  Preston 
with  Cheatham  in  reserve.  Walker's  division  was 
marching  to  take  position  on  the  right  of  McLaws's; 
Wheeler's  cavalry  was  posted  along  the  upper  fords 
of  the  Chickamauga.  Forrest's  cavalry  was  in  close 
proximity  to  Brannan's  division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  iQth  Rosecrans  and  Bragg 
were  each  ignorant  of  the  exad  position  of  the  army 


174  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

of  the  other.  Bragg  supposed  Crittenden's  corps  to 
be  the  Federal  left,  but  during  the  night  of  the  iSth 
Rosecrans  had  inverted  his  army,  still  leaving  Critten- 
den's corps  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  but  now  making 
it  the  extreme  right,  whereas  before  it  had  been  the 
extreme  left,  and  making  Thomas's  corps  the  extreme 
left  by  moving  it  from  McLemore's  Cove,  where  it 
had  been  the  extreme  right,  to  a  position  where  it  was 
nearer  Chattanooga  and  where  it  could  better  hold 
possession  of  the  Lafayette  road.  On  the  other  hand, 
Rosecrans  supposed  that  the  extreme  right  of  the  Con- 
federate army  was  on  the  east  side  of  Chickamauga 
creek  and  opposite  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill.  In  fact 
during  the  night  Bragg  had  thrown  a  large  force  on 
the  west  side  of  the  Chickamauga  with  the  intention 
of  turning  Crittenden's  left  flank.  Bragg  had  intended 
attacking  in  the  vicinity  of  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill 
what  he  supposed  to  be  the  Federal  left,  but  by  one 
of  the  chances  of  war  the  battle  opened  in  a  quarter 
not  anticipated  by  any  one. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  iQth  it  was  reported 
to  Thomas  that  a  Confederate  brigade  had  been  left 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river  after  the  burning  of  a 
bridge  the  night  before,  and  Brannan's  division  was 
sent  out  to  make  a  reconnaissance,  and,  if  possible,  to 
capture  the  brigade  supposed  to  have  thus  been  sepa- 
rated from  the  Confederate  army.  Brannan's  recon- 
naissance unexpectedly  disclosed  the  presence  of  a  por- 
tion of  Forrest's  cavalry,  which  was  encountered  by 
Brannan's  right  brigade,  that  of  Croxton,  about  7:30 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA 

A.  M.,  and  the  battle  at  once  opened  there  with  great 
fury,  resulting  in  such  fierce  fighting  that  Bragg  was 
compelled,  for  a  time,  to  give  his  entire  attention  to 
that  part  of  the  field.  Reenforcements  were  hurried 
by  Bragg  to  his  right  and  assault  after  assault  was 
made  on  Thomas's  lines,  but  the  Confederates  were 
repulsed  at  every  point  with  heavy  loss.  By  i  p.  M. 
there,  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting  in  that  quarter,  the  wave 
of  battle  having  passed  down  the  line. 

It  was  now  taken  up  by  the  divisions  of  Cheatham, 
Walker,  and  Stewart,  who  were  .suddenly  precipitated 
against  the  Federal  center,  the  weight  of  the  blow  fall- 
ing upon  the  division  of  Johnson  and  then  on  those 
of  Palmer  and  Reynolds  which  had  been  sent  to  reen- 
force  that  part  of  the  line.  About  i  P.  M.  Beatty's 
and  Dick's  brigades  of  Van  Cleve's  division  were  also 
marched  to  the  left,  taking  position  on  the  right  of  the 
brigade  of  Reynolds  next  on  Palmer's  right.  Beatty's 
brigade  had  scarcely  taken  position  when  a  Confeder- 
ate battery  was  discovered  directly  in  front  of  it,  the 
guns  spread  out  in  fan  shape,  at  a  point  southeast  of 
the  Brotherton  house,  now  marked  by  a  monument  to 
the  79th  Ind.  It  proved  to  be  Carnes's  battery  belong- 
ing to  Wright's  brigade  of  Cheatham's  division.  The 
guns  were  loaded  with  canister  and  a  single  discharge 
would  have  inflicted  immense  loss  of  life.  Instantly 
a  volley  of  musketry  was  fired  by  the  79th,  disabling 
both  the  gunners  and  the  horses  of  the  battery, 
and,  before  reenforcements  could  arrive,  a  rush  was 
made,  the  battery  was  captured,  and  the  guns  were 


1/  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

dragged  to  the  rear.  This  was  one  of  the  few  Confed- 
erate batteries  captured.  It  was  retaken  after  the  dis- 
aster to  the  Federal  right  the  next  day. 

The  auspicious  beginning  of  Van  Cleve's  division 
was  not  long  sustained.  Following  closely  Van  Cleve's 
division  came  Carlin's  and  Heg's  brigades  of  Davis's 
division,  which  took  position  on  Van  Cleve's  right. 
At  about  the  same  time  the  Confederate  divisions  of 
Law  and  Bushrod  Johnson,  under  command  of  Hood, 
were  preparing  to  turn  the  Federal  right  and  at  once 
fell  on  the  divisions  of  Van  Cleve  and  Davis.  Wild- 
er's  brigade,  then  Wood's  division  and  Barnes's 
brigade  of  Van  Cleve,  and  finally  Sheridan's  division, 
were  sent  to  reenforce  this  part  of  the  line,  and,  even 
then,  it  required  the  most  heroic  efforts  to  maintain  the 
Federal  right.  On  no  part  of  the  field  was  the  contest 
more  stubborn.  For  over  three  hours  there  was  a  des- 
perate stand-up  fight  between  the  combatants  without 
breastworks  or  protection  of  any  kind,  until  the 
Viniard  fields  were  literally  piled  with  dead  and 
wounded.  The  tide  of  battle  ebbed  and  flowed,  each 
side  alternately  advancing  and  retreating  as  victory 
seemed  to  incline  first  to  one  and  then  to  the  other, 
hesitating  with  which  to  abide. 

During  all  this  time  the  Confederates  were  persist- 
ing in  their  attacks  on  the  divisions  of  Johnson, 
Palmer,  and  Reynolds,  and  all,  together  with  that 
of  Van  Cleve,  were  forced  back  toward  the  Lafayette 
road.  Finally  the  retreat  was  stayed,  the  Federal  lines 
were  hastily  reformed,  all  the  artillery  that  could  be 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  177 

collected  was  brought  to  that  part  of  the  field,  and 
a  determined  stand  was  made.  But  the  Federal  right 
center  had  been  broken  and  the  Confederate  troops, 
pouring  through  the  opening  made  by  the  falling  back 
of  Van  Cleve's  division,  had  crossed  the  Lafayette 
road,  and  with  loud  cheers  were  now  rapidly  advancing 
into  the  fields  west  of  it.  As  the  tide  of  battle  neared 
Rosecrans's  headquarters  at  the  widow  Glenn's  house 
it  seemed  like  a  repetition  of  the  disaster  at  Stone's 
River,  and  that  the  Federal  right  was  doomed  to  de- 
struction. But  in  the  nick  of  time  Brannan's  division 
coming  from  the  left  and  Negley's  from  the  right  ap- 
peared, the  Confederates  were  repulsed,  and  the  Fed- 
eral lines  on  the  right  were  restored. 

During  the  day  the  sound  of  musketry  was  appall- 
ing. '  At  times  no  interval  between  the  volleys  could 
be  distinguished,  but  there  was  a  continuous  roar  like 
that  of  Niagara  Falls.  The  fighting  did  not  cease 
with  the  close  of  the  day,  for  long  after  the  going  down 
of  the  sun  the  stillness  of  the  night  was  suddenly 
broken  by  tremendous  firing  in  front  of  the  divisions 
of  Johnson  and  Baird,  now  fiercely  assailed  by  Cle- 
burne  and  Cheatham.  In  the  dense  and  dark  woods, 
lighted  only  by  the  flashing  of  the  guns,  the  weird  con- 
test, bordering  on  the  supernatural,  was  waged  for  an 
hour  or  more.  Again,  however,  the  Confederates  were 
repulsed  with  frightful  slaughter  and  the  Federal  lines 
remained  unbroken. 

The  day  closed  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 

12 


178  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

still  intact  and  holding  its  own.  It  had  been  a  hard 
day  on  the  troops,  many  of  whom  had  been  marching 
all  the  night  before  and  righting  all  day.  Nearly  the 
entire  army  had  been  engaged  and,  with  the  exception 
of  Granger's  reserve  corps,  there  were  no  fresh  Fed- 
eral troops  with  whom  to  renew  the  battle  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  On  the  other  hand,  Breckinridge's  and 
Hindman's  divisions  and  two  brigades  of  Preston's 
division  had  not  been  in  the  battle,  and  two  fresh 
brigades  of  McLaws's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  the  igth.  Nevertheless,  there 
was  much  to  encourage  the  Federal  army  and  to  in- 
spire it  with  confidence  at  the  close  of  the  day.  The 
Confederates  had  suffered  enormous  losses.  Bragg 
had  been  completely  foiled  in  every  attempt  to  get 
possession  of  the  Lafayette  road,  the  Federal  lines  were 
unbroken,  and  Bragg's  right  had  been  defeated  at 
every  point.  But  he  had  no  thought  of  giving  up  the 
contest  and  laid  his  plans  to  renew  battle  the  next 
morning. 

Various  changes  in  the  formation  of  the  Federal 
lines  had  been  made  during  the  day  and  night  of  the 
i  Qth.  The  next  morning  Thomas  still  held  the  left, 
the  order  of  formation  by  divisions  from  left  to  right 
being  as  follows :  Baird  on  the  extreme  left  near  the 
Kelly  house;  Johnson,  Palmer  and  Reynolds,  all  on 
the  east  side  of  the  Lafayette  road,  Brannan  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Poe  field,  Negley  west  of  the  Broth- 
erton  field,  Sheridan  in  front  of  the  widow  Glenn's 
house,  Wilder's  brigade  on  the  right  and  in  rear  of 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  179 

Sheridan.  Early  in  the  morning-  the  divisions  of 
Wood,  Van  Cleve  and  Davis  were  in  rear  of  the  cen- 
ter, but  Davis  soon  took  position  on  the  left  of  Sheri- 
dan and  Wood  took  the  place  of  Negley  who  had  been 
ordered  to  the  left.  Granger's  reserve  corps  was  still 
at  McAfee's  Church.  The  cavalry  was  mostly  on  the 
right  guarding  the  upper  fords  of  the  Chickamauga. 

Various  changes  had  also  been  made  in  the  Confed- 
erate lines.  Longstreet  reached  the  battle-field  at  n 
p.  M.  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Confed- 
erate left  wing,  while  General  Polk  was  placed  in  com- 
mand of  the  right  wing.  The  formation  of  the  Con- 
federate right  wing  in  the  order  of  divisions  from  right 
to  left  was  as  follows:  Forrest's  cavalry  east  of 
Cloud's;  Breckinridge's  and  Cleburne's  divisions  on 
the  east  and  south  of  the  Kelly  field  and  the  east  side 
of  the  Poe  field;  Walker's  (Gist's)  and  Liddell's  divi- 
sions in  reserve  in  rear  of  Breckinridge's  and  Cheat- 
ham's  in  rear  of  Cleburne's.  The  left  wing  was  posted 
as  follows  from  right  to  left :  Stewart's,  Bushrod  John- 
son's, Hindman's  and  Preston's  with  Law's  in  rear  of 
Johnson's  and  Kershaw's  (McLaw's)  in  rear  of  Law's. 
Bragg' s  order  to  Polk  was  to  begin  an  attack  on  the 
Federal  left  at  daylight  on  the  2Oth,  the  battle  to  be 
taken  up  by  divisions  along  the  line  from  right  to  left. 

During  the  day  and  night  of  the  I9th  the  movement 
of  the  Federal  army  had  been  continually  to  the  left, 
the  point  of  danger.  Division  after  division,  brigade 
after  brigade,  had  been  sent  from  the  corps  of  McCook 
and  Crittenden  to  reenforce  Thomas.  Before  the  dis- 


ISO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

aster  on  Sunday  in  which  the  Federal  right  was 
broken,  Crittenden's  corps  organization  had  been  com- 
pletely broken  up  by  taking  from  it  the  troops  sent  to 
the  support  of  Thomas.  Palmer's  division  had  gone 
on  the  1 9th.  Wood's  was  taken  out  to  reenforce 
Thomas  on  the  2Oth,  just  before  the  break,  and  with 
it  Barnes's  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  two  remaining  brigades  of  Van  Cleve's 
division,  Beatty's  and  Dick's,  were  also  on  their  way 
under  orders  to  march  to  the  support  of  Thomas. 

Had  the  right  wing  of  the  Federal  army  been  posted 
on  the  ridge  where  the  lines  were  finally  established 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  2Oth  as  Thomas  had  ad- 
vised,7 there  is  little  doubt  that  the  result  of  the  battle 
would  have  been  altogether  different.  It  was,  however, 
posted  in  such  position  as  to  give  it  little,  if  any,  ad- 
vantage over  a  superior  force  of  the  Confederates, 
and  to  make  any  change  in  the  face  of  the  enemy 
extremely  hazardous.  So  hasty  was  the  formation 
that  there  was  no  time  to  construct  rifle-pits,  and  the 
light  barricades  of  rails,  logs,  and  stones  afforded 
but  slight  protection. 

What  added  to  the  danger  of  the  right,  and  espe- 
cially to  the  danger  of  making  any  change  in  its  forma- 
tion on  the  morning  of  the  2Oth,  was  the  fact,  of  which 
Rosecrans  seems  to  have  been  entirely  unconscious, 
that  a  large  Confederate  force  had  been  massed  oppo- 
site the  Federal  right.  Concealed  in  the  dense  woods 

7  Van  Home:  Life  of  George  H.  Thomas,  p.  121. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  l8l 

east  of  the  Lafayette  road  were  the  heavy  Confeder- 
ate columns  under  the  command  of  General  Longstreet, 
momentarily  expecting  the  order  to  advance.  Imme- 
diately in  front  of  Wood's  division,  and  but  a  short 
distance  away,  lay  the  division  of  the  Confederate  Gen- 
eral Bushrod  Johnson,  and  behind  this,  in  supporting 
distance,  were  the  divisions  of  Law  and  Kershaw, 
while  to  the  left  of  Johnson  was  the  division  of  Gen- 
eral Hindman. 

The  battle  opened  on  the  morning  of  the  2Oth  with 
another  desperate  attack  on  the  Federal  left.  Had  it 
been  made  earlier  it  might  have  been  most  disastrous 
to  the  Union  army,  but  the  disaster  was  averted  by 
another  Confederate  blunder.  Bragg  had  ordered 
General  Polk,  in  command  of  the  Confederate  right 
wing,  to  attack  the  Federal  left  at  daylight  and  secure 
possession  of  the  Lafayette  road  which  was  not  suffi- 
ciently guarded.  Had  the  attack  been  made  as  ordered 
it  would  probably  have  been  successful,  as  Thomas  had 
not  then  enough  troops  to  defend  it.  But  Polk  on  the 
night  of  the  I9th  slept  outside  the  lines  and  was  not 
on  the  field  at  the  time  when  he  should  have  opened 
the  battle.  Bragg  sent  Major  Lee  to  ascertain  the 
cause  of  the  delay  and  to  urge  a  prompt  movement. 
He  found  Polk  at  the  breakfast-table,  surrounded  by 
a  brilliantly  dressed  staff.  With  pompous  politeness, 
Polk  replied  to  the  message :  "Do  tell  General  Bragg 
that  my  heart  is  overflowing  with  anxiety  for  the  at- 
tack— overflowing  with  anxiety,  sir."  When  this  was 
reported  to  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief  it  is 


1 82  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

said  that  it  called  forth  a  volley  of  sulphurous  impre- 
cations upon  Polk  and  all  his  corps  commanders,  and 
that  Bragg  in  the  fury  of  his  disappointment  at  once 
gave  orders  to  Major  Lee  to  "ride  along  the  line  and 
order  every  captain  to  take  his  men  instantly  into 
action."8 

By  the  time  the  attack  was  made  Thomas  was  pre- 
pared for  it  and,  though  sorely  pressed,  he  succeeded 
in  maintaining  his  position.  Against  his  lines  the  Con- 
federate billows  surged  and  beat  in  vain.  Once  in- 
deed, only  a  little  before  the  fatal  break  on  the  right, 
the  columns  of  Breckinridge,  under  the  supervision  of 
Bragg  himself,  had  completely  enveloped  the  Federal 
left,  and  for  a  few  moments  it  seemed  that  nothing 
could  avert  the  impending  ruin,  when  a  single  brigade 
— Van  Derveer's  of  Brannan's  division — rushed  for- 
ward in  one  of  the  most  brilliant  charges  of  the  battle 
and  turned  back  the  Confederate  tide. 

The  roar  of  musketry  that  morning  clearly  indicated 
the  frightful  carnage  on  the  left.  I  never  heard  any- 
thing so  appalling.  Requests  still  came  from  Thomas 
for  reenforcements.  Just  before  the  disaster  to  the 
right,  General  Rosecrans  rode  up  in  front  of  the  79th 
Ind.  and  exchanged  a  few  words  with  Colonel  Knefler. 
Though  not  near  enough  to  hear  what  was  said,  I 
could  plainly  see  Rosecrans's  face.  The  intense  strain 
under  which  he  had  been  laboring  for  days  had  told 
upon  him.  He  was  pale  as  a  corpse  and,  as  he  rode 

8  Pollard :  The  Lost  Cause,  p.  450. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  183 

away,  his  looks  too  plainly  disclosed  the  apprehensions 
he  could  not  conceal. 

By  a  strange  misunderstanding  of  the  actual  situa- 
tion, General  Rosecrans,  in  order  to  prevent  a  supposed 
gap  between  the  divisions  of  Wood  and  Reynolds,  at 
about  ii  A.  M.  ordered  General  Wood  to  close  up  on 
Reynolds's  right.  There  was  in  fact  no  gap,  Reynolds 
needed  no  support,  and  the  order  could  be  executed 
only  by  taking  Wood's  division  entirely  out  of  line 
and  marching  it  in  the  rear  of  Brannan's,  which  Gen- 
eral Wood  at  once  proceeded  to  do,  taking  with  him 
Barnes's  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division.9  At  the 

*  The  facts  relating  to  this  order,  as  nearly  as  I  can  gather  them 
from  the  official  reports  and  all  other  available  sources  of  infor- 
mation, seem  to  be  as  follows :  Thomas  had  sent  to  Rosecrans 
an  urgent  request  for  reenforcements  and  the  latter  had  sent  a 
staff  officer  to  Brannan  directing  him  to  go  immediately  to 
Thomas's  support.  On  the  supposition  that  Brannan  would  go  at 
once,  thus  leaving  a  gap  between  Reynolds  and  Wood,  Rosecrans 
sent  another  staff  officer  directing  Wood  to  close  up  on  Reynolds. 
At  the  time  Brannan  received  the  order  directed  to  him,  the 
enemy  was  already  advancing  against  him,  and  he  could  not  with- 
draw without  exposing  the  army  to  great  danger.  He  therefore 
sent  word  of  the  situation  to  Rosecrans  and  delayed  moving  until 
the  receipt  of  further  directions.  When  the  order  to  Wood  was 
received  by  the  latter,  he  had  not  yet  been  attacked,  though  he 
expected  to  be  soon.  But  the  order  was  imperative  and  he  pro- 
,  ceeded  at  once  to  obey  it.  Before  doing  so  he  informed  General 
McCook,  who  was  present,  and  advised  him  to  make  such  dis- 
positions as  would  be  necessary  to  fill  the  gap  that  would  be 
caused  by  the  withdrawal  of  his  division.  By  McCook's  direction 
the  two  brigades  of  Davis's  division  were  on  their  way,  at  the 
time  the  catastrophe  of  Sunday  occurred,  to  take  the  position 
vacated  by  Wood.  In  view  of  the  facts  above  detailed,  it  would 


184  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

same  time  the  two  remaining  brigades,  Beatty's  and 
Dick's  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  were  ordered  to  the 
left  to  support  Thomas  and  were  in  motion  by  the  left 
flank  and  on  double  quick.  Sheridan's  division  was 
also  ordered  to  the  left  to  support  Thomas  and  was 
likewise  in  motion  by  the  left  flank  and  on  double 
quick. 

Just  at  this  juncture,  while  all  these  movements 
were  being  executed,  the  Confederate  advance  upon 
the  Federal  right  began,  and  almost  instantly  the  wide 
gap  made  by  the  withdrawal  of  Wood's  division  was 
filled  with  the  advancing  troops  of  General  Bushrod 
Johnson,  followed  by  those  of  Law  and  Kershaw. 
Striking  Brannan's  division,  then  on  the  west  side  of 
the  Poe  field,  the  brigade  on  the  right  of  it  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  artillery  and  men  rushed  through 
the  moving  columns  of  the  brigades  of  Beatty  and 
Dick,  which  happened  at  that  particular  moment  to 
be  passing  in  Brannan's  rear,  throwing  them  also  into 
confusion.  At  nearly  the  same  time  Davis's  division, 
now  left  without  support  on  either  flank  or  in  the  rear, 
was  enveloped  by  the  troops  of  General  Hindman  and 
was  forced  to  fall  back.  As  it  was  falling  back  it 
came  into  collision,  at  an  angle,  with  Sheridan's  divi- 
sion, rapidly  moving  to  the  left,  and  both  these  divi- 
sions were  instantly  broken  in  fragments. 

seem  unjust  to  censure  severely  either  Rosecrans  or  Wood  for  the 
disaster  that  followed.  It  was  one  of  those  unforeseen  and  un- 
fortunate calamities  of  battle  which  it  seems  impossible  for  human 
wisdom  to  anticipate  or  guard  against. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  185 

Thus  almost  at  the  same  moment  portions  of  Bran- 
nan's,  Van  Cleve's,  Davis's,  and  Sheridan's  divisions, 
together  with  part  of  Negley's,  which  had  also  been 
ordered  to  the  left  but  had  not  yet  gone,  became  inex- 
tricably mingled  in  a  confused  mass  which,  even  if 
no  enemy  had  been  in  sight,  it  would  have  taken  sev- 
eral minutes  to  disentangle.  But  there  was  not  even 
a  single  minute  to  spare,  for  the  rapidly  advancing 
Confederate  columns  were  now  only  a  short  distance 
away  and  were  pouring  volley  after  volley  into  the 
disorganized  mass  of  troops  before  them.  Division, 
brigade,  and  regimental  organizations  went  to  pieces 
in  an  instant. 

It  was  impossible,  under  such  circumstances,  to  make 
any  new  formations  or  to  conduct  an  orderly  retreat. 
Even  Sheridan,  whose  influence  was  so  magical  at 
Winchester  and  whose  subsequent  career  so  clearly 
demonstrated  his  dash  and  his  soldierly  qualities,  was 
powerless  to  stem  the  overwhelming  tide  of  disaster. 
So  sudden  and  irresistible  was  the  onset  that  General 
Rosecrans  and  staff,  who  were  immediately  behind 
Sheridan's  division,  narrowly  escaped  capture.  A 
portion  of  the  79th  Ind.  went  with  Colonel  Knefler  in 
one  direction  and  a  portion  with  Lieut.-Colonel  Oyler 
in  another.  Continuing  their  advance  westward, 
Hindman's  forces  swept  Davis's  and  Sheridan's  di- 
visions and  part  of  Van  Cleve's  from  the  Dyer  field 
and  over  the  ridge  on  the  west  side  of  it.  Hindman 
then  returned  and  reformed  his  lines  on  the  left  of 
Bushrod  Johnson,  and  the  Confederate  columns  started 


1 86  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

north  through  the  Dyer  field  in  the  direction  of  the 
ridge  of  which  Snodgrass  Hill  forms  a  part. 

Rosecrans,  supposing  that  all  was  lost,  hastened  to 
Chattanooga  to  prepare  for  the  retreat  of  the  army 
to  that  place,  and  not  long  afterward  sent  word  to 
Thomas  to  take  command  of  all  the  forces  remaining 
on  the  battle-field.  Rosecrans  was  soon  followed  to 
Chattanooga  by  McCook  and  Crittenden. 

A  large  part  of  the  Federal  artillery  on  the  right  was 
captured;  about  fifty  pieces  were  saved  and  hauled 
off  the  field  by  order  of  General  Negley  in  order,  as 
he  said,  to  avoid  capture,  but  they  were  never  fired 
during  the  remainder  of  the  battle.  Five  or  six  thou- 
sand men  or  more,  who  had  escaped  over  the  ridge 
west  of  the  Dyer  field,  got  into  the  valley  beyond  it. 
General  Davis  gathered  together  a  few  of  them  and 
started  to  join  General  Thomas  but  was  unable  to  do 
so  before  the  close  of  the  battle.  General  Sheridan 
collected  others  and  tried  to  effect  a  junction  with 
Thomas  by  way  of  Rossville,  but  he  also  arrived  too 
late  to  be  of  service.  General  Negley  kept  a  large  part 
of  them  under  his  command  for  .the  purpose,  as  he  as- 
serted, of  protecting  the  retreat  of  the  artillery  and 
ammunition  trains.  He  was  accused  of  taking  with 
him,  in  addition,  part  of  Council's  brigade  of  Bran- 
nan's  division.10  As  if  to  insure  the  destruction  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  "some  unauthorized 
person,"  whose  name,  if  known,  has  been  considerately 

10  See  the  report  of  Col.  John  M.  Connell,  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  50, 
p.  407. 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA  l8/ 

suppressed  in  the  official  reports,  ordered  Thomas's 
ammunition  trains  back  to  Chattanooga. 

Charles  A.  Dana,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War, 
who  was  with  General  Rosecrans  and  with  him  had 
been  swept  from  the  field,  sent  Stanton  a  dispatch  at  4 
p.  M.  in  which  he  said :  "My  report  to-day  is  of  de- 
plorable importance.  Chickamauga  is  as  fatal  a  name 
in  our  history  as  Bull  Run."  Affairs  were  bad  enough 
but  not  quite  so  bad  as  Dana  pictured,  and  at  8  p.  M. 
he  was  "happy  to  report  that  my  dispatch  of  4  P.  M. 
to-day  proves  to  have  given  too  dark  a  view  of  our 
disaster."11  In  face  of  such  an  appalling  train  of  dis- 
asters, it  seems  miraculous  that  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland escaped  annihilation.  Had  the  movement  by 
which  General  Hindman,  later  in  the  afternoon,  gained 
the  top  of  the  ridge  north  of  Snodgrass  Hill,  been 
made  before  the  arrival  of  Whitaker's  and  Mitchell's 
brigades,  it  is  probable  that  the  Federal  army  would 
have  been  totally  defeated.  The  movement  was  not 
made  solely  for  the  reason  that  the  Confederate  gen- 
erals supposed  that  the  troops  that  had  been  driven 
over  the  ridge  west  of  the  Dyer  field  were  still  in  fight- 
ing condition  and  liable  to  fall  on  the  Confederate 
flanks.  Indeed,  Hindman  supposed  the  troops  of 
Whitaker  and  Mitchell,  that  later  in  the  afternoon 
drove  his  own  from  the  hill  west  of  the  Snodgrass 
house,  to  be  the  same  that  he  had  before  driven  from 
the  Dyer  field.  "At  3  P.  M.,"  he  reports,12  "a  force 

11  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  50,  pp.  192,  193. 

12  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  51,  p.  304. 


1 88  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

of  the  enemy,  probably  that  which  I  had  recently  con- 
fronted west  of  the  Crawfish  Spring  road,  appeared 
on  my  left,  capturing  several  men  of  my  infirmary 
corps  and  others  who  had  fallen  out  from  fatigue  or 
wounds.  I  was  apprehensive  of  an  attack  in  rear,  and 
sent  to  General  Longstreet  and  General  Buckner  for 
reenforcements." 

I  return  now  to  the  time  when  Generals  Bushrod 
Johnson  and  Hindman,  after  advancing  to  the  west 
side  of  the  Dyer  field,  reformed  their  lines  and  started 
north.  When  the  Confederate  troops  broke  through 
the  gap  caused  by  the  withdrawal  of  Wood's  division, 
I  was  near  the  left  of  the  regiment.  A  portion  of  the 
regiment  fell  back  a  short  distance  and  joined  some 
fragments  of  other  commands  that  were  endeavoring 
to  make  a  stand  behind  a  slight  barricade  of  rails. 
The  bullets  were  still  coming  fast  and  thick  from  the 
east,  and,  so  intent  was  I  in  looking  in  that  direction, 
expecting  every  moment  to  see  emerging  from  the 
woods  an  advancing  Confederate  line,  that  I  did  not 
observe  the  columns  of  Bushrod  Johnson  and  Hind- 
man, which  had  then  reformed  and  had  begun  their  ad- 
vance northward  through  the  Dyer  field,  until  Lindsay 
Stinnett,  one  of  my  company,  touched  my  arm  and 
said :  "Captain,  they  are  all  gone."  Hastily  looking 
I  saw  that  what  he  said  was  true  and  the  next  instant 
I  observed  the  Confederate  columns  advancing  north 
and  within  two  hundred  yards  of  us.  They  wore 
dark-colored  uniforms  and  for  a  second  I  mistook  them 
for  Federal  troops,  but  a  glance  at  the  stars  and  bars 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA  189 

dispelled  all  doubt.  We  were  in  very  close  and  dan- 
gerous quarters.  Escape  either  to  the  east,  west  or 
south  was  then  out  of  the  question,  and  the  only  way 
out  was  in  the  direction  of  Snodgrass  Hill.  In  going 
we  passed  through  a  portion  of  the  field  where  there 
must  have  been  at  least  twenty  or  thirty  pieces  of  Fed- 
eral artillery.  Not  an  artilleryman  nor  horse  was 
near;  the  cannon  had  evidently  been  abandoned  and 
were  undoubtedly  soon  captured  by  the  enemy.  My 
heart  sank  as  I  threaded  my  way  through  and  past 
them,  for  the  abandonment  of  our  artillery  signified  to 
me  with  more  emphasis  than  anything  I  saw  the  ex- 
tent of  the  disaster  which  had  overtaken  us. 

Reaching  Snodgrass  Hill  I  took  my  position  near 
the  east  end,  fifteen  or  twenty  yards  northeast  of  the 
place  where  the  government  observation-tower  now 
stands,  and  there  I  remained  until  after  dark,  leaving 
only  for  a  few  minutes  to  assist  one  of  my  company 
who  was  wounded.  About  the  time  I  reached  the  hill, 
General  Brannan  had  posted  his  division  near  the 
place  where  the  observation-tower  now  stands,  and 
Wood's  division  took  position  on  the  left  of  Brannan's. 
Besides  these,  there  were  gathered  there  fragments  of 
the  divisions  of  Negley  and  Van  Cleve.  The  latter 
included  representatives  of  the  iQth  Ohio,  the  9th  and 
1 7th  Ky.,  and  the  79th  Ind.,  all  of  Beatty's  brigade, 
and  the  44th  and  86th  Ind.  of  Dick's  brigade.  There 
were  colonels  without  regiments,  captains  without 
companies,  and  men  without  officers,  all  gathered  pro- 
miscuously together.  Van  Home  estimates  that  there 


CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

were  at  that  time  on  Snodgrass  Hill,  all  told,  about 
4,000  men.  General  Turchin13  makes  the  number 
6,500.  With  the  exception  of  Brannan's  and  Wood's 
divisions  there  was  little  semblance  of  brigade,  regi- 
mental, or  company  organization. 

It  was  at  this  critical  time  that  I  witnessed  what  I 
have  always  thought  to  be  the  most  striking  illustra- 
tion in  the  whole  war  of  the  coolness  and  intrepidity 
of  the  American  private  soldier  when  left  to  his  own 
resources  and  compelled  to  fight  "on  his  own  hook." 
The  men  on  Snodgrass  Hill  were  smarting  under  the 
mortification  of  having  been  driven  there  because  of  a 
disaster  for  which  they  knew  they  were  not  responsible 
and  which  was  not  caused  by  any  lack  of  bravery  or 
discipline  on  their  part.  They  were  resolved  to  be 
driven  no  farther  and,  facing  the  advancing  foe,  they 
savagely  stood  at  bay.  Taking  in  the  situation  at 
once,  and  acting  as  if  by  instinct,  they  immediately  be- 
gan the  construction  of  rude  breastworks  on  the  brow 
of  the  hill  from  such  logs,  rails,  and  stones  as  could 
be  hastily  raked  together,  and  then  awaited  the  coming 
Confederate  hosts.  Every  man  seemed  to  realize  that 
it  was  now  a  life  and  death  struggle  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  They  had  not 
long  to  wait,  for  the  Confederate  columns  were  ad- 
vancing rapidly,  cheering  as  they  came.  Exalted  to 
the  highest  pitch  of  enthusiasm  by  their  previous  suc- 
cess, it  seemed  that  nothing  could  stay  them  in  their 

13  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  p.  124. 


BATTLE    OF    CIIICKAMAUGA  IQI 

victorious  advance.  But  the  men  on  the  hill  fought 
with  a  desperate  courage  that  I  never  saw  surpassed 
on  any  other  field.  At  every  point  on  the  line  the 
charge  was  repulsed,  and  the  hosts  that  had  charged 
so  exultingly  were  forced  to  fall  back.  Again  and 
again  they  rallied  and  again  and  again  were  repulsed. 
For  more  than  four  hours  the  sanguinary  contest  last- 
ed, waged  with  a  valor  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates 
only  equaled  by  the  grim  steadfastness  of  the  -Spartan 
band  on  Snodgrass  Hill. 

Some  time  between  3  and  4  p.  M.,  during  a  lull  in 
the  assaults,  a  solitary  cannon  was  heard  and  then  be- 
gan a  cheer  on  the  Confederate  right  which  seemed  to 
be  taken  up,  regiment  by  regiment,  until  it  extended 
apparently  to  the  extreme  left.  It  seemed  to  me,  judg- 
ing the  position  of  the  Confederate  lines  by  the  course 
of  the  cheering,  that  we  were  almost  surrounded.  I 
did  not  then  understand  the  situation  but  I  know  now 
that  I  was  correct  in  my  conjecture. 

About  this  time,  despairing  of  success  in  their  at- 
tempt to  drive  from  the  hill  by  direct  assault  the  troops 
who  were  so  bravely  holding  it,  a  portion  of  the  Con- 
federate troops  had  passed  round  the  north  end  of  the 
hill  and,  establishing  themselves  on  one  of  the  ridges, 
were  about  to  attack  Brannan  in  the  rear.  The  troops 
on  the  hill  were  now  subjected  to  a  fire  not  only  in 
front,  but  in  the  rear.  Soon  after  this  Wesley  Shep- 
pard,  one  of  my  company,  while  in  the  act  of  firing  at 
the  Confederates  in  front,  was  struck  by  a  bullet  from 
the  rear.  The  ball  struck  him  near  his  shoulder  and 


CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

went  clear  through  his  body.  There  were  no  ambu- 
lances nor  stretcher-bearers  near  and,  as  I  saw  his  gun 
drop  from  his  hands,  I  hastened  to  his  assistance.  He 
was  still  able  to  walk  with  my  aid  and  I  took  him  first 
to  the  Snodgrass  House.  As  the  ground  for  several 
rods  about  the  house  was  covered  with  dead  and 
wounded,  we  passed  on  to  a  straw-stack  near  the  Snod- 
grass stable  where  I  thought  to  leave  him,  but  fearing 
that  some  exploding  shell  might  set  the  straw  on  fire, 
I  took  him  a  little  farther,  leaving  him  in  a  fence  cor- 
ner with  some  straw  under  his  head  and  bade  him 
good-bye.14  After  leaving  Sheppard  I  hastened  back 
to  the  little  squad  of  the  79th  that  I  had  left,  having 
been  absent,  I  presume,  not  more  than  fifteen  or  twenty 
minutes.  I  did  not  fail  to  observe  that  in  the  field 
where  I  left  Sheppard  a  line  of  Federal  troops  was  on 
one  side  facing  one  way,  and  on  the  other  side  was  a 
line  facing  another  way,  confirming  my  supposition 
that  we  were  at  that  time  nearly  surrounded. 

The  position  of  the  troops  on  the  hill  was  indeed 
most  critical,  but  help  was  coming  from  an  unexpected 
quarter.  General  Gordon  Granger,  of  the  Reserve 
Corps,  four  miles  away  at  McAfee's  Church,  had  heard 
the  tremendous  firing  and  had  rapidly  "marched  to  the 
sound  of  the  cannon,"  brushing  aside  the  Confederate 

14  When  I  left  Sheppard  the  blood  was  gushing  from  his  mouth 
in  torrents,  and  I  did  not  suppose  that  he  would  live  ten  minutes, 
but  after  having  been  captured  by  the  Confederates  that  night,  he 
recovered,  was  exchanged,  rejoined  his  company  in  east  Ten- 
nessee, and  remained  with  it  to  the  end  of  the  war. 


BATTLE  OF    CHICKAMAUGA 

cavalry  that  attempted  to  impede  his  march.  He 
reached  the  hill  with  two  brigades  of  Steedman's  and 
one  of  Morgan's  divisions  about  the  time  I  left  Shep- 
pard.  Van  Derveer's  brigade  was  also  approaching. 
Whitaker's  and  Mitchell's  brigades  of  Steedman's  di- 
vision were  at  once  deployed,  Van  Derveer  joining 
them  on  the  left,  and  advanced  against  the  Confeder- 
ates who  had  now  gained  the  north  end  of  the  ridge  in 
rear  of  Brannan.  I  saw  the  brilliant  charge  of 
Whitaker's  and  Mitchell's  brigades,  led  by  General 
Steedman  waving  a  regimental  flag.  It  was  the  turn- 
ing-point in  the  battle.  Fearlessly  confronting  the 
advancing  Confederate  columns,  Steedman's  troops 
drove  the  enemy  from  the  hill  and  again. established 
the  Federal  right.  But  for  this  timely  reenforcement 
there  is  little  doubt  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
would  have  been  utterly  defeated  and  probably 
annihilated,  for  Granger  had  brought  4,000  fresh 
troops  to  the  field  and,  what  was  needed  as  much  as 
men,  a  supply  of  ammunition  of  which  we  were  now 
almost  destitute. 

But  the  end  was  not  yet.  With  eleven  brigades 
Longstreet  again  sought  to  dislodge  the  little  band  on 
Snodgrass  Hill  and  assault  after  assault  was  made. 
Times  of  greatest  danger  develop  the  highest  courage, 
often  making  heroes  of  men  who  are  themselves  un- 
conscious of  the  transformation.  On  one  side  were 
men  flushed  with  victory  and  fighting  to  expel  from 
their  soil  those  whom  they  regarded  as  invaders  of 
their  homes;  on  the  other  were  men  making  a  last 
13 


194  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

stand  for  an  army  of  which  they  were  proud  and  for  a 
Union  they  loved;  both  sides  fought  with  a  desperate 
valor  never  surpassed  in  the  annals  of  war.  Confed- 
erate soldiers  were  killed  in  front  of  the  breastworks, 
some  after  they  had  crossed,  and  some  were  thrust 
back  with  the  bayonet  or  with  clubbed  musket.  When 
the  ammunition  of  those  on  the  hill  ran  low  they  re- 
plenished their  scanty  store  from  the  cartridge-boxes 
of  their  dead  and  wounded  comrades  and  renewed  their 
fire,  and  those  who  had  no  ammunition  still  held  fast 
to  their  guns,  resolved  to  use  their  bayonets  as  a  last 
resort.  Thus  the  conflict  was  maintained  until  night- 
fall. 

No  higher  tribute  has  ever  been  paid  to  the  valor  of 
both  the  Federal  and  the  Confederate  troops  who 
fought  that  afternoon  at  Snodgrass  Hill  than  that  of 
General  Hindman  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle. 
Describing  the  assaults,  he  says  :15 

"The  movement  began  at  3  130.  Skirmishing  ex- 
tended along  the  whole  line  as  Deas,  at  the  extreme 
left,  commenced  swinging.  In  a  few  minutes  a  ter- 
rific contest  ensued,  which  continued  at  close  quarters, 
without  any  intermission,  over  four  hours.  Our 
troops  attacked  again  and  again  with  a  courage  worthy 
of  their  past  achievements.  The  enemy  fought  with 
determined  obstinacy  and  repeatedly  repulsed  us,  but 
only  to  be  again  assailed.  As  showing  the  fierceness 
of  the  fight,  the  fact  is  mentioned  that  on  our  extreme 
left  the  bayonet  was  used,  and  men  also  killed  and 

uReb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  51,  p.  305. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  195 

wounded  with  clubbed  muskets.  A  little  after  4  the 
enemy  was  reenforced  and  advanced  with  loud  shouts 
upon  our  right,  but  was  repulsed  by  Anderson  and 
Kersliaw.  At  this  time  it  became  necessary  to  retire 
Garrity's  battery,  of  Anderson's  brigade,  which  had 
been  doing  effective  service.  It  was  subsequently  held 
in  reserve.  Dent's  battery  of  Deas's  brigade  was  en- 
gaged throughout  the  struggle.  Notwithstanding  the 
repulses  of  our  infantry,  the  officers  and  men  of  this 
battery  stood  to  their  guns  undaunted  and  continued 
firing,  inflicting  severe  loss  on  the  enemy  and  contrib- 
uting largely  to  the  success  of  my  operations. 

"At  4:20  Brigadier-General  Preston,  of  Buckner's 
corps,  in  answer  to  my  application  for  help,  brought 
me  the  timely  and  valuable  reenforcement  of  Kelly's 
brigade,  and  within  an  hour  afterward  the  remaining 
brigades  of  his  division — Gracie's  and  Trigg's.  These 
brave  troops  as  they  arrived  were  conducted  by  officers 
of  my  staff  to  the  right  of  my  line,  and  promptly  ad- 
vanced, in  conjunction  with  the  rest,  upon  the  enemy. 
From  this  time  we  gained  ground ;  but,  though  now 
commanding  nine  brigades,  with  Kershaw  co-operat- 
ing, and  all  in  action,  I  found  the  gain  both  slow  and 
costly.  I  have  never  known  Federal  troops  to  fight  so 
well.  It  is  just  to  say,  also,  that  I  never  saw  Confed- 
erate soldiers  fight  better." 

Some  time  after  dark,  probably  about  7  P.  M.,  an  or- 
der came  to  those  on  the  hill  to  retire,,  and  that  every 
man  should  hold  his  cartridge-box  to  prevent  its  rat- 
tling, step  lightly,  and  make  no  noise.  The  little  squad 
with  which  I  left  the  hill  was  under  the  command  of 
Lieut-Colonel  Oyler  of  the  /gth  Ind.  It  numbered 
from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred  men,  in- 


196  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

eluding  some  of  the  79th  and  some  of  other  regiments. 
We  left  none  too  soon,  for  a  few  minutes  later  three 
regiments  posted  to  our  right,  the  2ist  and  89th  Ohio, 
and  the  22d  Mich.,  which  had  not  received  the  order  in 
time,  were  quietly  surrounded  and  captured  by  the 
Confederates. 

Stepping  on  tip-toe  the  little  band  left  the  hill,  no 
man  speaking  above  a  whisper.  The  deserted  camp- 
fires  by  which  we  marched  told  us  that  a  great  part  of 
the  army  had  already  retreated.  We  expected  every 
moment  to  be  halted  or  fired  on  by  the  Confederates. 
Our  way  was  over  a  rough  road  through  McFarland's 
Gap,  a  narrow  mountain  pass  bordered  by  precipitous 
and  densely  wooded  hills,  of  wild  and  forbidding  ap- 
pearance in  the  day-time,  and  transformed  by  the  som- 
ber shadows  of  the  night  into  a  region  of  almost  super- 
natural gloom.  To  us,  traveling  at  such  a  time  and 
under  such  circumstances,  everything  assumed  a  weird 
look,  suggestive  rather  of  the  infernal  regions  than  of 
mother  Earth.  Now  and  then  from  some  flickering 
camp-fire  by  the  roadside  a  fitful  flame  shot  up,  for  a 
moment  illumining  the  dark  ravine  and  showing  the 
haggard  and  powder-begrimed  faces  of  the  passing 
marchers ;  but  most  of  the  way  was  traveled  in  silence 
and  in  darkness,  with  barely  light  enough  to  enable  us 
to  discern  the  dim  outlines  of  the  file  in  front.  We 
reached  Rossville  some  time  after  10  o'clock  that  night, 
and  foot-sore  and  heart-sore,  lay  down  for  a  few  hours' 
sleep.  The  great  battle  was  over  and  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  been  defeated. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA 

One  need  read  but  little  of  the  literature  relating  to 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga  to  discover  that  it  has  given 
rise  to  infinite  speculation  and  controversy  concerning 
the  causes  of  the  defeat  of  the  Federal  army  and  the 
errors  of  both  Rosecrans  and  Bragg.  It  is,  however, 
generally  conceded  now  that  the  initial  blunder  of 
Rosecrans  was  in  allowing  his  troops  to  get  so  far  away 
from  Chattanooga  and  to  become  so  widely  separated 
without  first  ascertaining  the  whereabouts  of  Bragg's 
army.  So  great  an  army  could  not  long  have  re- 
mained hidden,  and,  had  Rosecrans  used  proper  dili- 
gence, he  might  have  ascertained  its  location  in  time 
to  concentrate  his  own  forces  and  so  have  avoided  the 
disasters  that  followed. 

Before  Rosecrans  had  obtained  definite  and  reliable 
information  of  the  location  of  the  Confederate  army, 
his  own  army  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
crushed  in  detail  and,  even  after  the  junction  of  the 
Federal  corps  had  been  accomplished,  there  was  still 
great  danger  that  Bragg's  army  would  intervene  be- 
tween Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga,  cut  off  his  com- 
munications, and  block  retreat.  To  avoid  these  perils 
required  long  and  hard  marching,  and  for  several  days 
before  and  during  the  battle  the  movement  of  the  Fed- 
eral army  was  steadily  to  the  left.  Day  and  night, 
over  mountains  and  hills,  through  forests  and  fields,  it 
was  moving  to  the  left.  When  the  battle  could  no 
longer  be  postponed,  the  Federal  forces,  worn  out  by 
hard  marching,  were  pitted  against  fresh  troops  on 
ground  of  the  enemy's  choosing. 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Moreover,  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  were  such 
that,  to  supply  Thomas  with  the  reenforcements  neces- 
sary to  enable  him  to  prevent  Bragg  from  turning  the 
left  of  the  Federal  army  and  getting  between  it  and 
Chattanooga,  it  was  necessary  to  weaken  the  right  con- 
tinually in  order  to  strengthen  the  left.  In  doing  this 
the  unity  of  the  organizations  of  the  2Oth  and  2ist 
corps  was  broken,  divisions  were  separated  from  corps 
and  brigades  from  divisions,  so  that  the  troops  were 
placed  under  strange  commanders  and  subjected  to 
conflicting  orders,  and  all  the  strength  coming  from 
long  association  of  officers  and  men  was  lost  at  a  time 
when  it  was  most  needed.  As  already  stated,  immedi- 
ately before  the  break  on  Sunday  McCook  was  bereft 
of  all  but  two  brigades  of  Davis's  division,  and  when 
the  order  was  given  for  the  remaining  two  brigades 
of  Van  Cleve's  division  to  go  to  the  support  of 
Thomas,  Crittenden  was  left  without  a  single  brigade 
and  Van  Cleve  without  a  single  regiment.  The  new 
formations  and  changes  of  front  in  face  of  the  enemy, 
made  necessary  by  unexpected  emergencies,  were 
especially  dangerous  to  the  weakened  right  of  the  Fed- 
eral army,  exposed  to  the  overwhelming  forces  massed 
against  it  on  Sunday. 

These  facts  should  be  emphasized  in  refutation  of 
the  impression  which  prevailed  generally  for  some 
time  after  the  battle,  and  may  perhaps  still  exist  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  have  not  carefully  studied  the  of- 
ficial reports,  that  the  battle  on  the  Federal  side  was 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA 

fought  chiefly  by  the  I4th  corps  and  that  nearly  all  of 
the  2Oth  and  2ist  corps  ran  away. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  previous  mistakes,  the  re- 
sult would  undoubtedly  have  been  vastly  different  had 
it  not  been  for  the  disaster  on  Sunday ;  but  for  this  pos- 
sibly "Flodden  had  been  Bannockburn."  No  human 
being  could  have  anticipated  the  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances which  caused  it.  Mere  chances  seemed  to 
have  developed  the  actual  existing  conditions.  If 
these  had  been  prearranged  for  the  express  purpose  of 
producing  the  result  which  followed,  they  could  not 
have  been  made  to  follow  in  more  exact  sequence  or  to 
fit  together  more  nicely. 

Even  after  the  confusion  and  partial  demoralization 
following  the  break  on  Sunday  afternoon,  it  was  possi- 
ble that  the  result  might  have  been  different  if  it  had 
occurred  to  some  other  general,  as  it  did  to  Granger, 
"to  march  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon"  with  even  half 
of  the  five  or  six  thousand  men  huddled  together  in 
Dry  Creek  Valley  and  about  Rossville,  and  to  make  a 
stand  on  Snodgrass  Hill  with  their  comrades  who  were 
there  making  such  a  heroic  fight. 

Colonel  Thruston,  McCook's  chief  of  staff,  states 
that  he  saw  Sheridan  soon  after  the  disaster  to  the  Fed- 
eral right  and  informed  him  of  a  short  route  by  whu:h 
he  could  effect  a  junction  with  General  Thomas  by 
marching  only  about  two  and  a  half  miles.  Had  Sher- 
idan taken  this  route  with  such  soldiers  as  he  could 
gather  together  he  might  have  fallen  upon  Longstreet's 
flanks,  just  as  the  latter  was  expecting,  or  might  have 


2OO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

taken  some  other  position  that  would  have  turned  the 
tide  of  battle.  Instead  of  doing  so  he  marched  seven 
or  eight  miles  over  a  circuitous  route  and  did  not  reach 
Thomas  until  6  P.  M.16  No  one  doubts  the  bravery  or 
the  soldierly  abilities  of  General  Sheridan  and  we  must 
accept  the  explanation  given  by  him  in  his  Memoirs 
and  by  General  Davies,  his  biographer,  that,  at  the 
time,  he  thought  himself  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
cut  off  from  the  remainder  of  the  army  and  believed 
the  route  which  he  took  to  reach  General  Thomas  to 
be  the  only  one  practicable. 

Courts  of  inquiry  were  held  to  investigate  the  con- 
duct of  some  of  the  Federal  generals  but  all  were  ex- 
onerated in  flattering  terms.  The  court  which  sat  in 
General  Negley's  case  went  out  of  its  way  to  censure 
a  general  who  remained  on  the  field  and  was  conspicu- 
ous for  gallant  fighting  at  Chickamauga  and  in  sub- 
sequent battles.  One  reading  the  proceedings  of  these 
courts  is,  indeed,  likely  to  be  somewhat  bewildered  in 
trying  to  ascertain  the  object  of  the  inquiry — whether 
it  was  to  vindicate  those  who  left  the  field  or  to  call 
for  an  explanation  of  the  conduct  of  those  who  re- 
mained and  fought  out  the  battle  to  the  end. 

18  In  fact  Forrest's  cavalry  and  a  Confederate  corps  of  infantry 
(Walker's)  had  by  that  time  intervened  between  Sheridan  and 
Thomas.  At  dark  Sheridan's  heads  of  columns  had  advanced 
only  as  far  as  the  Cloud  House.  A  staff  officer,  sent  by  him  to 
report  his  position  to  Thomas,  reached  the  latter  only  by  riding 
around  the  enemy.  Thomas  at  that  time  was  preparing  to  retire 
and  sent  word  to  Sheridan  to  remain  where  he  was  until  Thomas's 
troops  were  withdrawn  and  then  to  return  to  Rossville. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  2OI 

One  general  was  never  called  to  explain  his  conduct. 
No  hostile  criticism  was  ever  made  of  the  conduct  of 
General  Thomas,  "the  Rock  of  Chickamauga."  Justice 
to  the  men  of  the  2Oth  and  2ist  army  corps,  however, 
requires  that  something  should  be  said  in  addition  to 
what  has  already  been  stated,  concerning  the  stripping 
of  these  corps  of  troops  to  reenforce  Thomas.  Pal- 
mer's and  Wood's  divisions  of  the  2ist  corps  and  John- 
son's of  the  2Oth  preserved  their  organization  through- 
out the  battle,  and  no  better  fighting  was  done  by  any 
troops  on  the  field  than  was  done  by  these  divisions. 
Barnes's  brigade  of -Van  Cleve's  division  of  the  2ist 
corps  also  retained  its  organization.  Of  the  two  re- 
maining brigades,  Beatty's  and  Dick's,  part  only  left 
the  field,  and  a  very  considerable  number  were  with 
those  who  made  the  memorable  stand,  on  Snodgrass 
Hill.  Five  brigades  of  the  2Oth  corps  left.  These 
were  the  three  of  Sheridan's  and  two  of  Davis's.  The 
men  of  Thomas's  corps  who  left  the  field  exceeded  in 
number  all  who  left  of  the  2ist  corps.  Van  Home 
states  the  facts  very  clearly : 

"As  the  statement  appears  in  many  histories  of  the 
war,  and  even  in  some  of  recent  publication,  that  Gen- 
eral Thomas  with  his  single  corps  saved  the  army  at 
Chickamauga,  it  is  imperative  to  refute  this  error,  as 
it  does  great  injustice  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
other  corps.  The  preceding  narrative  gives  an  indi- 
rect refutation,,  but  this  prevalent  mistake  should  be 
explicitly  corrected.  Generals  Crittenden  and  Mc- 
Cook  had  each  eight  brigades  on  the  field,  and  General 
Granger  had  three.  And  of  these  nineteen  brigades, 


2O2  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

twelve  were  with  General  Thomas  in  the  final  conflict. 
Five  brigades  of  McCook's  corps  were  cut  off  on  the 
right,  but  not  more  than  two  from  Crittenden's,  count- 
ing fragments.  Palmer's  division  of  Crittenden's 
corps  and  Johnson's  from  McCook's  were  with  Gen- 
eral Thomas  throughout  the  battle,  and  General  Wood 
of  the  former  corps,  with  two  brigades  of  his  own  di- 
vision and  one  from  Van  Cleve's,  went  to  him  on  the 
second  day.  Granger's  three  large  brigades  consti- 
tuted nearly  one-fourth  of  the  entire  force  on  the  final 
line.  More  men  left  the  field  from  General  Thomas's 
own  corps,  the  Fourteenth,  than  from  General  Critten- 
den's. Four  regiments  of  Wilder's  brigade  of  Rey- 
nolds's  division  were  on  the  right  of  the  breach ;  a  large 
portion,  more  than  a  moiety,  of  Negley's  division  was 
led  or  driven  from  the  field  ( Beatty's  brigade,  through 
the  emergencies  of  battle  and  orders  of  General  Neg- 
ley's adjutant-general,  joined  the  divisions  on  the 
right,  and  at  night  were  found  by  General  Beatty,  at 
Rossville),  and  Brannan  lost  a  portion  of  one  of  his 
brigades  through  orders  of  a  general  who  left  the  field 
before  the  final  crisis  of  the  battle.  The  glory  of  the 
final  conflict  is  then  the  common  inheritance  of  the 
army,  as  it  was  won  by  the  valor  of  troops  represent- 
ing the  four  grand  uni'ts."17 

I  have  laid  particular  stress,  even  at  the  risk  of  be- 
ing tiresome,  upon  the  facts  relating  to  the  part  taken 
by  the  2Oth  and  2ist  corps,  because  of  the  injustice 
done  them  in  the  early  reports  of  the  battle.  For  this 
injustice  Halleck  is  largely  to  blame.  In  the  official  re- 
port of  the  battle  made  by  him  as  commander-in-chief, 

17  Hist.  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  vol.  i,  pp.  361-2. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  2O3 

November  15,  1863,  he  said:  "Our  right  and  part  of 
center  had  been  completely  broken  and  fled  in  confusion 
from  the  field,  carrying  with  them  to  Chattanooga 
their  commanders,  Generals  McCook  and  Crittenden, 
and  also  General  Rosecrans  who  was  on  that  part  of 
the  line."  In  the  same  report,  in  order  to  emphasize 
the  matter,  he  says,  "As  most  of  the  corps  of  McCook 
and  Crittenden  had  retreated  to  Chattanooga,  it  was 
deemed  advisable  to  withdraw  the  left  wing  to  that 
place."18 

This  report  was  made  nearly  two  months  after  the 
battle  and  it  would  seem  reasonable  to  suppose  that  in 
that  time  some  glimmering  idea  of  the  greatest  battle 
fought  in  the  West,  and,  with  the  exception  of  Gettys- 
burg, the  greatest  of  the  Civil  War,  would  have  pene- 
trated even  the  brain  of  Halleck ;  but  we  have  his  own 
word  for  it  in  a  dispatch  to  General  Thomas,  as  late 
as  January  12,  1864,  that  he  had  never  read  nor  seen 
the  latter's  report  of  the  battle.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
Halleck  ever  obtained  a  more  accurate  conception  of 
the  battle  than  he  had  of  the  military  operations  pre- 
ceding it,  and  of  these  it  is  certain  that  his  ignorance 
was  impenetrable.  If  any  further  vindication  of  the 
men  of  the  2Oth  and  2ist  corps  is  needed,  it  will  be 
found  in  the  statistics  of  their  losses  given  in  the  fol- 
lowing tables. 

The  victory,  such  as  it  was,  had  been  won  by  Bragg, 
but  it  had  been  dearly  bought.  A  few  more  like  it 

18  Rcb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  50,  pp.  38,  39. 


204 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 


would  have  annihilated  his  army.  It  was  too  much 
broken  and  shattered  to  strike  another  blow,  and  Chat- 
tanooga, the  prize  for  which  the  great  battle  was 
fought,  had  eluded  the  grasp  of  the  victor. 

It  is  difficult  to  obtain  from  the  official  reports  accurate  sta- 
tistics of  the  numbers  and  losses  of  the  Federal  army  in  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  still  more  difficult  to  ascertain  the 
Confederate  numbers  and  losses.  The  following  tables  are  com- 
piled chiefly  from  the  official  reports  found  in  the  Rebellion  Rec- 
ords, ser.  Nos.  50  and  51,  and  from  the  tables  given  in  Turchin's 
Battle  of  Chickamauga: 


NUMBERS   AND    LOSSES   OF   THE   ARMY   OF   THE   CUMBERLAND   IN   THE 
BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 


Organization. 

Engaged. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

\g 

'<n 
1 

"re 
"o 
H 

Per  Cent. 

General  Headquarters. 

2 

4 

6 

1  4th  Corps. 
Staff  

I 

i 

ist  D.  Baird  

5.  =141 

181 

7Q4 

I,2O2 

2.177 

3028 

2d    D.  Negley  

2.71;  ; 

66 

43O 

2oc; 

7QI 

28.71 

3d    D.  Brannan  

"J.4OO 

32  C 

7~> 
I.6t;2 

214 

2.IOI 

4O.i;7 

4th  D.  Reynolds  

6,461 

Q3 

685 

176 

0=14 

v*-y/ 

14.76 

Aggregate 

2O.  K7 

665 

^6** 

1,  8o2 

6,  1  20 

^O.6  1 

2Oth  Corps, 
ist  D.  Davis  

3.QOO 

124 

820 

4Qi; 

I."UQ 

W.& 

2d   D.  Johnson  

4.2OO 

148 

Q4O 

1:1:4 

1,642 

7Q.OO 

3d   D.  Sheridan  

4,2OO 

1^1 

Q3Q 

yyt 

276 

1,366 

^2.^2. 

Aggregate  

I2,3OO 

423 

2,600 

1,23; 

4,^^7 

^.£2 

2ist  Corps. 
Staff  

3 

7 

ist  D.  Wood  

2,061; 

132 

744 

IQ4 

1,070 

36.08 

2d    D.  Palmer  

tj.ooc; 

134 

I.O3I 

20^ 

1,368 

27.^^ 

3d    D.  Van  Cleve  

4,000 

x 

c6 

'VJ 
604 

1O2 

t,JWU 

062 

21.O^ 

Aggregate.  . 

1  1  .070 

322 

2.182 

600 

3.403 

28.43 

BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA 


205 


Organization. 

Engaged. 

no 
£ 

3 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

"ea 
"o 
H 

Per  Cent. 

Reserve  Corps.  Granger. 
Staff  

i 

I 

ist  D.  Steedman  .  .  . 

-3,017 

212 

962 

613 

1,787 

45.66 

2d    D.  Morgan  

I,  CQO 

2 

18 

^4. 

.226 

Aggregate  

5,413 

215 

O76 

631 

1,822 

33.6; 

Cav.  Corps.     Mitchel. 
1st  D.  McCook  

6 

24 

254 

284 

2d   D.  Crook  

26 

112 

•*:>2 
46 

184 

.23 

Aggregate  

8.OOO 

32 

136 

300 

468 

Total  

C.7.84O 

1,657 

0,756 

4,757 

16.170 

27.01; 

The  character  of  the  ground  and  the  nature  of  the  battle  were 
not  favorable  to  operations  of  the  cavalry,  and  calculations  based 
on  the  numbers  and  losses  of  the  infantry  only  show  a  percentage 
of  loss  of  31.50.  Of  the  4,757  reported  "missing,"  doubtless  many 
were  killed  and  many  more  wounded.  The  general  hospital  at 
Crawfish  Spring  was  captured,  and  it  is  estimated  by  Surgeon 
Glover  Perin,  the  Federal  Medical  Director  of  the  Department 
of  the  Cumberland,  that  2,500  of  the  Federal  wounded  were  left 
on  the  field. 

The  brigade  reports  show  still  larger  percentages  of  loss. 
Baldwin's  and  Willich's  brigades  lost  heavily,  but  no  official  re- 
ports were  made  of  the  numbers  who  went  into  action,  and  hence 
the  percentages  of  their  losses  can  not  be  given.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  brigades  of  Sheridan's  division,  none  of  which  made  any 
return  of  the  numbers  engaged.  The  following  tables  show  that 
several  brigades  lost  over  40  and  some  over  50  per  cent. : 


206 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 


FEDERAL  BRIGADE    NUMBERS   AND  LOSSES. 


Brigade. 

Engaged. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

"rt 
O 

H 

• 

u 

h 

6 

PL, 

Heg  

1,218 

7O 

CIO 

IO7 

606 

^7.14. 

King  

I.CI7 

61 

2ZS, 

^2^ 

830 

^^.dc; 

Carhn  

I,2li; 

C4 

2QO 

298 

"JV 

6u 

^.^s 

Dodge  

I.I^O 

27 

2OO 

•2OQ 

Di 
<%6 

4.7.47 

Whitaker  

2,Q22 

IS  4. 

6^4. 

«8 

3J/- 
1,326 

4=i.^7 

Van  Derveer  

1,788 

lit 

vyt 

OOO 

'i 

6: 

810 

4.C.7O 

Buell  

I.4.4.C 

7Q 

4.4.-J 

1  20 

6"U 

4^.01; 

Whitaker's  brigade  suffered  much  the  heaviest  loss  for  the 
time  engaged,  nearly  all  having  occurred  between  2  p.  M.  and 
nightfall  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle.  Of  the  seven  brigades 
cut  off  on  the  right  and  driven  from  the  field  on  Sunday,  Carlin's 
and  Heg's  belonged  to  Davis's  division,  Lytle's,  Laiboldt's,  and 
Bradley's  to  Sheridan's,  Beatty's  and  Dick's  to  Van  Cleve's. 
That  they  did  not  leave  the  field  until  they  had  done  some  hard 
fighting  is  shown  by  their  losses.  From  those  of  Carlin's  and 
Heg's  brigades,  given  above,  it  appears  that  Heg's  brigade  lost  a 
greater  per  cent,  than  any  other  brigade  in  the  battle,  and  that 
Carlin's  was  third  in  the  list.  The  losses  of  the  other  five 
brigades  are  shown  in  the  following  table: 


Brigade. 

Engaged. 

i 

3 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

"3 
t3 
H 

"c 
<i> 
U 

i* 
o 
DM 

Lytle,  Laiboldt,  Bradley 
—  Aggregate 

4,2OO 

ICI 

938 

276 

1,365 

32.S2 

S.  Beatty  

1,^84 

Jf 

16 

254 

6l 

331 

23.9! 

Dick  

1,122 

16 

1  80 

83 

27O 

24.86 

The  following  table  of  Confederate  numbers  and  losses  is  taken 
from  Turchin's  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  p.  240: 


BATTLE    OF    CHICK  AM  AUGA 


2O7 


NUMBERS    AND    LOSSES    OF    THE    ARMY    OF    THE    TENNESSEE    IN    THE 
BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 


Command. 

Engaged. 

T3 
JU 

3 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

5 

'o 
H 

Per  Cent. 

Right  wing  —  Polk. 
Hill's  Corps  : 
Breckinridge's  Div  .... 
Cleburne's          "    
Walker  and 
Liddell's          "    .... 
Folk's  Corps  : 
Cheatham's         "    .... 

3,769 
5,115 

6,534 
6,454 

166 
204 

34i 
218 

909 

i,539 
1,949 
1,624 

I6I 

733 
118 

1,450 
1,749 

3,023 
1,973 

38.47 
34.19 

46.26 
30.57 

Total  right  wing  

21,872 

929 

6,021 

1,022 

8,195 

3746 

Left  wing  —  Longstreet. 
Stewart's    Div  

4?c8 

20; 

I.40O 

2Q 

I.7O7 

T.Q   l6 

Hood's               ....       ... 

e.coo 

2.QIO 

C-3  JO7 

McLaws's               

2.SOO 

6lO 

3J^/ 
25  06 

Johnson's           

3,428 

1  88 

1,  08  1 

1  80 

I.44Q 

4.2.26 

Hindman's        

6,122 

272 

1,480 

98 

i,  8  so 

•}O  21 

Preston's           

4,80Q 

1  08 

I.O77 

61 

*>    3« 
I.3TO 

27.78 

Total  left  wing  

26,717 

86  1 

^.1^7 

368 

Q.QOI 

77.01; 

Cavalry,  Wheeler,  about. 

I2.OOO 

Total  Army  of  Tenn  . 

60,589 

1,790 

11,158 

1,380 

18,096 

29.86 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  foregoing  calculations  are  based  on  the 
statements  placing  the  numbers  engaged  as : 

Federal 57,840 

Confederate 60,589 

Van  Home  (vol.  i,  pp.  360-361)  says  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  "General  Bragg's  army  was  the  larger."  He  estimates 
that  General  Rosecrans  had  in  action  30  brigades  of  infantry,  5  of 
cavalry,  and  i  of  mounted  infantry;  in  all,  135  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, 21  of  cavalry,  and  5  of  mounted  infantry,  together  with  33 
batteries,  amounting  in  all  to  56,160.  He  estimates  that  General 
Bragg  had  in  the  field  35  brigades  of  infantry  and  10  or  12  of 
cavalry,  and  that  he  had  in  all  70,000,  thus  making  his  army  su- 


2O8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

perior   in   numbers  to  that  of  General   Rosecrans  by    12,000  to 
15,000. 

In  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War  (vol.  3,  pp.  673,  676) 
are  tables  compiled  from  statistics  furnished  by  Adj. -Gen.  Richard 
C.  Drum,  stating  the  numbers  engaged  as : 

Federals 56,065 

Confederates 71>SS1 

Colonel  Livermore's  tables  (2d  ed.,  pp.  105,  106)  state  the  num- 
bers engaged  as : 

Federals 58,222 

Confederates 66,326 

The  latest  computation  of  the  Confederate  losses  which  I  have 
seen  is  the  following,  furnished  me  by  Colonel  William  F.  Fox : 

Killed.  Wounded.  Missing.  Total. 

Right  wing 950  6,257            943  8,150 

Left  wing 1,137  6,952            452  8,541 

Scott's  Cavalry 10  39  49 

Other  Cavalry  (estimated).        30  120             15  165 

2,127  13,368         1,410          16,905 

To  this  Colonel  Fox  adds  the  following: 

"The  provost  marshal  of  the  Union  Army  reported  that  2,005 
Confederate  prisoners  were  captured  at  Chickamauga.  This 
would  indicate  a  total  loss  of  17,500  instead  of  16,905,  as  shown 
in  the  Confederate  returns,  some  of  which  make  no  mention  of 
their  missing." 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  the  tables  given  above  there  is  not  a 
great  difference  in  the  statements  of  the  numbers  of  the  Federal 
army  engaged,  the  average  being  about  57,675,  but  that  there  is  a 
considerable  variation  in  the  figures  given  for  the  Confederate 
numbers  engaged,  the  general  average  being  about  66,155,  which 
very  nearly  agrees  with  the  figures  of  Colonel  Livermore.  The 
percentages  of  losses,  computed  on  Colonel  Livermore's  tables, 
are  about  the  same  as  those  above  given  for  the  Federal,  but 
somewhat  less  for  the  Confederate. 

General  Boynton  (Chickamauga  National  Military  Park,  pp. 
227-8),  basing  his  calculations  upon  estimates  of  numbers  and 
losses  somewhat  different  from  those  of  the  foregoing  tables, 
states  the  percentages  of  losses  as  follows : 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA  2(X) 

"A  reference  to  the  losses  on  each  side  will  show  that  there  has 
been  no  exaggeration  in  the  description  of  the  fighting.  Rose- 
crans's  loss  was  16,179.  This  included  4,774  missing,  of  which  a 
large  number  were  killed  or  wounded.  Bragg' s  losses,  as  com- 
piled and  estimated  at  the  War  Records  office,  were  17,804.  Thus 
the  total  loss  for  each  army  was  over  25  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
force  of  each,  and  it  will  be  found  to  average  about  33  per  cent, 
on  each  side  for  the  troops  actually  engaged. 

"Longstreet's  wing  of  the  Confederate  army  lost  44  per -cent., 
nearly  all  of  this  on  the  second  day,  and  the  largest  part  of  that 
in  an  hour  and  a  half  on  Sunday  afternoon. 

"Steedman's  and  Brannan's  divisions,  which  confronted  a  por- 
tion of  Longstreet's  assault,  lost,  the  first,  49  per  cent,  in  four 
hours,  and  all  these  were  killed  or  wounded  but  one,  and  the 
second,  an  average  of  38  per  cent.,  while  one  brigade,  Van  Der- 
veer's,  of  Brannan,  lost  only  a  small  fraction  less  than  50  per  cent. 

"For  the  entire  Union  army  the  losses  ranged  from  these 
maximum  figures  down  to  33  per  cent.,  a  terrible  minimum  of  one 
in  three. 

"Bushrod  Johnson's  division  lost  44  per  cent.,  Patton  Ander- 
son's brigade,  of  Hindman's,  30  per  cent.,  and  most  of  this  on 
Sunday  afternoon.  Bate's  brigade,  of  Stewart's  division,  lost  52 
per  cent.  Preston's  division,  in  an  hour  and  a  half  before  sunset 
on  Sunday,  lost  33  per  cent.,  and  Gracie's  brigade  nearly  35  per 
cent,  in  a  single  hour  while  assaulting  Brannan's  position  on  the 
Horseshoe.  The  brigade  losses  in  Cheatham's  division  ranged 
from  35  to  50  per  cent.  The  aggregate  loss  in  Breckinridge's 
division  was  33  per  cent.  Clebume's  loss  was  43  per  cent." 


CHAPTER   EIGHT 

THE   SIEGE  AND   BATTLES   OF    CHATTANOOGA1 

By  midnight  on  September  20  nearly  all  the  survi- 
vors of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  able  for  duty, 
were  collected  by  General  Thomas  at  or  near  Rossville 
and  were  posted  across  the  Lafayette  road,  at  McFar- 
land's  Gap,  and  on  Missionary  Ridge  to  the  right  and 
left  of  it.  They  maintained  substantially  this  position 
on  the  2 1  st.  Bragg  followed  and  that  night  the  Fed- 
eral army  occupied  Chattanooga;  by  morning  of  the 
22d  its  lines  were  established  and  fortifications  begun. 
The  same  day  Bragg's  army  took  possession  of  Look- 
out Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge,  but  the  attack 
ordered  by  him  for  the  23d  and  fully  expected  by  the 
Federal  troops,  was  indefinitely  postponed.  By  this 
time  the  Union  troops  had  learned  that  the  great  battle 
had  been  as  disastrous  in  loss  of  life  to  the  victors  as  to 
the  vanquished,  and  that  their  defeat  was  due  to  acci- 
dent, not  to  any  lack  of  courage  or  discipline.  There 

1  For  descriptions  of  the  battle-fields  about  Chattanooga,  the 
troops  engaged  and  many  valuable  statistics,  I  am  largely  indebted 
to  General  Boynton's  The  Chickamauga  National  Military  Park. 
See  also  Van  Home:  Hist.  Army  of  the  Cumberland;  Cist:  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  and  the  official  reports  contained  in  Rebellion 
Records,  ser.  No.  55. 

(210) 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  211 

remained  an  army  that  would  have  been  formidable 
on  any  field,  and  no  one  in  its  ranks  doubted  its  ability 
to  hold  Chattanooga.  Bragg  was  evidently  of  the  same 
opinion  for  his  army  quietly  settled  down  about  the 
town  with  the  expectation,  not  of  fighting  out  the 
Union  troops,  but  of  starving  them  out.  The  danger 
of  starving  them  out  grew  greater  every  day. 

Bragg's  army,  stretching  from  the  Tennessee  river 
along  Missionary  Ridge  and  across  the  valley  to  Look- 
out Mountain,  almost  encompassed  the  town.  The 
Confederate  batteries  on  Lookout  Mountain  command- 
ed the  river  as  well  as  the  road  and  the  railroad  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Tennessee.  To  procure  supplies 
from  the  North  the  supply  trains  were  obliged  to 
travel  from  Bridgeport,  Alabama,  to  Chattanooga,  a 
distance  of  sixty  miles,  by  way  of  the  Sequatchie  Val- 
ley and  over  the  mountains.  When  the  rains  set  in  the 
roads  became  very  bad  and  the  exhausted  mules  died 
by  thousands  until  the  route,  strewn  with  their  skele- 
tons, looked,  as  I  once  heard  it  described,  like  a  long 
extended  back-bone.  Moreover,  this  slender  line  of 
communication  was  continually  threatened  by  the  ene- 
my's cavalry.  Wheeler's  troops  captured  and  burned 
one  supply  train  and  every  day  increased  the  danger 
that  the  Union  army  would  be  compelled  either  to 
surrender  or  to  attempt  a  retreat  to  Nashville,  which 
would  expose  it  to  the  hazard  of  utter  demoralization 
and  possible  destruction.  From  lack  of  forage  great 
numbers  of  the  artillery  horses  died,  and  the  little  corn 
for  the  few  remaining  horses  and  mules  was  guarded 


212  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

with  the  utmost  vigilance  from  hungry  soldiers,  who 
were  first  put  on  half  and  then  on  quarter  rations.  I 
sometimes  saw  men  pick  up  the  few  grains  of  corn  left 
where  horses  had  been  fed  and  parch  them  for  food. 
During  the  whole  of  October,  while  I  was  never  off 
duty,  I  was  so  sick  that  I  had  little  appetite,  and  lived 
chiefly  on  one  meal  a  day — a  scanty  dinner  procured 
at  the  house  of  a  colored  man  near  the  camp.  During 
the  time  of  our  sorest  distress,  Jefferson  Davis  vis- 
ited Bragg's  army  and,  looking  down  from  Pulpit 
Rock,  on  Lookout  Mountain,  upon  the  starving  garri- 
son in  Chattanooga,  he  gloatingly  predicted  its  speedy 
extermination. 

The  situation  is  thus  concisely  stated  in  the  report 
of  General  Grant  :2 

"Up  to  this  period  [October  28]  our  forces  at  Chat- 
tanooga were  practically  invested,  the  enemy's  line 
extending  from  the  Tennessee  river  above  Chattanooga 
to  the  river  at  and  below  the  point  of  Lookout  Moun- 
tain below  Chattanooga,  with  the  south  bank  of  the 
river  picketed  to  near  Bridgeport,  his  main  force  being 
fortified  in  Chattanooga  Valley,  at  the  foot  of  and  on 
Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout  Mountain,  and  a 
brigade  in  Lookout  Valley.  True,  we  held  possession 
of  the  country  north  of  the  river,  but  it  was  from  sixty 
to  seventy  miles  over  the  most  impracticable  of  roads 
to  any  supplies.  The  artillery  horses  and  mules  had 
become  so  reduced  by  starvation  that  they  could  not 
have  been  relied  on  for  moving  anything.  An  attempt 
at  retreat  must  have  been  with  men  alone,  and  with 

2  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  55,  p.  29. 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  213 

only  such  supplies  as  they  could  carry.  A  retreat 
would  have  been  almcst  certain  annihilation,  for  the 
enemy,  occupying  positions  within  gunshot  of  and 
overlooking  our  very  fortifications,  would  unquestion- 
ably have  pursued  our  retreating  forces.  Already  more 
than  10,000  animals  had  perished  in  supplying  half 
rations  to  the  troops  by  the  long  and  tedious  route 
from  Stevenson  and  Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga,  over 
Walden  Ridge.  They  could  not  have  been  supplied 
another  week." 

It  was  during  this  stress  that  General  Thomas,  in 
response  to  a  message  from  General  Grant,  telling  him 
to  "hold  Chattanooga  at  all  hazards"  and  inquiring  the 
prospects  for  holding  out,  returned  the  historic  an- 
swer, "We  will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve." 

The  timber  near  the  fortifications  had  been  cut  down 
and  the  proximity  of  the  Confederate  pickets  made  it 
difficult  to  procure  enough  wood  with  which  to  cook 
the  few  provisions  we  had.  The  Confederate  batter- 
ies on  Lookout  Mountain  were  continually  harassing 
us,  and  so  near  was  the  enemy  to  our  lines  that  the  mo- 
ment the  Federal  pickets  left  their  works  to  go  to  the 
picket  stations  they  were  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
Confederate  sharpshooters.  Evidently  the  Confeder- 
ates expected  that  the  Union  army  would  soon  be  com- 
pelled to  evacuate. 

On  a  clear  night  the  band  at  Bragg's  headquarters 
on  Missionary  Ridge  could  be  distinctly  heard  in  our 
camp.  We  had  no  army  tune  so  melodious  as  "Dixie," 
but  when  wafted  through  the  still  night  air  from  Mis- 


214  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

sionary  Ridge  it  seemed  to  have  a  weird  sound,  creat- 
ing in  me  a  strange  foreboding.  * 

As  the  days  passed  the  situation  of  the  beleaguered 
army  became  more  critical.  But  relief  was  coming. 
Early  in  October,  "fighting  Jo.  Hooker"  arrived  from 
the  East  with  the  nth  and  I2th  corps,  and  so  disposed 
his  troops  between  Nashville  and  Bridgeport  as  to  pro- 
tect a  portion  at  least  of  Rosecrans's  communications. 

About  this  time  important  military  changes  were 
made.  Parts  of  the  nth  and  i2th  corps  had  been 
transferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and,  as  already  stated,  they 
had  arrived  early  in  October.  Generals  McCook  and 
Crittenden  were  relieved  October  9,  and  the  2Oth  and 
2ist  corps  were  consolidated  into  the  4th,  under  com- 
mand of  General  Gordon  Granger.  The  new  corps 
comprised  three  divisions,  General  John  M.  Palmer 
commanding  the  first,  General  Philip  H.  Sheridan 
the  second,  and  General  Thomas  J..  Wood  the  third, 
which  included  the  brigade  of  General  Samuel  Beatty. 
On  October  i8th  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi was  created,  including  the  three  departments  of 
the  Tennessee,  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ohio,  with 
General  Grant  in  command,  and  at  the  same  time 
General  Rosecrans  was  superseded  by  General  Thomas. 

The  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  always 
entertained  kindly  feeling  for  Rosecrans,  believing  that 
he  had  been  made  to  suffer  for  disasters  for  which  he 
was  not  wholly  responsible,  and  that  if  he  had  been 
sustained  with  the  powerful  backing  at  Washington 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  215 

extended  to  some  other  generals,  he  might  have 
achieved  higher  distinction  among  the  military  heroes 
of  the  war.  But  with  all  this  kindly  feeling,  unmixed 
with  the  slightest  doubt  of  either  his  bravery  or  his 
loyalty,  there  was  also  a  conviction  that  he  possessed 
some  faults  which  seriously  impaired  his  usefulness 
as  a  commander.  He  had  an  unfortunate  tendency  to 
set  up  his  own  judgment  against  that  of  his  superiors, 
and  this  continually  involved  him  in  trouble  with  them. 
Moreover,  it  was  thought  that  he  lacked  the  far-seeing 
sagacity  and  careful  attention  to  details  which  charac- 
terized Thomas;  that  he  also  lacked  the  latter's  equi- 
poise, self-possession,  presence  of  mind,  or  some  other 
quality,  whatever  it  was,  that  in  time  of  disaster,  seem- 
ingly irretrievable,  made  Thomas  as  clear-headed,  as 
imperturbable,  as  immovable  as  he  would  have  been  if 
witnessing  nothing  more  exciting  than  a  grand  review. 
Rosecrans  had  neither  the  foresight  which  enabled 
Thomas  to  avoid  disaster  nor  that  extraordinary  qual- 
ity, characteristic  of  Thomas  but  possessed  by  so  few 
men,  which,  when  disaster  comes,  however  great,  de- 
velops in  them  a  latent  power  enabling  them  to  tri- 
umph over  it.  Had  Rosecrans  possessed  the  qualities 
for  which  Thomas  was  so  conspicuous,  the  misfortunes 
at  Stone's  River  and  Chickamauga  might  never  have 
occurred,  at  least  their  consequences  would  probably 
have  been  far  less  serious. 

General  Grant  arrived  at  Chattanooga  October  23, 
and  at  once  began  preparations  for  raising  the  siege. 
Toward  the  end  of  October  Hooker  advanced  from 


2l6  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Bridgeport,  and,  after  a  sharp  encounter  with  the  Con- 
federates at  Wauhatchie,  took  possession  of  Lookout 
Valley,  and  the  way  was  speedily  opened  for  getting 
supplies.  General  Sherman  was  on  the  way  with  the 
1 5th  and  part  of  the  I7th  corps,  advancing  as  rapidly 
as  the  roads  would  permit;  all  available  troops  in  the 
rear  were  hurried  forward  to  Chattanooga;  great 
siege-guns  were  mounted  in  the  forts;  and  on  every 
hand  were  visible  preparations  indicative  of  some 
momentous  movement. 

About  this  time  Bragg  committed  the  blunder  of 
diminishing  his  army  by  sending  Longstreet  to  attack 
Burnside  in  east  Tennessee,  and  Longstreet  started 
November  4  with  20,000  men.  On  November  7  Gen- 
eral Grant  issued  peremptory  orders  to  Thomas  to 
attack  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning.  A  careful  examination  showed  that 
such  an  attack  under  the  existing  circumstances  would 
almo*st  certainly  fail.  Thomas  so  reported  and  the  or- 
der was  revoked.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  begin- 
ning of  the  ill  opinion  which  Grant  ever  afterward 
appears  to  have  entertained  for  Thomas.  The  subse- 
quent failure  of  Sherman,  under  much  more  favorable 
circumstances  and  after  two  days'  fighting,  to  make 
a  successful  assault  at  the  identical  place  mentioned  in 
the  order  to  Thomas,  justifies  the  opinion  of  military 
critics  that,  in  this  instance,  Thomas  was  right  and 
Grant  was  wrong.3 

3  See  General  William  F.  Smith's  article,  Comments  on  General 
Grant's  "Chattanooga,"  in  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War, 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA 

It  was  found  that  the  contemplated  attack  on  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  would  be  impracticable  until  the  arrival 
of  Sherman.  He  reached  Bridgeport,  Alabama,  No- 
vember 15,  and,  in  anticipation  of  his  arrival  in  time, 
it  was  decided  to  begin  the  attack  on  Missionary  Ridge 
Saturday,  November  21.  The  general  plan  was  out- 
lined in  an  order  issued  to  General  Thomas  on  the 
1 8th,  in  which  it  was  stated: 

"However,  the  general  plan,  you  understand,  is  for 
Sherman,  with  his  force  brought  with  him,  strength- 
ened by  a  division  from  your  command,  to  effect  a 
crossing  of  the  Tennessee  river  just  below  the  mouth 
of  the  Chickamauga;  his  crossing  to  be  protected  by 
artillery  from  the  heights  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
river  (to  be  located  by  your  chief  of  artillery),  and  to 
secure  the  heights  from  the  northern  extremity  to 
about  the  railroad  tunnel,  before  the  enemy  can  con- 
centrate against  him. 

"You  will  co-operate  with  Sherman.  The  troops  in 
Chattanooga  Valley  should  be  well  concentrated  on 
your  left  flank,  leaving-  only  the  necessary  force  to 
defend  fortifications  on  the  right  and  center,  and  a 
movable  column  of  one  division  in  readiness  to  move 
whenever  ordered.  This  division  should  show  itself 
as  threateningly  as  possible,  on  the  most  practicable 
line  for  making  an  attack  up  the  valley.  Your  effort 
will  then  be  to  form  a  junction  with  Sherman,  making 
your  advance  well  toward  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  moving  as  nearly  simultaneously  with  him 
as  possible.  The  juncture  once  formed  and  the  ridge 

vol.  3,  p.  715;  Van  Home:  Life  of  George  H.  Thomas,  pp.  160- 
166;  Nicolay  and  Hay:  Abraham  Lincoln,  vol.  8,  p.  131. 


2l8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

carried,  communications  will  be  at  once  established 
between  the  two  armies,  by  roads  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  river.  Further  movements  will  then  depend  on 
those  of  the  enemy."4 

In  this  general  plan  it  will' be  observed  that  Sherman 
was  to  take  the  leading  part  and  that  to  his  movements 
those  of  the  troops  under  Thomas  were  to  be  entirely 
subordinate.  The  former  was  delayed,  however,  by 
the  bad  condition  of  the  roads  and  the  attack  designed 
to  be  begun  on  the  2ist  was  postponed  to  the  23d.  In 
the  meantime  Grant,  fearing  that  Bragg  was  prepar- 
ing to  retreat  before  a  decisive  blow  could  be  struck, 
ordered  Thomas  to  make  a  reconnaissance  to  ascertain 
whether  the  Confederates  were  still  maintaining  their 
position.  This  was  done  by  the  troops  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Thomas,  beginning  about  noon  on  Monday  the  23d, 
Wood's  and  Sheridan's  divisions  being  in  the  lead,  the 
former  advancing  in  the  direction  of  Orchard  Knob 
with  Sheridan's  division  on  the  right.  So  secretly  had 
all  the  arrangements  been  made  that  when  the  troops 
leading  the  advance  were  formed  in  front  of  Fort 
Wood,  many  supposed  they  were  preparing  for  a  grand 
review  on  the  open  space  in  front.  They  were  not 
long  in  doubt,  however,  for  about  2  p.  M.  the  advance 
began.  So  rapidly  was  it  made  that  Orchard  Knob 
and  the  high  ground  in  its  vicinity  were  speedily  taken 

4  Reb.  Rec.,  vol.  55,  p.  31. 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  219 

and  fortified  and  that  night  a  battery  was  planted  upon 
the  knob. 

Tuesday,  the  24th,  was  an  exciting  day.  Wood's 
and  Sheridan's  divisions  of  the  4th  corps  and  Baird's 
and  Johnson's  of  the  I4th  remained  in  line  of  battle 
near  Orchard  Knob.  At  intervals  the  siege-guns  in 
Fort  -Wood  fired  at  the  Confederates  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  the  shells  going  over  our  heads  and  making 
a  most  unearthly  screeching  noise,  such  as  we  imagined 
might  be  made  by  some  invisible  saw-mill  swiftly  trans- 
ported through  the  air  and  in  operation  by  Satan  with 
a  full  set  of  hands. 

Other  and  far  more  exciting  movements  occupied 
our  attention  during  the  day.  Sherman's  troops  had 
arrived  on  the  23d  and  he  had  three  of  his  divisions  in 
position  behind  the  hills  opposite  the  mouth  of  Chicka- 
mauga  creek.  By  daylight  of  the  24th  these  had 
crossed  to  the  east  side  of  the  Tennessee  river  where 
they  were  joined  by  General  Jeff  C.  Davis's  division  of 
the  1 4th  corps.  One  of  Sherman's  divisions,  Oster- 
haus's,  not  being  able  to  cross  in  time  to  co-operate 
with  the  others,  joined  the  command  of  General 
Hooker.  At  i  P.  M.  Sherman's  troops  were  formed  to 
begin  the  attack  on  the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  with  the 
expectation  of  carrying  it  as  far  south  as  the  tunnel; 
and  at  3  130  they  had  gained  the  foot-hills  and  two 
high  points,  separated  by  a  deep  depression  from  the 
portion  of  the  ridge  over  the  tunnel;  but  they  failed 
to  reach  the  tunnel,  which  was  Sherman's  chief  ob- 
jective point,  and  at  night  the  Confederates  still  main- 


22O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

tained  their  position.  We  could  not  see,  but  could 
plainly  hear,  the  battle  on  our  left.  All  that  afternoon 
the  volleys  of  musketry  indicated  to  the  veteran  soldier 
the  fierceness  of  the  conflict. 

A  still  more  exciting  contest  was  being  waged  on 
our  right.  General  Hooker  with  Geary's  division  of 
the  1 2th  corps,  Osterhaus's  division  of  the  I5th,  and 
two  brigades  (Whitaker's  and  Grose's)  of  Cruft's  di- 
vision of  the  4th,  had  crossed  Lookout  creek  early  in- 
the  morning  of  the  24th  and  had  begun  the  attack  on 
the  Confederate  forces  at  the  base  and  sides  of  Lookout 
Mountain.  This  was  wholly  unexpected,  for  it  had 
never  occurred  to  us  that  an  attempt  would  be  made 
to  scale  its  precipitous  and  rocky  steeps.  One  would 
almost  as  soon  think  of  storming  Gibraltar.  But  surely 
the  attempt  was  being  made  to  carry  Lookout  Moun- 
tain. During  a  considerable  part  of  the  day  it  was  so 
foggy  that  we  could  see  only  the  flashing  of  the  guns, 
but  at  intervals  the  fog  lifted,  revealing  the  Federal 
line  in  the  distance  looking  like  a  dark  thread,  slowly 
advancing  from  rock  to  rock.  Then  cheer  after  cheer 
went  up  from  our  own  lines,  for  it  was  obvious  that  the 
Federal  troops  were  steadily  but  surely  gaining  ground. 
Far  into  the  night  the  flashes  of  musketry  indicated 
that  the  weird  "battle  among  the  clouds"  had  not 
ceased. 

A  grander  sight  greeted  us  next  morning,  for,  as 
soon  as  it  was  clear  enough  to  see,  we  beheld,  floating 
from  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  the  stars  and  stripes. 
The  mountain  itself  is  grand.  Lifting  its  bold  and 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  221 

frowning  front  1,600  feet  above  the  valley  below, 
it  affords  from  its  summit  one  of  the  most  magnifi- 
cent views  in  America.  But  it  never  looked  grander 
than  on  the  morning  of  November  25,  1863. 

Neither  the  advance  on  Orchard  Knob  nor  the 
storming  of  Lookout  Mountain  was  contemplated  in 
Grant's  original  plan.  The  first  was  intended  merely 
as  a  reconnaissance  to  develop  the  enemy's  position 
and  to  determine  whether  Bragg  had  begun  to  retreat ; 
the  second  was  undertaken  at  the  suggestion  of 
Thomas.  Both  had  resulted  in  surprising  and  un- 
looked-for success.  On  the  other  hand,  Sherman  had 
failed  to  capture  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge 
and  thus  carry  out  what  was  designed  as  the  leading 
movement,  to  which,  as  already  stated,  the  movements 
of  all  the  other  troops  were  intended  to  be  subordinate. 

On  the  night  of  the  24th  General  Grant,  as  shown 
in  his  dispatch  to  Halleck  of  that  date,  and  also  in  his 
order  to  Thomas  of  the  same  date,  erroneously  sup- 
posed that  Sherman  had  gained  the  north  end  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  as  far  as  the  tunnel.  On  this  supposi- 
tion, at  midnight  on  the  24th,  he  issued  an  order  to 
Sherman  directing  him  "to  attack  the  enemy  at  the 
point  most  advantageous  for  his  position  at  early 
dawn  to-morrow  morning."  At  the  same  time  the 
following  order  was  issued  to  General  Thomas : 

"General:  General  Sherman  carried  Missionary 
Ridge  as  far  as  the  tunnel,  with  only  slight  skirmish- 
ing. His  right  now  rests  at  the  tunnel  and  on  top  of 
the  hill ;  his  left  at  Chickamauga  creek. 


222  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

"I  have  instructed  General  Sherman  to  advance  as 
soon  as  it  is  light  in  the  morning,  and  your  attack, 
which  will  be  simultaneous,  will  be  in  co-operation. 

"Your  command  will  either  carry  the  rifle-pits  and 
ridge  directly  in  front  of  them  or  move  to  the  left,  as 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  may  require.  If  Hooker's 
present  position  on  the  mountain  can  be  maintained 
with  a  small  force,  and  it  is  found  impracticable  to 
carry  the  top  from  where  he  is,  it  would  be  advisable 
for  him  to  move  up  the  valley  with  all  the  force  he  can 
spare  and  ascend  by  the  first  practicable  road. 
"Very  respectfully, 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
"Major-General,  Commanding." 

When  this  order  was  issued  it  was  expected  that 
Sherman  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  would  sweep 
down  the  ridge  from  the  north  end,  that  Hooker  would 
reach  the  south  end  of  the  ridge  near  Rossville  and 
advance  northward;  and  it  was  intended  that  the  ap- 
pearance of  his  column,  moving  north  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  should  be  the  signal  for  the  advance  of  the 
troops  under  the  immediate  command  of  Thomas,  who 
were  then  to  storm  the  enemy's  center  on  Missionary 
Ridge.  But  the  next  morning  it  was  discovered  that 
the  Confederates,  though  they  had' evacuated  Lookout 
Mountain,  had  concentrated  their  entire  army  on  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  and  that,  instead  of  retreating,  they 
were  prepared  to  make  a  stubborn  defense.  They  had 
successfully  resisted  all  Sherman's  assaults,  had  forti- 
fied the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  and  had  reenforced  the 
troops  at  that  point.  Hooker  started  from  Lookout 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  223 

Mountain  about  10  A.  M.  to  fulfil  his  part  of  Grant's 
plan,  but  was  detained  three  or  four  hours  at  Chatta- 
nooga creek,  on  account  of  the  burning  of  a  bridge 
by  the  retreating  Confederates,  and  could  not  cross 
until  about  2  p.  M.  Though  "anxiously  looked  for 
and  momentarily  expected,"  by  General  Grant,  Hooker 
was  not  in  sight  at  the  point  where  he  was  expected 
to  be  on  the  morning  of  the  25th. 

The  day  wore  on  until  noon  and  still  the  Confeder- 
ates were  successfully  resisting  every  assault  on  the 
north  end  of  the  ridge  by  the  troops  under  Sherman, 
who  now  had  under  his  command  three  of  the  divi- 
sions that  he  had  brought  with  him,  Morgan  L.  Smith's 
and  Ewing's  divisions  of  the  I5th  corps  and  John  E. 
Smith's  of  the  I7th,  and,  besides  these,  Steinwehr's 
and  Schurz's  divisions  of  the  nth  corps,  Davis's  divi- 
sion and  Starkweather's  brigade  of  Baird's  division  of 
the  1 4th  corps — six  divisions  and  one  brigade  of  the 
thirteen  divisions  of  the  whole  army  at  Chattanooga. 
Confronting  Sherman  were  three  brigades — Smith's, 
Govan's  and  Lowrey's — of  Cleburne's  division ;  two — 
Brown's  and  Cummings's — of  Stevenson's  division, 
and  one — Maney's — of  Walker's  division. 

Of  the  remaining  divisions,  three  and  part  of  another 
were  in  the  vicinity  of  Orchard  Knob  under  the  im- 
mediate command  of  Thomas.  These  were  Sheridan's 
and  Wood's  divisions  of  the  4th  corps,  Baird's  divi- 
sion, and  two  brigades — Carlin's  and  Moore's — of 
Johnson's  division  of  the  I4th  corps.  When  the  assault 
began,  these  four  divisions  were  ranged  from  right  to 


224  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

left  in  the  following  order:  Johnson's,  Sheridan's, 
Wood's  and  Baird's.  Confronting  them  were  the  Con- 
federate divisions  of  Stewart,  Bate,  Anderson,  and 
Cheatham,  ranged  from  left  to  right  in  the  order 
named. 

As  expressed  by  brigades,  .the  comparative  strength 
of  Sherman  and  Thomas  and  the  Confederate  troops 
confronting  them  was  as  follows :  Sherman  had  thir- 
teen brigades,  and  opposed  to  these  the  Confederates 
had  six ;  Thomas  had  eleven,  and  opposed  to  these  the 
Confederates  had  thirteen. 

Hooker  had  under  his  immediate  command  Whita- 
ker's  and  Grose's  brigades  of  Cruft's  division  of  the 
4th  corps,  Geary's  division  of  the  i2th  and  Osterhaus's 
division  of  the  I5th.  A  considerable  interval  separated 
the  right  of  Sherman's  troops  from  the  left  of  Thomas, 
and  there  was  a  still  greater  interval  between  the  right 
of  Thomas  and  the  left  of  Hooker. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  25th  Baird's  division  had  been 
sent  to  feenforce  Sherman,  in  pursuance  of  Grant's 
purpose  to  make  Sherman's  movement  the  cardinal 
one  of  the  battle,  but,  as  there  was  no  place  in  Sher- 
man's line  for  this  division,  it  was  sent  back,  and  about 
2  P.  M.  took  position  on  the  left  of  Wood. 

All  the  Confederate  army  was  now  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  on  its  summit  were  planted  fifteen  batter- 
ies, comprising  about  fifty  guns.  There  were  also 
two  siege-pieces  near  Bragg's  headquarters.  The  dis- 
tance from  the  Federal  lines  to  the  top  of  the  ridge 
was  about  one  mile,  and  the  slope  of  the  ridge,  which 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  225 

was  steep  and  rough,  was  about  six  hundred  yards  in 
width,  its  average  height  being  about  four  hundred 
feet.  There  was  a  line  of  rifle-pits  at  the  base,  a  line 
of  breastworks  on  the  crest,  and  at  various  intermedi- 
ate places  there  were  breastworks  on  the  slope  of  the 
ridge. 

During  the  forenoon  the  movements  of  the  Confed- 
erates seemed  to  indicate  that  they  were  massing 
against  Sherman,  and  Grant  supposed  that,  in  order 
to  do  this,  they  were  weakening  their  center.  This 
was  not  true,  however,  for  the  Confederate  troops  seen 
during  the  forenoon  marching  north  along  the  ridge 
were  those  that  had  been  withdrawn  from  Lookout 
Mountain  and  the  valley.  In  his  Memoirs5  Grant 
says:  "Sherman's  condition  was  getting  so  critical 
that  the  assault  for  his  relief  could  not  be  delayed  any 
longer."  In  his  official  report6  he  says : 

"Being  satisfied  from  the  latest  information  from 
him  [Hooker]  that  he  must  by  this  time  be  on  his  way 
from  Rossville,  though  not  yet  in  sight,  and  discover- 
ing that  the  enemy  in  his  desperation  to  defeat  or  resist 
the  progress  of  Sherman  was  weakening  his  center  on 
Missionary  Ridge,  determined  me  to  order  the  advance 
at  once.  Thomas  was  accordingly  directed  to  move 
forward  his  troops,  constituting  our  center,  Baird's  di- 
vision (Fourteenth  corps),  Wood's  and  Sheridan's 
divisions  (Fourth  corps),  and  Johnson's  division 

6  Vol.  2,  p.  78. 

6  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  55,  p.  34. 

15 


226  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

(Fourteenth  corps),  with  a  double  line  of  skirmishers 
thrown  out,  followed  in  easy  supporting  distance  by 
the  whole  force,  and  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  when  carried  to  reform  his  lines 
on  the  rifle-pits  with  a  view  to  carrying  the  top  of  the 
ridge." 

It  is  not  probable  that  Grant  at  this  time  intended 
that  Thomas  with  four  divisions,  isolated  from  both 
Sherman's  and  Hooker's  forces,  the  latter  not  yet  in 
sight,  and  with  the  entire  Confederate  army  on  the 
ridge,  should  make  an  independent  assault  with  any 
reasonable  expectation  of  breaking  the  enemy's  center 
posted  on  the  steep  and  well-fortified  heights  in  front. 
It  is  evident  that  only  a  demonstration  for  the  relief 
of  Sherman  was  intended,  with  the  expectation  that, 
after  taking  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  the 
further  movements  of  the  assaulting  columns  would  be 
governed  by  further  orders,  dependent  on  subsequent 
developments,  and  especially  upon  the  success  of  Hook- 
er's movement. 

Soon  after  the  return  of  Baird,  Grant  ordered  an 
advance  of  Thomas's  four  divisions.  Six  cannon 
planted  on  Orchard  Knob  were  to  be  fired  in  quick  suc- 
cession, the  firing  to  be  the  signal  for  the  advance. 
On  the  knob  stood  Generals  Grant,  Thomas,  and 
Granger.  Near  by  were  Generals  Sheridan,  Wood, 
and  others  whose  names  are  now  historic.  In  front  of 
them  was  a  long  line  of  men  in  blue,  upon  whom  all 
eyes  were  fixed — battle-scarred  veterans  of  many 
bloody  conflicts — standing  motionless  in  the  trenches, 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA 

eagerly  waiting  for  the  signal  to  advance.  It  was 
given  between  3  and  4  p.  M.  and  at  once  began  the 
charge,  characterized  by  Dana  in  his  dispatch  to 
Stanton  as  "one  of  the  greatest  miracles  in  military 
history."  It  was  a  sight  never  to  be  forgotten  by  those 
who  witnessed  it.  No  sooner  had  the  signal  been 
given  than  the  men  of  the  four  divisions  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  leaped  from  their  places,  eighty- 
eight  battle-flags  waved  in  line,  and  18,000  men, 
making  a  battle-front  two  miles  long,  rushed  forward 
with  loud  cheers,  heard  above  all  the  din  of  battle, 
and  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  works  at  the 
foot  of  the  ridge.  At  the  same  instant  all  the  batteries 
on  the  ridge  concentrated  their  fire  upon  the  rifle- 
pits  at  the  base  and  the  bursting  of  shells  made  the 
very  sky  look  as  if  filled  with  falling  meteors. 

Then  occurred  the  grandest  spectacle  I  ever  saw, 
affording  another  striking  illustration  of  the  intelli- 
gence and  intrepidity  of  the  American  soldier  acting 
on  his  own  instincts.  The  orders  given  contemplated 
carrying  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  and  then 
reforming  and  waiting  for  further  orders;  at  least 
they  were  so  understood  by  all  or  nearly  all  the  troops 
engaged  in  the  assault,  and  certainly  by  those  of 
Wood's  and  Sheridan's  divisions.  But,  after  the  rifle- 
pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  had  been  taken,  it  was  at 
once  apparent  that  they  were  completely  commanded 
by  the  Confederate  artillery  on  the  top  of  the  ridge 
and  could  not  be  held,  and  that  the  Federal  troops 
must  either  advance  or  retreat.  This  is  evident  from 


228  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  official  report  of  General  Sheridan,  and  it  was  as 
obvious  to  the  men  as  it  was  to  the  generals.  With- 
out waiting  for  further  orders  the  advancing  troops 
at  once  began  the  ascent  of  the  ridge,  the  men  going 
first,  the  officers  following,  and  the  orders  following 
the  officers. 

To  one  who  stands  now  on  the  summit  of  Mission- 
ary Ridge,  looking  down  its  steep  sides,  the  wonder 
is  that  an  attempt  to  carry  the  works  on  the  crest 
could  have  been  contemplated,  and  still  greater  wonder 
that  such  an  attempt  could  have  been  successful.  Cer- 
tainly, until  the  last  moment,  Bragg  never  entertained 
a  thought  that  such  an  assault  would  be  made.  But 
there  were  the  Federal  troops  in  long  lines  rushing  up 
the  steep  ascent. 

All  the  batteries  on  the  ridge  to  the  right  and  left  of 
Bragg's  headquarters  opened  a  terrific  cannonade,  fir- 
ing in  front  and  across  the  sides  of  the  ridge  at  the  as- 
cending columns,  while  sheets  of  flame  shot  forth  from 
the  Confederate  troops  behind  the  breastworks  on  the 
crest. 

The  79th  Ind.  and  the  86th  Ind.  regiments  had  been 
consolidated  for  the  day  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Knefler,  the  79th  forming  the  right  wing  and  the  86th 
the  left,  and  the  two  being  in  the  front  line  of  Wood's 
division.  When  within  fifty  or  seventy-five  feet  of 
the  crest,  at  a  point  a  little  north  of  Bragg's  head- 
quarters, a  halt  was  made  in  order  to  reform  the  lines. 
At  this  moment  I  looked  and  saw  that  Wood's  divi- 
sion was  considerably  in  advance  of  the  divisions  on 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  229 

its  right  and  left,  and  I  spoke  to  Colonel  Knefler,  near 
whom  I  was  standing,  calling  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  we  were  alone.  I  am  confirmed  in  my  recollection 
of  this  incident  by  the  mention  of  it  in  Colonel  Knef- 
ler's  official  report  of  the  battle. 

We  were  now  so  near  the  Confederate  breastworks 
that  they  afforded  almost  as  much  protection  to  us  as 
to  the  troops  behind  them,  but  our  only  safety  lay  in 
keeping  up  a  steady  fire.  If  a  retreat  had  been  at- 
tempted every  Confederate  behind  the  breastworks 
would  have  risen  and  fired  and  we  knew  that  such  a 
fire  meant  certain  death  to  all  of  us.  But  no  one 
thought  of  retreating,  though  our  position  for  a  few 
moments  was  very  critical.  It  seemed  an  age,  but  it 
could  not  have  been  more  than  a  few  minutes,  perhaps 
not  more  than  two  or  three,  before  the  divisions  on 
our  right  and  left  were  in  line  with  that  of  Wood. 
During  the  interval  I  was  nearly  opposite  a  gigantic 
Confederate  who  stood  for  a  time  in  one  position  fir- 
ing guns  handed  him  by  those  in  the  trenches.  He 
looked  to  me  like  a  demon.  Once  I  thought  he  was 
aiming  at  Colonel  Knefler  or  me  and  we  both  lay 
down.  As  I  lay  down  a  bullet  rattled  the  leaves  under 
me  and  I  noticed  from  the  peeling  of  a  small  sapling 
near  by  that  another  had  passed  just  where  my  head 
had  been  the  instant  before. 

We  waited  only  a  few  minutes,  perhaps  only  a  few 
seconds,  for  no  man  can  accurately  measure  the  pass- 
ing time  when  seconds  seem  ages,  and  then  the  whole 
Federal  line  made  an  almost  simultaneous  rush  and 


230  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

at  six  different  points,  in  almost  the  same  instant,  the 
Federal  soldiers  leaped  over  the  breastworks.  General 
Bragg,  after  vainly  endeavoring  to  rally  his  men, 
barely  escaped  by  galloping  at  full  speed  down  the 
other  side  of  the  ridge.  We  found  the  giant  Confed- 
erate, whom  I  had  observed  a  few  moments  before, 
lying  dead  in  the  trenches,  riddled  with  bullets.  Hun- 
dreds of  Confederates  threw  down  their  arms  and  sur- 
rendered. Thirty  or  forty  pieces  of  artillery  stood 
near  the  place  where  we  crossed,  abandoned  by  their 
gunners.  It  was  an  inspiring  sight.  I  was  myself, 
for  the  moment,  utterly  delirious  with  excitement.  We 
had  recovered  not  only  the  guns  but  the  prestige  lost  at 
Chickamauga,  and  I  knew  then  that  no  higher  tribute 
could  ever  be  paid  a  soldier  than  to  say  of  him  that  he 
was  in  the  charge  at  Missionary  Ridge.  Shortly  after 
this  General  Grant  and  all  his  staff  came  riding  up  the 
ridge,  crossing  the  Confederate  lines  a  little  south  of 
Bragg's  headquarters.  That  was  the  first  and  last 
time  I  saw  Grant  on  a  battle-field. 

Some  further  resistance  was  made  by  the  Confed- 
erates on  the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  but  the  battles 
about  Chattanooga  were  virtually  over.  Bragg's  army 
was  completely  broken  and  in  full  retreat,  and  the 
siege  of  Chattanooga  was  ended.  So  rapid  was  the 
advance  of  the  Federal  lines  that  only  fifty-five  min- 
utes elapsed  from  the  time  they  started  until  they 
gained  the  crest. 

That  night  we  heard  floating  through  the  still  frosty 
air  the  notes  of  a  band  playing  a  familiar  tune  near 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  23! 

the  place  where  Bragg's  headquarters  had  been.  It 
was  not  "Dixie"  that  we  had  so  often  heard  there  but 
the  "Star-spangled  Banner."  Regiment  after  regi- 
ment took  up  the  cheer  until  it  was  heard  ringing  all 
round  the  line  to  Lookout  Mountain. 

The  battles  that  ended  the  siege  of  Chattanooga 
will  ever  be  memorable  in  the  history  of  the  Civil  War. 
The  glory  of  the  final  triumph  was  shared  by  the  heroes 
of  three  great  northern  armies — the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland.  On  the  field  were  four  Federal  gen- 
erals whose  names  stand  highest  on  the  roll  of  famous 
Union  commanders — Grant,  Sherman,  Thomas,  and 
Sheridan.  No  other  battle  of  the  war  exhibited  any- 
thing more  sublimely  picturesque  than  the  "battle 
among  the  clouds"  and  the  storming  of  Missionary 
Ridge. 

Some  surprise  has  been  expressed  that  such  an  as- 
sault as  that  of  Missionary  Ridge  was  successfully 
made  with  so  little  loss  of  life.  In  some  of  the  official 
reports  this  is  explained  as  due  to  the  conformation  of 
the  ground  and  to  the  fact  that  the  Confederate  artil- 
lerymen could  not,  or  did  not,  sufficiently  depress  their 
guns  and  so  overshot  the  assaulting  columns.  Grant's 
explanation7  is  that:  "In  fact  on  that  occasion  the 
Union  soldier  nearest  the  enemy  was  in  the  safest 
position."  This  explanation  is  all  the  more  singular 
because  it  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  Union  soldier 

7  Memoirs,  vol.  2,  p.  79. 


232  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

"nearest  the  enemy,"  in  order  to  get  there,  was  obliged 
to  travel  a  mile,  going  up  a  steep  ascent  and  exposed 
at  every  step  to  a  galling  fire  in  front  and  on  each  side. 
All  these  "explanations"  tend  to  belittle  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  four  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land by  creating  the  impression  that,  as  the  losses  were 
so  slight,  there  could  not  have  been  very  hard  fighting 
nor  very  much  danger,  and  that,  in  fact,  the  brilliant 
victory  won  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
merely  a  lucky  accident.  Considering  its  actual  losses 
and  that  they  were  sustained  within  less  than  one  hour, 
it  does  not  seem  that  these  explanations  are  called  for. 

The  tables  in  the  note  appended  to  this  chapter  show 
that,  in  the  space  of  one  hour,  the  four  divisions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  which  made  the  assault  on 
Missionary  Ridge  lost  over  sixteen  per  cent.,  and  that 
two  of  them  lost  over  twenty  per  cent.,  nearly  twice 
as  many  as  all  the  troops  under  Sherman  in  two  days' 
fighting.  Such  losses  in  so  short  a  period  indicate 
that  the  great  victory  gained  by  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland was  far  from  being  bloodless  and  that  it  was 
won  by  as  desperate  and  heroic  fighting  as  was  ex- 
hibited on  any  battle-field  of  the  Civil  War. 

The  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge  illustrates  very 
clearly  how  the  plans  of  the  wisest  generals  may  be 
modified  by  circumstances  that  no  man  can  foresee. 
Grant  clung  with  characteristic  tenacity  to  his  original 
plan.  There  is  nothing  in  the  official  reports  tending 
to  show  that,  at  the  time  he  issued  the  order  to  Thomas 
to  take  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  he  intended 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  233 

by  it  anything  more  than  a  movement  for  the  relief 
of  Sherman  in  order  to  enable  the  latter  to  carry  out 
the  movement  intrusted  to  him.  Neither  Grant  nor 
any  one  at  that  time  supposed  that  the  subordinate 
movement  which  Thomas  was  ordered  to  make  would 
prove  to  be  the  decisive  one,  the  turning-point  of  the 
battle.  But  so  it  proved.  It  is  in  regard  to  this  unex- 
pected turn  of  affairs  that  General  Thomas  in  his  offi- 
cial report  says  with  characteristic  modesty : 

"It  will  be  perceived  from  the  above  report  that  the 
original  plan  of  operations  was  somewhat  modified  to 
meet  and  take  the  best  advantage  of  emergencies, 
which  necessitated  material  modifications  of  that  plan. 
It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  original  plan,  had  it 
been  carried  out,  could  not  possibly  have  led  to  more 
successful  results."8 

Grant  underrated  the  ability  of  General  Thomas. 
He  was  equally  mistaken  in  underrating  the  soldierly 
qualities  of  the  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
Sherman  tells  us  in  his  Memoirs9  that  when  Grant  first 
informed  him  of  his  plans  for  taking  Missionary  Ridge, 
he  said  "that  the  men  of  Thomas's  army  had  been  so 
demoralized  by  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  that  he 
feared  they  could  not  be  got  out  of  their  trenches  to 
assume  the  offensive,"  and  that  for  this  reason  he 
wanted  Sherman's  troops  "to  hurry  up,  to  take  the 

8 Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  55,  p.  96.    See  also  Cist:  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  pp.  259-262. 
8  Vol.  i,  p.  390. 


234  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

offensive  first;  after  which  he  had  no  doubt  the  Cum- 
berland army  would  fight  well."  The  result  is  a  suffi- 
cient vindication  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

I  have  one  memento  of  the  battle  of  Missionary 
Ridge  that  I  greatly  prize.  It  is  the  sword  of  a  Con- 
federate captain,  surrendered  to  one  of  my  company 
and  given  by  him  to  me.  I  would  gladly  return  it  to  its 
owner  if  there  were  anything  about  it  by  which  I  could 
determine  his  name.  But  there  is  not,  and  so,  during  all 
the  long  years,  I  have  preserved  it  with  tender  care. 
This  sword  and  my  own,  crossed  in  friendly  touch, 
hang  over  the  mantel  in  my  library,  mute  but  eloquent 
reminders  of  days  that  tried  men's  souls,  recalling  no 
feeling  of  resentment,  but  inspiring  the  wish  that  if 
they  are  ever  drawn  again  in  war  by  Americans,  it  may 
be  in  defense  of  a  common  country  against  a  common 
foe. 

It  is  difficult  to  state  accurately  the  numbers  engaged  or  the 
losses  in  the  battles  of  Chattanooga.  The  official  reports  do  not 
show  the  numbers  engaged  in  each  battle,  and  the  revised  "Return 
of  Casualties  in  the  Union  Forces,"  given  in  ser.  No.  55,  p.  80,  of 
the  Rebellion  Records,  includes  in  one  table  the  losses  at  Orchard 
Knob,  Lookout  Mountain,  Missionary  Ridge,  and  the  minor  en- 
gagements in  the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga  on  Nov.  26  and  27. 
There  is  no  complete  report  of  the  Confederate  losses.  Van 
Home  estimates  that  General  Grant  had  60,000  and  General  Bragg 
40,000  men  in  action,  and  that  the  aggregate  losses  of  the  armies 
of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee  were: 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  235 

Killed    757 

Wounded    4,529 

Missing  330 


Total   5,616 

Colonel  Fox  makes  the  total  loss  5,382. 

General  Bragg's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  is  not  known,  but 
Van  Home  states  that  "he  lost  by  capture  six  thousand  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-two  men,  forty-two  guns,  sixty-nine  gun  carriages 
and  seven  thousand  stands  of  small  arms.  His  loss  in  material 
was  immense,  part  of  which  he  destroyed  in  his  flight,  but  a  large 
fraction,  which  was  uninjured,  fell  to  the  national  army." 

The  latest,  and  I  presume  the  most  accurate,  list  of  Union  losses 
is  that  given  by  General  Boynton  in  The  Chickamauga  National 
Military  Park  (pp.  137-8),  from  which  I  have  condensed  the 
following  tables : 

Battle.  Killed.  Wounded.  Total. 

Orchard  Knob 36                197  233 

Lookout  Mountain 81                390  471 

Missionary  Ridge 612             3,948  4,560 

Total 729  4,535  5,264 

The  losses  in  the  attack  on  Missionary  Ridge,  as  apportioned 
between  the  troops  commanded  by  General  Sherman  and  those 
under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Thomas,  were  as  fol- 
lows: 


Killed.    Wounded.        Total. 

Sherman 209  1,141  1,350 

Thomas 403  2,807  3.2I° 

Total 612  3,948  4,560 

The  two  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  which  led 
the  advance  and  bore  the  brunt  of  the  losses  in  the  assault  of 
Missionary  Ridge  on  Nov.  25  were  those  of  Sheridan  and  Wood. 


236  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Sheridan  went  into  action  with  about  6,000  men  and  Wood  with 
about  5,200.     Their  losses  were  as  follows : 

Killed.    Wounded.        Total. 

Sheridan 130  1,213  x>343 

Wood 148  875  1,023 

Total 278  2,088  2,366 

•  It  will  be  noted  from  the  foregoing  tables  that  each  of  these 
divisions  lost,  in  about  one  hour,  over  20  per  cent.,  and  that  to- 
gether they  lost  nearly  twice  as  many  as  were  lost  by  all  the 
troops  under  Sherman  in  two  days'  fighting. 

There  has  been  considerable  discussion  of  the  question  whether 
Grant's  order  for  taking  the  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of  Missionary 
Ridge  contemplated  an  advance  afterward,  and  without  further 
orders,  against  the  works  on  the  crest.  There  has  also  been  much 
newspaper  comment  upon  a  supposed  "lost  order"  to  that  effect, 
alleged  to  have  been  issued  by  General  Grant  to  General  Granger, 
commanding  the  4th  corps.  As  to  the  supposed  "lost  order,"  it 
suffices  to  say  that  it  is  not  probable  that  Grant  would  have  issued 
a  written  order  of  any  kind  directly  to  Granger,  inasmuch  as, 
according  to  the  regular  course,  Grant  would  have  issued  his 
orders  to  Thomas  and  he  to  Granger.  There  is  no  mention  in 
Grant's  Memoirs  of  any  "lost  order"  to  Granger,  and  the  official 
reports  make  it  clear  that  Grant's  order  for  taking  the  rifle-pits  at 
the  foot  of  the  ridge  did  not  contemplate  the  assault  of  the  works 
on  the  crest,  and  that,  when  the  orders  for  this  assault  were 
issued,  by  whomsoever  given,  the  men  who  had  taken  the  rifle-pits 
were  already  far  on  their  way  up  the  ridge. 

General  Grant  in  his  official  report  states  that  the  order  to 
Thomas  on  Nov.  25  was  to  "carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of 
Missionary  Ridge  and,  when  carried,  to  reform  his  lines  on  the 
rifle-pits  with  a  view  to  carrying  the  top  of  the  ridge."  The  in- 
ference from  this  is  that,  after  carrying  the  rifle-pits,  the  further 
movements  of  the  assaulting  columns  would  depend  on  subse- 
quent developments,  and  especially  upon  the  progress  of  Hooker ; 
and  we  should  not  infer  from  it  that,  after  taking  the  rifle-pits, 
the  troops  were  to  advance  without  further  orders.  Other  official 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  237 

reports  clearly  show  that,  whatever  Grant  may  have  intended,  his 
order  was  understood  by  most  of  the  corps  and  division  com- 
manders as  not  directing  an  advance  beyond  the  rifle-pits  without 
further  orders ;  that  the  ascent  of  the  ridge  was  made  by  the  men 
themselves  without  orders,  and  that  the  one  issued  afterward  was 
not  given  until  the  men  were  on  their  way. 

General  Granger  reports  that  he  was  "ordered  to  make  a  dem- 
onstration upon  the  works  of  the  enemy  directly  in  his  front  at 
the  base  of  Mission  Ridge."  After  describing  the  taking  of  the 
rifle-pits,  he  says  further : 

"My  orders  had  now  been  fully  and  successfully  carried  out, 
but  not  enough  had  been  done  to  satisfy  the  brave  troops  who  had 
accomplished  so  much.  Although  the  batteries  on  the  ridge,  at 
short  range,  by  direct  and  enfilading  fire,  were  still  pouring  down 
upon  them  a  shower  of  iron  and  the  musketry  from  the  hill-side 
was  thinning  their  ranks,  they  dashed  over  the  breastworks, 
through  the  rifle-pits,  and  started  up  the  ridge.  They  started 
without  orders  along  the  whole  line  of  both  divisions  from  right 
to  left  and  from  left  to  right,  simultaneously  and  with  one  accord, 
animated  with  one  spirit  and  with  heroic  courage.  Eagerly  they 
rushed  forward  to  a  danger  before  which  the  bravest,  marching 
under  orders,  might  tremble.  Officers  caught  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  men,  and  the  men  in  turn  were  cheered  by  the  officers.  Each 
regiment  tried  to  surpass  the  other  in  fighting  its  way  up  a  hill 
that  would  try  those  of  stout  limb  and  strong  lungs  to  climb,  and 
each  tried  first  to  plant  its  flag  on  the  summit.  Above  these  men 
was  an  additional  line  of  rifle-pits  filled  with  troops.  What  was 
on  the  summit  of  the  ridge  they  knew  not,  and  did  not  stop  to 
inquire.  The  enemy  was  before  them ;  to  know  that  was  to  know 
sufficient.  At  several  points  along  the  line  my  troops  were  as- 
cending the  hill  and  gaining  positions  less  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire,  though  more  exposed  to  the  fire  of  his  musketry. 
Seeing  this,  I  sent  my  assistant  adjutant-general  to  inquire,  first 
of  General  Wood  and  then  of  General  Sheridan,  whether  the 
troops  had  been  ordered  up  the  ridge  by  them,  and  to  instruct 
them  to  take  the  ridge  if  possible.  In  reply  to  this,  General 
Wood  told  him  that  the  men  had  started  up  without  orders,  and 
that  he  could  take  it  if  he  could  be  supported.  In  the  meantime 
an  aide-de-camp  from  General  Sheridan  had  reported  to  me  that 


238  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  general  wished  to  know  whether  the  order  that  had  been 
given  to  take  the  rifle-pits  'meant  those  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  or 
those  on  top.'  My  reply  was  that  the  order  had  been  to  take 
those  at  the  base." 

General  Sheridan  states  in  his  report  that  the  original  order  to 
him  was  "to  carry  the  enemy's  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of  Mission 
Ridge,"  but  that  after  they  had  been  carried,  being  in  doubt  as  to 
what  was  meant  by  the  order,  he  sent  Captain  Ransom  of  his  staff 
to  General  Granger  to  ascertain  "whether  it  was  the  first  line  that 
was  to  be  carried  or  the  ridge";  that  Captain  Ransom  had 
brought  back  word  "that  it  was  the  first  line  which  was  to  be 
carried,"  but  that  soon  after  "Captain  Avery  of  General  Granger's 
staff  came  up  and  informed  him  that  the  original  order  was  to 
carry  the  first  line  of  pits,  but  that  if,  in  his  judgment,  the  ridge 
could  be  taken,  to  do  so." 

General  Wood  reports  that  he  was  "ordered  to  advance  and 
carry  the  enemy's  entrenchments  at  the  base  of  Mission  Ridge 
and  hold  them."  After  describing  the  taking  of  the  rifle-pits,  he 
continues : 

"When  the  first  line  of  entrenchments  was  carried,  the  goal  for 
which  we  had  started  was  won.  Our  orders  carried  us  no  farther. 
We  had  been  instructed  to  carry  the  line  of  entrenchments  at  the 
base  of  the  ridge  and  there  halt.  But  the  enthusiasm  and  im- 
petuosity of  the  troops  were  such  that  those  who  first  reached  the 
entrenchments  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  bounded  over  them,  and 
pressed  on  up  the  ascent  after  the  flying  enemy.  Moreover,  the 
entrenchments  were  no  protection  against  the  enemy's  artillery  on 
the  ridge.  To  remain  would  be  destruction — to  return  would  be 
both  expensive  in  life  and  disgraceful.  Officers  and  men  all 
seemed  impressed  with  this  truth.  In  addition,  the  example  of 
those  who  commenced  to  ascend  the  ridge  so  soon  as  the  en- 
trenchments were  carried  was  contagious.  Without  waiting  for 
an  order  the  vast  mass  pressed  forward  in  the  race  of  glory,  each 
man  anxious  to  be  the  first  on  the  summit.  The  enemy's  artillery 
and  musketry  could  not  check  the  impetuous  assault.  The  troops 
did  not  halt  to  fire.  To  have  done  so  would  have  been  ruinous. 
Little  was  left  to  the  commanders  of  the  troops  than  to  cheer  on 
the  foremost — to  encourage  the  weaker  of  limb,  and  to  sustain  the 
very  few  who  seemed  to  be  faint-hearted." 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  239 

General  Baird  reports  that  the  order  to  him  was  to  take  the 
pits  at  the  base  of  the  ridge,  "as  preparatory  to  a  general  assault 
on  the  mountain" ;  that  •  after  taking  the  pits  General  Turchin 
pushed  on  with  his  brigade ;  that,  when  in  the  act  of  starting  the 
other  two  brigades  to  his  support,  he  received  orders  "not  to  per- 
mit his  men  to  go  farther  and  not  to  permit  them  to  become 
engaged" ;  but  that  "another  order  came  in  less  than  three  minutes 
for  the  whole  line  to  charge  to  the  top." 

Charles  A.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  on  the 
ground,  says  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"The  storming  of  the  ridge  by  our  troops  was  one  of  the  great- 
est miracles  in  military  history.  No  man  <tvho  climbs  the  ascent 
by  any  of  the  roads  that  wind  along  its  front  can  believe  that 
18,000  men  were  moved  up  its  broken  and  crumbling  face  unless 
it  was  his  fortune  to  witness  the  deed.  It  seems  as  awful  as  a 
visible  interposition  of  God.  Neither  Grant  nor  Thomas  in- 
tended it.  Their  orders  were  to  carry  the  rifle-pits  along  the 
base  of  the  ridge  and  capture  their  occupants,  but  when  this  was 
accomplished  the  unaccountable  spirit  of  the  troops  bore  them 
bodily  up  these  impracticable  steeps,  over  the  bristling  rifle-pits 
on  the  crest  and  the  thirty  cannon  enfilading  every  gully.  The 
order  to  storm  appears  to  have  been  given  simultaneously  by 
Generals  Sheridan  and  Wood,  because  the  men  were  not  to  be 
held  back,  dangerous  as  the  attempt  appeared  to  military  pru- 
dence. Besides,  the  generals  had  caught  the  inspiration  of  the 
men,  and  were  ready  themselves  to  undertake  impossibilities." 

Finally,  General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs  (vol.  2,  p.  80)  says : 
"Without  awaiting  further  orders  or  stopping  to  reform,  on  our 
troops  went  to  the  second  line  of  works,  over  that,  and  on  for  the 
crest."  Other  witnesses  of  the  battle  assert,  not  only  that  General 
Grant  did  not  order  the  advance  beyond  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot 
of  the  ridge,  but  that  he  manifested  some  irritation  at  the  sup- 
posed presumption  of  the  unknown  officer  who  had  given  such  an 
order.  General  Cist,  a  member  of  General  Thomas's  staff,  says : 

"No  wonder  that  General  Grant  failed  to  appreciate  this  move- 
ment at  the  time,  not  understanding  the  troops  who  had  it  in 
charge.  When  he  found  these  commands  ascending  the  ridge  to 
capture  it  when  he  ordered  a  'demonstration'  to  be  made,  to  the 
foot  of  the  hill  and  there  to  wait,  he  turned  sharply  to  General 


24O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Thomas  and  asked,  'By  whose  orders  are  those  troops  going  up 
the  hill?'  General  Thomas,  taking  in  the  situation  at  once,  sug- 
gested that  it  was  probably  by  their  own.  General  Grant  re- 
marked that  'it  was  all  right  if  it  turned  out  all  right,'  and  added, 
'if  not,  some  one  would  suffer.' "  (Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
p.  262.  See  also  Piatt :  George  H.  Thomas,  p.  481 ;  General 
Joseph  S.  Fullerton :  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  Chatta- 
nooga, in  Battles  and  Leaders,  vol.  3,  p.  725.) 

From  all  this  accumulation  of  testimony,  it  seems  to  be  very 
clear  that  the  original  order  for  taking  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot 
of  the  ridge  did  not  include  the  storming  of  the  ridge  itself; 
that,  after  they  had  been  taken,  it  was  found  that  they  were  un- 
tenable and  that  the  assaulting  columns  must  either  retreat  or 
advance ;  that  this  was  as  evident  to  the  men  as  to  the  generals ; 
and  that  the  men  preferred  to  advance  rather  than  to  retreat.  It 
is  also  clear  that,  before  the  orders  finally  given  to  go  on  to  the 
summit  were  received,  the  men  of  Wood's  and  Sheridan's  di- 
visions were  already  far  on  their  way  up  the  ridge.  To  the 
private  soldiers  belongs  the  chief  glory  of  the  successful  assault 
of  Missionary  Ridge. 

I  trust  that  I  may  not  be  considered  vainglorious  or  as  intend- 
ing to  detract  in  the  least  from  the  credit  due  the  other  troops 
engaged  in  the  assault  of  Missionary  Ridge,  if  I  refer  in  this 
note  to  the  part  taken  by  my  own  division  and  regiment.  Van 
Home  (Hist.  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  vol.  i,  p.  43)  says: 

"To  this  general  result,  each  of  the  four  central  divisions  and 
those  with  General  Hooker  contributed,  in  coordination  and  har- 
mony unprecedented  in  an  improvised  attack.  Each  one  was 
successful,  though  each  was  not  equally  prominent  in  success. 
From  General  Bragg's  declaration  that  his  line  was  first  pierced 
on  the  right — that  is,  to  the  north  of  the  house  which  he  occupied 
as  his  headquarters — and  from  the  observation  of  those  occupying 
elevated  positions,  there  is  no  room  to  doubt  that  General  Wood's 
division  first  reached  the  summit." 

In  his  official  report  General  Sheridan  describes  the  temporary 
halt  of  his  division  after  carrying  the  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of  the 
ridge,  and  then  says :  "Looking  to  the  left,  I  saw  a  single  regi- 
ment far  over  in  Wood's  line  dash  up  the  hill  and  lie  down  below 
the  crest."  The  regiment  to  which  he  refers  was  the  consoli- 


BATTLES    OF    CHATTANOOGA  24! 

dated  7gth  and  86th  Indiana.  This  is  indicated  in  a  letter  of  Mr. 
Theodore  R.  Davis,  the  illustrator  of  Harper's  Weekly,  who  wit- 
nessed the  battle  and  who,  in  a  letter  to  that  journal  published 
Dec.  19,  1863,  says :  "The  color  sergeant  of  the  Seventy-ninth 
Indiana,  Henry  C.  Lawrence,  carried  his  colors  far  in  advance  of 
his  regiment,  which  was  the  first  to  commence  the  ascent.  The 
whole  army  are  admiring  him." 


16 


CHAPTER  NINE 

THE  EAST  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN 

Wood's  division  had  little  opportunity  to  rest  after 
the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge.  General  Burnside  was 
penned  up  at  Knoxville,  besieged  by  General  Long- 
street,  and  it  was  certain  that  he  could  not  hold  out 
much  longer  unless  relief  were  sent.  Immediately  after 
the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge  orders  were  given  to 
prepare  for  a  forced  march  to  Knoxville.  General 
Howard  started  on  the  29th,  followed  on  the  same  day 
by  three  divisions  of  Sherman's  army  and  Davis's  di- 
vision of  the  1 4th  corps,  and  on  the  next  day  by  Gen- 
eral Granger  with  Wood's  and  Sheridan's  divisions  of 
the  4th  corps.  But  on  December  5  it  was  learned 
that  Longstreet  had  retreated  after  an  assault  on  Fort 
Sanders  on  November  29,  in  which  he  had  been  re- 
pulsed with  great  loss.  Sherman's  and  Howard's  divi- 
sions and  that  of  Davis  returned,  leaving  the  4th  corps 
to  continue  its  march  and  keep  on  the  lookout  for 
Longstreet. 

This  was  by  far  the  hardest  campaign  in  which  the 
9th  Ind.  was  engaged  during  the  service,  for,  after 
leaving  Chattanooga,  it  was  almost  continually  march- 
ing up  and  down  east  Tennessee  until  it  started  on  the 

(242) 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  243 

Atlanta  campaign.  It  was  especially  severe  on  the  men 
of  the  79th  because,  when  they  left  Chattanooga, 
they  were  told  that  they  were  going  on  a  foraging  ex- 
pedition and  would  return  in  three  or  four  days,  and, 
under  that  impression,  they  prepared  themselves  with 
only  a  light  marching  outfit,  leaving  everything  that 
could  not  conveniently  be  carried.  Most  of  them  had 
no  tents  and  the  only  shelter  they  had  was  such  as 
could  be  improvised.  Supplies  of  clothing  were  slow 
in  coming.  Nearly  all  left  their  overcoats  in  Chatta- 
nooga. I  left  mine  and  did  not  get  another  until  the 
middle  of  February.  The  one  pair  of  stockings  with 
which  I  started  soon  wore  out  and  before  I  got  others 
only  the  legs  and  part  of  the  heels  remained.  Many  of 
the  men  were  almost  barefoot  before  shoes  arrived. 

Several  times,  deluded  with  the  expectation  that  we 
should  remain  at  least  a  few  weeks,  we  built  comforta- 
ble log  huts,  but  invariably  the  order  came  to  march 
as  soon  as  they  were  completed  and  we  were  compelled 
to  abandon  them. 

The  difficulty  of  getting  supplies  made  it  necessary 
to  depend  largely  for  provisions  upon  what  could  be 
picked  up  in  the  country  through  which  we  passed.  It 
was  very  poor  picking.  Most  of  east  Tennessee 
through  which  we  marched  was  a  mountainous,  barren 
region,  with  only  here  and  there  a  fertile  valley,  and 
Longstreet's  army,  wherever  it  had  preceded  us,  had 
stripped  the  country.  Some  cattle,  probably  driven 
from  Kentucky  through  the  Cumberland  Gap,  fur- 
nished our  supply  of  meat.  There  was  not  enough  corn 


244  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

for  the  artillery  and  cavalry  horses,  so  the  cattle  got  lit- 
tle or  none.  It  was  current  rumor  that  they  were  in- 
spected every  morning  and  that  those  were  killed  first 
that  seemed  to  be  most  nearly  dead  of  starvation.  It 
was  also  said,  though  I  can  not  affirm  this  to  be  any- 
thing more  than  an  army  joke,  that,  in  order  to  deter- 
mine the  amount  of  vitality  left  in  a  herd  of  starving 
cattle,  they  were  made  to  jump  a  ditch  and  that  those 
found  to  be  too  weak  to  leap  across  were  at  once  dis- 
patched. The  beef  from  this  source  was  commonly 
known  as  "blue  beef."  There  was  not  a  particle  of  fat 
in  it,  we  had  no  salt  with  which  to  season  it,  and  it  was 
utterly  unfit  to  eat.  So  near  were  the  men  to  the  verge 
of  starvation  that  they  often  went  miles  to  get  a  little 
corn  to  parchS 

There  were  a  few  pleasant  days  after  leaving  Chat- 
tanooga but  cold  and  rainy  weather  soon  set  in,  caus- 
ing great  suffering.  We  often  marched  in  drizzling 
rain  or  sleet  and  over  roads  almost  impassable,  camp- 
ing at  night  with  nothing  to  shelter  us  but  cedar 
branches.  Many  in  the  North  will  recall  the  cold  first 
day  of  January,  1864.  That  night  the  79th  was  on 
picket  duty  near  Strawberry  Plains  and  was  stationed 
about  half  way  up  the  side  of  House  Mountain,  which 
was  so  steep  that  unless  hung  up  to  the  trees  one  was 
in  danger  of  sliding  down.  I  had  been  trying  to  sleep 
with  my  feet  next  to  a  log  fire,  but  getting  up  to  re- 
plenish it  I  accidentally  poked  out  the  stones  placed 
behind  the  enormous  back-log  to  prevent  it  from  roll- 
ing down  and  away  it  went,  bouncing  twenty  feet  in 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  245 

air  over  the  stumps  and  rocks  in  its  course  until  it 
reached  the  valley  below,  and  from  that  time  until 
morning  it  was  with  difficulty  that  I  avoided  freezing. 
During  a  considerable  part  of  the  winter  our  base  of 
operations,  if  in  our  ramblings  we  had  anything  like 
a  base,  was  the  little  village  of  Strawberry  Plains, 
about  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  east  of  Knoxville.  Our 
regular  exercise  was  to  march  from  Strawberry  Plains 
to  New  Market,  ten  miles  farther  east;  sometimes  we 
went  on  the  same  day  or  the  next  to  Morristown, 
eight  or  ten  miles  farther  east,  and  then  we  would 
return  to  Strawberry  Plains.  Sometimes  we  went  as 
far  east  as  Rutledge  and  once  to  Bean's  Station.  At 
another  time  we  went  within  a  few  miles  of  Cumber- 
land Gap.  We  also  explored  Flat  Creek  Valley  and 
Poor  Man's  Valley  and  Rich  Man's  Valley  and  ever 
so  many  little  valleys  lying  between  mountain  spurs, 
some  of  them  not  more  than  two  or  three  hundred 
yards  wide,  where  the  few  inhabitants  lived  in  small 
log-houses,  knowing  little  and  caring  little  about  the 
great  world  outside. 

This  was  the  most  primitive  region  in  east  Tennes- 
see. It  is,  I  presume,  the  locality  from  which  came  the 
hogs  known  in  the  early  history  of  Indiana  as  "Ten- 
nessee sharpshooters,"  long-snouted  hogs,  that  lived 
on  mast,  ran  like  deer,  and  never  could  be  fattened, 
and  so  thin  that  the  only  way,  it  was  said,  to  prevent 
them  from  going  through  a  fence  was  to  knot  their 
tails,  j 

During  all  this  winter  our  army  in  east  Tennessee 


246  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

was  what,  in  military  parlance,  was  known  as  an 
"army  of  observation."  We  were  observing  the  move- 
ments of  General  Longstreet  and  he  was  observing 
ours — we  to  see  that  he  did  not  get  back  into  east  Ten- 
nessee or  reenforce  the  Confederate  army  in  the  East 
or  West,  and  he  to  see  that  the  Federal  army  did  not 
invade  Virginia  from  the  west.  There  was  constant 
skirmishing  between  the  Federal  and  the  Confederate 
cavalry  but  little  fighting  of  any  consequence,  the  near- 
est approach  to  a  battle  being  a  small  engagement  at 
Dandridge.  It  was  not  the  intention,  it  seems,  of  the 
generals  on  either  side  to  bring  about  a  battle  in  that 
region. 

I  have  few  pleasant  recollections  of  our  campaign 
in  east  Tennessee.  The  most  pleasant  are  those  con- 
nected with  a  foraging  party  ordered  to  go  from  Mary- 
ville  to  McGee's  Ford  on  the  Little  Tennessee,  about 
eighteen  or  twenty  miles  distant,  and  gather  some  corn 
which  had  hitherto  escaped  the  notice  of  both  armies. 
The  detachment  consisted  of  my  own  company  and 
Company  C,  and  the  command  of  it  was  intrusted 
to  me.  It  was  the  highest  that  I  ever  attained  in  the 
army  and  I  felt  highly  honored  by  it.  I  was  ordered 
to  report  to  General  Willich,  then  temporarily  in  com- 
mand of  the  division,  for  instructions.  I  found  him  in 
his  tent,  a  fatherly,  benevolent-looking  man  who  at 
once  made  me  feel  quite  at  ease.  After  giving  me  my 
instructions  he  informed  me  that  I  should  be  provided 
with  a  small  steer  which  would  furnish  enough  meat 
for  two  weeks.  I  have  probably  inherited  from  my 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  247 

Yankee  ancestors  the  trait,  for"  which  they  were  pro- 
verbial, of  "looking  ahead";  so  I  ventured  to  ask: 
"What  shall  I  do  after  the  two  weeks  are  out?"  The 
good  old  general  almost  went  into  convulsions  of 
laughter  and,  patting  me  on  the  head,  replied :  "Tut, 
tut,  my  boy,  two  weeks  in  ze  army  is  an  eternitee."  I 
never  forgot  the  interview  nor  the  truth  of  what  he 
said. 

Starting  with  my  little  force  we  arrived  at  our  desti- 
nation that  night.  The  Little  Tennessee  is  a  beautiful 
stream  and  the  rocks  and  fish  can  be  seen  through  its 
clear  waters  at  a  depth  of  more  than  twenty  feet.  The 
valley  is  extremely  fertile,  yielding  fine  crops  of  corn. 
Along  the  river  were  great  plantations,  not  common 
elsewhere  in  east  Tennessee,  well  stocked  with  slaves. 
On  some  of  them  were  as  many  as  two  or  three  hun- 
dred. 

I  was  now  practically  monarch  of  all  I  surveyed,  and 
I  immediately  assumed  the  prerogatives  as  well  as  the 
honors  of  a  military  commander  of  high  rank.  I  es- 
tablished my  headquarters  in  the  best  negro  cabin  on 
the  plantation  and  my  men  in  others  near.  The  little 
steer  had  already  been  traded  by  the  men  to  a  farmer 
for  a  barrel  of  sorghum  molasses.  They  had  been  sur- 
feited with  "blue  beef."  But  we  could  not  live  on 
sorghum  molasses  alone.  We  had  no  money  and  but 
little  coffee  for  exchange,  and  we  were  strictly  forbid- 
den to  pillage.  It  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  however, 
that  I  should  let  my  men  starve  in  the  midst  of  plenty. 
In  this  dilemma  I  resorted  to  the  plan  of  providing  my 


248  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

foraging  parties  with  blank  receipts,  signed  "Daniel 
Wait  Howe,  Captain  Commanding  Detachment  4th 
Army  Corps  U.  S.  A."  The  issue  was  limited  only  by 
our  supply  of  paper.  The  "U.  S.  A."  gave  the  receipts 
an  official  appearance,  and  nobody  to  whom  they  were 
tendered  ever  refused  them.  My  impression  is  that 
the  adjacent  region  was  pretty  well  plastered  over  with 
them,  and  I  fear  that  they  speedily  depreciated  in  value 
after  our  departure,  but  they  were  good  as  long  as  we 
remained. 

When  the  foraging  parties  returned  they  brought 
great  stores.  Hams  and  shoulders  were  piled  in  one 
corner  of  my  headquarters  reaching  from  floor  to  ceil- 
ing. Butter,  milk,  eggs,  honey,  and  other  luxuries 
were  soon  added  to  our  larder.  The  "contrabands" 
were  only  too  glad  to  see  us  and  they  brought  fish  and 
corn  pones  in  great  abundance. 

I  soon  ascertained  about  how  much  corn  a  given 
number  of  men  could  gather  in  a  day  and  established 
it  as  a  day's  work,  but  the  men  usually  did  it  in  half 
the  time,  and  I  allowed  them  the  remainder  of  the  day 
in  which  to  rest  and  recuperate.  They  soon  found  a 
still  some  distance  from  camp,  and  I  was  informed,  but 
never  instituted  an  official  investigation  of  the  rumor, 
that  some  of  the  corn  gathered  was  converted  into 
whisky  through  the  connivance  of  the  "moonshiner" 
who  owned  the  still. 

"There  was  a  sound  of  revelry  by  night,"  for  every 
night  there  was  in  some  cabin  a  "stag  dance"  to  music 
furnished  by  a  venerable  contraband  with  a  banjo.  If 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  249 

he  could  not  be  procured,  some  darky  who  was  an  adept 
in  the  art  was  engaged  to  "pat  Juba"  and  keep  the 
dance  going.  Though  I  was  careful  to  keep  pickets 
posted,  it  is  strange  that  we  were  not  all  captured  by 
the  Confederate  cavalry,  and  I  look  upon  it  now  as  a 
piece  of  extraordinary  good  luck  that  we  were  not. 

But  this  luxurious  life  soon  came  to  an  end.  At  the 
expiration  of  two  weeks  we  had  gathered  all  the  corn, 
the  division  was  again  ordered  to  march,  and  we  were 
ordered  to  rejoin  our  regiment.  About  no  other  spot 
in  the  South  do  such  pleasant  memories  cluster  as  those 
that  are  recalled  by  the  name  of  McGee's  Ford  on  the 
Little  Tennessee. 

Preparations  had  begun  for  the  Atlanta  campaign 
and  Wood's  division  left  Strawberry  Plains  April  6, 
arriving  April  16  at  Cleveland,  Tennessee,  where  it  re- 
mained until  May  3  when  it  started  on  the  Atlanta 
campaign. 

The  following  extracts  from  my  diary  given  just 
as  they  were  written  thirty-nine  years  ago,  portray 
better  than  any  language  I  could  now  substitute,  some 
of  the  incidents  of  the  campaign  in  east  Tennessee  as 
I  saw  them.  They  illustrate  also  some  of  the  hard- 
ships, the  pleasures,  the  daily  thoughts  of  a  soldier  in 
such  a  campaign,  typical,  for  the  most  part,  of  the  life 
of  thousands  of  others  in  the  Civil  War. 


250  CIVIL  WAR  TIMES 

NOVEMBER  28,   1863. 

Rained  a  little.  Turned  cool  and  chilly  toward  af- 
ternoon ;  moved  at  4  P.  M.  in  the  direction  of  Cleveland. 
Bivouacked  at  night  about  five  miles  from  Chatta- 
nooga. Our  whole  corps  is  in  the  expedition. 

DECEMBER. 

3. — Rumored  that  we  are  going  to  Knoxville  by  the 
shortest  route,  living  on  the  country,  and  that  we  will 
draw  no  rations  till  we  get  there.  Camped  at  night  a 
mile  beyond  Sweet  Water,  having  made  about  twenty 
miles. 

4. — Marched  at  6  A.  M.  Two  men  detailed  from 
each  company  to  forage.  Marched  about  twelve  miles 
and  camped  at  3  P.  M.  four  or  five  miles  from  Morgan- 
town.  Weather  pleasant. 

5. — Cloudy.  Marched  at  6  A.  M.  The  fruits  of  the 
forage  party  were  a  spoonful  of  flour  and  a  potato  to 
the  man.  They  "went  for"  eatables  to-day  with  a 
vengeance.  Passed  through  Morgantown,  a  smart 
little  village.  Crossed  the  Little  Tennessee  about  12 
M.  \Vere  delayed  about  two  hours  by  the  breaking  of 
the  bridge.  Marched  some  eighteen  miles.  Got  into 
camp  at  8  P.  M.  The  question  is,  What  shall  we  eat? 
This  living  on  the  country  is  a  wretched  plan. 

6. — Sunday.  Moved  at  5  A.  M.  Marched  till  12 
and  camped  on  Little  river.  Our  regiment  was  the 
advance  regiment  of  the  column  and  was,  by  the  new 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN 

rule,  detailed  for  picket.  Nothing  unusual.  Rations 
were  issued  to-night — the  fruits  of  the  forage  party. 
Three-fourths  of  a  cup  of  meal  for  four  men  and  a 
potato  to  a  man.  This  is  living  on  the  country. 

10. — Got  an  old  copy  of  Brownlow's  Knoxville 
Whig,  giving  an  account  of  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter,  of  the  members  of  Lincoln's  cabinet,  and  sev- 
eral interesting  articles  relating  to  secession  in  its  then 
incipient  state.  This  is  the  only  paper  I  have  seen  for 
a  long  time.  The  surest  way  of  learning  to  appreciate 
the  importance  of  railroads  and  telegraphs  is  to  be  cut 
off  from  them  as  we  have  been  for  three  or  four  weeks. 
Nothing  unusual. 

13. — Went  on  picket  at  8  A.  M.,  relieving  the  iQth 
Ohio.  Quite  a  shower  blew  up  during  the  night  and 
rendered  it  very  disagreeable.  A  chance  was  offered 
to-day  for  the  first  time  since  we  left  Chattanooga  to 
send  off  letters.  The  brigade  postmaster  goes  to  Chat- 
tanooga to-morrow  for  mail-matter  and  is  to  take  let- 
ters. We  have  received  no  mail  or  papers  since  we 
crossed  the  Hiawassee. 

1 6. — Reveille  at  4.  Marched  at  6  A.  M.  Passed 
through  Knoxville  and  took  the  road  to  Strawberry 
Plains.  Bivouacked  at  night  twelve  or  fourteen  miles 
from  Knoxville.  Hear  that  there  is  some  skirmish- 
ing in  our  front.  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  go  much 
longer.  The  men  are  sadly  in  need  of  rations.  The 
fact  is,  we  are  not,  and  have  not  since  we  left  Chatta- 
nooga, been  getting  even  quarter  rations.  It  is  grow- 


252  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

ing  worse  every  day.  They  all  want  overcoats  also, 
and  shoes  worst  of  all. 

17. — Very  disagreeable  and  wet  last  night.  Got 
up  in  the  morning  to  find  myself  in  a  bundle  of  wet 
blankets.  Got  hold  of  a  paper — the  Cin.  Comm.  of 
December  2,  the  latest  I  have  seen.  It  contains  a  par- 
tial account  of  the  action  at  Chattanooga.  Did  not 
move  to-day.  No  news  from  the  front. 

19. — Picket  at  3  p.  M.  Visited  by — [illegible] — of 
the  4th  Cav.,  also  by  Loomis,  sutler  in  same.  Con- 
versed a  long  time  with  an  old  lady  named  Fitz-Jer- 
rold.  Her  husband  died  about  the  time  Tennessee  se- 
ceded. His  last  vote  was  for  the  Union  and  he  was 
hauled  to  the  polls  to  give  it.  Her  only  son  of  any  size 
is  in  our  army  in  ist  Tenn.  Batt.  The  rebs  took  nearly 
everything  and  our  men  the  rest.  But  she  is  true  yet. 

25. — Another  Christmas  dawns  upon  me  in  the  ser- 
vice. I  hardly  expected  it  last  Christmas  at  Nashville. 
But  things  look  much  brighter  now  than  then.  Nearly 
all  of  the  1 9th  Ohio  re-enlisted  yesterday  and  day  be- 
fore in  the  veteran  service.  They  are  making  great 
preparations  to  go  home  in  a  day  or  two.  How  differ- 
ent is  this  from  Christmas  at  home.  But  I  must  not  let 
my  mind  dwell  on  the  unpleasant  contrast. 

JANUARY,  1864. 

i. — Picket  at  3  P.  M.  Extremely  cold  all  day.  In 
fact  the  coldest  day  we  have  experienced  this  year  and 
here  we  are  destitute  of  everything  in  midwinter.  The 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  253 

men  are  ragged,  hungry,  and  with  no  shelter  except  a 
few  miserable  worn-out  dog-tents.  We  have  one  con- 
solation at  least — they  are  thinking  and  caring  for  us 
at  home  this  day.  May  the  good  people  who  are  get- 
ting up  fairs  and  subscriptions  for  the  benefit  of  those 
who  are  in  the  field  meet  with  the  greatest  success. 

9. — Spent  the  day  reading  old  newspapers  and  a 
novel,  Louisa  Elton,  a  southern  concern  remarkable 
for  the  bombast  and  egotism  of  its  author.  It  is  writ- 
ten by  a  lady  and  is  dedicated  to  Jeff  Davis  as  a  de- 
fender of  the  "Union  of  these  states." 

ii. — Accepted  the  invitation  of  Sergt. to  visit 

a  cousin  (female)  who  resides  about  two  miles  from 
camp.  Started  on  foot  about  9  A.  M.  Very  cold. 
Noticed  boys  sliding  on  mill-pond  as  we  passed. 
Reached  our  destination  about  10  A.  M.  Found  the 
young  lady,  Miss  Lizzie,  to  be  a  miss  of  some  eighteen 
summers,  of  average  good  looks  and  intelligence,  an 
ex-schoolmarm,  and  very  communicative.  Showed 
me  her  album  and  set  me  to  reading  poetry  fpr  her. 
Spread  myself  in  the  latter  business.  Ate  a  passable 
dinner.  Played  cards  and  conversed  a  while  and  start- 
ed back  about  3  P.  M. 

1 8. — Marched  at  3  A.  M.,  taking  the  back  track.  Of 
course  a  drizzling  rain  set  in.  The  roads  were  in  a 
most  wretched  condition.  In  many  places  it  was  al- 
most all  the  teams  could  do  to  pull  an  empty  wagon, 
and  men  had  to  be  detailed  to  help  them  along.  We 
took  a  roundabout  road  and  reached  the  Plains  about 
dark  without  any  special  incidents.  It  was  a  day  long 


254  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

to  be  remembered  as  severe  in  the  extreme  upon  the 
troops.  Turned  off  very  cold  and  snowed  to  the  depth 
of  about  two  inches  during  the  night. 

21. — Ammunition  sufficient  to  supply  each  man 
with  sixty  rounds  was  issued  this  morning.  Marched 
at  8  A.  M.  Reached  Knoxville  at  noon.  Halted  just 
before  entering  town  for  the  column  to  close  up.  En- 
tered the  city  at  i  P.  M.  with  banners  flying.  Saw 
Fred  Fout  and  Columbus  Hancock  [of  Co.  I].  Passed 
through  the  city  without  stopping  and  went  into  camp 
two  miles  from  town  across  the  river  on  the  Sevierville 
road,  which  we  supposed  to  be  our  destination. 
Mounted  a  horse  and  went  out  into  a  Union  settlement 
a  mile  or  so  from  camp.  Ate  supper  with  a  Mr.  Bare- 
ford,  a  true  blue  Union  man.  He  and  his  wife  put  me 
more  in  mind  of  genuine  home  sympathy  than  any  peo- 
ple I  have  met  for  a  long  time.  Afterward  I  visited  a 
Mr.  Anderson  who  is  a  member  of  the  3d  East  Tenn. 
Cav.,  at  home  on  furlough.  He  is  a  brother-in-law  of 
Bareford  and  I  found  them  the  same  kind  of  people. 
Although  his  wife  had  been  cooking  three  days  for 
soldiers,  she  said  she  could  not  turn  me  away,  and  so 
baked  me  a  dozen  ginger-cakes,  for  which  I  was  glad 
to  be  able  to  pay  her.  His  sister,  who  lives  near  and 
whose  husband  is  in  our  army,  had  also  been  cooking 
all  day  for  soldiers,  and  yet  one  graceless  scamp  had 
tried  to  steal  her  husband's  drawers.  Such  vagabonds 
should  be  shot. 

23. — Moved  at  8  A.  M. — 79th  in  advance.  Took  the 
Maryville  road.  Rumored  that  our  brigade  and  Wil- 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  255 

lich's,  under  command  of  Willich,  go  to  Maryville  to 
rest  a  spell.     Bivouacked  twelve  miles  from  Knoxville. 

FEBRUARY. 

1 6. — Started  at  2  A.  M.  A  train  being  ahead  of  us 
we  moved  very  slowly,  marching  a  few  yards  and  then 
stopping  five  or  ten  minutes.  Any  soldier  who  has  ever 
marched  behind  a  train  over  a  bad  road  realizes  how 
fatiguing  it  is.  To  make  matters  worse,  it  was  rain- 
ing, the  roads  were  wretchedly  miry,  and  it  grew  con- 
stantly colder.  A  little  before  daylight  we  halted  and 
threw  ourselves  down  right  in  the  mud,  just  as  we 
were,  and  slept  for  perhaps  an  hour.  By  7  in  the 
morning  we  were  just  about  two  miles  from  camp. 
We  had  not  time  to  get  breakfast  before  the  column 
started.  We  moved  on  without  much  stoppage,  reach- 
ing the  hills  in  the  vicinity  of  Knoxville  just  before 
dark.  We  camped  on  a  high,  bleak  hill.  Hardly  a 
splinter  of  wood  could  be  found  and  it  seemed  as 
though  the  wind  would  cut  us  in  two.  The  night  was 
intensely  cold.  It  is  this  kind  of  soldiering  that  kills 
men.  It  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  wholesale 
butchery. 

17. — Remained  on  the  hill  all  day.  It  was  very 
cold  and  snowed  during  the  day  to  the  depth  of  several 
inches.  The  scanty  fires  emitted  little  heat  and  many 
had  to  stay  in  their  tents,  wrapped  in  their  blankets, 
and  even  then  could  not  keep  warm.  Stiff  and  sore, 
too,  from  yesterday's  march,  we  were  miserable  in  the 


256  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

extreme.  If  ever  a  man  thinks  of  "Home,  -sweet 
home,"  it  is  during  such  experiences  as  we  have  had 
the  last  three  days. 

19. — Relieved  about  dark.  When  I  reached  camp 
I  felt  a  strange  itching  and,  upon  examination,  found 
I  was  alive  with  "graybacks,"  which  I  had  probably 
got  by  sleeping  in  straw  that  we  procured  for  beds 
from  some  huts  in  an  abandoned  camp  near  by.  There 
was  no  alternative  but  to  burn  my  shirt  after  which  I 
felt  considerably  relieved. 

22. — Spent  to-day  putting  a  floor  and  bunks  in  my 
tent.  If  I  can  only  get  it  finished  it  will  be  the  snug- 
gest arrangement  I  ever  had.  The  men  have  pretty 
much  quit  making  winter  quarters.  They  have  put 
them  up  only  four  times  since  we  left  Chattanooga  and 
never  were  permitted  to  stay  in  any  except  those  at 
Maryville,  over  three  days.  If  campaigning  is  as 
active  in  the  coming  summer  as  it  has  been  this  winter, 
this  department  will  afford  a  fine  field  for  gymnastics 
and  we  shall  all  retire  from  the  service  finished  acro- 
bats. Opened  my  desk  to-day  and  examined  my  books 
and  papers.  Sad  spectacle.  Not  a  report  or  return 
since  we  left  Chattanooga!  I  am  nearly  six  months 
behind  in  my  ordnance  and  clothing  returns.  Mus- 
tered up  courage  to  make  out  three  monthly  returns 
and  do  some  official  correspondence  this  evening. 

23. — Orders  this  morning  to  clean  up  the  quarters. 
Ordinarily  this  would  signify  that  we  were  to  remain 
here  for  a  few  days  at  any  rate.  But  by  the  rule  of 
contraries  which  obtains  in  this  department,  it  fore- 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  257 

shadows  an  immediate  movement.  It  has  been  said 
that  this  division  is  running  an  express  train  to  all  the 
little  by-places  around  Knoxville,  and  it  is  about  time 
for  us  to  make  another  trip.  Got  my  marque  up  to 
my  notion  to-day.  Am  prepared  now  to  go  to  work  at 
my  books  and  papers  and  enjoy  myself  in  comfortable 
quarters.  Finis  at  8.  Go  to  bed.  Grand  sequel.  At 
9,  orders  to  put  everything  in  readiness  to  march,  with 
three  days'  rations  for  the  men  and  complement  of 
eighty  rounds  of  cartridges.  Oh !  for  our  old  depart- 
ment and  our  old  commander !  But  I  presume  this  is 
strategy.  It's  no  use  to  swear,  for  like  the  profane 
man  on  a  certain  occasion,  "I  can't  do  justice  to  the 
subject." 

29. — Reveille  at  4.  Marched  at  5.  Passed  Mossy 
Creek  Station  about  8-  A.  M.  It  began  to  rain  last 
night  and  continued  all  day.  The  roads  were  very 
slippery  and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  straggling. 
General  Schofield  passed  us  again  to-day  and  the  boys 
lustily  yelled  "hard-tack"  and  "sow-belly."  He  took 
it  in  good  humor  and  remarked  that  they  "would  get 
harder  tack  than  they  had." 

MARCH. 

2. — Reveille  at  4  A.  M.     Moved  at  5.     Supposed  we 
were  going  toward  Bull  Gap  until  we  -reached  the  rail- 
road when  we  abruptly  turned  toward  New  Market. 
The  79th  was  in  advance  of  the  division.     Am  entirely 
17 


258  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

at  a  loss  to  know  why  we  made  either  the  movement 
here  or  the  movement  back.  Suppose  it's  "strategy." 
Anticipate  seeing  something  like  the  following  in  the 
papers  in  a  few  days :  "Brilliant  movement  in  east 
Tennessee."  "General  Schofield  drives  the  enemy  out 
of  the  state."  "No  rebels  this  side  of  Virginia." 
"Longstreet's  forces  demoralized  and  deserting  by 
scores."  "Whole  expedition  returned  without  the  loss 
of  a  man."  About  two  miles  from  Morristown  we 
passed  the  camps  of  a  portion  of  the  23d  Army  Corps. 
Think  about  half  the  corps  were  straggling  along  the 
road.  The  advance  of  the  corps  and  the  stragglers 
probably  formed  a  junction  somewhere  between  Mor- 
ristown and  New  Market.  Reached  latter  place  at  2 
p.  M.  and  camped.  The  day  has  been  beautiful. 

3. — Listened  intently  for  the. "general"  this  morn- 
ing, but  nobody  "bio wed  the  bazoo."  Last  night  the 
orders  were  for  the  men  to  be  kept  in  camp  in  readiness 
to  move  at  a  moment's  notice.  Probably  somebody  is 
scared.  Or  it  may  be  that  the  express  line  is  to  be 
again  opened  up  to  Dandridge.  Wrote  a  letter  to-day 

to .     Also  took   a  bath,   giving  myself  a  good 

scouring.  Luckily  I  brought  a  few  clean  underclothes 
with  me  in  a  knapsack.  I  have  cause  to  congratulate 
myself  on  so  doing  for  not  another  officer  in  the  regi- 
ment has  a  stitch  of  clothing  except  what  he  has  on  and 
no  very  flattering  prospect  that  his  condition  will  be 
bettered  for  weeks.  A  report  of  the  number  of  rounds 
of  ammunition  on  hand  was  called  for  to-day,  which 
may  portend  something  and  may  not.  Passed  my  time 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  259 

to-day  principally  in  loafing.  Think  I  shall  become  an 
adept  in  it.  Weather  warm  and  pleasant. 

4. — No  orders  to  move.  We  shall  probably  go 
somewhere  soon.  I  hear  it  rumored  to-day  that  within 
three  weeks  our  division  will  go  back  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Cumberland.  I  shouldn't  be  surprised  at 
anything  now.  Heard  to-day  from  Major  Parker  the 
only  lucid  explanation  of  our  late  movements.  Gen- 
eral Schofield  is  making  a  topographical  map  of  east 
Tennessee  and  is  taking  the  soldiers  along  just  to  show 
them  the  country.  In  absolute  despair  of  something 
to  read  or  do,  I  spent  to-day  in  reading  a  horrid  Mer- 
cury novel — Catholina  or  the  Niche  in  the  Wall,  by 
"Dr.  J.  S.  Robinson."  I  am  ashamed  to  make  even 
this  private  confession,  but  'tis  done.  I  excuse  my- 
self in  this  way :  a  man  hungry  for  something  to  read 
will  do  as  a  man  hungry  for  something  to  eat;  if  he 
can  not  get  good  he  will  take  bad.  Just  after  I  had 
gone  to  bed  companies  I  and  C  were  detailed  to  guard 
a  supply-train  which  arrived  to-day.  Received  a  mail 
to-night. 

5. — It  rained  last  night  and  I  climbed  into  a  wagon 
for  shelter.  Got  out  a  little  before  daylight  to  warm. 
When  I  returned,  found  the  mules  had  pulled  my 
blankets  out  of  the  wagon  and  had  well-nigh  devoured 
one.  The  train  pulled  out  early  in  the  morning  and  as 
there  was  no  further  need  of  my  services  I  returned  to 
camp  about  8  A.  M.  Cloudy  and  prospect  of  rain  this 
morning,  but  it  finally  cleared  and  the  day  was  pleas- 
ant. Drew  five  days'  rations  to-day — full  of  meat, 


26O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

sugar,  coffee,  and  half  of  bread.  Also  drew  clothing, 
consisting  of  blouses,  shirts,  stockings,  and  shoes. 
The  men  are  now  pretty  well  supplied  with  clothing, 
except  shoes,  of  which  there  is  still  a  great  deficiency, 
many  being  nearly  barefoot.  Hear  that  slight  skir- 
mishing is  going  on  in  our  front,  which  is  supposed  to 
be  at  Mossy  creek.  My  impression  is  that  no  very 
heavy  engagements  will  take  place. 

6. — The  day  opened  gloriously.  The  sun  shone 
with  a  warmth  and  splendor  seldom  seen  in  Indiana  be- 
fore May.  The  songsters  made  the  woods  fairly  ring 
with  their  joyous  melodies.  The  trees  have  not  yet 
put  forth  their  buds  but  the  meadows  are  growing 
green  and  the  unmistakable  signs  of  spring  begin  to 
manifest  themselves.  It  being  Sunday,  divine  ser- 
vice was  held  in  the  several  churches  of  New  Market. 
I  have  not  seen  nor  heard  anything  since  I  have  been  in 
Tennessee  which  so  much  reminded  me  of  home  as  the 
pealing  of  the  bells.  It  sounded  so  sweet  and  yet  so 
sad,  for  while  it  brought  pleasant  memories  it  created 
sad  longings.  But  let  us  "learn  to  labor  and  to  wait." 
O.  M.  Colclazer  [quarter-master]  came  up  to-day, 
bringing  a  bundle  of  clothing  for  Colonel  [Oyler]  and 
me,  sent  from  home.  Never  was  clothing  more  ac- 
ceptable. Orders  issued  to  be  ready  to  move  at  any 
moment.  Wrote  to to-day. 

9. — Spent  to-day  as  yesterday — reading  and  writ- 
ing. We  have  at  least  one  consolation  now — a  daily 
mail.  We  get  the  Nashville,  Louisville,  and  Cincin- 
nati papers  regularly  by  newsdealers,  besides  the  papers 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  26l 

which  come  by  mail.  A  newspaper  is  a  great  thing  in 
camp.  Men  who  scarcely  ever  read,  much  less  buy,  a 
paper  at  home,  are  eager  to  see  one  in  camp.  There 
seems  to  be  a  general  desire  to  keep  posted.  This  may 
.be  attributed  to  the  great  interest  felt  by  all  in  every- 
thing which  affects  the  conduct  or  prospects  of  the  war. 
To  the  same  cause  may  be  traced  the  interest  in  poli- 
tics. People  at  home  have  no  idea  how  well  posted 
and  how  interested  the  soldier  is  in  the  political  ques- 
tions of  the  day.  My  impression  is  that  the  majority 
of  soldiers  are  now  much  better  qualified  to  decide  po- 
litical questions  than  they  were  at  home;  therefore  I 
think  they  should  be  allowed  to  vote. 

24. — Relieved  at  10.  Reached  camp  about  n. 
Shoes  and  rations  were  to  be  issued.  The  shoes  were 
in  the  nick  of  time.  Four  of  my  company  were  almost 
literally  barefoot  and  three  others  were  nearly  as  bad. 
Had  not  finished  issuing  when  orders  were  received  to 
be  ready  to  march  at  i  P.  M.  Noticed  as  we  marched 
out  that  the  men  had  left  nearly  all  their  beef  un- 
touched, preferring  to  do  without  rather  than  eat  it. 

29. — Rained  all  day  or  nearly  all  day.  Somebody 
once  reproved  Dr.  Johnson  for  his  malignant  hatred  of 
Scotland  and  threw  in,  as  a  kind  of  sedative,  the  re- 
mark that  "God  made  Scotland."  "Yes,"  retorted 
the  Doctor  ferociously,  "God  made  hell,  too."  I  am 
inclined  to  feel  the  same  way  toward  this  woebegone 
waste.  It  looks  like  the  refuse  of  creation.  It  might 
look  romantic  in  summer-time  with  the  land  under  cul- 
tivation, but  it  doesn't  now  by  a  long  shot.  The 


262  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

weather  of  the  last  three  weeks  has  been  highly  favora- 
ble to  in-door  amusements,  viz. :  rolling  one's  self 
up  in  his  dog-tent  like  a  dog  in  his  kennel  or  a  hedge- 
hog in  his  hole.  I  should  say  Diogenes  might  have 
made  equally  as  philosophical  reflections  in  one  of  these 
as  in  his  tub.  (By  the  way,  my  opinion  of  Diogenes 
is  that  he  was  a  hoax. ) 

30. — It  has  been  raw  and  blustery  all  day.  I  have 
passed  much  of  the  time  in  talking  over  home  affairs 
with  Captain  Ellis.  What  a  great  pleasure  it  is  to  see 
one  who  has  just  come  from  the  scenes  to  which  our 
memory  is  constantly  going  back  and  where  are  all  that 
are  near  and  dear  to  us.  It  is  like  seeing  them  by 
proxy.  How  many  inquiries  we  press  upon  the  vis- 
itor that  attest  the  eagerness  of  our  interest  even  by 
their  very  simplicity. 

"How  dear  to  this  heart  are  the  scenes  of  my  childhood, 

When  fond  recollection  presents  them  to  view ; 
The  orchard,  the  meadow,  the  deep  tangled  wild-wood, 
And  every  loved  spot  which  my  infancy  knew." 

Capt.  Ellis  confirms  the  report  I  have  often  heard 
of  the  reckless  extravagance  which  is  fast  pervading 
all  classes  at  the  North.  Parties,  balls,  festivities  of 
every  kind — there  is  no  end  to  them.  "On  with  the 
dance"  is  the  cry.  God  forbid  that  in  the  midst  of  all 
these  gaieties  the  widow  and  orphan  be  forgotten. 

31. — Picket  at  10.  Companies  D,  E,  I  and  C.  I 
had  command  of  outpost  No.  2  on  the  Rutledge  road 
about  a  mile  from  camp.  Had  eight  reliefs  and  seven 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  263 

men  over  for  stack  guards.  The  day  was  very  pleas- 
ant. Being  close  by  a  house  occupied  by  an  old  lady  I 
made  a  little  visit  and  found  her  to  be  one  of  the  most 
intelligent  women  I  ever  conversed  with.  I  believe 
she  had  been  teaching  several  years  before  the  war  be- 
gan. On  examining  the  library  (for  she  had  a  scant 
one)  I  noticed  D'Aubigne's  Reformation,  Plutarch's 
Lives,  Josephus,  Bunyan's  Pilgrim's  Progress,  Ever- 
ett's Washington,  and  several  other  works  by  eminent 
authors.  A  Latin  reader,  well  thumbed  on  the  page 
beginning  with  "Antiquisimis  temporibus,"  she  in- 
formed me  belonged  to  her  son,  now  in  the  rebel  army 
in  Texas.  She  also  told  me  that  the  whole  family, 
consisting  of  nine  whites  and  six  blacks,  had  been  liv- 
ing for  more  than  ten  days  on  nothing  but  boiled  corn. 
I  believe  her  story  for  in  all  my  travels  I  have  not  seen 
a  family  in  apparently  more  destitute  circumstances. 

APRIL. 

3. — Troops  drew  three  days'  rations.  We  still  get, 
for  a  part  of  our  meat  rations,  the  lean,  miserable,  and 
unhealthy  beef  that  we  have  had  all  winter.  Perhaps 
we  are  kept  in  this  barren  country  that  we  may  be 
starved  into  eating  it  and  so  take  it  off  the  Q.  M.'s 
hands.  "Hold  on  there,  butcher,"  yelled  a  soldier  the 
other  day  as  that  amiable  individual  was  about  to  end 
the  miseries  of  a  very  attenuated  bovine,  "wait  for  sick 
call." 

4. — Picket  at  10.     D,  E,  I  and  C  at  the  same  out- 


264  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

posts  as  before.  It  began  to  rain  shortly  after  we 
reached  the  picket-line  and  continued  all  day  and  night 
at  intervals.  Borrowed  Everett's  Life  of  Washington 
from  the  family  living  near  the  outpost.  It  is  written 
with  great  beauty  of  diction  and  in  the  purest  style. 
Still  I  do  not  look  upon  it  as  remarkable  either  for  great 
originality  of  thought  or  for  presenting  any  very  new 
or  uncommon  theories.  Being  intended  as  an  encyclo- 
pedic article,  however,  it  is  all  that  could  be  expected. 
I  marked  one  passage  which  impressed  me  with  its 
beauty.  It  is  the  author's  illustration  of  genius  in  the 
closing  chapter.  I  also  finished  reading  Oliver  Twist. 
Chapters  i,  5  and  14,  Book  2,  finely  exhibit  Dickens' s 
humorous  powers.  The  narrative  of  the  murder  of 
Nancy  and  of  the  remorse  and  pursuit  and  final  end 
of  the  career  of  Sykes  are  striking  displays  of  strong 
and  powerful  writing. 

5. — Relieved  at  10.  The  creek  had  risen  so  rapidly 
last  night  that  this  morning  it  could  not  be  crossed  un- 
til trees  were  felled  across  it.  Companies  D  and  E 
were  not  relieved  till  afternoon.  It  looked  like 
clearing  off  to-day.  The  rain  has  been  warm  and  the 
grass  and  buds  seem  ready  to  leap  right  up.  I  sat 
down  to-day  to  the  best  dinner  I  have  eaten  in  camp 
for  two  months.  It  consisted  of  coffee,  "slap-jacks," 
baked  beans,  and  a  pot  of  boiled  beef  and  desiccated 
vegetables.  The  molasses  for  the  slap-jacks  was  made 
by  boiling  common  sugar.  The  meal  was  far  better 
than  any  I  have  had  since  I  left  Pikeville.  The  great 
desideratum  all  the  time  has  been  to  get  enough  of 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  265 

anything.  Started  a  furlough  to-day  for  Mat.  Chand- 
ler [of  Co.  I].  Orders  received  this  evening  to  march 
at  6  to-morrow.  Great  glee  and  rejoicing  prevailed 
all  over  the  whole  division  until  late  at  night,  it  being 
understood  that  we  were  going  to  Knoxville. 

6. — This  evening  an  order  from  Schofield  was  read, 
expressing  his  thanks  to  Wood's  division.  So  it  seems 
certain  we  are  at  last  to  leave  this  one-horse  depart- 
ment. We  all  go  without  regret.  There  was  great 
cheering  and  rejoicing  to-night. 

7. — Reveille  at  4.  Marched  at  6.  Stopped  an  hour 
for  dinner  at  noon.  Traveled  very  leisurely,  the  2d 
brigade  in  advance  and  Willich's  in  the  rear.  At  4 
p.  M.  passed  through  Knoxville  in  style  with  fixed  bay- 
onets. Saw  nobody  that  I  knew.  Camped  about  three 
miles  on  Loudon  side  of  Knoxville.  John  Israel,  Co- 
lumbus Hancock,  and  Matthew  Chandler  joined  the 
company  to-day.  All  our  wagons — six — reported  to 
regiment  last  night  and,  after  unloading,  went  back  to 
Knoxville  for  the  baggage  stored  there.  The  impres- 
sion is  that  our  destination  is  Cleveland.  It  is  re- 
ported that  Major-General  Howard  has  been  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  4th  corps  and  Hooker  to  the 
command  of  the  nth  and  i2th  corps,  consolidated  and 
called  the  2Oth.  Did  not  observe  anything  noticeable 
at  Knoxville  except  a  couple  of  negro  soldiers  in  full 
uniform,  the  first  I  ever  saw.  A  great  many  specta- 
tors were  out  to  see  us  pass.  All  the  "nigs"  must  have 
been  out  too,  judging  by  the  multitude  I  saw.  We 
marched  about  twenty  miles  to-day.  Rained  to-night. 


266  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

9. — Reveille  at  5.  Column  in  motion  at  7.  The 
rain  was  drizzling  with  no  prospect  of  slacking,  when 
we  started,  but  finally,  about  10,  the  skies  cleared  and 
the  sun  came  out.  The  roads,  however,  were  very 
muddy  and  marching  very  tedious.  Passed  Camp- 
bell's Station  at  10.  The  traces  of  the  skirmish  there 
where  Burnside  fell  back  before  Longstreet  are  very 
plenty.  Most  of  the  houses  and  trees  about  there  ex- 
hibit the  mark  of  a  cannon-ball  or  bullet.  The  coun- 
try through  which  we  passed  can  not  be  surpassed  for 
beautiful  landscapes.  It  needs  only  a  river  to  make  it 
perfectly  charming.  The  land  is  rolling,  the  farms  are 
well  cleared,  and  the  farm-houses  indicate  wealth  and 
taste.  From  the  number  of  orchards,  I  should  judge 
it  a  great  peach  country,  indeed  a  good  country  for  all 
kinds  of  fruits.  Camped  at  3  130  p.  M.  near  Lenoir 
Station,  six  miles  from  Loudon  and  twenty-two  from 
Knoxville.  A  portion  of  Sheridan's  division  is  here. 

15. — Reveille  at  4.  Marched  at  6.  Athens  is  a  neat 
little  place,  said  to  be  a  strong  Union  town.  Noticed 
several  handsome  buildings,  both  public  and  private. 
It  is  reputed  to  have  many  pretty  girls  but  they  didn't 
make  themselves  visible.  Perhaps  the  southern  beau- 
ties were  in  bed.  The  country  not  so  good  as  that 
passed  yesterday.  Reached  Calhoun  about  12.  Con- 
sumed about  an  hour  in  crossing  the  Hiawassee  and 
getting  into  camp.  Charlestown  is  opposite  Calhoun 
and  is  somewhat  noted  as  the  place  where  the  "con- 
valesce" whipped  Wheeler  last  winter.  Camped  on 
the  battle-ground.  A  meaner  place  could  not  have 


EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN  267 

been  selected  for  our  brigade/  A  couple  of  regiments 
are  stationed  at  this  point  and  a  fort  on  a  high  hill  com- 
mands a  wide  scope.  The  troops  stationed  along  the 
road  seem  to  be  living  "old  folks  at  home."  Paper 
collars  and  blackened  boots  abound,  to  which  our 
rough  boys  call  the  attention  of  the  owners  in  no  flat- 
tering terms.  Marched  about  fifteen  miles. 

1 6. — Reveille  at  4.  Marched  at  6,  our  brigade  in 
advance.  The  country  not  as  good  as  that  heretofore 
passed  though  I  noticed  a  great  many  very  fine  farm- 
houses. Reached  Cleveland,  twelve  miles  from  Charles- 
town,  at  12.  It  was  doubtless  the  intention  for  us  to 
stop  here  but  for  some  reason  we  were  ordered  forward. 
Went  through  town  in  style  in  column  of  companies. 
A  portion  of  Stanley's  division  is  here.  This  is  called 
the  prettiest  place  between  Chattanooga  and  Knoxville. 
Did  not  stop  in  the  town  but  marched  six  or  seven  miles 
beyond  and  camped.  This  turn  of  affairs  surprises  all 
of  us  and  where  we  will  go  next  is  the  question.  We 
are  only  twenty-two  or  twenty-three  miles  from  Chat- 
tanooga. Met  General  Beatty  and  staff  at  Cleveland, 
also  all  the  recruiting  officers  except  Dick  [Gosney], 
who  sent  word  that  he  was  sorry  he  couldn't  come, 
wherein  I  think  he  slightly  prevaricated. 


CHAPTER    TEN 

NEGRO    SOLDIERS    IN    THE    CIVIL    WAR 

The  two  negro  soldiers  I  observed  at  Knoxville  in 
April,  1864,  were  the  first  I  saw,  although  black  men 
had  been  enrolled  in  the  Federal  armies  long  before 
that  time.  During  the  progress  of  the  war  a  marked 
change  was  brought  about  in  the  attitude  of  the  people 
of  both  North  and  South,  not  only  as  to  the  question 
of  freeing  the  negroes,  but  also  of  arming  them.  It 
was,  however,  a  change  caused  by  the  exigencies  of  the 
'war,  rather  than  by  any  change  of  sentiment  in  regard 
to  the  moral  aspects  of  slavery.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  war  the  radical  element  in  the  North  would  have 
preferred  to  let  the  seceding  states  go  rather  than  that 
they  should  remain  in  the  Union  with  slavery;  before 
the  war  closed  the  radical  leaders  in  the  South  would 
have  preferred  t6  let  slavery  go  if  by  so  doing  they 
could  have  remained  out  of  the  Union.  The  evidence 
is  abundant  and  convincing  that,  before  the  close  of  the 
war,  many  of  the  radical  leaders  of  the  South  would 
willingly  have  consented  to  universal  emancipation  if 
by  so  doing  they  could  have  saved  the  Confederacy. 
The  study  of  the  causes  operating  to  produce  such  a 
revolution  of  ideas  is  both  curious  and  interesting. 

(268) 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  269 

The  value  of  the  services  of  the  slaves  to  the  Con- 
federate cause  was  manifest  from  the  beginning. 
Jefferson  Davis  says  i1 

"Much  of  our  success  was  due  to  the  much-abused 
institution  of  African  servitude,  for  it  enabled  the 
white  men  to  go  into  the  army,  and  leave  the  cultiva- 
tion of  their  fields  and  the  care  of  their  flocks,  as  well 
as  of  their  wives  and  children,  to  those  who,  in  the 
language  of  the  Constitution,  were  'held  to  service  or 
labor.' ' 

This  fact  was  soon  perceived  in  the  North.  At  an 
early  stage  of  the  war  the  slaves  were  also  employed 
in  building  forts  and  breastworks  and  in  various  places 
at  first  filled  by  white  rnen,  thus  relieving  an  equal  num- 
ber of  white  soldiers  for  service  in  the  Confederate 
ranks.  This  also  was  seen  and  its  significance  was  ap- 
preciated in  the  North  and  especially  in  the  northern 
armies.  It  was  obvious  that  whatever  would  weaken 
the  allegiance  of  the  slaves  to  their  masters  and  induce 
them  to  favor  the  Federal  cause  would  weaken  the  Con- 
federate armies  and  the  Confederate  cause.  The 
emancipation  proclamation  was,  therefore,  a  logical 
war  measure,  and  it  was  on  this  ground  that  many  in 
the  North  and  in  the  northern  armies,  at  first  hostile 
to  emancipation,  were  at  a  later  period  induced  to 
favor  it. 

If  the  first  step  in  severing  the  allegiance  of  the  slave 
to  his  master  was  to  declare  his  freedom,  then  obvious- 

1  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  i,  p.  303. 


2/O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

ly  the  next  step  was  to  arm  him  so  that  he  might  fight 
for  it ;  because,  in  fighting  for  his  freedom,  he  was  not 
only  directly  aiding  the  Federal  armies,  but  was  in- 
spiring his  fellow-slaves  to  do  likewise.  Thus  a  dan- 
gerous enemy  of  the  South  and  a  zealous  ally  of  the 
North  was  developed  in  the  very  heart  of  the  Confed- 
eracy. 

But,  when  it  was  first  suggested,  the  idea  of  arming 
negroes  and  enrolling  them  as  soldiers  in  the  Federal 
armies  aroused  violent  opposition  in  the  North  and 
furnished  new  arguments  to  those  who  denounced  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  as  an  Abolition  crusade. 

The  first  act  of  Congress  authorizing  the  enlistment 
of  colored  soldiers  was  passed  July  17,  1862,  after  very 
bitter  opposition,  particularly  from  the  members  repre- 
senting the  border  states,  but  this  act  discriminated  be- 
tween the  slaves  of  loyal  and  those  of  disloyal  citizens. 
Few  colored  men  enlisted,  and  the  first  order  for  rais- 
ing colored  troops  was  issued  by  the  War  Department 
August  25,  1862,  to  General  Saxton,  in  command  at 
Hilton  Head,  South  Carolina,  authorizing  him  to  en- 
list and  equip  "such  number  of  volunteers  of  African 
descent  as  he  might  deem  expedient,  not  exceeding  five 
thousand."  When  the  order  was  issued  it  was  ac- 
companied with  the  remark,  "This  must  never  see 
daylight,  because  it  is  so  much  in  advance  of  public 
sentiment."  It  was  not  until  1863  that  the  work  of 
enrolling  colored  troops  in  the  Federal  armies  was 
begun  in  earnest.  The  first  order  for  raising  colored 
troops  in  the  free  states  was  issued  from  the  War 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  2/1 

Department  January  20,  1863,  to  Governor  Andrew 
of  Massachusetts.  It  was  not  until  March  3,  1864, 
that  Congress  passed  an  act  making  free  the  families 
of  colored  soldiers,  and  not  until  later  in  that  year 
that  colored  soldiers  were  allowed  the  same  pay  and 
emoluments  as  white  soldiers. 

The  first  colored  regiment  mustered  into  the  United 
States  service  was  the  First  Louisiana  Native  Guard, 
raised  by  General  Butler  in  New  Orleans  and  re- 
cruited chiefly  among  the  free  blacks.  It  was  mustered 
in  September  27,  1862.  Another,  organized  in  Kan- 
sas but  recruited  chiefly  from  Missouri  slaves,  was 
mustered  in  January  13,  1863,  as  the  First  Kansas 
Colored  Volunteers,  but  the  name  was  afterward 
changed  to  that  of  79th  U.  S.  Colored  Infantry.  The 
first  colored  regiment  raised  in  a  seceding  state  from 
former  slaves  was  recruited  in  South  Carolina,  of 
which  T.  W.  Higginson  was  commissioned  colonel. 
Its  organization  was  begun  by  order  of  General  Hun- 
ter in  May,  1862,  but  not  completed  until  January  31, 
1863.  It  was  at  first  called  the  First  South  Carolina 
but  afterward  the  33d  U.  S.  Colored  Infantry.  The 
first  colored  regiment  raised  in  a  northern  state  and 
recruited  from  free  blacks  was  the  54th  Massachu- 
setts, organized  in  Massachusetts,  but  recruited  from 
several  northern  states.  Its  organization  was  begun 
in  February  and  completed  in  May,  1863.  The  total 
number  of  colored  troops  enrolled  in  the  Federal 


272  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

armies  during  the  war  was  178,975,  of  whom  99,337 
were  recruited  in  the  southern  states.2 

The  idea  of  enlisting  negro  soldiers  was  not  at  first 
favorably  received  in  the  northern  armies.  The  oppo- 
sition was  plainly  manifest  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac during  McClellan's  command  of  that  army.  Nor 
was  the  idea  generally  favored  in  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  There  were  never  many  colored  soldiers 
in  that  army.  They  were  at  first  viewed  with  curios- 
ity by  the  white  troops,  but  all  finally  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  black  man  might  quite  as  well  help 
the  Union  cause  by  fighting  for  his  freedom  and  that, 
in  so  doing,  he  was  far  better  employed  than  he  was 
when  helping  to  construct  Confederate  forts  and 
breastworks. 

So  vindictive  was  the  feeling  inspired  in  the  South 
by  the  enrollment  of  negroes  in  the  northern  armies, 
that,  in  1863,  the  Confederate  Congress  passed  an  act 
providing  that  "every  white  commissioned  officer 
commanding  negroes  or  mulattoes  in  arms  against  the 
Confederate  states  shall  be  deemed  as  inciting  servile 
insurrection  and  shall,  if  captured,  be  put  to  death  or 
be  otherwise  punished  at  the  discretion  of  the  court," 
and  also  providing  that  the  negro  and  mulatto  soldiers 
so  captured  should  be  delivered  to  the  authorities  of 

2  For  a  history  of  the  Federal  legislation  on  the  subject  and  the 
organization  and  enrollment  of  colored  soldiers  in  the  Federal 
armies,  see  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power,  vol.  3, 
PP-  357~379>  4°3~4I4;  Fox,  Regimental  Losses,  pp.  52-56;  Apple- 
ton's  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1863,  pp.  25-29. 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  273 

the  states  wherein  captured,  "to  be  dealt  with  accord- 
ing to  the  present  or  future  laws  of  such  state  or 
states." 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  few  could  have 
been  found  in  the  South  bold  enough  to  advocate  the 
dangerous  experiment  of  arming  the  slaves  and  put- 
ting them  into  the  Confederate  armies.  In  the  North, 
even  at  this  day,  many  would  probably  be  surprised 
to  learn  of  the  gradual  change  of  sentiment  in  the 
South  on  this  proposition.  It  affords  most  striking 
proof  that,  long  before  the  close  of  the  war,  the  des- 
perate nature  of  the  contest  was  appreciated  by  the 
southern  leaders;  for,  in  their  eagerness  to  save  the 
Confederacy,  they  were  ready  to  throw  overboard 
slavery  itself. 

The  first  significant  evidence  of  this  change  of  sen- 
timent is  found  in  the  proceedings  of  a  meeting  of  the 
officers  of  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee  at 
Dalton,  Georgia,  January  2,  1864.  The  meeting  was 
attended  by  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  the  general  com- 
manding, Generals  Hardee,  Walker,  Stewart,  and  oth- 
ers. Patrick  Cleburne,  one  of  the  most  noted  generals 
of  the  army,  read  an  elaborate  paper  prepared  for  the 
evident  purpose  of  being  circulated  in  the  army  if 
approved  by  the  meeting. 

The  paper  set  forth  the  depletion  of  the  Confederate 
armies,  the  constantly  increasing  number  of  desertions, 
and  the  discouragement  of  the  Confederate  soldiers, 

who  were  "growing  weary  of  hardships  and  slaugh- 
18 


274  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

ters"  which  promised  no  results,  and  portrayed  in 
strong  language  the  impending  danger  of  "subjuga- 
tion." One  of  the  three  great  causes  "operating  to 
destroy"  them  was  alleged  to  be  slavery,  which  from 
being  one  of  their  "chief  sources  of  strength  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war,"  had  now  become,  "in  a 
military  point  of  view,  one  of  their  chief  sources  of 
weakness."  The  paper  emphasized  the  reasons  for 
regarding  slavery  as  a  source  of  weakness  to  the  Con- 
^  f ederacy : 

"Wherever  slavery  is  once  seriously  disturbed, 
whether  by  the  actual  presence  or  the  approach  of  the 
enemy,  or  even  by  a  cavalry  raid,  the  whites  can  no 
longer,  with  safety  to  their  property,  openly  sympa- 
thize with  our  cause.  The  fear  of  their  slaves  is  con- 
tinually haunting  them,  and  from  silence  and  appre- 
hension many  of  these  soon  learn'  to  wish  the  war 
stopped  on  any  terms.  The  next  stage  is  to  take  the 
oath  to  save  property,  and  they  become  dead  to  us, 
if  not  open  enemies.  To  prevent  raids  we  are  forced 
to  scatter  our  forces,  and  are  not  free  to  move  and 
strike  like  the  enemy;  his  vulnerable  points  are  care- 
fully selected  and  fortified  depots.  Ours  are  found 
in  every  point  where  there  is  a  slave  to  set  free.  All 
along  the  lines  slavery  is  comparatively  valueless  to 
us  for  labor,  but  of  great  and  increasing  worth  to  the 
enemy  for  information.  It  is  an  omnipresent  spy 
system,  pointing  out  our  valuable  men  to  the  enemy, 
revealing  our  positions,  purposes,  and  resources,  and 
yet  acting  so  safely  and  secretly  that  there  is  no  means 
to  guard  against  it.  Even  in  the  heart  of  our  country, 
where  our  hold  upon  this  secret  espionage  is  firmest, 
it  waits  but  the  opening  fire  of  the  enemy's  battle  line 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  275 

to    wake    it,    like    a    torpid    serpent,    into    venomous 
activity." 

In  order,  therefore,  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  Confed- 
erate armies,  to  insure  the  sympathy  of  foreign  na- 
tions, and  to  infuse  new  life  into  the  decaying  Confed- 
eracy it  was  proposed  "that  we  retain  in  service  for  the 
war  all  troops  now  in  service  and  that  we  immediately 
commence  training  a  large  reserve  of  the  most  cour- 
ageous of  our  slaves,  and  further  that  we  guarantee 
freedom  within  a  reasonable  time  to  every  slave  in 
the  South  who  shall  remain  true  to  the  Confederacy  in 
this  war." 

General  Cleburne  recognized,  not  only  the  absurdity, 
but  the  danger,  of  arming  the  slaves  without  freeing 
them.  It  would  be  preposterous,  he  argued,  to  ex- 
pect the  negro  to  fight  against  the  hope  of  freedom 
with  any  degree  of  enthusiasm : 

"Therefore,"  he  adds,  "we  must  bind  him  to  our 
cause  by  no  doubtful  bonds ;  we  must  leave  no  possi- 
ble loophole  for  treachery  to  creep  in.  The  slaves 
are  dangerous  now,  but  armed,  trained,  and  collected 
in  an  army,  they  would  be  a  thousandfold  more  dan- 
gerous ;  therefore  when  we  make  soldiers  of  them  we 
must  make  free  men  of  them  beyond  all  question,  and 
thus  enlist  their  sympathies  also." 

General  Patton  Anderson,  who  attended  the  confer- 
ence, felt  moved  to  write  General  Leonidas  Polk  a 
confidential  letter  on  the  subject  of  Cleburne's  "mon- 
strous proposition"  and  his  own  feelings  "on  being 


276  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

confronted  by  a  project  so  startling  in  its  character — 
may  I  say,  so  revolting  to  southern  sentiment,  south- 
ern pride,  and  southern  honor."  He  adds :  "Not  the 
least  painful  of  the  emotions  awakened  by  it  was  the 
consciousness  which  forced  itself  upon  me  that  it  met 
with  favor  by  others,  besides  the  author,  in  high  sta- 
tion then  present." 

Somehow  the  matter  reached  the  ears  of  Jefferson 
Davis  and  thereupon  his  Secretary  of  War,  James  A. 
Seddon,  wrote  a  letter  to  General  Johnston  expressing 
the  earnest  convictions  of  the  President  that  "the  dis- 
semination or  even  promulgation  of  such  opinions 
under  the  present  circumstances  of  the  Confederacy, 
whether  in  the  army  or  among  the  people,  can  be  pro- 
ductive only  of  discouragement,  distraction,  and  dis- 
sension," and  General  Johnston  was  requested  to 
communicate  the  President's  views  to  the  officers  pres- 
ent at  the  meeting  "and  urge  on  them  the  suppression, 
not  only  of  the  memorial  itself,  but  likewise  of  all 
discussion  and  controversy  respecting  or  groiving  out 
of  it."3 

The  question  of  arming  the  slaves  continued  to  be 
agitated  in  the  South,  and  was  favorably  considered, 
though  public  sentiment  never  quite  reached  the  point 
of  universal  emancipation.  The  Richmond  Enquirer, 
in  an  editorial,  October  6,  1864,*  said: 

"Whenever  the  subjugation  of  Virginia  or  the  em- 

3  The  memorial  itself  and  the  correspondence  relating  to  it  will 
be  found  in  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  i,  vol.  52,  pt.  2,  pp.  586,  598,  606,  608. 

4  McPherson :  Hist,  of  the  Rebellion,  p.  428. 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  277 

ployment  of  her  slaves  as  soldiers  are  alternative 
positions,  then  certainly  we  are  for  making  them  sol- 
diers and  giving  freedom  to  those  negroes  that  escape 
the  casualties  of  battle." 

Jefferson  Davis  foreshadowed  his  own  views  in  a 
message  to  the  Confederate  Congress,  November  7, 
1864,  in  which  he  said : 

"Should  the  alternative  ever  be  presented  of  subju- 
gation or  of  the  employment  of  the  slave  as  a  soldier, 
there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to  doubt  what  should  then 
be  our  decision." 

General  Lee  also  became  a  convert  to  the  proposi- 
tion for  arming  the  slaves,  and,  in  a  letter  written 
January  n,  1865,  to  Andrew  Hunter,  expressing  his 
views  on  the  subject,  he  said : 

"I  think,  therefore,  we  must  decide  whether  slavery 
shall  be  extinguished  by  our  enemies  and  the  slaves 
be  used  against  us,  or  use  them  ourselves  at  the  risk 
of  the  effects  which  may  be  produced  upon  our  social 
institutions.  My  own  opinion  is  that  we  should  em- 
ploy them  without  delay.  I  believe  that,  with  proper 
regulations,  they  can  be  made  effective  soldiers.  They 
possess  the  physical  qualifications  in  an  eminent  degree. 
Long  habits  of  obedience  and  subordination,  coupled 
with  that  moral  influence  which  in  our  country  the 
white. man  possesses  over  the  black,  furnish  the  best 
foundation  for  that  discipline  which  is  the  surest  guar- 
antee of  military  efficiency.  Our  chief  aim  should  be 
to  secure  their  fidelity.  There  have  been  formidable 
armies  composed  of  men  having  no  interests  in  the 


2/8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

country  for  which  they  fought  beyond  their  pay  or 
the  hope  of  plunder.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  best 
foundation  upon  which  the  fidelity  of  an  army  can 
rest,  especially  in  a  service  which  imposes  peculiar 
hardships  and  privations,  is  the  personal  interest  of 
the  soldier  in  the  issue  of  the  contest.  Such  an  inter- 
est we  can  give  our  negroes  by  granting  immediate 
freedom  to  all  who  enlist,  and  freedom  at  the  end  of 
the  war  to  the  families  of  those  who  discharge  their 
duties  faithfully,  whether  they  survive  or  not,  together 
with  the  privilege  of  residing  at  the  South." 

On  February  7,  1865,  a  letter  from  General  Lee 
to  General  Wise  was  published,  thanking  the  latter's 
brigade  for  resolutions  adopted  declaring  that  they 
would  consent  to  gradual  emancipation  for  the  sake 
of  peace.  Jefferson  Davis,  explaining  his  own  change 
of  mind,  says:5  "Subsequent  events  advanced  my 
views  from  a  prospective  to  a  present  need  for  the  en- 
rollment of  negroes  to  take  their  place  in  the  ranks." 
On  February  8,  1865,  Senator  Brown  of  Mississippi 
introduced  a  resolution  in  the  Confederate  Senate 
that,  if  adopted,  would  have  freed  200,000  negroes 
and  put  them  into  the  army,  but  this  was  defeated  the 
next  day  in  secret  session.  On  February  n  a  bill 
was  introduced  in  the  Confederate  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, authorizing  the  enrollment  of  200,000 
slaves  with  the  consent  of  their  masters.  While  it  was 
pending,  General  Lee  wrote  a  letter  to  E.  Barksdale 
of  the  House,  urging  its  passage.  On  the  subject  of 

6  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  i,  pp.  5i5~ 
519. 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  2/9 

emancipation  he  said,  "I  think  those  who  are  employed 
should  be  freed.  It  would  be  neither  just  nor  justice, 
in  my  opinion,  to  require  them  to  serve  as  slaves." 
The  proposed  bill  was  defeated  February  23  by  the 
vote  of  Senator  Hunter  of  Virginia,  who,  while  it 
was  under  discussion,  made  a  bitter  speech  opposing 
it,  in  which  he  said : 

"When  we  left  the  old  government  we  thought  we 
had  got  rid  forever  of  the  slavery  agitation;  but,  to 
my  surprise,  I  find  that  this  [the  Confederate]  gov- 
ernment assumes  power  to  arm  the  slaves,  which  in- 
volves also  the  power  of  emancipation.  This"  proposi- 
tion would  be  regarded  as  a  confession  of  despair. 
If  we  are  right  in  passing  this  measure,  we  are  wrong 
in  denying  to  the  old  government  the  right  to  interfere 
with  slavery  and  to  emancipate  slaves.  If  we  offer 
the  slaves  their  freedom  as  a  boon,  we  confess  that 
we  were  insincere  and  hypocritical  in  saying  slavery 
was  the  best  state  for  the  negroes  themselves.  I  believe 
that  the  arming  and  emancipating  the  slaves  will  be 
an  abandonment  of  the  contest.  To  arm  the  negroes 
is  to  give  them  freedom.  When  they  come  out  scarred 
from  the  conflict  they  must  be  free." 

On  March  4  the  bill  was  again  taken  up  and  passed, 
Senator  Hunter  voting  for  it  under  instructions  from 
the  Virginia  legislature. 

The  negro  soldier  bill  passed  by  the  Confederate 
Congress  March  9,  1865,  authorized  the  President  of 
the  Confederacy  "to  ask  for  and  accept  from  the  own- 
ers of  slaves  the  services  of  such  number  of  able- 
bodied  negro  men  as  he  may  deem  expedient  for  and 


28O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

during  the  war,  to  perform  military  services  in  what- 
ever capacity  he  may  direct."  It  also  provided  for  the 
organization  of  such  troops  into  companies,  battal- 
ions, regiments,  and  brigades,  and  that  while  in  the 
service  they  should  "receive  the  same  rations,  clothing, 
and  compensation  as  allowed  troops  in  the  same  branch 
of  service." 

A  proviso  was  added  to  the  bill  before  its  final  pas- 
sage, providing  that  "not  more  than  25  per  cent, 
of  the  male  slaves  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45 
in  any  state  should  be  called  for  under  the  provision 
of  this  act."  Section  5  of  the  act  expressly  provided 
"that  nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  to  author- 
ize a  change  in  the  relation  of  said  slaves." 

On  February  25,  1865,  the  legislature  of  Virginia 
also  passed  an  act  authorizing  the  governor  of  the 
state  "to  call  for  volunteers  from  among  the  slaves 
and  free  negroes  of  the  state  to  aid  in  the  defense  of 
the  capital  and  such  other  points  as  may  be  threat- 
ened by  the  public  enemy."6 

It  will  be  observed  that  there  was  nothing  in  either 
the  act  of  the  Confederate  Congress  or  in  that  of  the 
Virginia  legislature  providing  for  emancipation,  im- 
mediate or  gradual.  But,  as  had  been  pointed  out 
by  Generals  Cleburne  and  Lee,  it  was  futile  to  arm 

8  For  the  history  of  Confederate  legislation  on  the  subject  of 
negro  soldiers,  see  McPherson:  Hist,  of  the  Rebellion,  pp.  282, 
283,  427,  429,  611,  612;  Davis:  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  vol.  i,  pp.  514-519;  Pollard:  The  Lost  Cause,  pp. 
659-660;  Jones's  Diary,  vol.  2,  pp.  413-444. 


NEGRO    SOLDIERS  28 1 

the  slaves  without  giving  them  their  freedom;  it  was 
worse  than  futile — it  was  suicidal.  Nevertheless,  the 
negro  soldiers'  bill  held  out  some  hope,  and  Mr.  Jones 
records  in  his  Diary  under  date  of  March  17 : 

"We  shall  have  a  negro  army.  Letters  are  pouring 
into  the  department  from  men  of  military  skill  and 
character,  asking  authority  to  raise  companies,  battal- 
ions, and  regiments  of  negro  troops.  It  is  the  desper- 
ate remedy  for  the  very  desperate  case — and  may  be 
successful.  If  300,000  efficient  soldiers  can  be  made 
of  this  material,  there  is  no  conjecturing  where  the 
next  campaign  may  end." 

It  was  then  too  late  to  raise  an  army  of  Confeder- 
ate negroes,  with  or  without  emancipation.  There 
were  not  arms  enough  for  them;  there  was  not  time 
sufficient  to  organize  and  drill  them.  The  Confed- 
eracy was  in  the  throes  of  dissolution.  Pollard 
speaks  with  bitterness  of  this  last  puerile  attempt  of 
the  southern  leaders  to  galvanize  into  life  the  dying 
Confederacy  :7 

"Such  paltry  legislation,  indeed,  may  be  taken  as 
an  indication  of  that  vague  desperation  in  the  Confed- 
eracy which  grasped  at  shadows;  which  conceived 
great  measures,  the  actual  results  of  which  were  yet 
insignificant;  which  showed  its  sense  of  insecurity — 
and  yet,  after  all,  had  not  nerve  enough  to  make  a 
practical  and  persistent  effort  at  safety." 

Calling  on  the  negroes  at  this  stage  of  the  war  to 
enlist  in  the  Confederate  armies  was  like  calling  spir- 

7  The  Lost  Cause,  p.  660. 


282  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

its  from  the  vasty  deep.  They  did  not  come.  A  few 
were  gathered  together  in  Richmond,  about  twenty 
all  told,  including  three  slaves  of  Benjamin,  the  Con- 
federate Secretary  of  State,  and  these  were  paraded 
through  the  streets  as  an  illustration  of  the  loyalty 
of  the  southern  negroes  to  the  cause  of  their  masters 
and  as  an  inspiring  example  to  their  fellows.  The 
loyalty  of  the  slaves  or  that  of  their  masters  had 
waned,  and  a  draft  was  ordered.  The  3d  day  of 
April,  1865,  was  appointed  to  begin  the  conscription 
of  negroes  for  the  Confederate  armies. 

But  there  were  to  be  no  more  drafts  in  the  South 
for  either  black  or  white  men.  Before  the  3d  day 
of  April  arrived,  Lee  had  evacuated  Richmond,  Jef- 
ferson Davis  and  his  cabinet  had  fled ;  the  members 
of  the  Confederate  Congress  were  fugitives,  the  Con- 
federate government  had  disappeared,  and  the  city  of 
Richmond  was  on  fire.  On  the  day  set  for  the  draft, 
amidst  the  smoke  and  flames  of  the  burning  city, 
10,000  black  soldiers  were  marching  through  the 
streets  singing  "John  Brown"  and  scattering  broadcast 
the  emancipation  proclamation,  and  thousands  upon 
thousands  of  the  resident  Richmond  negroes  were 
joining  in  the  joyful  chorus : 

"Glory,  glory  hallelujah, 
Glory,  glory  hallelujah, 
Glory,  glory  hallelujah, 
We  is  free  to-day." 

The  black  soldiers  who  marched  were  not  Confed- 
erate conscripts;  they  wore  the  blue  and  carried  the 
stars  and  stripes. 


CHAPTER   ELEVEN 

THE    ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN 

The  future  historian  who  looks  for  a  date  from 
which  to  trace  the  decline  and  fall  of  the  Confederacy, 
will  probably  fix  upon  July  4,  1863.  On  that  day  the 
news  of  two  great  Federal  victories,  one  at  Gettys- 
burg, the  other  at  Vicksburg,  thrilled  the  northern 
heart  and  cast  a  gloom  over  the  South  which  never 
lifted.  Lee's  defeat  ended  all  hope  of  successful  in- 
vasion of  the  North,  and  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg 
opened  the  Mississippi  and  practically  cut  off  all  the 
country  west  of  it  from  the  Confederacy. 

Public  sentiment  in  the  North  underwent  a  rapid 
and  radical  change.  The  fall  elections  of  1863  un- 
mistakably showed  the  turning  tide.  In  Ohio,  Indiana, 
and  other  western  states  large  numbers  of  the  Demo- 
cratic party  were  loyal  to  the  Federal  government 
and,  while  those  known  as  "copperheads"  became  more 
and  more  venomous,  their  power  to  harm  the  Federal 
cause  diminished  and  they  came  to  be  universally  de- 
spised by  all  decent  citizens,  both  in  the  North  and  in 
the  South.  In  fact,  after  the  Morgan  raid,  the  "Peace 
at  any  Price"  platform  at  Chicago,  and  the  exposures 
in  the  treason  trials  at  Indianapolis  of  the  infamous 

(283) 


284  CIVIL,    WAR    TIMES 

schemes  of  the  Sons  of  Liberty,  public  sentiment  un- 
derwent a  change  so  marked  that  nothing  more  was 
needed  to  solidify  the  whole  North. 

The  resources  of  the  Federal  government  seemed 
to  be  inexhaustible  and,  notwithstanding  the  enormous 
expenses  of  the  war  and  the  steady  drain  of  men,  there 
was  no  abatement  of  the  martial  spirit  that  pervaded 
the  North,  now  thoroughly  aroused,  determined,  and 
confident  of  ultimate  success.  The  three-years'  troops 
who  had  entered  the  service  in  1861  and  1862  were 
now  veteran  soldiers.  Many  of  them,  on  the  expira- 
tion of  .their  terms  of  enlistment,  reenlisted.  On  Jan- 
uary i,  1864,  there  were  on  the  Union  army  rolls 
860,737  men — nearly  twice  the  number  on  the  Confed- 
erate rolls.  To  insure  enough  soldiers,  drafts  for 
three-years'  men  were  ordered  February  i,  1864,  for 
500,000,  and  March  14,  for  200,000  more.  On  April 
23,  the  Federal  government  accepted  a  tender  from  the 
governors  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Iowa,  and  Wis- 
consin of  85,000  hundred-day  men.  Between  that 
date  and  July  18,  83,612  men  were  mustered  into  the 
United  States'  service  for  100  days.  There  was  no 
lack  of  men. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Confederacy  was  now  on 
the  defensive.  It  had  been  shorn  of  a  large  part  of 
its  territory  by  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi;  it  was 
hard  pushed  for  means  to  carry  on  the  government 
and  to  maintain  its  armies  in  the  field ;  and  by  the  be- 
ginning of  the  year  1864,  it  was  evident  that  it  was 
in  process  of  rapid  disintegration.  All  hope  of  for- 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  285 

eign  intervention  had  vanished  and  Jefferson  Davis 
is  reported  to  have  replied  to  some  one  who  inquired 
about  the  prospect  of  it,  "We  have  no  friends  abroad." 

The  Federal  blockade  was  now  so  stringent  that  all 
foreign  trade  was  cut  off  and  nothing  could  be  taken 
into  or  out  of  the  Confederacy  except  in  occasional 
blockade  runners  and  at  great  risks.  The  Confederacy 
had  no  credit  abroad  or  at  home.  Its  financial  system, 
if  it  can  be  called  a  system,  violated  every  cardinal 
principle  of  national  finance,  and,  in  the  issue  of  paper 
money,  the  wildest  dreams  of  "fiaters"  were  realized. 
As  the  volume  of  irredeemable  currency  expanded, 
prices  went  up  and  the  result,  inevitable  in  such  cases, 
was  that  those  receiving  fixed  salaries,  especially  sala- 
ries fixed  by  law,  were  the  first  and  greatest  sufferers. 
The  railroads  were  largely  used  for  military  purposes, 
and  in  Richmond  and  other  cities,  dependent  chiefly  on 
the  railroads  for  supplies,  provisions  commanded  ex- 
orbitant prices. 

The  fallacy  of  the  fascinating  idea  that  government 
can,  by  mere  paper  decrees,  create  value  out  of  noth- 
ing was  never  more  clearly  illustrated  than  it  was  in 
the  financial  measures  of  the  Confederate  government. 

"The  consequences  of  this  ignorant  and  wild  finan- 
cial policy,"  says  Mr.  Pollard,1  "were,  that,  by  the  next 
meeting  of  Congress,  the  volume  of  currency  was  at 
least  four  times  what  were  the  wants  of  the  commu- 
nity for  a  circulating  medium;  that  prices  were  in- 

1  Southern  History  of  the  War,  vol.  2,  pp.  233-4. 


286  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

flated  more  than  an  equal  degree,  for  want  of  confi- 
dence in  the  paper  of  the  government  had  kindled  the 
fever  of  speculation;  that  the  public  credit,  abused  by 
culpable  ignorance  and  obstinate  empiricism,  had 
fallen  to  an  ebb  that  alarmed  the  country  more  than 
any  reverse  in  the  military  fortunes  of  the  war;  and 
that  the  government  was  forced  to  the  doubtful  and 
not  very  honorable  expedient  of  attempting  to  restore 
its  currency  by  a  system  of  demonetizing  its  own 
issues. 

"The  redundancy  of  the  currency  was  the  chief 
cause  of  its  depreciation.  The  amount  of  money  in 
circulation  in  the  South,  in  time  of  peace,  was  $80,- 
000,000.  In  January,  1863,  it  was  $300,000,000.  In 
September,  1861,  Confederate  notes  were  about  equal 
to  specie ;  before  December,  specie  was  at  20  per  cent, 
premium;  before  April,  1862,  it  was  at  50  per  cent.; 
before  last  of  September,  at  100;  before  December,  at 
225 ;  before  February,  at  280 ;  and  in  the  spring  of 
1863,  at  the  frightful  premium  of  400  per  cent.,  while 
bank  bills  were  worth  190  cents  on  the  dollar. 

"Since  the  foundation  of  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment, its  finances  had  been  grossly  mismanaged.  The 
treasury  note  was  a  naked  promise  to  pay;  there  was 
no  fund  pledged  for  its  redemption;  and  the  prospect 
of  the  rigid  liquidation  of  the  enormous  debt  that  this 
class  of  paper  represented  six  months  after  the  restora- 
tion of  peace,  depended  solely  on  the  speculative  pros- 
pect of  a  foreign  loan  to  the  amount  of  many  hundred 
millions  of  dollars.  At  the  commencement  of  the  war 
the  South  had  the  elements  for  the  structure  of  one 
of  the  most  successful  and  elastic  schemes  of  finance 
that  the  world  had  seen.  The  planters  were  anxious 
to  effect  the  sales  of  their  cotton  and  tobacco  to  the 
Confederate  States;  these  would  have  supplied  the 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  287 

government  with  a  basis  of  credit  which  would  have 
been  extended  as  the  prices  of  these  staples  advanced, 
and  therefore  kept  progress  with  the  war;  but  this 
scheme  was  opposed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
Mr.  Memminger,  and  defeated  by  his  influence.  He 
was  unfortunately  sustained  by  an  executive  grossly 
incompetent  on  subjects  of  finance;  which  was  ig- 
norant of  the  principle  of  political  economy  that  there 
are  no  royal  ways  of  making  money  out  of  nothing, 
that  governments  must  raise  money  in  the  legitimate 
way  of  taxation,  loans,  etc. ;  which  relied  upon  the 
manufacture  of  a  revenue  out  of  naked  paper  obliga- 
tions ;  and  which  actually  went  to  the  foolish  extremity 
of  recommending  that  the  creditors  of  the  government 
should  take  their  payment  in  currency  rather  than  in 
the  public  stocks.  It  appears,  indeed,  that  our  govern- 
ment was  ignorant  of  the  most  primitive  truths  of 
finance,  and  that  it  had  not  read  in  history  or  in  reason 
the  lesson  of  the  fatal  connection  between  currency 
and  revenue." 

A  southern  writer2  has  given  some  Richmond  prices 
during  the  first  three  months  of  the  year  1864.  Flour 
sold  at  $200  per  barrel ;  meal  at  $50  per  bushel ;  beans 
at  $75  per  bushel;  bacon  at  $7.75  per  pound;  butter 
at  $8  per  pound;  sugar  at  $10  to  $12  per  pound;  and 
$40  was  asked  for  "an  old,  tough  turkey  gobbler." 
Fabulous  prices  were  also  demanded  for  clothing  and 
all  other  necessaries  of  life. 

Various  financial  expedients  had  been  tried.  On 
February  17,  1864,  a  new  funding  law  was  passed, 
and  also  an  act  largely  increasing  taxation  and  author- 

2 Jones:  A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,  vol.  2,  pp.  122-179. 


288  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

izing  the  collection  of  taxes  in  kind.  The  purpose  of 
the  funding  act,  as  expressed  in  the  title,  was  "to  re- 
duce the  currency  and  to  authorize  a  new  issue  of  notes 
and  bonds."  It  was  "hoped  that  as  money  got  scarcer 
food  and  raiment  would  get  cheaper."  But  the  fund- 
ing of  old  notes  did  not  keep  pace  with  the  issue  of 
new  ones.  Eight  hundred  or  1,000  millions  of  the  old 
notes  had  been  issued ;  200  to  250  millions  were  fund- 
ed, leaving  over  600  millions  outstanding.  The  Con- 
federate Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  reported  to  have 
said  that  he  could  make  "2,000,000  to  3,000,000  of 
the  new  currency  per  day."  How  much  he  did  issue, 
there  is  no  way  of  ascertaining,  but  he  made  all  that 
was  called  for;  prices  continued  to  advance  and  there 
were  renewed  complaints  against  the  "extortioners" 
who  charged  such  enormous  sums  for  everything  that 
people  were  obliged  to  buy. 

Before  the  opening  of  the  great  campaign  of  1864, 
the  Confederate  currency  had  so  depreciated  that  it 
had  practically  ceased  to  afford  any  certain  measure 
of  values  and,  consequently,  had  ceased  to  be  a  medium 
of  exchange.  The  result  was  that  the  people  in  their 
commercial  transactions  returned  to  the  primitive  sys- 
tem of  barter.3  In  the  agricultural  regions,  likely  to 
be  traversed  by  either  the  Federal  or  the  Confederate 
armies,  there  was  little  encouragement  for  the  farmer 

Prof.  Schwab  in  The  Confederate  States  of  America  has 
given  an  exhaustive  financial  history  of  the  Confederacy  and  has 
clearly  shown  to  what  desperate  straits  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment had  been  reduced  prior  to  the  last  year  of  the  war. 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  289 

to  raise  more  than  was  absolutely  necessary  for  his 
own  use.  He  was  in  danger  of  foe  and  friend  alike. 
If  Federal  troops  came  by  they  took  what  he  had  and 
paid  him  nothing;  if  Confederate  troops  visited  him 
they  took  what  they  wanted  and  paid  him  in  depreci- 
ated currency;  if  he  chanced  to  escape  both  and  took 
his  surplus  to  market,  he  could  get  nothing  but  a  wad 
of  worthless  paper.  Under  such  conditions  commerce 
was  paralyzed,  manufactures  and  agriculture  lan- 
guished, and  all  business  suffered. 

Dire  distress  was  on  every  hand  and  destitution  in 
many  homes.  A  southern  writer4  has  given  a  graphic 
description  of  Hard  Times  in  the  Confederacy;  of 
the  fabulous  prices  of  all  the  necessaries  of  life;  of 
the  substitutes  people  were  compelled  to  use  in  place 
of  luxuries  formerly  enjoyed.  Those  who  liked  coffee 
were  obliged  to  content  themselves  with  a  decoction 
of  dried  sweet  potatoes;  old  ladies  who  loved  their 
tea  "drowned  their  happy  memories  of  hyson  in  a 
solution  of  raspberry  leaves";  the  children -ate  ginger- 
cakes  sweetened  with  sorghum;  all  kinds  of  make- 
shifts were  resorted  to  in  desperate  attempts  to  pre- 
serve an  appearance  of  gentility  by  bringing  forth 
from  old  closets  and  garrets  the  antiquated  and  bat- 
tered hats  and  bonnets  that  had  been  worn  "before  the 
war" ;  even  the  insignia  of  rank  of  a  distinguished 
Confederate  general  were  made  of  some  yellow  flan- 

4  A.  C.  Gordon,  Century  Mag.,  vol.  36,  p.  761. 
19 


2QO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

nel  procured  from  children's  petticoats  that  his  wife 
had  resurrected.  We  may  smile  when  reading  all 
this,  but  there  are  few  that  will  not  agree  with  the 
writer  that  "though  there  is  something  ludicrous  in 
it  all,  the  humor  of  it  touches  so  nearly  the  outer  edge 
of  the  heroic  as  to  seem  strangely  like  pathos." 

The  Confederacy  was  driven  to  the  severest  straits 
in  maintaining  its  armies.  Its  military  strength  had 
been  largely  spent.  Sweeping  conscription  acts  that 
seemed  to  rob  the  cradle  and  the  grave  for  recruits  had 
been  passed  by  the  Confederate  Congress  and  were 
unsparingly  enforced.  The  first  of  these  had  aroused 
violent  opposition,  but  one  still  more  sweeping  was 
passed  February  n,  1864,  subjecting  to  conscription 
all  white  men  between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  fifty, 
and  providing  that  all  then  in  service  between  the  ages 
of  eighteen  and  forty-five  should  be  retained  during 
the  war.  The  opposition  to  these  acts  continued,  and 
large  numbers  of  those  so  forced  into  the  southern 
armies  deserted.  It  has  been  stated  that  few  con- 
scripts were  found  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
or  in  any  other  southern  army  at  the  final  surrender.5 
The  additions  to  the  Confederate  armies  hardly  sup- 
plied the  vacancies  caused  by  deaths,  disease,  and  de- 
sertions, and,  long  before  the  close  of  the  war,  Lee 
was  urgently  calling  the  attention  of  the  Confederate 
government  to  this  alarming  fact. 

But  to  obtain  men  for  the  armies  was  not  more  diffi- 

8  See  Stephens :  The  War  Between  the  States,  p.  573. 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  2QI 

cult  than  it  was  to  procure  supplies  for  them.  In  Jan- 
uary, 1864,  General  Lee  wrote  the  President  of  the 
Confederacy  that  he  had  "but  one  day's  meat  rations 
and  feared  that  he  should  not  be  able  to  retain  the  army 
in  the  field,"  and  on  February  29  his  commissary  re- 
ported that  he  had  bread  enough  to  last  only  until  the 
next  day.  On  March  14  Lee  dispatched  that  "the 
army  was  out  of  meat  and  had  but  one  day's  rations 
of  bread."  Mr.  Jones,  recording  this  in  his  diary, 
adds :  "No  wonder  that  generals  are  in  consultation, 
for  all  the  armies  are  in  the  same  lamentable  predica- 
ment." The  Confederate  soldiers  were  as  poorly 
clothed  as  they  were  fed  and  their  pay  was  still  more 
scanty.  Indeed,  they  were  practically  serving  without 
pay.6  Death  stared  them  in  front  and  starvation  of 
their  families  lurked  in  the  rear.  Whatever  we  may 
think  of  their  "cause,"  we  must  admit  their  devotion 
to  it  and  admire  the  heroism  with  which  they  fought 
for  it.  No  soldiers  ever  made  greater  sacrifices. 

Moreover,  the  very  idea,  which  constituted  the 
corner-stone  of  secession  was  now  developing  its  de- 
structive tendency  and  bearing  fruit  in  renewed  and 
determined  opposition  to  the  measures  which  the  gov- 
ernment had  been  forced  to  adopt.  The  conscription 

8  The  pay  of  the  private  Confederate  soldier  was  fixed  at  $11  a 
month  until  June  9,  1864,  when  the  Confederate  Congress  raised 
the  amount  to  $18.  In  January,  1864,  $i  in  gold  was  worth  $21  in 
Confederate  currency,  so  that  at  that  time  the  pay  of  the  Con- 
federate private  soldier,  measured  in  gold,  was  about  fifty-two 
cents  a  month. 


292  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

laws  had  aroused  violent  hostility  from  the  beginning. 
The  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  the 
declaration  of  martial  law  created  great  dissatisfaction. 
When  people  refused  to  sell  supplies  for  the  army  at 
the  prices  fixed  by  the  government,  often  far  below  the 
market  prices,  and  to  take  their  pay  in  Confederate 
currency,  impressment  was  resorted  to.  This  caused 
universal  complaints  of  favoritism,  corruption,  and  op- 
pression on  the  part  of  the  impressing  officers.  In 
many  places  impressment  by  roving  bands,  claiming  to 
be  acting  under  authority  of  the  government,  degen- 
erated into  what  was  denounced  as  no  better  than  pil- 
lage. The  collection  of  taxes  in  kind,  a  measure 
forced  upon  the  government  as  one  of  the  results  of 
the  depreciation  of  its  currency,  was  necessarily 
accompanied  with  great  waste  and  occasioned  loud 
complaints  of  corruption  and  oppression  of  the  tax- 
gatherers,  especially  in  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Alabama  where  the  greater  part  of  such  taxes  was 
collected. 

General  Bragg,  chief  military  adviser  of  the  Presi- 
dent, was  extremely  unpopular  with  the  Confederate 
generals  and  with  the  people.  Not  only  were  his  own 
official  actions  criticized,  but  he  was  often  compelled 
to  bear  hostile  criticism  intended  to  cover  an  attack 
upon  Jefferson  Davis  himself,  for  the  people  had  al- 
ready begun  to  denounce  what  was  now  openly  styled 
a  military  despotism.  Both  in  North  Carolina  and  in 
Georgia  there  were  loud  protests  against  the  conscrip- 
tion and  impressment  laws  and  arbitrary  arrests,  and 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN 

it  was  said  that  "seizures  of  persons  and  property  had 
become  as  common  as  they  were  in  France  and  Rus- 
sia." Public  meetings  denouncing  these  proceedings 
were  held  in  various  counties  in  North  Carolina,  and 
eight  of  the  ten  persons  chosen  in  1863  to  represent 
the  state  in  the  Confederate  Congress  were  reported  to 
be  secretly  in  favor  of  peace.7 

Judge  Pearson  of  North  Carolina  assumed  the  right 
to  discharge,  on  writs  of  habeas  corpus,  conscripts  who 
had  substitutes  in  the  army,  on  the  ground  that  the  law 
authorizing  their  conscription  was  unconstitutional. 
Governor  Vance  of  that  state  wrote  President  Davis 
a  letter  saying  that  he  should  be  obliged  to  sustain 
Judge  Pearson  "even  to  the  summoning  the  military 
force  of  the  state  to  resist  the  Confederate  States  au- 
thorities." Governor  Brown  of  Georgia  was  equally 
outspoken  in  denying  the  constitutional  power  of  the 
Confederacy  to  enforce  its  conscription  laws  in  a  "sov- 
ereign state."  Even  the  Confederate  Vice-President, 
Alexander  Stephens,  is  quoted  as  saying  in  a  public 
speech  that  "Independence  without  liberty  was  of  no 
value  to  him,  and  if  he  must  have  a  master  he  cared 
not  whether  he  were  northern  or  southern." 

On  every  hand  were  signs  of  revolt  against  the  Con- 
federate administration.  So  loud  were  the  complaints 
of  illegal  impressments  in  east  Louisiana  and  southern 
Mississippi,  that  the  Confederate  President  directed 
George  B.  Hodge,  the  Assistant  Inspector-General,  to 

7  See  Appleton's  Annual  Cyclopedia  for  1863,  under  North  Caro- 
lina and  Georgia. 


294  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

make  an  official  investigation  of  them.  This  officer 
interviewed  "the  most  prominent  and  respectable  citi- 
zens," and  on  July  14,  1864,  submitted  a  report. 
Some  complaints  were  ascertained  not  to  be  well 
founded,  but,  the  report  stated,  "The  proofs,  however, 
are  overwhelming  that  the  people  of  this  district  have 
for  months  and  years  undergone  exactions  and  op- 
pressions at  once  illegal,  vexatious,  and  unjust."  The 
military  officers  "imagined  themselves  invested  with 
plenary  powers"  and  "supplies  of  forage  and  subsist- 
ence were  impressed  by  officers  of  all  grades,  and  even 
by  privates,"  for  which  certificates  were  given.  There 
was  no  money  in  circulation,  but  the  people  were 
"laden  with  these  worthless  certificates,"  which  the 
Confederate  disbursing  officers  would  not  honor  and 
the  tax-collectors  would  not  receive  in  payment  of 
taxes.  A  few  examples  were  given  in  order  to  con- 
vey "an  idea  of  the  chaotic  condition  of  affairs,"  but, 
says  the  report,  "to  enumerate  all  would  swell  the  list 
of  claims  to  thousands,  the  amount  claimed  to  mil- 
lions."8 

No  northern  writer  ever  penned  so  bitter  an  arraign- 
ment of  the  Confederate  authorities  as  did  Governor 
Brown  of  Georgia.  His  voluminous  correspondence 
with  the  Confederate  authorities  amply  proves  that  in 
his  hands  the  pen  was  mightier  than  the  sword.  In  a 
letter  written  by  him  November  14,  1864,  to  the  Con- 
federate Secretary  of  War,  denying  the  right  of  the 

8  See  report  in  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  1 10,  pp.  695-700. 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN 

Confederate  government  to  control  the  militia  of  Geor- 
gia, the  usurpations  of  the  Confederate  authorities  are 
set  forth  in  forceful  language.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
the  Richmond  military  despotism  grew  more  and  more 
intolerable,  but,  if  so  obnoxious  in  November,  1864,  as 
Governor  Brown's  letter  indicates,  it  must  have  been 
very  bad  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  In  his  letter 
Brown  says  :9 

"It  is  not  only  my  right,  but  my  duty,  to  uphold  the 
constitutional  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  of 
Georgia  by  force,  if  necessary,  against  usurpations  and 
abuses  of  power  by  the  central  government.  The 
militia  is,  under  the  constitution,  one  of  the  proper  in- 
strumentalities for  that  purpose.  There 'is  scarcely  a. 
single  provision  in  the  constitution  for  the  protection 
of  life,  liberty,  or  property  in  Georgia  that  has  not  been 
and  is  not  now  constantly  violated  by  the  Confederate 
government  through  its  officers  and  agents. 

"It  has  been  but  a  short  time  since  one  of  the  stores 
of  the  state  of  Georgia,  containing  property  in  the 
peaceable  possession  of  the  state,  was  forcibly  entered 
by  a  Confederate  officer,  and  the  property  taken  there- 
from by  force.  I  had  no  militia  present  at  the  time  to 
repel  this  invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  sovereign  state, 
but  should  have  had  them  there  soon  if  the  property 
had  not  been  restored.  A  single  Confederate  provost- 
marshal  in  Georgia  admits  that  thirty  citizens  and  sol- 
diers have  been  shot  by  his  guard  without  his  right  to 
shoot  citizens  being  questioned  till  within  the  last  few 
days,  when  he  was  greatly  enraged  that  a  true  bill  for 
murder  should  have  been  found  by  a  grand  jury 

9  Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  no,  pp.  789-790. 


296  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

against  one  of  them  for  shooting  down  a  citizen  in  the 
streets,  who  offended  him  by  questioning  his  authority 
over  him.  Every  citizen  in  the  state,  both  man  and 
woman,  is  arrested  in  the  cars,  streets,  and  highways, 
who  presumes  to  travel  without  a  pass.  -They  are  ar- 
rested without  law  and  imprisoned  at  pleasure  of  gov- 
ernment officials.  The  houses,  lands,  and  effects  of 
the  people  of  Georgia  are  daily  seized  and  appropriated 
to  the  use  of  the  government  or  its  agents  without  the 
shadow  of  law,  without  just  compensation,  and  in  de- 
fiance of  the  decision  of  the  supreme  tribunal  of  the 
state,  and  her  officers  of  justice  are  openly  resisted  by 
the  officers  of  the  Confederate  States.  The  property 
of  the  families  of  soldiers  now  under  arms  to  sustain 
the  Confederacy  is  forcibly  taken  from  them  without 
hesitation,  and  appropriated,  in  many  cases,  without 
compensation." 

The  wonder  is  that,  under  the  conditions  prevailing 
in  the  southern  states,  the  Confederacy  was  able  to 
keep  in  the  field  such  armies  as  it  had  in  the  beginning 
of  the  year  1864.  Nevertheless,  a  great  Confederate 
army,  commanded  by  a  great  general,  stood  between 
Washington  and  Richmond,  and  one  as  formidable, 
commanded  by  another  great  general,  still  barred  the 
advance  of  the  Union  armies  south  of  Chattanooga. 
Halleck  continued  to  pose  at  Washington  as  general- 
in-chief.  For  nearly  two  years  he  had  been  confound- 
ing the  Federal  generals  and  amusing  the  Confederates 
with  his  stupid  strategy,  but  the  Union  cause  had  sur- 
vived all  his  blunders.  It  was  impossible,  however,  to 
foretell  what  might  happen  if  he  were  retained  in  chief 
command,  and  so  in  February,  1864,  Congress  revived 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  297 

the  grade  of  lieutenant-general.  Grant's  nomination 
to  fill  the  place  was  confirmed  March  2 ;  on  the  Qth  he 
received  his  commission  and  on  the  I2th  was  appointed 
general-in-chief  of  all  the  Federal  armies.  President 
Lincoln,  after  so  long  and  painful  and  hitherto  fruitless 
search,  had  at  last  found  the  general  who  was  destined 
to  lead  to  victory  the  armies  of  the  East  as  he  had  led 
the  armies  of  the  West. 

About  the  same  time  Sherman  was  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 
The-  two  generals  held  a  conference  in  March  and 
planned  an  early  and  simultaneous  movement  against 
the  Confederate  armies.  Grant  was  to  move  on  Lee's 
army,  with  Richmond  as  the  objective  point;  Sher- 
man was  to  attack  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who, 
after  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  had  superseded 
Bragg;  and  General  Banks  was  to  move  against  Mo- 
bile. 

Pursuant  to  this  general  plan,  a  mighty  army  was 
gathered  at  Chattanooga,  in  every  respect  the  greatest 
ever  assembled  in  the  West ;  great  in  numbers,  great  in 
commanders,  and  great  in  respect  to  the  troops  that 
composed  it.  It  drew  from  the  Northwest  the  flower 
of  its  youth;  in  its  ranks  were  representatives  of  all 
the  leading  Federal  armies  of  the  East  and  of  the 
West,  veterans  of  Antietam,  Chancellorsville,  Gettys- 
burg, Shiloh,  Vicksburg,  Stone's  River,  Chickamauga, 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  other  famous  fields. 

Three  armies  were  combined  to  make  up  the  splen- 
did host  led  by  Sherman — the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 


298  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

land,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio.  General  Thomas  commanded  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  composed  of  the  4th  corps  under  General 
O.  O.  Howard,  the  I4th  corps  under  General  Palmer, 
and  the  2Oth  corps  (formed  by  consolidation  of  the 
nth  and  I2th)  under  General  Hooker,  with  a  cavalry 
corps  under  General  Elliott.  General  James  B.  Mc- 
Pherson  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
composed  of  the  I5th  corps,  under  General  John  A. 
Logan,  the  2d  and  4th  divisions  of  the  i6th  corps 
under  General  Granville  M.  Dodge,  and  two  divisions 
of  the  i /th  corps  under  General  Frank  P.  Blair. 
General  Schofield  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
composed  of  the  23d  corps  and  General  George  Stone- 
man's  cavalry  division. 

During  the  entire  month  of  April,  troops,  ammuni- 
tion, provisions,  and  military  stores  of  all  kinds  were 
hurried  to  Chattanooga.  Everything  was  in  readiness 
for  the  forward  move  which  began  May  5,  1864. 
When  General  Sherman's  army  started  it  numbered 
over  100,000  men. 

General  Johnston's  army,  variously  estimated  at 
from  55,000  to  65,000  on  May  5,  was  increased  in  a 
few  days  to  about  75,000.  As  it  was  too  weak  to  take 
the  aggressive,  Johnston  was  obliged,  from  the  begin- 
ning, to  act  on  the  defensive,  keeping  his  army  intact 
and  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  take  advantage  of 
any  false  move  that  might  be  made  by  Sherman.  It 
was  also  necessary  for  Johnston  to  rely  very  largely 
upon  fortifications  and  to  prepare  for  the  contingency 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  2Q9 

of  being  driven  out  of  one  line  of  works  by  having  an- 
other in  rear  of  it  behind  which  he  could  fall  back  when 
compelled  to  retreat. 

Sherman's  tactics  were  to  move  his  army  as  near  the 
Confederate  works  as  practicable  and  to  make  such 
demonstrations  in  front  as  would  fully  occupy  the  at- 
tention of  the  occupants  while  he  was  sending  a  flank- 
ing force  to  the  right  or  left.  In  this  way  the  campaign 
was  conducted  from  the  beginning  to  the  capture  of  At- 
lanta— Sherman  continually  flanking  and  Johnston 
continually  falling  back  from  one  fortified  line  to  an- 
other. 

A  marked  peculiarity  of  the  campaign  was  that  the 
two  armies  fought  no  great  battle,  such  as  that  of 
Chickamauga  or  even  that  of  Stone's  River.  There 
was  none  in  which  all  the  troops  of  both  armies  were 
engaged.  The  greatest  number  engaged  at  one  time 
was  in  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  July  22,  1864,  where  the 
Federal  troops  numbered  30,477  and  the  Confederates, 
36,934.  In  the  bloody  assault  on  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, June  27,  1864,  the  Federal  troops  numbered 
16,225  and  the  Confederate,  17,733.  The  greatest 
Federal  loss  in  any  battle  of  this  campaign  was  4,200, 
at  Atlanta,  July  21  and  22,  the  next  largest  being  3,000 
in  the  assault  on  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27. 

There  was,  however,  a  succession  of  battles  such  as 
those  of  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  Resaca,  New  Hope 
Church,  Pickett's  Mill,  Kenesaw  Mountain,  and  those 
in  the  vicinity  of  Atlanta,  in  which  large  losses  were 
sustained.  These  do  not,  by  any  means,  represent  all 


3OO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  fighting.  In  fact  there  was  almost  continual  fight- 
ing in  the  Atlanta  campaign  from  May  5  to  September 
i.  Besides  the  battles  there  was  heavy  skirmishing 
nearly  every  day  at  various  points  along  the  lines,  re- 
sulting in  severe  losses  to  the  troops  that  participated. 
From  May  3,  when  the  79th  left  Catoosa  Springs,  un- 
til June  23,  there  were  only  three  days  when  the  reg- 
iment was  not  under  fire.  I  was  wounded  on  the  23d 
and  can  not  state  from  personal  observation  what  oc- 
curred after  that  date,  but  my  information  is  that  the 
regiment  was  almost  continuously  under  fire  until  the 
capture  of  Atlanta.  As  already  stated,  Sherman's 
plan  was  to  push  his  lines  as  near  those  of  the  Confed- 
erates as  practicable,  so  that  often  the  main  lines  of  the 
two  armies  were  not  more  than  two  or  three  hundred 
yards  apart.  From  their  works  or  in  trees  near  by, 
Confederate  sharpshooters  kept  up  a  constant  fire  into 
our  lines.  Men  were  liable  to  be  struck  by  a  bullet 
at  any  time  while  walking  about  behind  their  own 
works.  Frequently  some  one  was  killed  in  his  sleep 
by  a  stray  ball  of  a  Confederate  sharpshooter.  Some- 
times in  the  night  a  furious  cannonading  was  begun 
at  some  point  in  the  front,  and  then  a  whole  brigade  or 
division  was  hastily  awakened  and  compelled  to  re- 
main for  hours  in  line  of  battle  expecting  an  attack. 

The  sanguinary  character  of  the  fighting  may  be  in- 
ferred from  the  statistics  given  by  Colonel  Fox,  who 
states  that  the  total  losses  in  the  Atlanta  campaign 
from  May  5  to  September  i  were : 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  3OI 

Killed    4,423 

Wounded    22,822 

Missing 4,442 


Total   31,687 

The  Confederate  losses  during  the  same  period,  as 
estimated  by  Colonel  Fox,  were : 

Killed    3,044 

Wounded    18,952 

Captured    12,983 


Total  34,979 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  began  the  campaign 
with  60,773  men.  Between  May  5  and  September  6, 
it  lost  in 

Killed    3,041 

Wounded   15,783 


Total  18,824 

The  Atlanta  campaign  illustrates  very  clearly  the 
folly,  to  call  it  by  no  harsher  name,  of  attempting  to 
take,  by  direct  assault,  strongly  fortified  positions. 
This  was  demonstrated  in  the  assault  on  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  June  27,  1864.  It  has  never  been  satis- 
factorily explained  why  it  was  ordered  but  it  is  known 
to  have  been  made  without  the  approval  of  Sherman's 
subordinate  generals  and  over  the  vigorous  protests  of 
McPherson  and  Logan.  The  assault  was  made  with 
the  2d  and  part  of  the  ist  division  of  the  4th  corps, 


3O2  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  2d  division  of  the  I5th  corps,  and  part  of  the  2d 
division  of  the  i4th  corps.  The  Federal  forces  num- 
bered 16,225  and  the  Confederate  17,733.  The  losses 
in  killed  and  wounded,  not  including  the  missing,  most 
of  whom  were  probably  killed,  were  as  follows : 

Federal    1,999 

Confederate    270 

It  will  be  observed  that,  the  numbers  being  about 
equal,  the  Federal  army  lost  eight  men  killed  and 
wounded  for  every  killed  or  wounded  Confederate. 
At  such  a  rate  it  would  not  take  long  to  fritter  away 
an  army  of  a  million.  We  can  well  understand  the  in- 
dignation of  General  Thomas  expressed  in  a  note  to 
General  Sherman  on  that  day,  when,  after  two  unsuc- 
cessful assaults,  a  third  was  suggested. 

"The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  has  already  made 
two  desperate,  bloody,  and  unsuccessful  assaults  on  this 
mountain.  If  a  third  is  ordered,  it  will,  in  my  opin- 
ion, result  in  demoralizing  this  army,  and  will,  if  made, 
be  against  my  best  judgment  and  most  earnest  pro- 
test." 

In  a  later  dispatch  on  the  same  day,  when  asked  by 
General  Sherman  his  opinion  concerning  a  proposed 
movement,  General  Thomas  said  : 

"What  force  do  you  think  of  moving  with?  If 
with  the  greater  part  of  the  army,  I  think  it  decidedly 
better  than  butting  against  breastworks  twelve  feet 
thick  and  strongly  abatised." 


ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN  303 

The  campaign  very  rapidly  exhausted  the  vitality  of 
the  men.  Hard  marches,  intense  heat,  loss  of  sleep, 
bad  water,  constant  exposure  to  miasma,  told  heavily 
on  the  strongest  constitutions.  Hardest  of  all  was  the 
intense  mental  strain  of  being  continually  under  fire, 
with  the  possibility  of  being  killed  or  wounded  at  any 
moment  in  the  day  or  night.  No  man  ventured  to 
undress ;  every  soldier  sleeping  in  his  clothes  and  with 
his  musket  and  accoutrements  by  his  side,  ready  to 
spring  into  line  of  battle  at  a  moment's  notice.  For  a 
week  'before  I  was  wounded,  though  I  was  never  re- 
lieved from  duty,  I  had  been  taking  medicine  and  was 
scarcely  able  to  march.  I  probably  could  not  have  kept 
up  another  week  even  if  I  had  not  been  wounded. 

Van  Home  states  that,  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
fend  alone,  "during  the  campaign  forty-three  thousand 
one  hundred  and  fifty-three  were  reported  sick  to 
Major  George  E.  Cooper,  Surgeon  United  States 
army,  medical  director  of  the  department.  Of  these, 
twenty-six  thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-four 
were  sent  to  the  rear;  two  hundred  and  seven  died 
from  disease,  and  one  thousand  and  sixty-seven  died 
from  wounds."10 

The  campaign  closed  with  the  surrender  of  Atlanta, 
September  I,  1864,  leaving  the  Confederate  army  near 
by.  Notwithstanding  its  heavy  losses  it  was  still  in- 
tact and  formidable  though  it  had  been  greatly  shorn 
of  its  power  by  the  removal  of  its  commander,  General 

10  Hist.  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  vol.  2,  p.  150. 


3O4  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Johnston,  who,  after  Lee,  was  the  ablest  general  in  the 
Confederacy.  He  had  done  all  that  could  reasonably 
have  been  expected.  Though  unable  to  resist  success- 
fully the  advance  of  an  army  greatly  superior  in  num- 
bers, he  had  contested  its  advance  with  signal  ability. 
Because  he  had  not  accomplished  more,  Jefferson 
Davis,  yielding  to  senseless  clamor,  had  removed  him 
and  in  his  place  had  appointed  General  Hood,  who  was 
understood  to  be  a  "fighting  general." 

General  Humphreys  closes  his  Virginia  Campaign 
with  this  modest  sentence :  "It  has  not  seemed  to  me 
necessary  to  attempt  a  eulogy  upon  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  or  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia."  The 
same  may  be  said  of  Sherman's  army  and  of  the  Con- 
federate army  confronting  it  in  the  Atlanta  campaign. 
No  eulogy  could  add  to  the  admiration  inspired  by  the 
bare  recital  of  their  deeds. 


CHAPTER   TWELVE 

HOOD^S    INVASION    OF   TENNESSEE 

For  more  than  a  month  after  the  capture  of  Atlanta, 
Sherman  and  Hood  were  each  ignorant  of  the  other's 
plans.  Jefferson  Davis  had  visited  Hood  and  had  dis- 
cussed the  latter's  project  of  marching  north  in  order 
to  draw  Sherman's  army  after  him  and  thereby  avert 
its  threatened  march  through  the  heart  of  the  Con- 
federacy. Hood  crossed  the  Chattahoochee  Septem- 
ber 29 ;  on  October  4th  he  captured  the  Federal  garri- 
sons at  Big  Shanty  and  Ackworth;  on  the  I3th  that 
at  Dalton,  and  on  the  i5th,  .halted  his  army  near  La- 
fayette where  he  remained  a  few  days  and  then  moved 
to  Gadsden.  There  he  had  a  conference  with  Beaure- 
gard  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
Confederate  department  to  which  Hood's  army  was 
assigned.  From  Gadsden  Hood  marched  to  Tuscum- 
bia,  Alabama,  where  'he  arrived  October  31.  Sher- 
man, leaving  the  2Oth  corps  at  Atlanta,  had  followed 
Hood  as  far  as  Gaylesville  and  there  had  abandoned 
the  pursuit. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  had  been  revolving  in  his  mind 
the  plan  of  marching  through  the  South.  There  was 
nothing  very  wonderful  in  the  mere  idea  of  pushing 

(305) 

20 


3O6  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

on  past  Atlanta.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that,  hav- 
ing taken  Atlanta,  his  army  would  sit  down  there  and 
do  no  more.  Nor  was  it  to  be  expected  that  it  would 
march  back  north.  This  would  have  been  imitating 
the  King  of  France  who  "went  up  the  hill  with  twenty 
thousand  men"  and  then — came  down. 

Manifestly  it  was  advisable  to  push  farther  south, 
which  would  compel  Sherman  to  abandon  Atlanta  as 
a  base  of  supplies  and  seek  a  new  one.  To  have  re- 
tained a  base  so  far  south  of  the  Ohio  would  have  re- 
quired a  vast  army  to  keep  open  his  line  of  communi- 
cations extending,  for  a  long  distance,  through  the 
enemy's  country.  The  successful  execution  of  Sher- 
man's plan  obviously  required  the  selection  of  a  new 
base  at  some  point  on  the  gulf  coast.  All  this  is  clear 
even  to  one  not  versed  in  military  strategy.  It  is 
equally  clear  that  it  was  a  very  hazardous  undertaking 
to  cut  loose  from  Atlanta  before  Hood's  army,  which 
was  still  intact,  with  the  possibility  of  being  largely 
augmented,  had  been  destroyed,  or  until  it  was  cer- 
tain that  there  was  a  Federal  army  north  of  Atlanta 
sufficient  to  prevent  Hood's  advance  in  that  direction. 
If,  as  Sherman  maintained,  the  divisions  of  the  i6th 
corps  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  then  in  Missouri, 
could  be  brought  to  Nashville  in  ten  days  to  reenforce 
Thomas,  who  was  to  be  left  to  look  after  Hood,  it 
would  seem  to  have  been  the  prudent  course  for  Sher- 
man to  delay  his  proposed  march  until  they  came,  or 
at  least  until  it  was  certain  that  they  were  on  the  way. 

That   Sherman  was  sincere  in  his  prediction  that 


HOOD'S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  307 

Thomas  would  be  able  to  hold  Hood  in  check,  there 
can  be  no  doubt.  His  enthusiastic  belief  in  the  success 
of  his  plan  led  him  to  underestimate  its  dangers.  He 
dispatched  Grant  October  9  that  he  could  "make  the 
march  and  make  Georgia  howl,"  and  the  day  follow- 
ing, assured  him  that  Thomas  "would  have  an  ample 
force  when  the  reenforcements  ordered  reached  Nash- 
ville." On  the  i7th  he  said  to  Thomas:  "Hood 
won't  dare  to  go  into  Tennessee.  I  hope  he  will." 
On  the  iQth  in  a  dispatch  to  Halleck,  Sherman  was 
confident  that  "the  enemy  would  not  venture  toward 
Tennessee  except  around  by  Decatur." 

As  late  as  November  i,  Grant  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  cutting  loose  from 
Atlanta  and  leaving  Hood's  army  to  roam  about  at 
will  in  the  rear.  His  own  idea  of  an  "objective"  was 
well  known — it  was  the  army  of  the  enemy  in  his 
front.  The  three  dispatches  that  follow  show  clearly 
his  objections  and  the  assurances  by  which  they  were 
overcome : 

CITY  POINT,  Nov.  i,  1864 — 6  P.  M. 
Major-  General  Sh  erman : 

Do  you  not  think  it  advisable,  now  that  Hood*  has 
gone  so  far  north,  to  entirely  ruin  him  before  starting 
on  your  proposed  campaign?  With  Hood's  army  de- 
stroyed, you  can  go  where  you  please  with  impunity. 
I  believed,  and  still  believe,  if  you  had  started  south 
while  Hood  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  you,  he  would 
have  been  forced  to  go  after  you.  Now  that  he  is  so 
far  away,  he  might  look  upon  the  chase  as  useless,  and 
he  will  go  in  one  direction  while  you  are  pushing  the 


3O8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

other.  If  you  can  see  the  chance  for  destroying 
Hood's  army,  attend  to  that  first,  and  make  your  other 
move  secondary. 

U.  S.  GRANT,   Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSIS- 
SIPPI. IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  Nov.  2,  1864. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.i 

If  I  turn  back,  the  whole  effect  of  my  campaign  will 
be  lost.  By  my  movements,  I  have  thrown  Beaure- 
gard  well  to  the  west,  and  Thomas  will  have  ample 
time  and  sufficient  troops  to  hold  him  until  reenforce- 
ments  meet  him  from  Missouri  and  recruits.  We 
have  now  ample  supplies  at  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta 
to  stand  a  month's  interruption  to  our  communica- 
tions, and  I  don't  believe  the  Confederate  army  can 
reach  our  lines,  save  by  cavalry  raids,  and  Wilson  will 
have  cavalry  enough  to  checkmate  that.  I  am  clearly 
of  opinion  that  the  best  results  will  follow  me  in  my 
contemplated  movement  through  Georgia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Nov.  2,  1864 — n  130  A.  M. 

Major-General  Sherman : 

Your  dispatch  of  9  A.  M.  yesterday  is  just  received. 
I  dispatched  you  the  same  date  advising  that  Hood's 
army,  now  that  it  had  worked  so  far  north,  ought  to  be 
looked  upon  more  as  the  object.  With  the  force,  how- 
ever, you  have  left  with  General  Thomas,  he  must  be 
able  to  take  care  of  Hood,  and  destroy  him.  I  really 
do  not  see  that  you  can  withdraw  from  where  you  are, 
to  follow  Hood,  without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained 
in  territory.  I  say,  then,  go  on  as  you  propose. 

U.  S.  GRANT,   Lieutenant-General. 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  309 

Grant's  permission  having  at  last  been  obtained, 
Sherman  did  not  long  delay.  Thomas  had  already 
been  sent  to  Nashville  and,  in  view  of  the  proposed 
movement  south,  Sherman  had  authorized  him  "in  the 
event  of  military  movements  or  the  accidents  of  war 
separating  the  general  in  command  from  his  military 
division,"  to  assume  command  over  all  troops  and  gar- 
risons not  absolutely  in  the  presence  of  the  command- 
ing general. 

In  a  dispatch  to  Thomas  November  10,  Sherman 
made  the  prediction :  "I  think  you  will  find  Hood 
marching  off  and  you  should  be  ready  to  follow  him," 
and  in  another  on  the  nth  he  gave  Thomas  this  cheer- 
ful assurance:  "You  can  safely  invite  Beauregard 
across  the  Tennessee  and  prevent  his  ever  returning.  I 
still  believe,  however,  that  public  clamor  will  force 
him  to  turn  and  follow  me ;  in  which  event  you  should 
cross  at  Decatur  and  move  directly  toward  Selma  as 
far  as  you  can  transport  supplies."  Sherman  started 
November  15  on  his  poetic  and  erratic  "march  to  the 
sea,"  carrying  out  his  threat  to  "make  Georgia  howl." 

Hood,  meanwhile,  had  been  cogitating  a  plan  of  his 
own  which  he  tells  us  he  had  evolved  during  his  stay  at 
Lafayette,  October  15  and  I6,1  and  to  which  he  had 
finally  won  the  consent  of  General  Beauregard  and 
Jefferson  Davis.  This  was  to  march  rapidly  north, 
cutting  off  the  4th  and  23d  corps,  then  to  Nashville, 
and  thence  to  the  Ohio.  In  order  to  accomplish  this, 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  vol.  4,  p.  427. 


3IO  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

he  expected  to  be  reenforced  by  Forrest's  cavalry, 
12,000  strong,  and  by  18,000  or  20,000  Confederate 
troops  west  of  the  Mississippi.  He  also  expected  the 
advance  of  his  army  to  be  greeted  by  a  great  uprising 
of  the  people  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  His  plan 
has  been  denounced  by  both  Federal  and  Confederate 
critics  as  chimerical,  but,  from  his  standpoint,  and  tak- 
ing into  account  the  unforeseen  accidents  which  pre- 
vented its  accomplishment,  it  does  not  seem  to  merit 
so  severe  a  criticism. 

It  was  evident  that  Hood  could  not  make  a  success- 
ful stand  against  Sherman's  strong  and  well-equipped 
veteran  army,  and,  desperate  as  was  the  venture  made, 
the  condition  of  the  Confederacy  was  such  that  noth- 
ing remained  for  Hood  but  to  take  desperate  chances. 
No  critic  has  yet  suggested  any  plan  which  offered 
greater  promise  of  success  than  the  one  which  he 
adopted.  Even  if  he  had  reached  the  Ohio  it  is  not 
probable  that  he  could  have  gone  beyond  it,  or  that  his 
march  would  have  saved  the  dying  Confederacy;  but 
it  is  probable  that,  but  for  the  unforeseen  delay  in 
crossing  the  Tennessee  at  Florence  and  the  blunder  by 
reason  of  which  Schofield's  army  was  permitted  to  es- 
cape at  Spring  Hill,  Hood  might  have  reached  the 
Ohio.  It  is  also  probable  that  if  he  had  done  so  the 
war  would  have  been  indefinitely  prolonged,  that  he 
would  have  been  the  hero  of  the  "march  to  the  Ohio," 
and  that  Sherman's  "march  to  the  sea"  would  have 
been  condemned  as  the  colossal  blunder  of  the  war. 

On  November  13  Hood  moved  to  Florence,  Ala- 


HOOD'S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  3!  I 

bama,  where  he  was  joined  the  next  day  by  Forrest, 
one  of  the  boldest  and  best  cavalry  commanders  in  the 
war,  with  12,000  cavalry  fully  equipped.  The  vigi- 
lance of  Canby  and  the  gunboats  prevented  his  re- 
ceiving the  trans-Mississippi  reenforcements  which  he 
had  expected,  but,  with  Forrest,  he  had  an  army  of 
nearly  50,000  veteran  soldiers.  He  had  ordered  the 
railroads  and  bridges  to  be  repaired,  so  that  he  could 
cross  the  Tennessee  at  once  and  begin  his  march  to 
Nashville,  but  this  had  not  been  done.  The  weather 
was  bad,  the  roads  were  in  wretched  condition,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  wait  another  week  before  starting.  By 
November  21  all  his  army  had  crossed  the  Tennessee 
near  Florence  and  he  began  his  march,  intending  first 
to  cut  off  the  Federal  troops  between  him  and  Nash- 
ville. 

Sherman,  before  starting  south  from  Atlanta,  had 
sent  to  Nashville  all  superfluous  baggage,  arms,  and 
stores,  and  also  all  sick  and  disabled  soldiers.  Two 
divisions  of  cavalry  were  dismounted  in  order  to  sup- 
ply horses  and  equipments  for  General  Kilpatrick's 
cavalry  which  was  selected  to  accompany  Sherman  and 
the  dismounted  cavalry  and  scraps  of  accoutrements 
were  also  sent  to  Nashville. 

It  was  originally  intended  to  leave  Thomas  only  the 
4th  corps,  but  to  this  was  afterwards  added  the  23d. 
These  were  the  two  smallest  corps  of  Sherman's  army 
and  they  were  still  further  depleted  before  the  battle 
of  Nashville  by  the  return  home  of  large  numbers 
\vhore  terms  of  enlistment  had  expired. 


312  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

By  this  division  of  the  army  which  had  accom- 
panied Sherman  to  Atlanta  he  retained  a  force  of  about 
62,000  veteran  soldiers,  with  nothing  to  impede  their 
march  that  could  be  dispensed  with,  while  Thomas  was 
given  the  4th  and  23d  corps,  together  with  the  divi- 
sions of  A.  J.  Smith,  then  in  Missouri,  and  the  "odds 
and  ends." 

We  turn  now  to  the  man  who  thenceforward,  until 
after  the  battle  of  Nashville,  becomes  the  chief  figure 
in  the  exciting  military  drama  that  followed.  Upon 
Thomas  the  eyes  of  all  the  North  were  riveted ;  it  was 
he  whose  success  was  to  make  the  "march  to  the  sea" 
the  theme  of  poets'  songs  for  all  ages,  or  whose  failure 
was  to  stamp  it  as  a  stupendous  blunder.  It  was  with 
great  reluctance  that  he  had  assumed  the  vast  responsi- 
bility placed  upon  him  by  Sherman,  but  having  accept- 
ed it  he  discharged  it,  as  he  could  always  be  depended 
upon  to  do,  faithfully  and  loyally. 

When  Hood  began  his  advance  on  Nashville,  Sher- 
man's army  was  so  far  away  that,  for  all  the  aid  it 
could  render  Thomas,  it  might  as  well  have  been  in 
South  America.  The  divisions  of  Gen.  A.  J.  Smith 
had  not  arrived.  Thomas  had  telegraphed  to  Rose- 
crans  for  them  but  could  get  no  response.  As  was 
afterward  learned,  the  river  was  too  low  to  transport 
them  by  boats  and  they  were  obliged  to  march  across 
the  state  of  Missouri  in  order  to  reach  St.  Louis.  They 
did  not  arrive  until  November  30,  the  day  on  which 
the  battle  of  Franklin  was  fought  and  one  day  before 
the  advance  of  Hood's  army  was  encamped  before 


HOODS    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  313 

Nashville.  Troops  were  stationed  at  various  garri- 
sons throughout  Georgia,  Tennessee,  and  Alabama, 
but  it  was  necessary  that  a  large  portion  of  them 
should  remain  to  save  the  immense  stores  collected  at 
Chattanooga,  Bridgeport,  Murfreesboro,  and  other 
points,  and  to  guard  the  railroads,  unless  all  the  terri- 
tory, acquired  after  two  years'  hard  fighting,  was  to  be 
abandoned. 

All  the  troops  that  could  possibly  be  spared  were 
hurried  to  Nashville.  Raw  recruits,  belated  soldiers 
who  had  been  home  on  furloughs,  conscripts,  and  con- 
valescents, about  12,000  in  all,  had  been  gathered  to- 
gether by  Thomas.  These  were  put  into  provisional 
organizations,  but  they  made  a  motley  gathering.  "In 
some  of  the  companies,"  it  has  been  said,2  "every  sol- 
dier was  a  stranger  to  every  other.  No  man  knew 
his  file  leader  and  the  officers  did  not  know  a  single 
member  of  their  command."  Such  an  organization 
was  ill  fitted  to  take  the  place  of  the  15,000  veterans 
who  had  been  sent  north  from  Nashville  on  furlough 
or  by  reason  of  expiration  of  enlistment  within  a  few 
days  after  Hood's  movement  began. 

No  better  cavalry  commander  could  have  been  se- 
lected than  General  Wilson,  a  general  of  great  energy 
and  recognized  ability,  whom  Grant  had  recom- 
mended to  Thomas  with  the  assurance  that  he  "would 
add  fifty  per  cent,  to  the  effectiveness  of  his  cavalry." 

2  Captain  John  E.  Cleland:  The  Second  March  to  the  Ohio,  a 
paper  read  before  the  Indiana  Loyal  Legion,  War  Papers,  vol.  I, 
P-  233. 


314  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

But  notwithstanding  the  most  extraordinary  exertions 
of  General  Wilson,  he  had  been  able,  from  the  dis- 
mounted cavalry  sent  to  Thomas,  to  send  to  the  front 
only  about  5,000  and  of  these  only  about  4,300  were 
fully  mounted  and  equipped  and  able  for  duty.  With 
these  he  was  to  oppose  Forrest's  12,000. 

The  only  available  forces  to  resist  the  advance  of 
Hood  were  the  troops  about  Pulaski,  Tennessee,  com- 
prising the  three  divisions  of  the  4th  corps,  numbering 
about  12,000,  the  second  and  third  of  the  23d  number- 
ing about  10,000,  and  Wilson's  cavalry.  Immediate 
command  of  the  troops  at  the  front  was  given  to  Gen- 
eral Schofield.  It  would  have  been  madness  to  risk  a 
pitched  battle,  if  it  could  be  avoided,  with  Hood's 
army,  numbering  twice  as  many,  and,  therefore,  the 
instructions  to  Schofield  were  to  fall  back,  contesting 
the  Confederate  advance  as  stubbornly  and  as  long  as 
practicable,  until  Thomas  could  gather  troops  enough 
to  make  a  stand  or  to  take  the  offensive. 

Hood's  first  move  was  to  cut  off  Schofield's  retreat 
to  Nashville,  and  this  compelled  the  quick  withdrawal 
of  the  troops  at  Pulaski.  It  was  thought  that  a  stand 
might  be  made  at  Columbia  on  Duck  river,  and  prepa- 
rations were  made  accordingly.  But  Schofield  stood 
longer  than  was  safe,  and  during  the  night  of  Novem- 
ber 28  General  Wilson  found  that  Hood's  infantry  was 
crossing  the  river  with  the  purpose  of  getting  in  Scho- 
field's rear  and  cutting  off  retreat  by  the  pike,  leading 
from  Columbia  to  Spring  Hill  and  Franklin,  by  which 


HOODS    INVASION    OF   TENNESSEE  315 

the  army  must  pass  to  reach  Nashville.  Forrest's  cav- 
alry was  already  between  Wilson  and  Schofield,  so  that 
the  messenger  who  was  to  carry  this  most  important 
and  alarming  news  was  obliged  to  travel  by  a  long  and 
circuitous  route  and  did  not  reach  Schofield  until  day- 
light on  the  morning  of  the  29th.  There  was  now  a 
race  to  Spring  Hill  between  the  Federal  and  the  Con- 
federate troops.  Forrest's  cavalry  arrived  first,  but 
as  his  men  were  entering  the  town,  General  Stanley, 
with  Wagner's  division  of  the  4th  corps,  appeared, 
drove  Forrest's  troops  out  of  town,  and  began  to  pre- 
pare works  to  hold  Hood's  army  in  check  until  the  re- 
maining four  divisions  of  Schofield  should  arrive. 

In  the  meantime  Hood,  with  Cheatham's  and  Stew- 
art's corps  and  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps,  had 
come  up,  going  into  camp  about  3  P.  M.,  two  miles  and 
a  half  from  Spring  Hill  and  not  more  than  half  a  mile 
from  the  pike  by  which  Schofield's  troops  and  trains 
must  pass  to  reach  Franklin.  Schofield's  little  army 
was  now  in  a  very  perilous  situation.  Of  the  three  di- 
visions of  the  4th  corps  Wagner's  had  preceded 
Hood's  army  and  was  at  Spring  Hill,  but  Kimball's 
was  at  Rutherford  creek,  seven  miles  south,  and 
Wood's  was  still  at  Duck  river,  where  were  also  Cox's 
and  Ruger's  divisions  of  the  23d  corps,  and  all  of  them 
with  their  trains,  in  order  to  reach  Spring  Hill,  were 
obliged  to  march  over  the  pike  near  which  Hood's 
army  had  halted.  The  danger  greatly  increased  when 


3l6  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

darkness  came  on.     Colonel  Stone,  of  Thomas's  staff,3 
thus  describes  the  situation : 

"When  night  came  the  danger  increased  rather  than 
diminished.  A  single  Confederate  brigade,  like 
Adams's  or  Cockrill's  or  Maney's — veterans  since 
Shiloh — planted  squarely  across  the  pike,  either  south 
or  north  of  Spring  Hill,  would  have  effectually  pre- 
vented Schofield's  retreat  and  daylight  would  have 
found  his  whole  force  cut  off  from  every  avenue  of  es- 
cape by  more  than  twice  its  numbers,  to  assault  whom 
would  have  been  madness  and  to  avoid  whom  would 
have  been  impossible." 

And  now  occurred  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  in- 
cidents of  the  war,  betokening  something  like  a  mirac- 
ulous intervention  of  Providence.  Nearly  all  that 
night  the  four  divisions  mentioned,  with  their  trains, 
were  passing  along  the  pike  on  the  road  to  Spring  Hill. 
Hood  states4  that  he  called  Generals  Cheatham  and 
Cleburne  to  the  spot  "where  sitting  upon  his  horse  he 
had  in  sight  the  enemy's  wagons  and  men  passing  at 
double  quick  along  the  Franklin  pike,"  and,  pointing 
out  to  them  the  moving  columns,  urged  them  to  attack 
at  once,  but  that  they  failed  to  do  so.  Cleburne  was 
killed  the  following  day  and  we  do  not  have  his  ver- 
sion of  the  matter,  but  Cheatham  indignantly  denies 
that  anything  of  the  kind  occurred,  and  says  that,  on 
the  contrary,  Hood  told  him  he  had  concluded  to  defer 

3  Article  on  Repelling  Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee,  Battles 
and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  4,  p.  446. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  4,  p.  429. 


HOODS    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  317 

the  attack  until  the  next  morning  and  that  the  only 
thing  in  the  semblance  of  an  order  was  the  suggestion 
received  about  midnight  that  it  would  be  well  for  him 
to  order  his  pickets  to  fire  on  the  stragglers  of  the  Fed- 
eral army  that  Hood  understood  to  be  passing  along" 
the  road.5 

Why  Hood  did  not  place  his  army  across  the  pike 
as  soon  as  he  reached  the  place  where  it  halted,  and 
why  he  allowed  the  troops  and  trains  to  march  by  dur- 
ing the  entire  night  without  molestation,  has  never 
been  satisfactorily  explained.  I  have  often  talked  about 
it  with  the  men  of  the  79th  Ind.  They  speak  of  it  as  a 
"close  call,"  but  they  are  at  a  loss  to  explain  this,  to 
them,  the  most  inexplicable  circumstance  of  their  en- 
tire military  experience.  I  have  in  my  possession 
the  diary  of  Lieut.  William  H.  Huntzinger  of  Co.  I, 
which  states  that  the  regiment  started  at  8  o'clock  on 
the  evening  of  the  29th.  He  records :  "At  midnight 
we  were  ordered  to  be  very  still  and  march  very  quiet- 
ly, as  we  must  pass  near  a  rebel  camp-fire  not  more  than 
half  a  mile  from  the  pike.  Soon  we  came  to  the  light 
from  the  rebel  camp-fires;  the  rebel  pickets  heard  us 
and  began  firing."  He  adds  that  they  marched  safely 
by,  passing  through  Spring  Hill  and  halting  at  3  A.  M. 

The  whole  army,  with  all  its  trains  of  ammunition 
and  supplies,  reached  Franklin  the  next  day,  November 
30,  but  here  another  trouble  arose.  The  Confederate 
advance  at  Columbia  had  been  so  rapid  that  Schofield 

6  Ibid.,  vol.  4,  pp.  429,  439. 


3l8  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

was  unable  to  save  his  pontoons  and,  without  them, 
it  was  impossible  to  get  the  army  across  the  Harpeth 
river  at  Franklin  before  the  arrival  of  Hood.  To  make 
a  stand  was  not  a  matter  of  choice  but  of  necessity. 
Such  works  were  thrown  up  and  such  preparations 
made  as  were  practicable  in  the  short  time  allowed 
and  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  ot  the  war,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  numbers  engaged,  was  now  fought.  Again 
it  seemed  that  the  little  Federal  army  was  doomed. 
This  time,  however,  it  was  saved,  not  by  the  blunder 
of  Hood,  but  by  the  desperate  valor  of  the  Federal 
troops. 

By  some  misunderstanding  of  orders,  two  brigades 
of  Wagner's  division  stood  too  long  in  an  exposed 
position  and  were  driven  back  by  an  overwhelming 
force  of  the  Confederates  which  followed  scf  closely 
that  the  Federal  guns  could  not  fire  on  the  pursuers 
without  subjecting  the  pursued  to  equal  danger,  and 
so  all  entered  together  the  Federal  works  at  the  strong- 
est point  in  them.  At  once  the  Federal  guns  at  that 
point  were  captured  and  turned  on  the  Federal  troops, 
and  for  a  few  minutes  it  seemed  that  all  was  lost.  At 
this  critical  juncture  General  Stanley,  commanding 
the  4th  corps,  hastened  to  order  forward  the  remain- 
ing brigade  of  the  division,  but  Colonel  Opdycke,  the 
brigade  commander,  without  waiting  for  orders,  had 
already  started,  and  Stanley  himself  marched  with 
the  men  of  the  brigade.  The  charge  was  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  in  the  war  and  resulted  in  recapturing 
the  guns,  driving  back  the  Confederates,  and  firmly 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF   TENNESSEE  319 

establishing  the  Federal  lines.  From  that  time  until 
the  end  of  the  battle  every  assault  was  repulsed  with 
frightful  loss  to  the  Confederates.  The  bloody  char- 
acter of  the  contest  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact 
that  in  this  single  engagement  more  general  officers 
were  killed  and  wounded  than  in  any  other  battle  of 
the  war.  The  Confederate  loss  in  general  officers  was 
five  killed,  including  General  Cleburne,  one  of  the  most 
noted  of  the  Confederate  fighters,  six  wounded,  and 
one  taken  prisoner. 

That  night  the  Federal  army  with  all  its  trains 
crossed  the  Harpeth  and  the  next  night  reached  Nash- 
ville. Hood  was  not  far  behind,  and  by  December  3 
his  entire  army  was  in  front  of  the  Federal  lines,  just 
where  it  had  been  two  years  before.  General  A.  J. 
Smith  had  arrived  on  the  day  the  battle  at  Franklin 
was  fought.  Not  until  then,  since  Hood  had  started 
on  his  march  to  Nashville,  had  Thomas  troops  suffi- 
cient to  justify  him  in  risking  a  battle. 

By  this  time  the  whole  North  was  alarmed,  the  au- 
thorities at  Washington  were  in  a  panic,  and  Grant 
himself  exhibited  more  uneasiness  than  ever  before 
or  after.  The  danger  now  was  not  that  Hood  would 
attack  Nashville — it  was  almost  certain  that  he  would 
not — but  the  danger  was  that  he  would  go  around  it 
and  continue  his  march  through  Kentucky  to  the  Ohio, 
leaving  both  Sherman's  and  Thomas's  armies  behind 
him.  He  had  not  even  waited  for  the  "invitation," 
which  Sherman  thought  Thomas  might  safely  extend, 


32O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

to  invade  Tennessee,  and  here  he  was  in  front  of 
Nashville. 

Grant,  foreseeing  the  danger,  had  sent  General  Raw- 
lins,  his  chief  of  staff,  to  St.  Louis  to  hasten  the  divi- 
sions of  General  A.  J.  Smith.  Every  day  he  became 
more  pressing  in  his  demand  that  Thomas  should  take 
the  offenaive  and  attack  Hood.  Thomas  was  ready 
to  move  December  9,  but  a  great  storm  of  sleet  fell 
upon  the  country  about  Nashville,  making  the  ground 
so  slippery  that,  until  the  I4th,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  for  infantry  to  march  on  level  ground  and 
impossible  for  them  to  ascend  the  hills  upon  which 
Hood's  army  was  entrenched,  and  the  cavalry  horses 
would  have  been  liable  to  fall  and  maim  both  them- 
selves and  their  riders.  Under  such  circumstances  an 
assault  on  the  Confederate  entrenchments  would  have 
savored  of  madness,  as  Thomas's  subordinate  generals 
in  council  of  war  agreed. 

Grant's  demands  on  Thomas  for  an  immediate  ad- 
vance became  more  urgent  every  day.  Halleck  also 
prodded  him  with  messages,  and  Stanton  sent  insult- 
ing dispatches.  The  cruelest  of  all  was  a  dispatch  sent 
by  the  latter  to  Grant  December  7,  in  which  he  said : 
"Thomas  seems  to  be  unwilling  to  attack  because  it  is 
hazardous.  If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready, 
Gabriel  will  be  blowing  his  horn."  And  this  was  said 
of  the  man  by  whose  heroic  stand,  more  than  all  else, 
the  Union  army  had  been  saved  from  annihilation  at 
Chickamauga ! 

Indeed,  for  a  few  days,  the  fault-finders  at  Wash- 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  321 

ington  made  Thomas's  life  more  miserable  than  all 
the  Confederates  that  had  ever  confronted  him  in  bat- 
tle. Notwithstanding  his  explanation  of  the  situation, 
the  carping  at  his  alleged  "slowness"  continued. 
Grant  every  day  became  more  importunate  and  plainly 
indicated  to  him  that  unless  he  made  an  immediate 
advance,  sleet  or  no  sleet,  cavalry  or  no  cavalry,  he 
was  likely  to  be  removed  from  command.  But  Thomas 
comprehended,  more  clearly  than  Grant  or  any  one 
in  Washington,  the  gravity  of  the  situation ;  he  under- 
stood his  duty  and  he  had  the  moral  heroism  that 
nerves  a  man  to  discharge  it,  fearless  of  all  personal 
consequences.  He  knew  that,  by  refusing  to  advance, 
he  was  incurring  the  displeasure  of  his  superiors,  and 
that  he  might  bring  upon  himself  the  disgrace  of  being 
removed  from  command,  but  knowing  that  to  advance 
at  that  time  would,  in  all  probability,  result  in  a  dis- 
astrous defeat  and  in  incalculable  injury  to  the  Union 
cause,  he  remained  as  immovable  in  his  purpose  as  he 
had  been  at  Chickamauga.  The  high  quality  of  moral 
heroism  which  he  exhibited  in  this  trying  situation  is 
admirably  expressed  by  Prof.  Coppee  :6 

"A  weaker  man  than  Thomas  would  have  yielded 
to  the  importunity  and  attacked  before  he  was  ready. 
Indeed,  there  seemed  little  discretion  in  the  matter. 
He  was  ordered  to  attack  at  once.  If  he  obeyed,  the 
best  interests  of  the  country  were  endangered.  If  he 

c  General  Thomas,  p.  262 

21 


322  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

did  not,  he  was  liable  to  the  charge  of  'disobedience 
of  orders.'  The  firmness  of  General  Thomas,  there- 
fore, assumes  the  proportions  of  a  martyr's  faith;  he 
would  die  for  the  cause,  for  the  honor  of  the  profession 
of  arms,  and  for  his  own  spotless  character,  rather 
than  obey  the  orders." 

Thomas  had  explained  the  situation  to  Grant  and  the 
Washington  authorities.  With  modest  dignity  he  said 
in  a  dispatch  .to  Grant  December  9 :  "I  can  only  say 
that  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and  if  you 
should  deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  me,  I  shall  submit 
without  a  murmur."  He  did  not  know  that  on  the 
very  day  he  penned  this  dispatch,  an  order,  dictated 
by  Grant,  had  been  prepared,  relieving  him  and  turn- 
ing over  his  command  to  General  Schofield.  The  or- 
der was  withheld  at  the  instance  of  Halleck,  who  re- 
deemed many  of  his  own  mistakes  by  this  one  exhibi- 
tion of  ability  to  comprehend  the  situation,  superior 
to  that  of  both  Stanton  and  Grant. 

But  Grant  would  brook  no  delay,  and  another  order, 
prepared  December  13,  was  given  to  General  Logan, 
directing  him  to  proceed  at  once  to  Nashville  and  to 
take  the  command  if  Thomas  had  not  moved  before  his 
arrival.  Grant  finally  started  to  Nashville  to  take 
command  in  person.  Fortunately  for  Thomas  and  for- 
tunately for  the  country,  the  battle  of  Nashville  had 
begun  before  the  arrival  of  either  Logan  or  Grant. 
On  the  1 4th  a  thaw  set  in  which  broke  the  sleet  block- 
ade and  orders  were  given  for  opening  the  battle  on 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  323 

the  following  day.  It  could  not  safely  have  been  be- 
gun a  day  sooner. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  tell  again  in  detail  the  story 
of  the  battle  of  Nashville.  Military  critics  unite  in 
saying  that  the  generalship  of  Thomas  was  unsur- 
passed by  that  of  any  other  general  in  any  other  battle 
of  the  Civil  War.  His  plan  of  battle  is  studied  in  mili- 
tary schools  and  will  be  for  ages,  as  a  marvelous  mas- 
terpiece of  battle  tactics.  It  was  far-reaching,  compre- 
hending the  minutest  details,  and  was  executed  with 
unerring  skill.  The  battle  was  like  a  game  of  chess 
in  which  a  skilful  player  so  disposes  his  pieces  and  so 
makes  his  moves  that  the  defeat  of  his  adversary  is 
inevitable.  The  fighting  lasted  two  days.  When  it 
ended  Hood's  army  was  utterly  broken  and  practically 
destroyed.  The  victory  at  Nashville,  quoting  again 
from  Prof.  Coppee,7  "stands  alone  as  a  unique,  thor- 
ough, magnificent  and  far-reaching  victory,  achieved 
by  the  skill  and  firmness  of  one  man,  who  had  acquired 
the  confidence  of  his  officers  and  men,  so  that  they 
fought  for  him  as  well  as  for  the  cause." 

It  was  the  last  great  battle  fought  by  General 
Thomas  and  by  the  4th  corps  or  by  any  part  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  It  was  a  fitting  climax  to 
the  military  career  of  that  great  general,  and  added 
fresh  laurels  to  the  brilliant  record  of  the  4th  corps 
and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  For  the  Confeder- 
ates it  was  the  most  crushing  defeat  inflicted  during 

7  Ibid.,  p.  276. 


324  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

the  war  upon  an  army  in  the  field.  In  the  battle  and  in 
the  rout  which  followed  Hood  lost  over  13,000  men, 
seventy-two  guns,  and  seventy  flags.  In  the  retreat 
thousands  of  Confederates,  especially  those  whose 
homes  were  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  left  the  ranks 
never  to  return.  They  were  not  cowardly  deserters. 
Far  from  it.  Among  them  were  doubtless  great  num- 
bers whose  bravery  and  whose  loyalty  to  the  Confeder- 
ate cause  had  been  amply  proved  on  many  bloody 
fields.  They  were  men  who  now  saw  plainly  the  hand- 
writing on  the  wall  and  who  were  determined  to  be 
led  no  longer  to  useless  slaughter  in  a  vain  attempt 
to  prolong  a  hopeless  struggle. 

The  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee  never 
fought  another  battle  under  that  name.  Hood  himself, 
on  January  23,  1865,  was  relieved  of  its  command  at 
his  own  request.  Between  the  Ohio  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  there  was  no  Confederate  organization  left 
which  deserved  the  name  of  army.  The  only  Confed- 
erate army  worth  considering  was  that  of  Lee,  now 
hemmed  in  between  the  great  host  of  Grant  in  front 
and  that  of  Sherman  in  the  rear.  The  final  blow  to 
the  dying  Confederacy  was  given  at  Five  Forks,  but 
the  mortal  wound  was  inflicted  at  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville. 

Mr.  Ropes,8  while  awarding  the  credit  due  to  Gen- 

8  Article  on  General  Sherman  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  Aug., 
1891,  reprinted  in  a  volume  entitled  Some  Federal  and  Confed- 
erate Commanders,  pp.  125,  144,  152,  published  by  the  Military 
Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts. 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  325 

eral  Sherman's  great  military  ability,  thus  clearly 
states  the  risks  that  attended  the  march  to  the  sea  and 
the  importance  of  Thomas's  victory  at  Nashville : 

"Yet  the  propriety  of  the  withdrawal  of  this  army 
from  the  seat  of  war  in  the  west  can  be  defended  only 
by  the  event.  To  have  imperiled  the  hold  of  the  Union 
government  on  the  states  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky ; 
to  have  exposed  all  the  posts  from  Chattanooga  to 
Nashville,  to  say  nothing  of  Louisville,  to  assault  and 
capture  by  the  Confederate  army  under  Hood ;  in  short, 
to  have  left  so  much  to  chance  when  everything  might 
so  easily  have  been  made  secure,  was  to  count  unwar- 
rantably upon  the  favors  of  fortune.  No  margin  was 
left  for  accidents.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  50,000 
men  would  not  have  served  Sherman's  purpose  as  well 
as  62,000  men;  and  assuredly  12,000  good  troops 
would  have  added  greatly  to  Thomas's  scanty  re- 
sources, and  contributed  largely  to  insure  the  destruc- 
tion of  Hood's  army,  which  alone  could  give  to  the 
strategy  which  sanctioned  the  withdrawal  of  so  many 
troops  to  the  Atlantic  coast  the  possibility  of  leading 
to  useful  results.  It  is  true  that  Thomas's  victory 
practically  attained  this  end.  In  the  march  of  his 
army  through  the  Carolinas,  Sherman  had  to  encoun- 
ter only  the  remnants  of  Hood's  defeated  and  discour- 
aged troops  added  to  the  insignificant  garrisons  of  the 
Atlantic  cities ;  and  with  these  forces  he  was  abun- 
dantly able  to  cope.  But  Thomas's  success  was  really 
unprecedented.  It  could  not  fairly  have  been  antici- 
pated. And  it  would  have  been  an  entirely  different 
matter  for  Sherman  if  Hood's  whole  army,  or  the 
greater  part  of  it,  had  confronted  him  at  the  marshes 
and  rivers  over  which  his  toilsome  and  difficult  route 
lay.  .  .  . 


/• 

326  CIVIL    WAR-TIMES 

"Thomas,  however,  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  He 
scored  a  magnificent  success  at  Nashville.  Sherman 
at  the  same  time  captured  Savannah.  Everything 
turned  out  marvelously  well.  Both  officers  showed 
themselves  at  their  best.  The  risk  having  passed  by, 
the  North  reaped  the  full  advantage  of  the  daring 
march.  The  task  then  before  Sherman  was  one  to 
which  he  was  by  nature  wonderfully  adapted,  and 
which  he  soon  brought  to  a  triumphant  end." 

The  victory  at  Nashville  was  fortunate  for  the 
Union  cause.  It  was  fortunate  for  Thomas  because 
it  saved  a  noble  soldier  the  mortification  of  a  shameful 
requital  for  four  years  of  conspicuous  services  and  un- 
flinching loyalty  to  the  Union  cause.  It  was  fortunate 
for  Sherman,  because  defeat  would  have  stripped  all 
the  glory  from  the  march  to  the  sea;  it  was  fortunate 
for  Grant,  because,  if  his  ill-advised  order  to  Logan 
had  been  carried  out,  he  would  have  been  adjudged 
guilty  of  the  most  stupendous  blunder  of  the  war. 

General  Thomas,  above  all  other  generals  who  ever 
commanded  them,  is  the  idol  of  the  survivors  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  A  born  Virginian,  he  re- 
mained steadfast  to  the  Union  cause.  His  ability  as 
a  general  was  demonstrated  on  many  fields.  There 
was  nothing  of  the  martinet  in  his  military  character. 
He  disciplined  his  troops  in  all  that  was  required  to 
make  soldiers  of  them,  but  avoided  wearing  them  out 
in  useless  drills  and  pompous  displays.  He  never  use- 
lessly sacrificed  them  in  battle.  His  fatherly  care  of 
them  was  so  proverbial  that  he  was  familiarly  known 


HOOD'S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  327 

as  "Pap  Thomas."  He  was  equally  distinguished  for 
his  generosity  and  his  sense  of  justice.  After  Halleck 
had  shelved  Grant  in  the  reorganization  of  his  army 
for  the  advance  on  Corinth,  Thomas  voluntarily  re- 
signed his  command  of  the  right  wing,  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  in  order  that  Grant  might  take  it, 
and  he  himself  resumed  the  command  of  a  single  di- 
vision in  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under  General  Buell. 
He  was  as  loyal  to  his  superiors  in  command  as  he  was 
to  the  government.  He  refused  to  take  Buell's  place 
when  it  was  offered,  because  of  his  belief  that  the  latter 
had  been  unjustly  criticized.  He  stood  by  Rosecrans 
long  after  the  hostility  of  Stanton  and  Halleck  had  be- 
come apparent,  and  after  it  had  become  equally  appar- 
ent that  they  were  seeking  some  excuse  to  remove  him 
from  command,  and  when  Thomas  must  have  known 
that  in  the  event  of  the  removal  of  Rosecrans  he  would 
become  his  successor. 

It  is  painful,  even  at  this  late  day,  to  read  of  the 
jealousy  and  envy  of  genejals  in  the  early  years  of 
the  war,  of  the  political  "pulls,"  the  intrigues  by  which 
promotion  was  sought,  of  the  disasters  that  came  be- 
cause some  risked  defeat  of  the  Union  arms  rather 
than  help  achieve  victory  under  the  leadership  of  an- 
other. Thomas's  rugged  honesty  would  have  made 
him  recoil  from  the  mere  suggestion  of  his  own  ad- 
vancement by  such  means.  Modest  and  retiring,  he 
never  thrust  himself  forward  to  grasp  for  honors; 
those  that  came  were  almost  thrust  upon  him.  When 
juniors  in  rank  were  appointed  over  him,  when  his 


328  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

own  plans  or  suggestions  were  ignored  by  his  su- 
periors, he  never,  like  Achilles,  sulked  in  his  tent,  but 
manfully  and  faithfully  persevered  in  doing  all  in  his 
power  to  aid  the  cause  he  had  espoused. 

The  affection  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  for  their  loved  commander  has  been  in- 
tensified by  the  conviction  that  he  was  unjustly  treated 
by  his  superiors  and  was  deprived,  during  his  lifetime, 
of  the  recognition  that  he  had  so  fairly  earned.  As 
the  years  go  by  General  Thomas's  fame  grows.  In 
the  estimation  of  those  who  served  under  him  no  man 
ranks  higher  on  the  splendid  roll  of  famous  Union 
generals.  But  there  is  something  more  than  admiration 
and  respect  for  his  military  abilities.  There  is  added 
a  feeling  such  as  one  entertains  for  a  kind  father. 
Other  great  Union  generals  may  be  admired  and  re- 
spected for  their  shining  soldierly  qualities  and  their 
great  achievements — the  memory  of  none  is  cherished 
with  such  deep  and  lasting  affection  as  that  of  General 
Thomas.9  • 

9  Adam  Badeau  in  his  Military  Life  of  U.  S.  Grant  has  prob- 
ably done  more  than  any  other  writer  to  cast  discredit  upon  the 
well-earned  fame  of  General  Thomas.  In  all  his  allusions  to 
Thomas  we  perceive  a  covert  attempt  to  damn  him  with  faint 
praise.  That  he  merited  some  commendation  for  his  great 
achievements  and  that  he  had  earned  the  love  of  his  soldiers  and 
the  respect  of  his  country,  Badeau  could  not  well  deny,  and  so 
there  is  a  studied  effort  to  show  that  Thomas's  "slowness"  per- 
petually exasperated  the  general-in-chief  and  thwarted  his  plans, 
and  was,  in  fact,  one  of  the  chief  drawbacks  to  the  Federal  cause 
in  the  last  year  of  the  war.  This  slowness,  which  Badeau  vari- 
ously characterizes  as  "torpor,"  "inertia,"  or  "a  provoking,  ob- 


HOOD  S    INVASION    OF    TENNESSEE  329 

stinate  delay  before  battle,"  he  would  have  us  believe  was  a  con- 
stitutional defect  in  Thomas's  character,  so  deep-seated  and 
inveterate  that  it  rendered  him  invulnerable  to  any  amount  of 
prodding  and  goading  by  his  superior  officers.  To  prove  that  he 
"was  always  heavy  and  slow,"  Badeau  has  raked  up  an  alleged 
nickname  of  "Slow  Trot  Thomas,"  a  sobriquet  which  he  says 
Thomas  acquired  as  a  West  Point  cadet  at  the  very  outset  of  his 
military  career.  We  are  assured  that  his  failure  to  carry  out 
Grant's  order  of  Nov.  7,  1863,  to  attack  Missionary  Ridge  the 
next  morning  "was  a  great  disappointment"  to  Grant ;  that  there 
was  no  necessity  for  Thomas  falling  back  to  Nashville  "except 
what  Thomas  imposed  on  himself  by  not  concentrating  earlier." 
For  his  alleged  procrastination  in  giving  battle  at  Nashville, 
Badeau  finds  no  excuse,  and  he  asserts  that  Thomas's  delays  con- 
tinued to  embarrass  Grant  in  1865  and  "now  compelled  Grant  to 
change  his  plans."  Indeed,  according  to  Badeau,  the  "torpor  of 
Thomas  in  the  Nashville  campaign  had  determined  the  general- 
in-chief  to  entrust  to  that  commander  no  more  operations  in 
which  prompt  aggressive  action  was  necessary."  Finally  we  are 
told,  notwithstanding  the  admission  that  Thomas's  signal  victory 
at  Nashville  vindicated  the  soundness  of  his  judgment  and  his 
splendid  generalship,  that  "if  Grant's  other  subordinates  had 
taken  it  upon  themselves  at  critical  moments  to  defy  his  judg- 
ments and  disregard  his  orders,  the  strategy  which  gave  Thomas 
the  opportunity  to  strike  that  blow  would  have  come  to  naught." 

At  this  day  little  weight  is  accorded  Badeau's  opinion  of  any 
Federal  general.  Van  Home,  in  his  Life  of  Thomas,  has  con- 
clusively shown  that  Badeau's  aspersions  on  his  character  are 
made  with  a  reckless,  if  not  malicious,  disregard  of  facts  which 
are  amply  established  by  the  official  records. 


CHAPTER   THIRTEEN 

THE  END  OF  AN   UNIMPORTANT   MILITARY  CAREER 

I  did  not  see  the  close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign.  My 
military  career  was  abruptly  cut  short  June  23,  1864. 
My  experience  on  the  last  day  of  service  in  the  field 
affords  a  fair  illustration  of  much  of  the  fighting  dur- 
ing the  campaign. 

The  Confederates  had  made  a  stand  at  Kenesaw 
Mountain.  On  June  23  Wood's  division  occupied  a 
position  in  the  line  six  or  eight  miles  southeast  of 
Big  Shanty,  a  small  station  on  the  railroad.  At  that 
point  the  main  lines  of  the  two  armies  were  hardly 
more  than  three  hundred  yards  apart.  The  Confed- 
erate breastworks  were  so  formidable  that  to  take  them 
by  direct  assault  was  plainly  a  hopeless  undertaking. 
In  front  of  them,  probably  seventy-five  or  one  hundred 
yards,  were  the  rifle-pits  of  the  Confederate  skirmish- 
ers. About  seventy-five  yards  in  front  of  these  were 
the  Federal  rifle-pits,  mere!)-  a  slight  barricade  of  rails, 
two  or  three  feet  high,  with  a  shallow  excavation  be- 
hind them.  To  reach  these  from  the  main  line,  the 
pickets  were  obliged  to  run  from  the  brow  of  a  little 
elevation,  exposed  at  every  step  to  the  bullets  of  the 
Confederate  skirmishers  and  sharpshooters,  jump  into 

(330) 


END    OF    MILITARY    CAREER  33! 

the  rifle-pits,  and  lie  flat  on  the  ground  all  day.  So 
close  was  the  watch  that  the  exposure  by  a  man  in  the 
rifle-pits  of  his  head,  his  arm,  or  any  part  of  his  per- 
son, instantly  drew  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharp- 
shooters. 

Six  companies  of  the  79th  were  on  skirmish  duty 
that  day  and  I  was  in  command  of  the  right  of  the  line. 
About  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  orders  came  for  the 
skirmishers  to  advance  at  the  sound  of  the  bugle  and 
to  charge  the  Confederate  rifle-pits.  I  do  not  know 
whether  the  purpose  was  to  develop  the  actual  strength 
of  the  Confederates  at  that  point,  or  to  ascertain  if 
they  had  evacuated  their  main  works,  or  whether  the 
charge  was  designed  as  a  mere  feint  to  cover  an  attack 
in  some  other  quarter.  When  the  bugle  sounded  there 
was  a  momentary  hesitation,  for  every  one  felt  that 
those  who  first  exposed  themselves  were  doomed  to  cer- 
tain death.  A  second  time  the  bugle  sounded  the  ad- 
vance, and  then  the  whole  line  of  Federal  skirmishers 
leaped  from  the  rifle-pits,  every  man  rushing  forward, 
sheltering  himself  as  much  as  possible  behind  trees 
and  stumps.  This  advance  drew  the  fire  of  the  Confed- 
erates, and  before  they  could  reload,  the  Federal  skir- 
mishers were  upon  them,  driving  them  out  of  their 
rifle-pits  and  back  into  their  main  works.  For  a  few 
seconds  not  a  Confederate  could  be  seen.  Then  came 
a  volley  and  I  felt  a  sharp,  stinging  sensation  and 
knew  that  I  had  been  hit.  As  far  as  I  could  see,  the 
space  directly  beneath  the  head-log  of  the  Confederate 
breastworks  was  filled  with  human  faces.  That  was 


332  CIVIL    WAR   TIMES 

all  we  could  see  of  those  behind  the  works  but  the  pro- 
truding guns  and  the  flash  of  their  discharge  told  very 
plainly  that  the  works  had  not  been  evacuated.  Al- 
most immediately  after  the  first  volley  the  Confederates 
made  a  counter-charge ;  reenforcements  were  sent  from 
our  lines,  and,  for  a  few  minutes,  there  was  an  almost 
hand  to  hand  struggle.  So  closely  were  the  combat- 
ants intermingled  that  a  Confederate  captain,  with 
drawn  revolver,  chased  the  color-bearer  of  the  79th 
around  a  tree  demanding  his  surrender.  It  is  almost 
needless  to  say  that  the  demand  was  emphatically  re- 
jected. Sergeant  Matthew  Chandler  of  my  company 
assisted  me  to  the  rear.  As  we  were  leaving  the  field 
we  were  pursued  by  two  Confederates.  They  were 
about  to  overtake  us  when  Chandler  turned  and  shot 
one  of  them.  He  fell  dead  and  the  other  stopped. 

This  engagement  was  never  specially  mentioned  in 
the  official  reports.  It  was  only  a  skirmish,  and  yet 
two  men  of  my  company,  which  numbered  about 
twenty-five  on  the  skirmish  line,  and  five  Federal 
commissioned  officers  standing  within  twenty-five 
yards  of  me,  were  killed  within  less  than  ten  minutes. 
Similar  skirmishing  occurred  almost  every  day  at  va- 
rious points  along  the  lines. 

The  rest  of  the  story  of  my  military  career  can  be 
briefly  told.  I  was  taken  to  one  of  the  general  field 
hospital  tents  in  the  rear.  There  I  rested  for  three 
days  on  a  cot  laid  on  the  ground.  All  was  done  for  me 
that  could  be  done  there.  The  surroundings  were  not 
very  cheerful,  and  now  and  then  I  involuntarily  shud- 


END    OF    MILITARY    CAREER  333 

dered  as  I  looked  through  the  opening  of  the  tent  and 
spied  a  hospital  attendant  carrying  an  armful  of  am- 
putated legs  and  arms  with  as  much  indifference  as 
if  they  had  been  so  many  sticks  of  stovewood. 

On  June  27,  the  day  of  the  general  assault  on  Ken- 
esaw  Mountain,  the  ambulances  having  been  sent  to 
the  front,  I  was  put  in  a  government  wagon  and 
hauled  eight  miles  over  a  new  corduroy  road  to  Big 
Shanty,  the  nearest  railroad  station,  where  I  was  put 
on  board  a  freight  train  with  three  or  four  hundred 
wounded  soldiers.  There  were  various  delays,  occa- 
sioned by  the  passing  of  other  trains  and  anticipated 
attacks  of  guerrillas,  and  our  train  did  not  reach  Chat- 
tanooga until  nearly  noon  on  the  29th. 

On  my  arrival  there  I  was  put  into  an  ambulance 
and  driven  to  the  officers'  hospital  on  Lookout  Moun- 
tain. As  the  ambulance  neared  the  hospital  I  observed 
several  female  nurses  moving  about  and  instantly  it 
occurred  to  me  that  I  was  appareled  in  a  style  scarcely 
befitting  my  return  to  civilized  society.  One  leg  of 
my  trousers  had  been  cut  off  to  facilitate  the  dressing 
of  my  wound,  and,  as  the  weather  was  very  hot,  I  had 
not  paid  much  attention  to  the  remnant  which  entirely 
disappeared  on  the  way  to  Chattanooga,  so  that  when 
I  arrived  at  the  hospital  I  found  myself  bereft  of  every 
stitch  of  clothing  except  a  very  short  blouse  and  a 
very  short  undershirt.  However,  the  driver  lent  me 
a  long-tailed  rubber  overcoat,  in  which  I  was  smug- 
gled into  the  hospital  without  attracting  special  atten- 
tion. 


334  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

It  was  found  that  I  had  a  very  bad  wound,  but  I 
received  every  possible  attention  from  the  kind  hos- 
pital surgeon  in  charge,  Dr.  J.  G.  McPheeters,  and 
his  attentive  assistants.  In  about  five  weeks  I  was 
pronounced  strong  enough  to  be  sent  home  on  fur- 
lough. I  reached  Franklin  August  4.  At  that  stage 
in  the  war  the  return  of  dead  and  wounded  soldiers 
had  long  ceased  to  be  an  unusual  spectacle.  Four  old 
friends  of  the  family  met  me  at  the  railroad  station. 
Any  of  them  could  easily  have  carried  me  on  one  arm, 
so  poor  and  thin  had  I  grown,  but  they  put  me  on  a 
stretcher  and  tenderly  bore  me  home.  My  mother 
was  waiting  at  the  gate  to  clasp  in  her  arms  once  more 
her  boy,  the  mere  shadow  of  his  former  self,  but  still 
alive.  She  had  discharged  her  duty  to  her  country 
and  I  had  discharged  mine. 

My  wound  healed  slowly.  It  was  several  months 
before  I  could  sit  in  a  chair  and  many  months  after 
that  before  I  could  walk  without  crutches.  On  No- 
vember 10,  1864,  I  was  honorably  discharged  from  the 
service.  The  day  that  I  received  notice  of  it  I  hob- 
bled on  crutches  to  my  stepfather's  law  office  and 
resumed  the  study  of  law.  I  had  laid  aside  forever 
the  duties  of  an  American  soldier,  thenceforth  to  re- 
sume the  less  dangerous,  but  not  less  important  duties 
of  an  American  citizen. 


CHAPTER  FOURTEEN 

THE    STORY    TOLD    BY    THE    STATISTICS 

The  United  States  government  has  published  a 
great  mass  of  records,  both  Federal  and  Confederate, 
relating  to  the  Civil  War,  including  reports  of  battles, 
military  reports,  correspondence,  and  documents  of 
all  kinds.  The  volumes,  popularly  known  as  the  "Re- 
bellion Records,"  are  bulky  and  now  number  130. 
These  are  the  great  storehouse  of  information  relating 
to  the  war.1 

A  large  amount  of  information  is  to  be  gathered 
from  the  muster-out  rolls  on  file  in  the  United  States 

1  There  is  much  diversity  in  the  methods  of  citing  these  vol- 
umes. The  official  title  printed  on  the  back  of  each  is :  War  of 
the  Rebellion.  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
Armies.  They  are  variously  cited  as  Official  Records,  War  Rec- 
ords, or  Rebellion  Records.  I  have  referred  to  them  by  their 
popular  title,  or  by  the  abbreviation  Reb.  Rec.  To  one  not  fa- 
miliar with  the  method  of  citation  there  may  also  be  difficulty  in 
following  references  to  volumes  prior  to  the  one  now  designated 
as  "Serial  Number  36"  which,  according  to  the  original  and 
cumbrous  method  of  citation  adopted  by  the  government,  was 
"Series  i,  Vol.  XXIV,  Part  i."  This  and  following  volumes 
now  have  double  labels,  one  designating  the  series,  volumes  and 
parts,  and  the  other  the  serial  number.  The  volumes  subsequent 
to  vol.  35  are  usually  referred  to  by  the  serial  numbers ;  those 
prior  to  that  volume  by  series,  etc. 

(335) 


336  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

war  department  and  in  the  archives  of  the  different 
states.  Indiana  has  published  eight  large  volumes, 
compiled  by  Adjutant-General  Wm.  H.  H.  Terrell, 
containing  not  only  the  muster-out  rolls  of  the  various 
military  organizations  contributed  by  the  state  during 
the  Civil  War,  but  also  a  brief  history  of  each.  Other 
northern  states  have  issued  similar  publications,  but 
few  are  so  complete  as  those  of  Indiana.  North  Caro- 
lina has  published  a  roster  of  the  Confederate  organi- 
zations contributed  by  that  state.  But  many  states  are 
still  much  behind  in  such  work;  some  have  not  even 
printed  their  muster-out  rolls  and  the  information 
contained  in  them  can  be  found  only  in  the  unpublished 
records. 

To  make  all  this  mass  of  facts  available  to  the  gen- 
eral reader  requires  long  and  laborious  investigation 
and  study.  No  single  volume  yet  published  gives 
such  an  exhaustive  compilation  of  statistics  as  that  of 
Colonel  Fox,  entitled  Regimental  Losses  in  the  Amer- 
ican Civil  War,  published  in  1898.  A  smaller  book, 
by  Colonel  Thomas  L.  Livermore,  entitled  Numbers 
and  Losses  in  the  Civil  War  in  America,  has  recently 
passed  to  a  second  edition.  It  contains  in  a  condensed 
form  a  great  deal  of  information  compiled  from  official 
records,  the  portion  relating  to  the  numbers  and  losses 
of  the  Confederates  being  especially  valuable  and  in- 
teresting. Many  statistics  are  also  to  be  found  in  the 
Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  published  by 
the  Century  Company,  and  in  Phisterer's  Statistical 
Records  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States.  Besides 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  337 

these,  there  are  multitudes  of  histories  of  the  war,  of 
particular  campaigns  and  battles,  regimental  histories, 
etc.,  in  which  statistics  of  various  kinds  may  be  found. 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  exact  number  of  men 
enlisted  on  each  side.  Some  of  the  records  have  been 
lost ;  others  were  imperfectly  kept ;  the  enlistments  cov- 
ered various  periods,  and  some  men  enlisted  more  than 
once.  Reducing  the  whole  number  to  a  three-years' 
basis,  Colonel  Fox's  estimate  of  the  total  number  of 
men  enlisted  in  the  northern  armies  is  2,326,168  while 
that  of  Colonel  Livermore  is  i, 556,678. 2 

It  has  been  much  more  difficult  to  ascertain  the  total 
number  of  enlistments  in  the  Confederate  armies.  For 
a  long  time  those  speaking  from  the  Confederate  stand- 
point assumed  that  it  did  not  exceed  600,000,  but  Col- 
onel Livermore  has  shown  that  it  was  much  larger — 
nearer  1,000,000. 

Mere  figures  do  not  convey  a  tangible  idea.  We  ob- 
tain a  clearer  conception  of  the  great  armies  in  the  last 
year  of  the  war,  of  their  composition  and  dimensions, 
from  General  Webb's  statement  of  the  organization 
and  strength  of  the  army  with  which  General  Grant 
entered  upon  the  Virginia  campaign  in  April,  1864. 
He  says  :3 

2  The  variance  is  chiefly  the  result  of  differences  in  the  method 
of  computing  the  term  of  service  of  those  who  enlisted  for  three 
years,  but   who   were   discharged  before  the  expiration  of  that 
period  by  reason   of  the  close  of  the  war.     See  Numbers  and 
Losses,  2d  ed.,  p.  49. 

3  Article  on  Through  the  Wilderness,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the 
Civil  War,  vol.  4,  p.  152. 

22 


33$  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

"The  total  force  under  General  Grant,  including 
Burnside,  was  4,409  officers  and  114,360  enlisted  men. 
For  the  artillery  he  had  9,945  enlisted  men  and  285 
officers;  in  the  cavalry  11,839  enlisted  men  and  585 
officers;  in  the  provost  guards  and  engineers  120  offi- 
cers and  3,274  enlisted  men.  His  118,000  men,  prop- 
erly disposed  for  battle,  would  have  covered  a  front 
of  twenty-one  miles,  two  ranks  deep,  with  one-third  of 
them  held  in  reserve ;  while  Lee,  with  his  62,000  men, 
similarly  disposed,  would  cover  only  twelve  miles. 
Grant  had  a  train  which  he  states  in  his  'Memoirs' 
would  have  reached  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond, 
or  sixty-five  miles." 

What  became  of  the  vast  host  enrolled  in  the  Fed- 
eral and  Confederate  armies  ?  Of  those  in  the  Federal 
armies  Colonel  Fox  estimates  that  there  were 

Killed  in  battle  (including  those  who  died  of  wounds) 110,070 

Died  of  disease ioa>72° 

Deaths  from  all  causes 359>528 

It  is  impossible  to  make  an  accurate  statement  of 
the  Confederate  losses.  The  number  of  those  killed 
in  battle  or  died  of  wounds  has  been  variously  esti- 
mated; it  is  stated  by  Colonel  Fox  as  at  least  94,000. 
The  lowest  estimate  of  the  number  of  those  who  died 
of  disease  is  59,297. 

It  is  difficult  to  form  an  adequate  idea,  from  these 
figures,  of  the  enormous  number  killed  and  died  of 
wounds.  The  number  in  fact  was  much  larger  than 
that  given  by  the  statistics,  for  these  include  only 
those  who  died  in  service,  while  many  died  of  wounds 
after  their  discharge  from  the  army.  Instances  are 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  339 

not  rare  of  men  who  died  many  years  after  the  close 
of  the  war  from  wounds  received  in  the  service. 

Persons  not  familiar  with  the  statistics  usually  im- 
agine that  most  of  those  who  died  in  the  service  died 
on  the  battle-field  or  as  the  result  of  wounds  received 
in  battle.  In  fact  the  number  of  those  who  died  from 
disease  was  nearly  twice  as  large  as  the  number  killed 
in  battle,  or,  exactly  stated,  199,720.  Colonel  Fox 
states  that  of  those  who  died  from  disease,  one-fourth 
died  from  fevers,  principally  typhoid ;  one- fourth  from 
diarrhea  or  other  bowel  trouble;  nearly  one-fourth 
from  consumption  or  other  pulmonary  disease,  and 
the  remainder  from  various  other  diseases. 

The  statement  of  the  number  of  deaths  from  disease 
is  remarkable  when  considered  in  connection  with  the 
fact  that,  before  being  mustered  in,  a  physical  exami- 
nation was  made  of  the  enlisted  men,  and  that  most 
of  them  were  young,  strong,  and  robust ;  but  it  is  not 
surprising  when  we  consider  the  exposures  to  which 
they  were  subjected,  the  unhealthy  camps,  the  poor 
diet,  the  bad  water,  and  the  great  physical  and  mental 
strain  to  which  they  were  subjected.  My  company 
on  December  I,  1862,  numbered  ninety,  rank  and  file. 
Of  these  ten  died  of  disease  in  that  month.  We  can 
form  some  idea  of  this  per  cent,  of  mortality  if  we  im- 
agine a  village  of  nine  hundred  in  which  one  hundred 
are  carried  off  by  cholera  or  other  epidemic  in  one 
month. 

But  appalling  as  are  these  statistics  of  the  loss  of 
life,  they  do  not  by  any  means  tell  the  whole  story  of 


34-O  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

those  who  died  from  disease ;  for  many  of  those  dis- 
charged for  disability  died  after  reaching  home,  and 
of  these  the  army  records  give  no  account.  The  men 
who  died  either  in  or  out  of  the  army,  from  disease 
contracted  in  the  service,  as  truly  gave  their  lives  for 
their  country  as  did  those  who  died  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle. Nor  do  the  statistics  tell  of  all  who  lived,  some 
of  whom  still  live,  with  broken  health  and  shattered 
constitutions. 

Notwithstanding  the  drafts  ordered  during  the  war 
there  were  very  few  drafted  men  in  the  Federal  armies 
in  proportion  to  the  total  enrollment.  The  total  num- 
ber held  to  service,  as  given  by  Colonel  Fox,  was 
52,068. 

There  was  also  a  very  small  percentage  of  regulars 
in  proportion  to  the  volunteers.  "At  no  time,"  Col- 
onel Fox  states,4  "during  the  period  of  active  hostili- 
ties, did  the  regular  army  number,  present  and  ab- 
sent, over  26,000,  officers  and  men." 

There  are  some  curious  statistics  concerning  the 
number  of  deserters.  In  the  regular  army  the  loss 
by  desertions  was  24  per  cent.,  while  in  the  volun- 
teer service  it  was  only  6  per  cent.  But,  according 
to  the  provost  marshal  general,  25  per  cent,  of 
those  reported  as  deserters  were  wrongly  reported. 
I  have  no  doubt  of  the  truth  of  this  statement. 
There  was  but  one  real  deserter  from  my  company, 
though  several  men  who  had  been  sent  home  on 

4  Reg.  Losses,  p.  528. 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  341 

sick  furloughs  from  various  hospitals  were  reported 
by  the  hospital  authorities  as  deserters  and  were  so 
entered  on  the  muster-rolls.  All  of  them  afterward 
rejoined  the  company,  when  it  was  ascertained  that 
they  had  been  unable  from  sickness,  inability  to  get 
transportation,  or  other  meritorious  excuse,  to  return 
to  the  hospitals  at  the  expiration  of  their  furloughs. 

The  most  interesting  statistics,  on  the  compilation 
of  which  the  greatest  labor  has  been  expended,  are 
those  relating  to  the  battles  in  which  the  armies  were 
engaged.  These  give  the  number  engaged,  the  num- 
ber killed,  wounded  and  captured,  the  number  hit  in 
every  1,000,  the  proportion  of  the  number  killed  and 
wounded  to  the  number  engaged,  and  various  other 
curious  facts. 

The  magnitude  of  the  Civil  War  will  most  clearly 
be  perceived  by  comparing  it  with  prior  wars  of  this 
country.  The  statistics  given  in  Spofford's  American 
Almanac  for  i8865  of  the  Mexican  War  and  the  War 
of  1812,  are  as  follows: 

Mexican   War   1846-1848: 

Total  American  troops  enrolled 101,282 

Total   killed 1,049 

Total  died  of  wounds 508 

Total  wounded 3,420 

4,977 

1  P.  23. 


342  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

War  1812-1815: 

The  whole  number  of  regulars  during  the  entire 
service  can  not  be  accurately  given,  but  there  were  in 
service  in  February  1815,  33,424.  The  whole  number 
of  militia  enrolled  during  the  war  was  471,622  and  the 
losses  were  : 

Killed  ................................  1,877 

Wounded    ............................  3,737 


The  battles  of  the  Revolution  deservedly  occupy  a 
prominent  place  in  history,  but  they  seem  insignificant 
when  compared  with  those  of  the  Civil  War.  The 
official  records  of  the  Revolutionary  battles,  especially 
those  relating  to  the  militia,  are  very  imperfect  and  it 
is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  discrepancies  in  the  un- 
official accounts  given  of  the  numbers  and  losses. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  May  10,  1790,° 
gives  the  number  of  troops  from  each  of  the  thirteen 
states  during  the  years  1775-1783,  including  conti- 
nental soldiers  and  militia.  The  largest  number  in 
service  at  any  time  was  in  the  year  1776,  when  it 
amounted  to  89,651.  In  the  last  year,  1783,  it  was 
13,476.  The  following  table  is  probably  sufficiently 
accurate  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  comparison  be- 
tween the  battles  of  the  Revolution  and  those  of  the 
Civil  War:7 

*  American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  vol.  i,  pp.  14-19.  An 
abstract  of  this  report  will  be  found  in  Spofford's  American 
Almanac  for  1886,  p.  23. 

1  This  table  does  not  include  the  naval  engagements  and  omits 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS 


343 


NUMBERS  AND  LOSSES  IN  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


Battle—  Date. 

Engaged. 

•d 

0) 

I 

Wounded. 

bi 
a 

01 

i 

•o  a 

d  U 

IS-o" 
CIA  £ 
"  i-  u 

U  OT3 

3 
0 

H 

Lexington,  April  19, 

A 

8 

Q 

17 

1775. 

R 

I,7OO 

Concord,  April  19, 

A 

41 

"V) 

t 

8c 

1771. 

B 

68 

178 

a| 

272 

Noddles  Island,  May 

A 

27,  1775. 

B 

2 

2 

4 

Bunker  Hill,  Tune  17, 

A, 

3,OOO 

136 

304 

9 

44O 

1771. 

B 

4.1OO 

22O 

828 

I.O14 

Montreal,  Sept.  25, 

A 

IIO 

7 

21 

28 

1771. 

B 

21O 

Quebec,  Dec.  31, 

A 

QOO 

1O 

no 

426 

626 

1771. 

B 

I,2OO 

C 

17 

18 

Moore's  Cr'k  Bridge, 

A 

I 

I 

2 

N.C.,  Feb.  27,  1776. 

B 

IO 

2O 

^o 

Sullivan's  Island  or 

A 

12 

21 

77 

Ft.  Moultrie,  S.  C.,  - 

B 

64 

141 

20  1 

June  28,  1776.           ( 

some  insignificant  skirmishes  and  "affairs,"  and  also  various  en- 
gagements between  the  Patriots  or  Whigs  on  one  side  and  the 
Tories  on  the  other,  but  it  includes  all  the  principal  land  battles 
of  the  Revolution  and  most  of  the  minor  engagements.  In  com- 
piling the  table  I  have  taken  the  numbers  of  those  engaged  from 
Townsend's  U.  S.  Curious  Facts,  pp.  338-9.  This  author  does 
not  cite  his  authorities  and  I  have  been  unable  to  verify  his  fig- 
ures. 

Statements  of  the  numbers  of  killed,  wounded  and  missing  in 
some  of  the  battles  are  given  in  Bancroft's  Hist,  of  the  U.  States, 
but,  in  the  main,  I  have  adopted  the  figures  kindly  furnished  me 
by  Colonel  William  F.  Fox,  author  of  Regimental  Losses.  These 
correspond  substantially  with  those  given  in  Dawson's  Battles  of 
the  United  States,  Lossing's  Field  Book  of  the  Revolution,  and 
Carrington's  Battles  of  the  Revolution.  In  a  few  instances  the 
numbers  given  are  only  estimates  and  these  are  indicated  by 
asterisks. 


344 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 


Battle—  Date. 

Engaged. 

-6 

o 

i 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

T}  a 

U   -j 
>-  u- 

55-g 

oc/2  2 

"  l.  0 

U  0-0 

a 
"o 
H 

Long  Island,  N.  Y.,     ( 

A 

IO.OOO 

*4O 

*i6o 

*I,OQ7 

*I.2O7 

August  27.  1776. 

R 

20,000 

64 

282 

21 

•^67 

Harlem  Plains,  N.  Y  ,  < 

A 

17 

4O 

C7 

Sept.  16,  1776           | 

R 

14. 

78 

O2 

White  Plains,  N.  Y., 

A 

1,  600 

CO 

*5 

^O 

f 

16^ 

Oct.  28,  1776. 

R 

2,OOO 

48 

1*3 

2O 

271 

Ft.  Washington, 
N.Y.,  Nov.  16,  1776.  " 

A. 
R 

3.OOO 
5,OOO 

54 
79 

93 

375 

214 

6 

2,6OO 

y 

2,061 

460 

Trenton,  N.  J.,  Dec. 

A 

2,400 

2 

4 

6 

26,  1776. 

R 

5,OOO 

^O 

50 

018 

008 

Princeton,  N.  J.,  Jan. 

A 

3,OOO 

2O 

40 

60 

7.  1777. 

R 

1,  800 

18 

58 

2OO 

276 

Danbury,  Conn  , 

A 

20 

AQ 

60 

April  215-27.  1777. 

R 

*5o 

*I^O 

*20 

200 

Hubbardton,  Vt., 

A 

7OO 

so 

66 

228 

724 

July  4-7,  1777. 

R 

I,2OO 

55 

148 

2O  7 

Oriskany  or 

A 

*IOO 

*7OO 

4OO 

Ft.  Schuyler,  N.Y., 

R 

*IOO 

*7oo 

4OO 

Aug.  2-22,  1777. 
Bennmgton,  Vt., 

A 

2,OOO 

30 

40 

7O 

Aug.  1  6,  1777. 

R 

I.2OO 

207 

744 

Q5I 

Brandywine,  Pa., 

A 

I  I,OOO 

200 

800 

2OO 

I,2OO 

Sept.  II,  1777. 

R 

l8,OOO 

oo 

488 

6 

584 

Bemis  Heights  or 

A 

2,500 

65 

218 

38 

721 

Stillwater,  N.  Y., 

R 

7,000 

*2OO 

*4OO 

6OO 

Sept.  19,  1777. 
Paoh,  Pa.,  Sept.  20, 

A 

moo 

*IOO 

*2OO 

80 

380 

1777. 

R 

4 

4 

38 

Germantown,  Pa., 

A 

11,000 

152 

521 

400 

I,O77 

Oct.  4,  1777. 

R 

15,000 

IOO 

400 

^5 

535 

Ft.  Clinton,  N.  Y., 

A 

*;o 

*i8o 

*  3 

*2O 

2  5O 

Oct.  6,  1777. 

R 

*10 

*KO 

IOO 

Saratoga,  N.  Y., 

A 

13,222 

40 

no 

150 

Oct.  17,  1777. 
Ft.  Mercer,  N.  J., 

'B. 

A 

8,000 

45O 

*5o 
14 

*3oo 

21 

*i5o 
I 

5.791 

f    ^ 

6,291 
38 

Oct.  22,  1777. 

R 

2,OOO 

78 

150 

& 

Ft.  Mifflin,  Pa.,  Nov. 

!  A 

*5o 

J,  -' 
*2OO 

2;o 

IO-I5.  1777. 

R 

H 

24 

^7 

Whitemarsh,  Pa., 

i  A 

10 

34 

44 

Dec.  5-8,  1777. 

IB 

8 

s 

26 

34 

Monmouth,  N.  J., 

A 

I2.OOO 

60 

161 

172 

362 

Tune  28,  1778. 

!R. 

11.000 

6=; 

160 

61 

286 

STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS 


345 


Battle—  Date. 

Engaged. 

-6 
6 

2 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

•a  a 

<u  o> 

pi 

U  o-o 

« 

o 
H 

Wyoming,  Pa.,     (  A. 
July  1-4,  1778.  |  B. 
Ft.  Boone,  Ky.,  Aug. 
8-20,  1778. 
Quaker  Hill,  R.  I., 
Aug.  29,  1778. 
Tappan,  N.  Y.,  Sept. 
27,  1778. 
Cherry  Valley,  N.  Y., 
Nov.  11,  1778. 
Savannah,  .Ga.,  Dec. 
29,  1778. 
Sunbury,  Ga.,  Jan. 

9,  1779- 
Beaufort  or  Port  Roy- 
al, S.  C.,  Feb.  3,  '79, 
Kettle  Creek,  Ga., 
Feb.  14,  1779- 
Brier  Creek,  Ga., 
March  3,  1779. 
Stono  Ferry,  S.  C., 
June  20,  1779. 
New  Haven,  Conn., 
July  5,  1779. 
Stony  Point,  N.  Y., 
July  16,  1779. 
Paulus  Hook,  N.  J., 
Aug.  19,  1779. 
Newtown  or  Che-    (  1 
mung,  N.  Y.,         •]  ] 
Aug  29,1779.       (t 
Siege  of  Savan-    (  A  , 
nah,  Ga.,  Sept.  ]  ^ 
23-Oct.  1  8,  I779( 
Young's  House,  N. 
Y.,  Feb.  3,  1780. 
Siegeof  Charleston, 
S.  C.,  March  29- 
May  13,  1780. 
Waxhaws,  S.  C.,  May 
29,  1780. 
Springfield,  N.  J., 
Tune  23,  1780. 

&I. 

A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
|A. 
i  B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A 

40O 
I,OOO 

227 

IO 
2 

37 

3°. 
38 

40 
i 
32 

227 
i06 

137 

211 

260 
60 
I 
62 

40 
4 

IOO 

137 

2IO 
20 

5,000 
5,000 

44 
12 

30 

&I.  .. 

900 
2,000 

2OO 
2,OOO 

80 
3 
4 
I 
8 
15 
9 
40 
20 

5 
*3Q 
26 

22 

9 
15 
20 

*4 

*IO 

7 

2OO 
10 

7 
3 

22 
52 
23 
1  2O 

50 
II 

*ii6 
103 

17 
40 

83 
74 
*i6 
*4O 
3° 

453 

733 
13 

200 

4 
30 
75 
32 
235 
259 
16 
301 
130 

39 
74 

<?* 
624 

20 
208 
37 

189 

8 

75 

2.OOO 
1  ,800 
800 
2.OOO 

189 

155 
i 

B. 

A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 

}.' 
v.  I. 

kF. 

A. 
B. 

A. 
B. 

A. 
B. 

ii.. 

B. 

25 

1,200 
6OO 
4OO 
208 
4,500 

1,500 

4,500 
2,OOO 

58 

472 

158 

228 
40 

14 

5 

gl 
76 

"3 
16 

13 

610 
63 

37 
18 

148 
189 

203 

12 

61 

838 
155 
119 
23 
2,240 
265 

316 
28 
83 

52 
68 

3.900 
9.OOO 

400 

2,000 

3,OOO 

q.ooo 

9 

346 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 


Battle—  Date. 

Engaged. 

T3 
JU 

1 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

T3  C 
-    O 

SZ-v 

^  " 

U  OT3 

"S 
o 

H 

Rocky  Mount,  S.  C., 

A 

600 

A 

IO 

14 

July  30,  1780. 

R 

c.oo 

IO 

IO 

2O 

Green  Spring,  S.  C., 

A 

4 

2^ 

27 

Aug.  i,  1780. 

R 

28 

28 

Hanging  Rock,  S.  C., 

(  A 

600 

12 

41 

c-i 

Aug.  6,  1780. 

'  R 

500 

2^ 

4° 

2O6 

l^ 
260 

Camden,  S.  C.,  Aug. 
1  6,  1780. 

A. 
R 

3,000 

2  2OO 

*2OO 

68 

*5oo 
24  c 

*3OO 
II 

*I,OOO 

„,  *"2 

*2,OOO 

-321 

Musgrove's  Mill, 

A 

e 

ii 

•**3 

16 

S.  C.,Aug.  18,  1780. 

R 

86 

78 

164 

Fishing  Creek,  S.  C., 

A 

*^o 

*I2O 

^oo 

4C,O 

Aug.  18,  1780. 

R 

o 

6 

1C 

Charlotte,  N.  C., 

A 

6 

n 

IO 

Sept.  26,  1780. 

R 

King's  Mountain, 

A 

OOO 

28 

60 

88 

S.  C.,  Oct.  7,  1780. 

R 

I  IOO 

22S 

26^? 

718 

1,206 

Blackstocks,  S.  C., 

[  A 

1 

4 

7 

Nov.  20,  1780. 

IR 

O2 

IOO 

I  Q2 

Cowpens,  S.  C., 

A 

OOO 

12 

60 

72 

Jan.  17,  1781. 

R 

I,  IOO 

IOO 

220 

coo 

820 

GuilfordCt.H.,S.C, 

A 

4,4.01 

78 

183 

1,  016 

I.1O7 

March  15,  1781. 

R 

2  4OO 

I  Co 

"^1 

2$ 

ISII 

Hobkirks  Hill,  S.  C., 

A 

I  5OO 

IQ 

IIS 

T36 

27O 

April  25,  1781.          | 

R 

oCo 

18 

2OO 

2O 

258 

Siege  of  Augusta, 

A 

*IO 

*T,O 

4O 

Ga.,  April  i6-June 

R 

^oo 

TOO 

5,  1781. 
Ft.  Ninety-Six,  S.  C., 

A. 

I,  OOO 

4.0 

nc 

ISC. 

June  19,  1791. 

R 

ceo 

2C. 

£. 
OO 

Jamestown  Ford,Va., 

A 

2O 

80 

18 

118 

July  6,  1781. 

R 

2O 

ee 

7S 

Ft.  Griswold,  Conn., 

A 

ICO 

OC 

7< 

1  7O 

Sept.  6,  1781. 

R 

800 

48 

I41? 

IQI 

Eutaw  Springs,  S.C., 

A 

2,OOO 

114 

73 
262 

^2 

408 

Sept.  8,  1781. 

R 

2,8OO 

85 

1CI 

257 

60^ 

Yorktown,  Va.,  Sept. 

A 

l6,OOO 

72 

202 

274 

28-Oct.  19,  1781. 

B. 

8,000 

156 

326 

70 

7,073 

7,625 

STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS 

SUMMARY. 


347 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Captured 
or 
Surren- 
dered. 

Total. 

Americans  
British  

3»112 

1.212 

7,518 

8,114. 

3.415 
1,217 

8,064 
l6,88o 

22,IOg 
20,641 

Total  

6,124 

15,812 

4,652 

24,944 

51,752 

Killed,  wounded,  missing,  captured  or  surrendered: 

Americans 22,109 

British 29,643 


Killed,  wounded  and  missing: 

Americans 14.045 

British 12,763 


51.752 


26,808 


Killed  and  wounded: 

Americans 10,630 

British 11,526 

22,156 

It  would  require  too  much  space  to  give  the  numbers 
and  losses  in  each  of  the  battles  of  the  Civil  War. 
Those  stated  in  the  following  table,  compiled  mainly 
from  Livermore's  Numbers  and  Losses,  are  for  bat- 
tles in  which  the  total  engaged  was  50,000  or  more. 
In  preceding  chapters  are  given  fuller  statistics  of  the 
battles  of  Stone's  River,  Chickamauga,  and  Missionary 
Ridge. 


348 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 


NUMBERS  AND  LOSSES  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


-a 

Tj 

i 

f 

ti 

o 

Battle. 

9 

•u 
I 

c 

3 

d 
°3 

"B 

a 

S 

O 

.'— 

o 

W 

M 

* 

& 

H 

Shiloh,  April  6-7,  1862. 

F. 
C. 

62,682 
40,335 

1,754 
1,723 

8,408 

8,OI2 

2,885 
959 

13,047 
10,694 

Williamsburg,  May 

F. 

40,768 

456 

1,410 

373 

2,239 

4-5,  1862. 

(F' 

31$23 

K.&W. 

1,570 

133 

1,703 

Fair  Oaks,  May  31- 

41,797 

790 

3,594 

647 

5,031 

June  i,  1862. 

c.' 

41,816 

980 

4,749 

405 

6,134 

Gaines's  Mill,  June  27, 

F. 

34,214 

894 

2,836 

6,837 

1862. 

C. 

57,Ol8 

K.,  W. 

&'M. 

8,71:1 

Seven  Days',  June  25 

F. 

J  1  )v  *  *» 

91,169 

1.734 

8,062 

6,053 

v»/  J  * 

15,849 

to  July  i,  1862. 

C. 

95,481 

3,478 

16,261 

875 

20,614 

Manassas  &  Chantilly, 

F. 

75,696 

8,372 

5,958 

16,054 

Aug.  27-Sept.  2,  1862. 

C. 

48,527 

1481 

7,627 

89 

9,197 

Antietam,  Sept.  16-17, 

!F- 

75,316 

2,108 

9,549 

753 

12,410 

1862. 

C. 

51,844 

2,700 

9,024 

2,000 

13,724 

Perryville,  Oct.  8,  1862. 

i£ 

36,940 
l6,OOO 

845 
510 

2,851 
2,635 

515 
251 

4,211 

3,396 

Fredericksburg,  Dec. 

\F' 

106,007 

1,284 

9,600 

1,769 

12,653 

13,  1862. 

'C. 

72,497 

595 

4,061 

653 

5,309 

Stone's  River,  Dec.  31, 

\F' 

41,400 

i,677 

7,543 

3,686 

12,906 

1862,  to  Jan.  i,  1863. 

(C. 

34,732 

1,294 

7,945 

2,500 

n.739 

Chancellorsville,  May 

|F. 

97,382 

1,575 

9,594 

5,676 

16,845 

1-4,  1863. 

'C. 

57,352 

1,665 

9,081 

2,018 

12,764 

Champion  Hill,  May 

1F- 

29,373 

410 

1,844 

187 

2,441 

1  6,  1863. 

|C. 

2O,OOO 

381 

i  ,800 

1,670 

3,851 

Assault  on  Vicksburg, 

\F- 

45,556 

502 

2,550 

147 

3,199 

May  22,  1863. 

'  C. 

22,301 

Gettysburg,  July  1-3, 

IF. 

-88,289 

3,155 

14,529 

5,365 

23,049 

1863. 

•  c 

75,000 

3'9°3 

18,735 

5,425 

28,063 

Chickamauga,  Sept. 

IF. 

-58,222 

i,657 

9,756 

4,757 

16,170 

19-20,  1863. 

'C. 

66,326 

2,312 

14,674 

1,468 

18,454 

Chattanooga,  Nov.  23- 

\F- 

56,359 

753 

4,722 

349 

5,824 

25,  1863. 

'C. 

46,165 

361 

2,160 

4,146 

6,667 

Mine  Run,  Nov.  27- 

!F- 

69,643 

173 

1,099 

381 

1,653 

Dec.  i,  1863. 

[C. 

44,426 

no 

570 

65 

745 

Wilderness,  May  5-7, 

\F- 

101,895 

2,246 

12,037 

3,383 

17,666 

1864. 

1  C. 

61,025 

Spottsylvania,  May  12, 

F. 

65,785 

K.&W. 

6,020 

800 

6,820 

1864. 

1  C. 

Cold  Harbor,  June  1—3, 

i  F. 

I  O7  OO7 

K.&W. 

12,000 

12,000 

1864. 

C. 

x  w/  ,y^/ 

STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS 


349 


BaUle. 

Engaged. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

IB 

in 

_o 

~a 
o 
H 

Petersburg,  June  15-18, 

63,797 

K.,  W. 

&  M. 

8,  1  50 

1864. 

r 

41,400 

Atlanta,  July  22,  1864. 

F. 
C. 

30,477 
36,934 

430 
K.&W. 

1,559 
7.OOO 

i,733 
1,000 

3,722 
8,000 

Winchester  Sept.  19, 

F. 

37,7H 

697 

3,983 

338 

5,018 

1864. 

C. 

16,377 

276 

1,827 

1,818 

3,921 

Cedar  Creek,  Oct.  19, 

F. 

30,829 

644 

3,430 

i,59i 

S.66; 

1864. 

C. 

18,410 

320 

1,540 

1,050 

2,910 

Boydton  Plank  Road, 
Oct.  27,  28,  1864. 

F. 

r 

42,823 
20,324 

166 

1,028 

564 

i,758 

Franklin,  Nov.  30,  1864. 

!F- 
C 

27,939 
26,897 

189 
i,75o 

I,°33 
3,800 

1,104 
702 

2,326 
6,252 

Nashville,  Dec.  15,  16, 

F. 

49,773 

387 

2,562 

112 

3,061 

1864. 

1  ( 

2-^,207 

Assault  at  Petersburg, 

F. 

63,299 

625 

3,189 

326 

4,140 

April  2,  1865. 

C. 

18,576 

The  greatest  loss  of  general  officers  in  any  single 
engagement  was  that  of  the  Confederates  in  the  battle 
of  Franklin,  in  which  one  major-general  and  four 
brigadier-generals  were  killed,  one  major-general  and 
five  brigadier-generals  were  wounded,  and  one  briga- 
dier-general was  captured.  This  was  most  remarka- 
ble, considering  that  the  total  number  of  Confederates 
engaged  was  only  26,897. 

Neither  the  number  of  men  lost  in  a  particular  bat- 
tle nor  the  number  lost  by  a  particular  regiment  gives 
us  an  accurate  idea  of  the  dangers  to  which  the  partici- 
pants were  exposed^  unless  we  know  the  proportion 
of  the  killed  and  wounded  to  the  number  engaged. 
Many  regiments  lost  a  greater  per  cent,  of  killed  and 


35°  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

wounded  in  some  small  battle  or  skirmish  than  others 
lost  in  greater  ones. 

The  charge  of  the  Light  Brigade  has  been  celebrated 
in  prose  and  verse  as  the  most  striking  exhibition  in 
history  of  men  marching  into  the  very  jaws  of  death. 
The  Light  Brigade  lost  36.7  per  cent,  in  killed  and 
wounded.  Colonel  Fox  gives  a  list  of  63  Federal 
regiments  and  52  Confederate  regiments,  each  of 
which  in  a  single  engagement  lost  over  50  per  cent,  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  24  of  the  Federal  regi- 
ments lost  over  60  per  cent.  Two  Federal  regiments, 
the  ist  Minn,  and  the  141  st  Penn.,  and  two  Confeder- 
ate regiments,  the  ist  Texas  and  the  2ist  Ga.,  each 
lost  at  Gettysburg  over  75  per  cent.  In  a  single  charge 
at  Gettysburg,  the  ist  Minn,  took  into  action  262  offi- 
cers and  men  and  lost  50  killed  and  174  wounded; 
seventeen  officers,  including  the  colonel,  lieutenant- 
colonel,  major,  and  adjutant,  being  among  the  num- 
ber. In  the  same  battle  the  26th  North  Carolina  of  the 
Confederate  army  went  into  the  first  day's  fight  with 
800  men,  losing  86  killed  and  502  wounded;  it  par- 
ticipated on  the  third  day  in  the  charge  of  Pickett's 
division  with  216  men;  of  these  only  80  were  left  for 
duty  the  next  day.  The  5th  New  Hampshire,  during 
its  four-years'  service,  lost  295  men  killed  in  action  or 
died  of  wounds,,  the  killed  including  18  officers  and 
277  enlisted  men.  The  Federal  regiment  that  lost 
the  greatest  number,  though  not  the  greatest  per  cent., 
of  killed  and  died  of  wounds,  was  the  ist  Maine  Heavy 
Artillery,  recruited  for  artillery  service  but  serving  as 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  351 

an  infantry  regiment.  Of  its  total  enrollment  of 
2,202,  it  lost  423  in  killed  and  died  of  wounds,  or  19.2 
per  cent.,  all  these  losses  occurring  during  a  period 
of  about  ten  months.  . 

Undoubtedly  there  were  other  regiments,  Federal 
and  Confederate,  the  statistics  of  which  are  imperfect, 
whose  losses  were  fully  fifty  per  cent.,  or  perhaps 
more;  but  the  average  per  cent,  of  killed  and  died  of 
wounds  was  far  below  that  of  the  regiments  above 
mentioned.  It  was  about  4.7  per  cent,  of  Colonel 
Fox's  total  of  2,326,168,  and  about  7  per  cent,  of 
Colonel  Livermore's  total  of  1,556,698. 

The  figures  given  in  the  foregoing  tables  do  not  fully 
represent  the  fighting  in  campaigns  such  as  those  of 
Grant  and  Sherman  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1864. 
The  battles  beginning  with  the  first  day's  fight  in  the 
Wilderness,  May  3,  1864,  and  ending  with  that  of 
Spottsylvania,  May  12,  were  really  parts  of  one  con- 
tinuous battle  in  which  the  Federal  loss,  according  to 
Colonel  Livermore,  was  26,815  in  killed  and  wounded, 
and  4,183  missing.  So  the  battles  of  the  Atlanta  cam- 
paign in  the  month  of  May,  1864,  were  really  parts 
of  one  continuous  battle  in  which  the  Federals,  with 
an  effective  force  of  110,123,  lost  in  killed  and 
wounded  10,528  and  in  missing,  1,240,  and  the  Con- 
federates, with  an  effective  force  of  66,089,  I05*  m 
killed  and  wounded  9,187.  Even  these  figures  do  not 
convey  an  accurate  idea  of  the  desperate  fighting  and 
the  enormous  losses  in  the  last  year  of  the  war. 


352  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Charles  A.  Dana8  has  compiled  from  the  official  re- 
ports a  table  showing  the  losses  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the  James  in  Grant's  Rich- 
mond campaign,  from  the  beginning,  May  3,  1864, 
to  the  surrender  at  Appomattox,  April  9,  1865.  It 
shows  the  following  totals : 

Captured  and 

Killed.  Wounded.  Missing.  Total. 

15,139  77,748  31,503  124,390 

Some  idea  may  be  formed  of  these  enormous  losses 
if  we  consider  that  they  far  exceed  the  great  army  with 
which  Sherman  began  his  Atlanta  campaign,  and  that 
they  more  than  twice  outnumber  the  army  with  which 
Rosecrans  started  on  his  Chattanooga  campaign. 
They  also  outnumber  all  the  American  troops  engaged 
in  the  whole  of  the  Mexican  War.  And  yet  these 
figures  represent  only  the  Federal  losses  and  do  not 
take  into  account  those  of  the  Confederates. 

The  magnitude  of  the  battles  of  the  Civil  War, 
compared  with  those  of  the  Revolution,  will  be  seen 
by  comparing  the  following  summary  of  the  losses  at 
Chickamauga  and  Gettysburg  with  the  summary  given 
of  the  Revolutionary  losses. 

LOSSES  AT  CHICKAMAUGA. 

Killed.         Wounded.        Missing.        Total. 

Federals    1,657  9,756  4,757  16,170 

Confederates    2,312  14,674  1,468  18,454 


Total    3,969  24,430  6,225  34,624 

'Recollections  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  211. 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  353 

Killed,  wounded  and  missing: 

Federals    ........................   16,170 

Confederates    ....................   18,454 

-  34,624 

Killed  and  wounded: 
Federals 


Confederates    ....................   16,986 

-  28,399 

LOSSES  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

Killed.         Wounded.        Missing.        Total. 
Federals    ...........  3,155  14,529  5,365  23,049 

Confederates    .......  3,903  18,735  5,425  28,063 


Total    ..........  7,058  33,264  10,790 

Killed,  wounded  and  missing: 

Federals    ........................  23,049 

Confederates    ....................  28,063 


Killed  and  wounded: 

Federals    ........................   17,684 

Confederates    ....................  22,638 

-  40,322 

The  following  statistics  of  my  company  probably  do 
not  vary  materially  from  those  of  other  companies  in 
active  service,  in  the  showing  made  of  the  men  who 
entered  the  service  and  what  became  of  them. 

Mustered  into  service  : 

Captain    ..............................................  I 

1st   Lieutenant  .........................................  I 

2d   Lieutenant  .........................................  I 

Sergeants    ............................................  5 

Corporals    ............................................  8 

Wagoner  .............................................  I 

Privates  ..............................................  79 

-      96 

23 


354  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Gained  by  assignment I 

Gained  by  recruit i 

Total    98 

Resignations    3 

Transferred  by  promotion i 

Transferred  to  Engineer  Corps,  Veteran  Reserve  Corps, 

and  other  army  organizations 10 

Released  by  civil  authority i 

Deserted    I 

Killed  in  action : 5 

Died  of  disease 22 

Discharged  for  wounds  or  disability 15 

58 

Mustered  out  at  expiration  of  enlistment 40 

The  number  killed  and  wounded  during  the  service 
were: 

Killed,  enlisted  men 5 

Wounded,   officers 2 

Wounded,  enlisted  men 10 

12 

Total    17 

All  these  were  killed  or  wounded  after  December  30, 
1862,  at  which  time  the  total  rank  and  file  of  the  com- 
pany numbered  only  eighty,  so  that  about  20  per  cent, 
of  those  remaining  after  that  date  were  killed  or 
wounded.  But  there  were  never  eighty  men  in  any 
engagement.  At  Stone's  River,  the  first  battle,  the 
total  number  engaged  was  only  thirty-four,  and  there 
was  never  a  greater  number  in  action  at  one  time. 

The  statistics  give  us  only  a  hint  of  the  development 


STORY    OF    THE    STATISTICS  355 

of  a  citizen  into  a  soldier,  and,  to  understand  this  fully, 
we  must  read  such  books  as  General  Humphreys's  Vir- 
ginia Campaign  and  General  Cox's  Atlanta  Campaign. 
These  are  not  mere  eulogies,  such  as  are  found  in  regi- 
mental histories  and  memorial  day  addresses.  They 
are  careful  statements  of  facts  by  men  fully  conver- 
sant with  them.  They  tell  of  such  heroic  fighting  on 
both  sides  as  was  never  surpassed  in  any  war  in  the 
world.  The  men  of  the  North  and  the  South  that 
fought  in  1864  in  the  Richmond  and  Atlanta  cam- 
paigns were  veteran  soldiers,  whose  training  and  ex- 
perience had  raised  them  to  the  highest  grade  of  ef- 
ficiency. We  read  of  repulses  but  of  few  panics.  The 
men  on  both  sides  went  where  they  were  ordered,  stood 
as  long  as  they  were  commanded  to  stand,  and  retreat- 
ed only  when  it  was  apparent  to  their  officers  that  to 
stand  longer  would  result  in  useless  slaughter. 


CHAPTER    FIFTEEN 

REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA    AND    CHICKAMAUGA 

Since  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  the  United  States 
government  has  established  the  Chickamauga  and 
Chattanooga  National  Military  Park,  including  not 
only  the  battle-ground  of  Chickamauga,  but  consider- 
able portions  of  Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout  Moun- 
tain and  the  approaches  to  the  battle-fields.  Part  of 
the  ground  has  been  acquired  by  purchase  and  part  by 
donation. 

The  plan  of  this  great  work  originated  with  General 
Henry  V.  Boynton,  then  the  Washington  correspond- 
ent of  the  Cincinnati  Commercial-Gazette,  and  now 
President  of  the  Park  Commission.  As  Lieut.-Colonel 
of  the  35th  Ohio  Vols.,  he  participated  in  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga  and  in  the  assault  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
and  he  has  been  actively  identified  with  the  park  since 
its  inception.  He  began  by  advocating  the  project  in 
a  series  of  letters  to  the  Commercial-Gazette.  It  was 
favorably  considered  at  a  meeting  of  the  Society  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  a  committee  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  society  which  met  in  Washington  in 
February,  1889,  and  secured  the  cooperation  of  a 
number  of  those,  formerly  in  the  Confederate  army, 

(356) 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  357 

who  had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  the  battle.  Out 
of  this  grew  the  Chickamauga  Memorial  Associa- 
tion. The  original  plan  was  to  include  in  the  pro- 
posed park  only  the  Chickamauga  battle-ground,  but 
its  scope  was  enlarged  to  include  the  approaches  and 
portions  of  Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout  Moun- 
tain. Later  the  aid  of  Congress  was  invoked.  This 
resulted  in  the  passage  in  1890  of  a  bill,  prepared  by 
General  Boynton,  for  the  purchase  of  the  necessary 
ground  and  the  establishment  of  a  national  park  to 
be  known  as  the  "Chickamauga  and  Chattanooga  Na- 
tional Military  Park."  The  purchase  of  the  ground 
and  the  establishment  of  the  park  were  placed  under 
the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  manage- 
ment, subject  to  his  supervision,  was  given  to  three 
commissioners,  each  of  whom  must  have  actively  par- 
ticipated in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  or  in  one  of  the 
battles  about  Chattanooga.  Two  of  the  commis- 
sioners were  to  be  appointed  from  civil  life  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  a  third  was  to  be  detailed  by  the 
Secretary  from  among  the  officers  of  the  army  best 
acquainted  with  the  details  of  those  battles,  who  was  to 
act  as  secretary  of  the  commission. 

Since  then  the  government  has  acquired  5,000  acres 
of  the  ground  on  which  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  was 
fought,  about  fifty  acres  of  the  north  end  of  Mission- 
ary Ridge,  five  acres  where  the  north  observation  tower 
stands,  and  three  acres  where  Bragg  had  his  head- 
quarters, also  Orchard  Knob,  about  eight  acres,  and 
about  ninety-eight  acres  at  the  point  of  Lookout  Moun- 


358  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

tain,  besides  about  330  acres  for  the  various  ap- 
proaches. About  seventy-five  miles  of  the  approaches 
have  been  improved  and  converted  into  magnificent 
boulevards.  The  ground  which  it  is  proposed  to  ac- 
quire, in  addition  to  that  already  obtained,  will  make  a 
total  of  nearly  7,600  acres.1 

The  appearance  of  Missionary  Ridge  has  been  much 
changed  since  the  war.  Several  houses  have  been 
erected  on  it  and  a  considerable  portion  of  the  ground 
between  Fort  Wood  and  the  base  of  the  ridge  has  been 
platted  into  lots  upon  which  houses  have  been  built. 
The  government  has  constructed  a  road  on  the  crest, 
following  the  line  occupied  by  Bragg's  army,  and  has 
erected  two  observation  towers,  one  at  the  point  where 
Bragg's  headquarters  were  located,  the  other  some  dis- 
tance north  of  that  point  and  opposite  the  place  where 
the  left  of  the  assaulting  line  reached  the  summit. 
Along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  are  various  monuments 
and  markers  commemorating  the  positions  of  some  of 
the  troops  engaged,  but  when  I  was  last  there  the  mark- 
ing was  not  so  complete  as  that  on  the  battle-field  of 
Chickamauga. 

Greater  changes  are  seen  on  Lookout  Mountain  and 

1  General  Boynton  published  a  volume  in  1895  entitled  The 
Chickamauga  National  Military  Park,  containing  a  full  history  of 
the  preliminary  steps  and  the  legislation  leading  to  the  establish- 
ment of  the  park,  its  boundaries,  the  approaches,  and  the  method 
of  marking  the  various  points  of  interest,  with  much  valuable  in- 
formation concerning  the  battles  intended  to  be  commemorated. 
To  this  volume  I  am  largely  indebted  for  statistics  not  easily 
obtainable  elsewhere. 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  359 

in  its  vicinity.  A  railroad  now  reaches  the  summit 
by  winding  around  the  mountain.  There  is  also  an 
inclined  railroad  on  which  cable  cars,  drawn  by  pow- 
erful machinery,  are  hauled  up  a  very  steep  incline. 
A  dummy  railroad  on  the  top  extends  back  several 
miles  from  the  point.  There  is  a  large  hotel  not  far 
from  the  place  where  the  old  wagon  road  reaches  the 
summit  and  another  on  the  side  of  the  mountain  a  little 
below  the  point.  The  old  officers'  hospital  burned 
down  and  on  its  site  another  building  has  been  erected. 
Various  other  changes  are  manifest  but  the  point  itself 
looks  precisely  as  it  looked  during  the  war. 

The  greatest  effort  made  by  the  government  is  seen 
in  the  work  which  has  been  done  to  restore  the  battle- 
field of  Chickamauga,  so  that  it  may  present,  as  nearly 
as  possible,  its  appearance  when  the  battle  was  fought. 
The  timber  which  afterward  grew  in  the  open  fields 
has  been  cut  down,  and  in  places  where,  after  the  bat- 
tle, timber  was  cut  down,  trees  are  now  being  allowed 
to  grow.  Nearly  all  the  old  roads  and  bridges  are 
there  just  as  they  were  during  the  battle,  but  the  roads 
have  been  improved  by  the  government  and  converted 
into  splendid  driveways.  Roads  opened  since  the  bat- 
tle have  been  closed,  except  a  few,  constructed  by  the 
government  to  afford  greater  facilities  for  viewing 
the  battle-field.  The  most  noticeable  change  in  the 
natural  surface  of  the  ground  itself  is  seen  in  the  clear- 
ing away  of  the  underbrush,  which  was  necessary  in 
order  to  give  an  unobstructed  view  of  the  lines  of  bat- 
tle, and  access  to  them.  A  few  structures  appear  that 


360  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

were  not  there  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  particularly 
the  buildings  erected  by  the  government  for  the  use  of 
the  troops  quartered  in  the  park  during  the  Spanish 
War,  and  a  hotel  near  Crawfish  Spring.  But  nearly 
all  the  old  houses,  chiefly  log  structures,  remain,  nota- 
bly Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  the  Widow  Glenn,  the 
Brotherton,  the  Poe,  the  Kelly,  and  the  Snodgrass 
houses,  and  they  show  few  changes. 

Three  iron  and  steel  observation  towers,  each  sev- 
enty feet  high,  have  been  erected  by  the  government, 
one  on  Snodgrass  Hill,  one  near  Hall's  Ford  and  one 
near  Jay's  saw  mill.  The  positions  occupied  by  the 
Federal  and  Confederate  lines  during  each  day  of  the 
battle  are  designated  by  small  stone  markers,  indicat- 
ing each  regiment  engaged.  The  position  of  each  bat- 
tery is  indicated  by  cannon,  of  the  kind  used  by  it  in 
the  battle,  mounted  on  carriages  but  without  caissons. 
Iron  markers,  three  by  four  feet,  indicate  the  head- 
quarters of  the  armies  and  the  positions  of  the  corps, 
divisions  and  brigades.  A  tablet  designating  the  posi- 
tion of  a  corps  is  inscribed  with  the  name  of  the  com- 
mander, the  divisions,  and  the  division  commanders. 
The  division  tablets  represent  the  brigade  organiza- 
tions, and  the  brigade  tablets,  the  regimental  organiza- 
tions. On  each  tablet  is  also  inscribed  the  position  or 
event  which  it  commemorates.  Smaller  tablets  com- 
memorate some  notable  event  of  the  battle.  The  place 
where  any  general  officer  was  killed  is  indicated  by  a 
pyramid  of  cannon-balls.  Monuments  have  also  been 
erected  by  the  government  and  by  the  states  whose 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  361 

troops  were  represented  in  the  battle,  in  honor  of  the 
various  organizations  engaged.  These  are  generally 
located  at  some  point  where  the  organization  desig- 
nated especially  distinguished  itself,  or  where,  for  some 
other  reason,  the  site  was  deemed  most  appropriate. 
The  monument  erected  by  the  state  of  Georgia,  the 
Wilder  brigade  monument,  and  some  others,  are  beau- 
tiful and  imposing. 

I  did  not  see  Chattanooga  or  the  Chickamauga  bat- 
tle-field after  the  year  1864  until  the  fall  of  1899,  when 
Captain  Eli  F.  Ritter,  of  the  79th  Ind.,  and  I  accom- 
panied a  small  party  going  to  participate  in  the  dedica- 
tion of  the  monument  erected  to  Wilder's  brigade.  In 
the  forenoon  of  the  first  day  after  our  arrival  we  vis- 
ited the  National  Cemetery.  To  me  it  did  not  seem 
right  that  only  Union  soldiers  should  be  buried  there. 
I  hope  to  see  the  day  when  the  Confederate  dead  also 
shall  be  buried  in  this  ground  which  now  belongs  to  a 
common  Union. 

We  next  visited  Missionary  Ridge,  ascending  at  the 
north  end  where  Sherman  fought,  and  driving  along 
the  magnificent  boulevard  on  the  crest  to  a  considera- 
ble distance  south  of  the  point  where  Bragg  had  his 
headquarters.  From  the  summit  one  has  a  full  view 
of  the  valley  below,  of  Orchard  Knob,  Chattanooga, 
and  Lookout  Mountain.  The  distance  from  Orchard 
Knob  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  in  front  is  a  mile  or  more, 
the  slope  of  the  ridge  is  about  six  hundred  yards,  and 
its  height  about  four  hundred  feet.  It  would  require 
considerable  physical  exertion  to  walk  from  Orchard 


362  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

Knob  to  the  top  of  the  ridge,  and  not  many  would  at- 
tempt it  without  a  good  stout  pair  of  legs.  Looking 
at  the  long  distance  traveled  by  the  assaulting  forces 
and  at  the  steepness  of  the  ascent,  it  seems  incredible 
that  the  Union  troops  should  have  carried  the  works 
on  the  summit.  But  Captain  Ritter  and  I  can  each 
vouch  that  the  other,  on  November- 25,  1863,  ran  at  a 
pretty  brisk  gait  from  Orchard  Knob  to  the  foot  of 
the  ridge  and  then  climbed  the  hill  without  stopping  to 
take  breath  until  near  the  top. 

In  the  afternoon  we  ascended  Lookout  Mountain  in 
a  cable  car  which,  at  times,  seemed  to  be  going  almost 
straight  up.  Notwithstanding  the  changes  since  the 
war,  the  essential  features  of  the  mountain,  and  es- 
pecially of  Lookout  Point,  remain  as  they  were  during 
the  war.  From  the  point,  which  rises  almost  perpen- 
dicularly about  i, 600  feet  above  the  valley  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, the  view  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  in  Amer- 
ica. It  is  said  that  one  standing  there  on  a  clear  day 
can  see  portions  of  seven  states — Tennessee,  Georgia, 
Alabama,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Kentucky, 
and  Virginia.  When  in  the  hospital  there  I  could 
view  from  my  window  the  thunder-storms  raging  in 
the  clouds  below.  It  was  below  and  about  Lookout 
Point  that  Hooker's  men  fought  the  memorable  ''battle 
among  the  clouds."  After  going  on  the  dummy  rail- 
road to  its  terminus,  we  returned  and  spent  some  time 
walking  about  in  the  vicinity  of  the  point. 

The  next  day  we  drove  from  Chattanooga  to  the 
Chickamauga  battle-ground,  passing  through  Ross- 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  363 

ville,  of  which  I  had  a  very  vivid  recollection  as  it  ap- 
peared on  the  morning  of  September  21,  1863.  Leav- 
ing- Rossville  we  drove  first  to  the  Wilder  monument 
near  Lytle's  station.  All  along  the  road  from  Chatta- 
nooga we  passed  the  tablets  commemorating  some  im- 
portant event  that  occurred  during  or  shortly  before 
the  battle. 

To  one  who  participated  in  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  it  is  a  weird  sight  which  the  field  now  presents 
to  his  view.  Looking  through  the  trees  at  the  monu- 
ments and  markers  which  indicate  the  lines  of  battle 
and  at  the  batteries  which  now  stand  as  mute  as  the 
monuments  themselves,  one  can  almost  imagine  the 
dead  rising  out  of  the  ground  and  taking  their  places 
in  mortal  conflict. 

Some  points  on  the  field  were  especially  interesting 
to  us.  We  first  visited  the  place  now  marked  by  a 
monument  to  the  79th  Ind.,  a  little  southeast  of  the 
Brotherton  House,  where  Beatty's  brigade  charged  and 
captured  a  Confederate  battery.  As  we  stood  silently 
looking  at  the  monument  I  felt  the  tears  trickling  down 
my  cheeks.  I  looked  at  Captain  Ritter  and  the  tears 
were  running  down  his  cheeks  also.  Neither  of  us 
spoke,  but  each  understood  that  memory  had  recalled 
the  scenes  of  long  ago  and  had  touched  some  hidden 
spring  in  the  human  heart  that  causes  it  to  overflow. 

Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  appears  almost  precisely  as 
it  did  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  but  there  has  been  a 
change  in  the  road  crossing  Chickamauga  creek. 
Crawfish  Spring  is  unchanged,  but  the  surroundings 


CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

have  been  somewhat  altered  by  the  erection  of  a  dam 
just  below  it  and  a  hotel  near  by.  The  flow  is  of  suf- 
ficient volume  to  make  a  large  stream.  We  camped 
near  it  a  few  days  before  the  battle,  after  a  hot  and 
dusty  march,  and  I  recall  the  ecstasy  with  which  men 
and  beasts  quenched  their  thirst  in  the  cold  clear  water 
that  gushed  out  of  the  rocks. 

The  point  that  interested  me  more  than  any  other 
was  Snodgrass  Hill.  I  easily  found  the  spot,  a  few 
yards  east  of  the  observation-tower,  where  I  stood 
Sunday  afternoon  until  after  7  o'clock  and  witnessed 
the  repeated  assaults  of  Longstreet's  forces  and  the 
magnificent  charge  of  Whitaker's  and  Mitchell's  bri- 
gades. 

The  day  after  visiting  the  battle-field  of  Chicka- 
mauga  I  happened  to  meet  in  the  hotel  at  Chattanooga 
a  Confederate  officer  of  the  brigade  to  which  Carnes's 
battery  was  attached.  This  was  the  battery  in  the  cap- 
ture of  which  I  had  participated.  We  had  a  brief  but 
social  talk  about  it  and,  with  a  cordial  grasp  at  part- 
ing, he  said :  "Well,  Captain  Howe,  the  war  is  over." 
I  replied :  "Thank  God,  we  can  at  last  clasp  hands 
over  the  bloody  chasm." 

That  evening  all  the  visiting  Union  soldiers  were 
cordially  invited  to  attend  a  camp-fire  at  one  of  the 
Confederate  camps  in  the  city.  Much  to  my  regret,  on 
account  of  engagements  at  home,  I  could  not  stay. 
Nothing  would  have  pleased  me  better  than  to  accept 
the  hospitality  of  the  battle-scarred  veterans  who  were 
once  my  foes.  I  felt  that  I  had  been  thoroughly  "re- 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  365 

constructed."  "Old  age,"  it  is  said,  "ne'er  cools  the 
Douglas  blood."  Perhaps  it  has  not  cooled  my  own 
patriotic  ardor,  but  the  lapse  of  years  has  wrought  a 
wonderful  change  in  my  feelings  toward  my  ancient 
foemen. 

No  one  who  took  part  in  the  bloody  contest  at  Chick- 
amauga  can  ever  forget  it.  But  the  field  on  which 
that  memorable  battle  was  fought  has  since  taken  on 
a  new  glory.  We  recall  that  it  was  the  camp-ground 
of  the  soldiers  of  the  Spanish-American  War.  We 
see  marching  from  that  field  too  the  defense  of  a  com- 
mon country  men  of  Massachusetts  and  South  Caro- 
lina, of  Georgia  and  Indiana,  marching  side  by  side, 
men  whose  fathers  a  third  of  a  century  before  had  met 
there  in  mortal  combat.  Whether  they  step  to  the 
tune  of  "Dixie"  or  the  "Red,  White  and  Blue,"  they 
are  marching  under  one  flag  and  keeping  time  to  the 
music  of  the  Union.  Is  there  a  soldier,  Federal  or 
Confederate,  in  whom  this  scene  inspires  no  generous 
thoughts,  no  new  devotion  to  his  country? 

We  of  the  North  recall  with  honest  pride  the  splen- 
did achievements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
wonderful  victories  won  by  Grant,  Sheridan's  brilliant 
climax  at  Five  Forks.  But  as  I  read  the  glowing  ac- 
counts of  the  final  Federal  triumph,  I  can  not  help 
thinking  of  the  last  stand  made  by  the  gallant  band  un- 
der General  Lee  at  Appomattox  Court  House,  of  the 
little  handful  left  of  the  once  great  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  men  whose  valor  had  been  proved  in  many 
desperate  conflicts,  heroes  who  had  fought  at  Freder- 


366  CIVIL    WAR    TIMES 

icksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  at  Gettysburg  and  on 
many  famous  fields,  tired,  hungry,  worn  with  days 
and  nights  of  fighting  and  marching,  brought  to  bay  at 
last,  hemmed  in  by  overwhelming  numbers,  knowing 
that  the  cause  so  dear  to  them  had  been  forever  lost, 
and  yet  ready  at  the  word  of  command  to  rush  against 
their  exulting  foes  and  cut  their  way  out  or  perish  in 
the  attempt. 

When  I  reflect  on  all  this  I  respect  more  than  ever 
the  brave  men  against  whom  I  fought.  I  no  longer 
think  of  them  as  foemen,  but  as  Americans  whose  an- 
cestors and  my  own  were  comrades  in  the  Revolution ; 
and  I  rejoice,  as  I  believe  most  of  them  in  their  hearts 
rejoice,  that  the  war  ended  as  it  did,  not  as  a  mere 
triumph  of  the  soldiers  of  the  North  over  those  of  the 
South,  but  as  the  close  of  a  struggle  which,  without 
casting  any  shadow  on  the  motives  or  the  valor  of  the 
soldiers  of  either  section,  makes  this  the  common 
country  of  us  all,  and  enables  us  all  to  say,  whether  we 
stand  at  the  base  of  Bunker  Hill  monument  or  beside 
Georgia's  shaft  at  Chickamauga,  "This  is  my  own,  my 
native  land."  The  "Lost  Cause"  has  been  forever  lost, 
but  the  heroism  it  developed  will  bear  fruit  for  ages  yet 
to  come. 

It  was  the  soldiers  of  the  North  and  of  the  South 
who  first  learned  to  respect  their  adversaries  and  who 
were  the  soonest  reconciled.  In  the  last  volume  of 
Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War2  is  a  picture  of  a 

2  Vol.  4,  P-  745- 


REVISITING    CHATTANOOGA  367 

scene  at  Appomattox  after  Lee's  surrender.  Though 
a  mere  wood-cut  it  tells  a  touching,  an  impressive 
story.  The  picture  is  entitled  :  "Union  soldiers  shar- 
ing their  rations  with  the  Confederates.  From  a 
sketch  made  at  the  time."  The  restoration  of  broth- 
erly feeling  between  the  North  and  the  South,  slow  as 
it  may  have  been  in  coming,  began  with  the  men  who 
for  four  years  had  confronted  each  other  in  mortal 
combat ;  it  began  as  soon  as  the  last  gun  had  been  fired ; 
it  began  with  the  sharing  of  rations. 

I  grasp  with  greatest  ardor  the  hand  of  the  comrade 
who  stood  side  by  side  with  me  in  deadly  conflict ;  but, 
strange  as  it  may  seem,  next  to  the  pleasure  of  grasp- 
ing the  hand  of  one  who  fought  with  me  is  the  pleas- 
ure of  grasping  the  hand  of  the  man  who  fought 
against  me.  All  are  Americans  now;  all  are  com- 
rades. Why  should  we  not  clasp  hands?  It  is  true 
that  in  the  bloody  contest  many  went  down,  but  in  both 
North  and  South  widows  and  orphans  still  weep  for 
the  "touch  of  a  vanished  hand,  the  sound  of  a  voice 
that  is  still."  It  is  true  that  we  may  not  agree  in  our 
views  of  the  causes  of  the  strife  long  past,  but  when 
we  talk  of  long  and  weary  marches,  of  standing  on 
picket,  exposed  to  howling  storms  and  wintry  blasts, 
of  battles  in  which  Federals  and  Confederates  marched 
into  the  very  jaws  of  death,  we  speak  in  words  that 
all  understand  and  of  experiences  in  which,  as  Amer- 
ican soldiers,  all  bore  an  honorable  part. 

"LET  US  HAVE  PEACE." 


APPENDIX 


When  General  Buell  arrived  at  Louisville  in  September,  1862, 
he  combined  the  old  regiments  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  the 
new  ones  which  he  found  there,  and  which  subsequently  came 
there,  into  brigades,  and  the  brigades  into  divisions.  The 
brigades  and  divisions  were  consecutively  numbered  from  first  to 
last ;  the  army  was  designated  as  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  was 
divided  into  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Corps. 

Pursuant  to  general  order  No.  168  of  the  War  Department, 
issued  Oct.  24,  1862,  General  Buell  was  superseded  by  General 
William  S.  Rosecrans,  a  new  department  was  created,  called  the 
Department  of  the  Cumberland,  and  the  army  was  designated  as 
the  Fourteenth  Corps.  It  was,  however,  from  that  time  popu- 
larly known  as  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

On  Nov.  7,  1862,  by  order  of  General  Rosecrans,  the  army  was 
divided  into  the  Center,  Right  Wing,  and  Left  Wing,  under 
the  commands  respectively  of  Generals  George  H.  Thomas,  Alex- 
ander McD.  McCook,  and  Thomas  L.  Crittenden,  the  brigades  and 
divisions  retaining  their  former  numbers.  The  roster  of  the 
army  under  this  order  is  given  in  Cist's  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
(pp.  263-5). 

By  a  subsequent  order  of  General  Rosecrans,  issued  Dec.  19, 
1862,  the  Center  was  given  five  divisions  and  the  Right  Wing  and 
Left  Wing  three  each.  Most  of  the  divisions  comprised  three 
brigades,  the  brigades  being  numbered  as  parts  of  the  division  to 
which  they  were  assigned,  and  the  divisions  as  parts  of  the  Center, 
Right  Wing,  and  Left  Wing.  The  organization  so  effected  con- 
tinued without  substantial  change  until  after  the  battle  of  Stone's 
River. 

Pursuant  to  general  order  No.  9  of  the  War  Department,  issued 
Jan.  9,  1863,  the  Center,  Right  Wing  and  Left  Wing  were  re- 
spectively designated  as  the  I4th  Army  Corps,  the  20th  Army 

24  (369) 


37°  APPENDIX 

Corps,  and  the  21  st  Army  Corps,  but  the  commanders  were  not 
changed  and  the  army  was  now  formally  called  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland. 

The  corps  and  division  organizations  remained  substantially 
the  same  until  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Sept.  19  and  20, 
1863,  the  roster  at  that  date  being  given  in  one  of  the  tables  fol- 
lowing. 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  the  second  and  third  di- 
visions of  the  nth  corps  and  the  first  and  second  of  the  I2th  were 
transferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  the  nth  under  General  Oliver  O.  Howard  and  the 
I2th  under  General  Henry  W.  Slocum,  both  under  general  com- 
mand of  General  Joseph  Hooker. 

Generals  McCook  and  Crittenden  were  relieved  Oct.  9,  1863, 
and  the  2Oth  and  21  st  corps  were  consolidated  into  the  4th  under 
command  of  General  Gordon  Granger.  The  new  corps  comprised 
three  divisions,  General  John  M.  Palmer  commanding  the  first, 
General  Philip  H.  Sheridan  the  second,  and  General  Thomas  J. 
Wood  the  third.  General  Rosecrans  was  superseded  Oct.  16  by 
General  Thomas.  General  John  M.  Palmer  afterward  succeeded 
Thomas  in  command  of  the  I4th  corps,  General  David  S.  Stanley 
succeeding  Palmer  in  command  of  the  first  division  of  the  4th 
corps,  this  division,  during  the  battles  at  Chattanooga,  having 
been  under  the  temporary  command  of  the  senior  brigadier, 
General  Charles  Cruft. 

The  roster  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  the  battles  of 
Chattanooga,  Nov.  23-25,  1863,  is  given  in  one  of  the  tables  fol- 
lowing. 

Pursuant  to  general  order  No.  144  of  the  War  Department, 
issued  April  4,  1864  (Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  59,  p.  258),  the  nth  and 
i2th  corps  were  consolidated  into  the  2Oth  under  command  of 
General  Hooker;  General  Granger  was  superseded  in  command 
of  the  4th  corps  by  General  Howard,  and  General  Sheridan  was 
transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Subsequently  General 
John  Newton  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  Sheridan's  division 
of  the  4th  corps. 

The  roster  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  May  5,  1864,  is  given  in  one  of  the  tables 
following. 


APPENDIX  371 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  practically  ceased  to  be  known  by 
that  name  after  Sherman  began  his  march  to  the  sea.  The  I4th 
and  20th  corps  made  part  of  the  army  which  accompanied  him, 
being  thereafter  designated  as  the  Army  of  Georgia,  under  com- 
mand of  General  Slocum.  The  4th  corps  returned  to  Nashville 
and  remained  under  the  command  of  General  Thomas. 

The  roster  of  the  troops  which  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, including  the  4th  corps,  is  given  in  one  of  the  following 
tables. 

The  following  rosters  contain  only  the  corps,  division,  and 
brigade  organizations.  The  regimental  lists  and  lists  of  depart- 
ment, headquarter,  unassigned,  garrison,  and  other  detached 
troops  will  be  found  in  the  volumes  cited. 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE    ARMY    OF   THE 

CUMBERLAND   AT   THE   BATTLE 

OF    STONE'S    RIVER. 

Dec.  31,  1862 — Jan.  I  and  2,  1863. 

(Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  i,  vol.  20,  pt.  i,  pp.  174-182;  Van  Home:  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  vol.  i,  pp.  281-286.) 

MAJ.-GEN.  WILLIAM  S.  ROSECRANS,  Commanding. 

CENTER. 
MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  LOVELL  H.  ROUSSEAU. 
Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Benj.  F.  Scribner. 
2d,  Col.  John  Beatty. 
3d,  Col.  John  C.  Starkweather. 
4th,  Lt.-Col.  Oliver  L.  Shepherd  (Regulars). 


372  APPENDIX 

Artillery.     Capt.  Cyrus  O.  Loomis. 
Kentucky  Battery  A. 
ist  Mich.  Battery  A. 
5th  U.  S.  Battery  H. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JAMES  S.  NEGLEY. 

Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  James  S.  Spears. 

2d,  Col.  Timothy  R.  Stanley. 

3d,  Col.  John  F.  Miller. 
Artillery.     Kentucky  Battery  B. 

loth  Wis.  (2  sections). 

ist  Ohio  Batteries  G  and  M. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  SPEED  S.  FRY. 

(The  first  brigade  and  Church's  Battery  were  the  only  troops 
of  this  division  engaged.) 

Brigades,    ist,  Col.  Moses  B.  Walker. 
2d,  Col.  John  M.  Harlan. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  James  B.  Steedman. 
Artillery,     ist  Mich.  Battery  B. 
ist  Ohio  Battery  C. 
4th  U.  S.  Battery  I. 

FOURTH  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  ROBERT  B.  MITCHELL. 

(Only  a  portion  of  the  division  engaged.     See  Rcb.  Rec.,  ser.  I, 
vol.  20,  pt.  i,  p.  179.) 

Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  James  D.  Morgan. 

2d,  Col.  Daniel  McCook. 
Artillery.    2d  111.  Battery  I. 
loth  Wis. 


Artillery  Reserve. 


nth  Ind.  Battery. 
I2th  Ind.  Battery, 
ist  Mich.  Battery  E. 


APPENDIX 

FIFTH  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOSEPH  J.  REYNOLDS. 
(The  division  was  not  engaged.) 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Albert  S.  Hall. 

2d,  Col.  Abram  O.  Miller. 
Artillery.     i8th  Ind.  Battery. 
Ind.  Battery. 


373 


RIGHT   WING. 

MAJ.-GEN.  ALEXANDER  McD.  McCooK. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  P.  Sidney  Post. 

2d,  Col.  William  P.  Carlin. 
3d,  Col.  William  E.  Woodruff. 
Artillery.     2d  Minn.  Battery. 
5th  Wis.  Battery. 
8th  Wis.  Battery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

BRIG.-GEN.  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
Brigades,     jst,  Brig.-Gen.  August  Willich. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  Edward  N.  Kirk. 

3d,  Col.  Philemon  P.  Baldwin. 
Artillery.     5th  Ind.  Battery. 

ist  Ohio  Batteries  A  and  E. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Joshua  W.  Sill. 
2d,  Col.  Frederick  Schaeffer. 
3d,  Col.  George  W.  Roberts. 
Artillery.     Capt.  Henry.  Hescock. 
ist  111.  Battery  C. 
4th  Ind.  Battery. 
ist  Mo.  Battery  C. 


374  APPENDIX 

LEFT    WING. 

MAJ.-GEN.  THOMAS  L.  CRITTENDEN. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 

Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Milo  S.  Hascall. 
2d,  Col.  George  D.  Wagner. 
3d,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker. 

Artillery.    Maj.  Seymour  Race. 
8th  Ind.  Battery, 
loth  Ind.  Battery. 
6th  Ohio  Battery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  PALMER. 

Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Cruft. 
2d,  Col.  .William  B.  Hazen. 
3d,  Col.  William  Grose. 

Artillery.     Capt.  William  E.  Standart. 
1st  Ohio  Batteries  B  and  F. 
4th  U.  S.  Batteries  H  and  M. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  HORATIO  P.  VAN  CLEVE. 

Brigades.  1st,  Col.  Samuel  Beatty. 
2d,  Col.  James  P.  Fyffe. 
3d,  Col.  Samuel  W.  Price. 

Artillery.     Capt.  George  R.  Swallow. 
7th  Ind.  Battery. 
26th  Penn.  Battery  B. 
3d  Wis.  Battery. 


APPENDIX 

CAVALRY. 
BRIG.-GEN.  DAVID  S.  STANLEY. 

DIVISION. 
COL.  JOHN  KENNETT. 
Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Robert  H.  G.  Minty. 
2d,  Col.  Lewis  Zahm. 
Gen.  David  S.  Stanley, 
ist  Ohio  Battery  D. 

PIONEER    BRIGADE. 

CAPT.  JAMES  ST.  CLAIR  MORTON. 


375 


Reserve. 
Artillery. 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE    ARMY    OF    THE 

CUMBERLAND    AT   THE   BATTLE 

OF    CHICKAMAUGA. 

Sept.  19  and  20,  1863. 

(Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  i,  vol.  30,  pt.  i,  pp.  40-47;  Van  Home:  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  pp.  378-385 ;  Turchin :  Battle  of  Chickamauga, 
pp.  215,  223.) 

MAJ.-GEN.  WILLIAM  S.  ROSECRANS,  Commanding. 

FOURTEENTH    ARMY    CORPS. 
MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ABSALOM  BAIRD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Benj.  F.  Scribner. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Starkweather. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  John  H.  King  (Regulars). 
Artillery,     ist  Mich.  Battery  A. 
4th  Ind.  Battery. 
5th  U.  S.  Battery  H. 


376 


APPENDIX 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  JAMES  S.  NEGLEY. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Beatty. 
2d,  Col.  Timothy  R.  Stanley. 
3d,  Col.  William  Sirwell. 
Artillery,     ist  Ohio  Batteries  G  and  M. 

111.  Light  Art,  Bridge's  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  BRANNAN. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  John  M.  Connell. 
2d,  Col.  John  T.  Croxton. 
3d,  Col.  Ferdinand  Van  Derveer. 
Artillery,     ist  Mich.  Battery  D. 
ist  Ohio  Battery  C. 
4th  U.  S.  Battery  I. 

FOURTH  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  JOSEPH  J.  REYNOLDS. 

Brigades,     ist,  Col.  John  T.  Wilder  (Mounted  Infantry). 
2d,  Col.  Edward  A.  King. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Turchin. 
Artillery.     i8th  Ind.  Battery, 
igth  Ind.  Battery. 
2ist  Ind.  Battery. 


TWENTIETH    ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  ALEXANDER  McD.  McCooK. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  P.  Sidney  Post. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  William  P.  Carlin. 
3d,  Col.  Hans  C.  Heg. 
Artillery,     sth  Wis.  Battery. 
2d  Minn.  Battery. 
Sth  Wis.  Battery. 


APPENDIX  377 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

BRIG.-GEN.  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  August  Willich. 

2d,  Col.  Joseph  B.  Dodge. 

3d,  Col.  Philemon  P.  Baldwin. 
Artillery,     ist  Ohio  Battery  A. 

20th  Ohio  Battery. 

5th  Ind.  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  William  H.  Lytle. 
2d,  Col.  Bernard  Laiboldt. 
3d,  Col.  Luther  P.  Bradley. 
Artillery.    2d  Ind.  Battery  "n." 
ist  Mo.  Battery  G. 
ist  111.  Battery  C. 

TWENTY-FIRST    ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  THOMAS  L.  CRITTENDEN. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  George  P.  Buell. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  George  D.  Wagner.  (Not engaged.) 
3d,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker. 
Artillery.    8th  Ind.  Battery. 

loth  Ind.  Battery.  (Not  engaged.) 
6th  Ohio  Battery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  PALMER. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Cruft. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  William  B.  Hazen. 
3d,  Col.  William  Grose. 
Artillery.     Capt.  William  E.  Standart. 
ist  Ohio  Batteries  B  and  F. 
4th  U.  S.  Batteries  H  and  M. 


378 


APPENDIX 


THIRD  DIVISION. 

BRIG.-GEN.  HORATIO  P.  VAN  CLEVE. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  Beatty. 

2d,  Col.  George  F.  Dick. 

3d,  Col.  Sidney  M.  Barnes. 
Artillery.     7th  Ind.  Battery. 

26th  Penn.  Battery. 

3d  Wis.  Battery. 

RESERVE    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  GORDON  GRANGER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JAMES  B.  STEEDMAN. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Walter  C.  Whitaker. 
2d,  Col.  John  G.  Mitchell. 

3d,  Col.  John  Coburn.   (On  detail  service;  not  en- 
gaged at  Chickamauga.) 
Artillery.     i8th  Ohio  Battery, 
ist  111.  Battery  M. 
9th  Ohio  Battery.   (Not  engaged.) 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JAMES  D.  MORGAN. 

Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Robert  F.  Smith.   (Not  engaged.) 
2d,  Col.  Daniel  M.  McCook. 
3d,  Col.  Charles  C.  Doolittle.  (Not  engaged.) 
Artillery.     loth  Wis.  Battery.  (Not  engaged.) 
2d  111.  Battery  I. 
ist  Ohio  Battery  E. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

(Not  engaged.) 

BRIG.-GEN.  ROBERT  S.  GRANGER. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  S.  D.  Bruce. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  T.  D.  Ward. 

3d,  Brig.-Gen.  James  G.  Spears. 


APPENDIX 


379 


Artillery. 


2d  111.  Battery  H. 
5th  Mich.  Battery, 
ist  Tenn.  Battery. 


CAVALRY. 

MAJ.-GEN.  DAVID  S.  STANLEY  (Absent). 
BRIG.-GEN.  ROBERT  B.  MITCHELL  (Commanding). 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
COL.  EDWARD  M.  McCooK. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Archibald  P.  Campbell. 
2d,  Col.  Daniel  M.  Ray. 
3d,  Col.  Louis  D.  Watkins. 
Artillery,     ist  Ohio  Battery  D  (Section). 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  GEORGE  CROOK. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Robert  H.  G.  Minty. 
2d,  Col.  Eli  Long. 

3d,  Col.  William  W.  Lowe.  (Not  engaged.) 
Artillery.     Chicago  Board  of  Trade  Battery. 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 

CUMBERLAND  AT  THE  BATTLES 

OF  CHATTANOOGA. 

Nov.  23-25,  1863. 

(Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  55,  pp.  14-21.) 

MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS,  Commanding. 


APPENDIX 

FOURTH    ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  GORDON  GRANGER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  CHARLES  CRUFT. 

Brigades.  1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Cruft.  (The  brigade  not 
engaged;  stationed  at  Bridgeport,  Ala.;  the 
brigade  commander  temporarily  in  command  of 
division.) 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  Walter  C.  Whitaker.  (The  usth 
111.,  84th  Ind.  and  5th  Ind.  Battery  not  engaged ; 
stationed  at  Shellmound,  Tenn.) 

3d,  Col.  William  Grose.  (The  3Oth  Ind.,  ;;th 
Penn.,  and  Battery  H  4th  U.  S.  Art.  not  en- 
gaged; stationed  at  Whitesides,  Tenn.) 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN. 

Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Francis  T.  Sherman. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  George  D.  Wagner.  (The  sist  Ind. 
not  engaged;  between  Nashville  and  Chatta- 
nooga.) 

3d,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker. 
Artillery.     Capt.  Warren  P.  Edgarton. 

ist  111.  Battery  M. 

loth  Ind.  Battery. 

ist  Mo.  Battery  G. 

ist  Ohio  Battery  I. 

4th  U.  S.  Battery  G. 

5th  U.  S.  Battery  H. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 

Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  August  Willich. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  William  B.  Hazen. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  Beatty. 


APPENDIX  381 

Artillery.     Capt.  Cullen  Bradley. 
Bridge's  (111.)  Battery. 
6th  Ohio. 
20th  Ind. 
Penn.  Light  Battery  B. 

ELEVENTH  AND  TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  JOSEPH  HOOKER. 

ELEVENTH    ARMY    CORPS. 
MAJ.-GEN.  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ADOLPH  STEINWEHR. 
Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Adolphus  Buschbeck. 
2d,  Col.  Charles  Smith. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  CARL  SCHURZ. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Hector  Tyndale. 
2d,  Col.  Wladimir  Krzyzanowski. 
3d,  Col.  Frederick  Hecker. 
Artillery.     Maj.  Thomas  W.  Osborn. 

ist  N.  Y.  Light  Batteries  i  and  13. 
1st  Ohio  Batteries  I  and  K. 
4th  U.  S.  Battery  G. 

(Batteries  I,  ist  Ohio,  and  G,  4th  U.  S.,  tempo- 
rarily attached  to  2d  div.  4th  corps.) 

TWELFTH    ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM. 

(The  corps  commander  and  the  first  division  on  detached  duty 
and  not  in  battle.) 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  W.  GEARY. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Charles  Candy. 

2d,  Col.  George  A.  Cobham. 
3d,  Col.  David  Ireland. 


382 


APPENDIX 


Artillery.     Maj.  John  A.  Reynolds. 
Penn.  Light. 
5th  U.  S.  Battery  K. 


FOURTEENTH    ARMY    CORPS. 
MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  PALMER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  William  P.  Carlin. 
2d,  Col.  Marshall  F.  Moore. 

3d,    Brig.-Gen.    John    C.    Starkweather.     (During 
the  battles  was  holding  fort  and  breastworks  at 
Chattanooga.) 
Artillery,     ist  111.  Battery  C. 

ist  Mich.  Battery  A. 

5th  U.  S.  Battery  H.     (Temporarily  attached  to 
2d  div.  4th  corps.) 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  James  D.  Morgan. 
2d,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Beatty. 
3d,  Col.  Daniel  McCook. 
Artillery.    Capt.  William  A.  Hotchkiss. 
2d  111.  Battery  I. 
2d  Minn. 
5th  Wis. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ABSALOM  BAIRD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Turchin. 
2d,  Col.  Ferdinand  Van  Derveer. 
3d,  Col.  Edward  H.  Phelps. 
Artillery.    Capt.  George  R.  Swallow. 
7th  Ind. 
igth  Ind. 
4th  U.  S.  Battery  I. 


APPENDIX  383 

ENGINEER    TROOPS. 

BRIG.-GEN.  WILLIAM  F.  SMITH. 

ARTILLERY    RESERVE. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  BRANNAN. 

CAVALRY. 
SECOND  BRIGADE,  SECOND  DIVISION. 

COL.  ELI  LONG. 

.(The  other  brigades  of  first  and  second  divisions  on  detached 
duty  at  various  points.) 

POST    OF    CHATTANOOGA. 

COL.  JOHN  G.  PARKHURST. 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE    ARMY    OF    THE 

CUMBERLAND    AT    BEGINNING   OF 

ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN. 

May  5,  1864. 

(Reb.  Rec.,  ser.  No.  59,  pp.  551-560;  Van  Home:  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  vol.  2,  pp.  31-39.) 

MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS,  Commanding. 

FOURTH    ARMY    CORPS. 
MAJ.-GEN.  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  DAVID  S.  STANLEY. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Cruft. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  Walter  C.  Whitaker. 
3d,  Col.  William  Grose. 


APPENDIX 

Artillery.     Capt.  Peter  Simonson. 
5th  Ind.  Battery. 
Penn.  Battery  B. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  NEWTON. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Francis  T.  Sherman. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  George  D.  Wagner. 
3d,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker. 
Artillery,     ist  Mo.  Battery  G. 
ist  111.  Battery  M. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  August  Willich. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  William  B.  Hazen. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  Beatty. 
Artillery.     Capt.  Cullen  Bradley. 
6th  Ohio  Battery. 
Bridge's  (111.)  Battery. 


FOURTEENTH    ARMY   CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  PALMER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  William  P.  Carlin. 
2d,  Brig.-Gen.  John  H.  King. 
3d,  Col.  James  M.  Neibling. 
Artillery.     Capt.  Lucius  H.  Drury. 
ist  Mich.  Battery  A. 
ist  111.  Battery  C. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  James  D.  Morgan. 
2d,  Col.  John  G.  Mitchell. 
3d,  Col.  Daniel  McCook. 


APPENDIX 

Artillery.     Capt.  Charles  M.  Barnett. 
2d  Minn.  Battery. 
2d  111.  Battery  I. 
5th  Wis.  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ABSALOM  BAIRD. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Turchin. 
2d,  Col.  Ferdinand  Van  Derveer. 
3d,  Col.  George  P.  Este. 
Artillery.     Capt.  George  R.  Swallow. 
7th  Ind.  Battery, 
igth  Ind.  Battery. 

TWENTIETH    ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  JOSEPH  HOOKER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  F.  Knipe. 
2d,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.  Ruger. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  Hector  Tyndale. 
Artillery.     Capt.  John  D.  Woodbury. 

ist  N.  Y.  Batteries  M  and  I. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  W.  GEARY. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Charles  Candy. 

2d,  Col.  Adolphus  Buschbeck. 
3d,  Col.  David  Ireland. 
Artillery.     Capt.  William  Wheeler. 

Independent  Penn.  Battery  E. 
I3th  N.  Y.  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  DANIEL  BUTTERFIELD. 
Brigades.     1st,  Brig.-Gen.  William  T.  Ward. 
2d,  Col.  John  Coburn. 
3d,  Col.  James  Wood. 

25 


385 


386  APPENDIX 

Artillery.     Capt.  Marco  B.  Gary. 
ist  Ohio  Battery  C. 
ist  Mich.  Battery  I. 

FOURTH  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  LOVELL  H'.  ROUSSEAU. 

(The  organization  of  this  division  was  incomplete  and  it  never 
j  oined  the  corps ;  portions  of  it  were  on  detached  or  garrison 
duty.  See  Fox:  Reg.  Losses,  p.  104.) 

Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  S.  Granger. 

Various  regiments  not  brigaded. 
Artillery,    gth  Ohio  Battery. 
20th  Ind.  Battery. 


CAVALRY. 

BRIG.-GEN.  WASHINGTON  L.  ELLIOTT. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
COL.  EDWARD  M.  McCooK. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Archibald  P.  Campbell. 
2d,  Col.  Oscar  H.  LaGrange. 
3d,  Col.  Louis  D.  Watkins. 
Artillery.     i8th  Ind.  Battery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  KENNER  GARRARD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  William  B.  Sipes. 

2d,  Col.  Robert  H.  G.  Minty. 
3d,  Col.  Abram  O.  Miller. 
Artillery.     Chicago  Board  of  Trade  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JUDSON  KILPATRICK. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  William  W.  Lowe. 
2d,  Col.  Charles  C.  Smith. 
3d,  Col.  Eli  H.  Murray. 


APPENDIX  387 


FOURTH  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  ALVAN  C.  GILLEN. 
Brigades,     ist,  Lt.-Col.  Duff  G.  Thornburgh. 
2d,  Lt.-Col.  George  Spalding. 
3d,  Col.  John  K.  Miller. 

ARTILLERY. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  BRANNAN. 


ORGANIZATION   AT    THE    BATTLE    OF 
NASHVILLE. 

Dec.  15  and  16,  1864. 

(Cox:  March  to  the  Sea,  pp.  223-227.) 

MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS,  Commanding. 

FOURTH    ARMY    CORPS. 
BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  NATHAN  KIMBALL. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Isaac  M.  Kirby. 

2d,  Brig.-Gen.  Walter  C.  Whitaker. 
3d,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Grose. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  WASHINGTON  L.  ELLIOTT. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Emerson  Opdycke. 
2d,  Col.  John  Q.  Lane. 
3d,  Col.  Joseph  Conrad. 


388 


APPENDIX 


THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  SAMUEL  BEATTY. 
Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Abel  D.  Streight. 
2d,  Col.  P.  Sidney  Post. 
3d,  Col.  Fred  Knefler. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 
MAJ.  WILBUR  F.  GOODSPEAD. 

TWENTY-THIRD   ARMY    CORPS. 

MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJ.-GEN.  DARIUS  N.  COUCH. 
Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  A.  Cooper. 
2d,  Col.  Orlando  H.  Moore. 
3d,  Col.  John  Mehringer. 
Artillery.     I5th  Ind.  Battery, 
igth  Ohio  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JACOB  D.  Cox. 
Brigades.     1st,  Col.  Charles  C.  Doolittle. 
2d,  Col.  John  S.  Casement. 
3d,  Col.  Isaac  N.  Stiles. 
Artillery.    23d  Ind.  Battery. 

ist  Ohio  Battery  D. 


DETACHMENT  OF  ARMY  OF  TENNESSEE. 

MAJ.-GEN.  ANDREW  J.  SMITH. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  MCARTHUR. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  William  L.  McMillen. 
2d,  Col.  Lucius  F.  Hubbard. 
3d,  Col.  S.  G.  Hill. 


APPENDIX  389 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  KENNER  GARRARD. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  David  Moore. 

2d,  Col.  James  I.  Gilbert. 
3d,  Col.  Edward  H.  Wolfe. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
COL.  JONATHAN  B.  MOORE. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Lyman  M.  Ward. 
2d,  Col.  Leander  Blanden. 
Artillery.     I4th  Ind.  Battery. 
2d  Mo.  Battery  A. 

PROVISIONAL  DETACHMENT  (District  of  the 
Etowah). 

MAJ.-GEN.  JAMES  B.  STEEDMAN. 

PROVISIONAL  DIVISION. 

BRIG.-GEN.  CHARLES  CRUFT. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Benjamin  Harrison. 
2d,  Col.  John  G.  Mitchell. 
3d,  Lt.-Col.  Charles  H.  Grosvenor. 

Second  Brigade  (Army  of  Tenn.),  Col.  Adam  G.  Malloy. 
First  Colored  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Morgan. 
Second  Colored  Brigade,  Col.  Charles  R.  Thompson. 

POST    OF    NASHVILLE. 

BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  F.  MILLER. 
Second  Brigade,  4th  Div.,  20th  Army  Corps,  Col.  Edwin  G. 

Mason. 
Garrison  Artillery,  Maj.  John  J.  Ely. 

QUARTERMASTER'S    DIVISION. 

(Composed  of  Quartermaster's  employes.) 
COL.  JAMES  L.  DONALDSON. 


390 


APPENDIX 


CAVALRY    CORPS. 

BREVET  MAJ.-GEN.  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigades,     ist,  Brig.-Gen.  John  T.  Croxton. 
Artillery.     111.  Board  of  Trade  Battery. 

FIFTH  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  EDWARD  HATCH. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Robert  R.  Stewart. 

2d,  Col.  Datus  E.  Coon. 
Artillery.     1st  111.  Battery  I. 

SIXTH  DIVISION. 

BRIG.-GEN.  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Harrison. 

2d,  Col.  James  Biddle. 
Artillery.    4th  U.  S.  Battery  I. 

SEVENTH  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GEN.  JOSEPH  F.  KNIFE. 
Brigades,     ist,  Col.  J.  H.  Hammond. 
2d,  Col.  G.  M.  L.  Johnson. 
Artillery.     I4th  Ohio  Battery. 


INDEX  TO  CITATIONS 


NOTE:  I  have  consulted  and  drawn  very  liberally  from  Van 
Home's  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Cist's  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, Cox's  Atlanta  Campaign  and  Fox's  Regimental  Losses.  I 
make  this  general  acknowledgment  in  lieu  of  a  multitude  of  cita- 
tions' from  them. 

American  State.  Papers.    Military  Affairs,  342 

Appleton.    Annual  Cyclopedia  for  1863,  272,  293 

Atlantic  Monthly,  324 

Badeau,  Adam.     Military  Life  of  U.  S.  Grant,  328 

Bancroft,  George.     Hist.  U.  States,  343 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War, 

19,  24,  208,  216,  240,  309,  316,  317,  336,  337,  366 
Elaine',  James  G.     Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  24 

Boynton,  Gen.  Henry  V.    Chickamauga  National  Military 

Park,  163,  208,  210,  235,  358 

Boynton,  Gen.  Henry  V.     Continuation  of  Piatt's  George 

H.   Thomas.     See  Piatt. 

Brock,  Francena  Howe.     Campbell  Hospital,  67 

Carrington,  Gen.  Henry  B.    Battles  of  the  American  Revo- 
lution, 343 
Century  Magazine,                                                                       89,  289 
Cheatham,  Gen.  Benj.  F.     Article  on  General  Cheatham  at 

Spring  Hill  (Battles  and  Leaders),  317 

Cist,  Gen.  Henry  M.    Army  of  the  Cumberland, 

99,  102,  121,  163,  210,  233,  240 
Cleland,  John  E.     The  Second  March  to  the  Ohio  (Indiana 

Loyal  Legion;  War  Papers),  313 

Committee    on    Conduct    of   the    War.    Report   on    Rose- 

crans's  Campaign,  161 

Coppee,  Henry.     General  Thomas,  321,  323 

Cox,  Gen.  Jacob  D.     Atlanta,  87,  355 

Cox,  Gen.  Jacob  D.    Military  Reminiscences,  157,  160 

Cox,    Gen.    Jacob    D.     War    Preparations    in    the    North 

(Battles  and  Leaders),  19 

Dana,  Charles  A.     Recollections  of  the  Civil  War,  352 

Davie,  Gen.  Henry  E.    Biography  of  Gen.  Sheridan,  200 

(390 


392  INDEX    TO    CITATIONS 

Davis,  Jefferson.    Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  States, 

269,  278,  280 

Dawson,  Henry  B.    Battles  of  U.  States,  343 

Foulke,  William  Dudley.    Life  of  Oliver  P.  Morton,      15,  51,  53 
Fox,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  F.    Regimental  Losses, 

54,  81,  89.  122,  235,  272,  300,  301,  336,  337,  338,  340,  350 
Fox,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  F.     The  Chance  of  Being  Hit  in  Bat- 
tle (Century  Magazine),  89 
Fullerton,  Gen.  Joseph  S.     The  Army  of  the  Cumberland 

at  Chickamauga  (Battles  and  Leaders,  vol.  3,  p.  725),  240 

Gordon,  A.  C.    Hard  Times  in  the  Confederacy  (Century 

Magazine),  289 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.    Memoirs,        26,  28,  29,  33,  225,  231,  239 
Greeley,  Horace.    American  Conflict,  128 

Harper's  Weekly,  3,  123,  241 

History  of  86th  Indiana,  95 

Holt,  Joseph  (Judge  Adv.  Gen.).  Report  to  Secy,  of  War 
on  the  Order  of  American  Knights  or  Sons  of  Liberty, 
etc.,  130 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B.     Article  on  The  Invasion  of  Tennessee 

(Battles  and  Leaders),  309,  316 

Humphreys,  Gen.  Andrew  J.     Virginia  Campaign,  304,  355 

Indjana  Adjutant  General's  Reports,  336 

Indiana  Brevier  Legislative  Reports,  133 

Indiana  Commandery  Loyal  Legion.     War  Papers,  313 

Indiana  House  Journal,  133 

Indiana  Senate  Journal,  133,  135 

Irwin,  Lt.-Col.  Richard  B.    Ball's  Bluff,  etc.     (Battles  and 

Leaders),  24 

Jones,  J.  B.     A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,  280,  281,  287 

Livermore,  Col.  Thomas  L.    Numbers  and  Losses  in  the 

Civil  War,  122,  208,  336,  337,  341,  343,  347,  351 

Lossing,  Benson  J.    Field  Book  of  the  Revolution,  343 

Military  Historical   Society  of  Mass.     Some  Federal  and 

Confederate  Commanders,  324 

McClellan,     Gen.     George    B.    McClellan's    Own    Story, 

30,  34,  36,  37,  42 

McClure,  Alexander  K.     Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times,   28,  49 
McPherson,  Edward.     History  of  the  Rebellion,  276,  280 

New  York.    Assembly  Documents,  133 

Nicolay  and  Hay.    Abraham  Lincoln,  23,  217 

Phisterer,  Capt.  Frederick.    Statistical  Record  of  the  Ar- 
mies of  the  U.  States,  336 
Piatt,  Donn.     General  George  H.  Thomas  (with  a  continu- 
ation by  Gen.  Henry  V.  Boynton),                               81,  163,  240 
Pitman,  Benn.    Indiana  Treason  Cases,  131 
Pollard,  E.  A.     The  Lost  Cause,                        39,  40,  182,  280,  281 
Pollard,  E.  A.    Southern  History  of  the  War,                           285 


INDEX    TO    CITATIONS  393 

Proceedings  of  the  Officers   and   Soldiers   of  the  Indiana 

Regiments,  134 

Rebellion  Records, 

32,  48,  127,  160,  163,  186,  187,  104,  203,  204,  210,  212,  218,  225, 
233,  234,  276,  294,  295,  335. 

Reid,  Whitelaw.     Ohio  in  the  War,  18,  19,  28 

Richmond  Enquirer.     Editorial  on  Arming  the  Slaves,  276 

Ropes,  John  C.     The  Army  under  Pope,  44 

Ropes,  John  C.    Story  of  the  Civil  War,  103 

Ropes,   John    C.    Article   on    General   Sherman    (Atlantic 

Monthly,  and  Some  Federal  and  Confederate  Commanders) ,  324 
Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.  Forty-Six  Years  in  the  Army,  83,  87 
Schwab,  Prof.  John  C.  The  Confederate  States  of  America,  288 
Sheridan,  Gen.  Phil  H.  Memoirs,  80,  200 

Sherman,  Gen.  Wm.  T.     Memoirs,  233 

Smith,  Gen.  Wm.  F.     Comments  on  General  Grant's  "Chat- 
tanooga" (Battles  and  Leaders),  216 
Spofford,  Ainsworth  R.    American  Almanac,                      341,  342 
Stephens,  Alexander.     The  War  betiveen  the  States,               .   290 
Stone,    Col.    Henry.    Repelling  Hood's  Invasion   of   Ten- 
nessee (Battles  and  Leaders),  316 
Swinton,  William.     Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac,                                                                                            25,  31 
Terrell,  Adj. -Gen.  Wm.  H.  H.    Reports,  336 
Townsend,  Malcom.     U.  S.  Curious  Facts,  etc.,                           343 
Turchin,  Gen.  John  H.     Battle  of  Chickamauga,   163,  190,  204,  206 
Van  Home,  Thomas  B.     Army  of  the  Cumberland, 

103,  163,  190,  202,  207,  210,  234,  240,  303 
Van  Home,  Thomas  B.    Life  of  George  H.  Thomas, 

164,  180,  217,  329 
Webb,   Gen.   Alex.    S.     Through  the   Wilderness    (Battles 

and  Leaders),  337 

Wilson,  Henry.     The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power,         272 


GENERAL  INDEX 


Ackwprth  (Ga.)  :  305. 

Ac  quid  Creek  (Va.)  :    43. 

Adams,  John :  40. 

Alabama,  state:    165,  313,  362. 

Alexander's     bridge     (Chicka- 

mauga)  :    171. 
Allotment  rolls:    63,  148. 
Alpine  (Ga.)  :    164,  165,  167. 
Amenities  of  war:    93-96. 
American  Knights :    130-132. 
A merican  Reform  Society :  146. 
Amusements  in  Army :  66. 


Anderson,  Gen.  Patton 
Anderson,   Mr. 


275- 
254- 
271. 


Andrew,  Gov.  John  A. 

Antietam,  battle   of:     35,   297 
numbers  and  losses,  348. 

Appomattox  Court  House : 
surrender  at,  367. 

Armed  neutrality:  of  Ken- 
tucky, 5. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland :  or- 
ganization in  1862,  101 ;  Gen. 
Rosecrans  appointed  to  com- 
mand of,  101 ;  organized  into 
Center,  Right  Wing,  and 
Left  Wing,  101 ;  in  camp  at 
Nashville,  Tenn.,  104-5 ;  re- 
organization Nov.  7,  1862, 
1 06;  in  camp  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  Tenn.,  123-155;  com- 
posed mainly  of  men  from 
Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois, 
127;  Democrats  in,  127;  de- 
sertions from  in  1863,  127, 
137;  protests  of  Indiana 
regiments  in  to  Indiana  leg- 
islature, in  1863,  134;  con- 


solidation of  2Oth  and  21  st 
corps  into  4th,  214;  Thomas 
succeeds  Rosecrans  in  com- 
mand of,  214;  kindly  feeling 
of  soldiers  for  Rosecrans, 
214;  Grant  underestimates 
soldierly  qualities  of  men, 
233 ;  reorganization  prior  to 
Atlanta  campaign,  298;  af- 
fection of  soldiers  for  Gen. 
Thomas,  326,  328;  see  also 
titles  of  battles  and  cam- 
paigns in  which  the  army 
participated. 

Army  of  the  James:  losses  in 
Richmond  campaign,  352. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
(Confederate)  :  24,  45,  304, 
365 ;  its  last  stand,  365. 

Army  of  the  Ohio:  99,  103, 
298. 

Army  of  the  Potomac:  24,  26, 
31,  35,  42,  43,  44,  45,  93,  124, 
126,  150,  152,  159,  272,  304, 
365;  organization,  20,  35; 
Gen.  McClellan  appointed  to 
command  of,  35 ;  Burnside 
supersedes  McClellan  in 
command  of,  124;  Hooker 
supersedes  Burnside,  124; 
desertions  from  in  1863,  127; 
Meade  supersedes  Hooker, 
125 ;  losses  in  Richmond 
campaign,  352. 

Armv  of  the  Tennessee  (Fed- 
eral) :  298. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee  (Con- 
federate) :  Gen.  Bragg  ap- 

(395) 


396 


GENERAL    INDEX 


pointed  to  command  of,  47; 
Gen.      Johnston      supersedes 
Bragg,  297;    Gen.   Hood  su- 
persedes Johnston,  304;  vir- 
tually destroyed  at  battle  of 
Nashville,   324;    Hood  relin- 
quishes    command     of,    324. 
See  the  titles  of  the1  various 
battles     and     campaigns     in 
which  it  participated. 
Army    of   Virginia:    organiza- 
tion, 44;  demolition  of,  45. 
Army      Organizations      (Fed- 
eral) : 
Corps  (Infantry) : 

Crittenden,  Thomas  L. :  99, 
1 06.  See  2  ist  Army 
Corps. 

Gilbert,  Charles  C. :   99. 
McCook,  Alexander  McD. : 
99,    100,    106,    109.    See! 
20th  Army  Corps. 
Thomas,  George  H. :    106. 

See  I4th  Army  Corps. 
Fourth :    214,  219,  220,  223, 
226,    242,   265,    298,    309, 
312,  314,  315,  318. 
Eleventh:     214,    223,    265, 
298.      See     2Oth     Army 
Corps. 

Twelfth:  214,  224,  265, 
298.  See  20th  Army 
Corps. 

Fourteenth  (old)  :    101. 
Fourteenth     (new)  :      158, 
164,    169,    170,    171,    172, 
174,    175,    178,    179,    199, 

2OI,     2O2,     204,     219,     223, 
226,   242,  298. 

Fifteenth :  216,  223,  224, 
242,  298. 

Sixteenth:  298,  306,  312, 
320. 

Seventeenth:    216,  223,298. 

Twentieth  (old)  :  109,  157, 
167,  171,  172,  179,  199, 
201,  202,  204,  214.  See 
4th  Army  Corps. 


Twentieth  (new)  :  265, 
208.  See  nth  and  I2th 
Army  Corps. 

Twenty-first :  106,  158, 
161,  168,  169,  170,  171, 

172,  173,    174,    179,    199, 

201,  202,   204,    214.     See 
4th  Army  Corps. 

Twenty-third :      258,     298, 

309,  312,  314,  315- 
Corps  (Cavalry)  : 

Elliott,     Washington     L. : 

208. 

Kilpatrick,  Judson:  311. 
Mitchell,  Robert  B. :  205. 
Wilson,  James  H. :  313, 

314,  315. 

Corps  (Reserve)  : 
Granger,  Gordon:  158,  173, 

178,    179,    192,    193,   201, 

202,  205. 

Divisions : 

Baird,  Absalom:    172,  177, 

178,    204,    219,    223,  224, 
225,  226. 

Brannan,    John    M. :  172, 

173,  174,    177,    178,  182, 
183,    184,    185,    186,  189, 
191,  193,  202,  204,  209. 

Cox,  Jacob  D. :  315. 

Crook,  George  (Cav.)  : 
205. 

Cruft,  Charles :   220,  224. 

Davis,  Jefferson  C. :  108, 
in,  116,  172,  176,  179, 
183,  184,  185,  198,  201, 
204,  206,  219.  242. 

Ewing,  Hugh :    223. 

Geary,  John  W. :    220,  224. 

Johnson,  Richard  W. : 
108,  no,  in,  172,  175, 
176,  177,  178,  201,  202, 
204,  219,  223,  224,  225. 

Kimball,  Nathan :   315. 

Mitchell,  Robert  B. : 
(Cav.)  205. 

Morgan,  James  :     193,  205. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


397 


McCook,  Edward  M. 
(Cav.)  :  205. 

Neglev.  James  H. :  108, 

in,  112,  113,  116,  119, 

120,  165,  168,  169,  172, 

177,  179,  185,  189,  202, 
204. 

Newton,  John :  301. 

Osterhaus,  Peter  J. :  219, 
220,  224. 

Palmer,  John  M. :  108, 

113,  116,  119,  172,  175, 

176,  178,  201,  202,  204, 
214. 

Reynolds,  Joseph  J. :  172, 

175,  176,    178,    183,  202, 
204. 

Rousseau,  Lovell  H. :  108, 

112,  113,  114,  115,  n6, 
122. 

Ruger,  Thomas  H. :   315. 

Schurz,  Carl :    223. 

Sheridan,  Phil.  H. :  108, 

in,  112,  116,  117,  172, 

176,  178,    179,    184,  185, 

201,     204,     206,     214,  2l8, 

219,  223,  224,  226,  235, 
236,  242,  266. 

Smith,  John  E. :    223. 

Smith,    Morgan    L. :  223, 

302. 

Stanley,     David    S. :  120, 

267,  302. 

Steedman,  James  B. :  193, 

205,  209. 

Steinwehr,      Adolph  V. : 

223. 

Van     Cleve,    Horatio  P. : 

106,    108,    109,    no,  114, 

116,    117,    119,    120,  136, 

155,    162,    172,    175,  176, 

177,  179,    180,    183,  184, 

185,     189,     198,    201,  202, 

204,  206. 

Wanner,   George  D. :  315, 


Wood,  Thomas  J. :  55,  95, 
108,  no,  116,  117,  172, 
176,  179,  180,  183,  184, 
189,  201,  204,  214,  218, 
219,  223,  224,  226,  228, 
229,  235,  236,  240,  242, 
249,  257,  259,  265,  315, 

.  330. 
Brigades : 

Barnes,  Sidney  M. :  176, 
180,  183,  201,  202. 

Beatty,  Samuel :  100,  106, 
114,  115,  119,  162,  175, 
180,  184,  189,  201,  202, 
206,  214,  254,  267. 

Bradley,  Luther  P.:    206. 

Buell,  George  P. :    206. 

Carlin,  William  P.:  176, 
206,  223. 

Connell,  John  M. :    186. 

Croxton,  John  T. :    174. 

Dick,  George  F. :  175, 
1 80,  184,  189,  201,  206. 

Dodge,  Joseph  B. :    206. 

Fyffe,  James  P.:    114,  119. 

Grose,  William:  119,  220, 
224. 

Harker,  Charles  G. :  1 14, 
117. 

Hascall,  Milo  S.:    108. 

Hazen,  Wm.  B. :    265. 

Heg,  Hans  C. :    176,  206. 

King,  Edward  A. :    206. 

Kirk,  Edward  N. :  109, 
in. 

Laiboldt,  Bernard :    206. 

Lytle,  Wm.  F. :    206. 

Miller,  John  F. :    113,  120. 

Minty,  Robert  H.  G. :  161, 
172. 

Mitchell,    John     G. :      187, 

193,  364- 

Moore,  Marshall  F. :    223. 
Opdycke,  Emerson:    318. 
Price,  James  P.:    114,  118. 
Shepherd,  Oliver  L. :    117, 

122. 


398 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Stanley,  Timothy  R. :    113, 

1 20. 
Starkweather,     John      C. : 

223. 
Van    Derveer,    Ferdinand : 

182,   193,  206,  209. 
Whitaker,  Walter  C. :    187, 

193,  206,  220,  224,  364. 
Wilder,  John  T. :    161,  169, 

172,  176,  178,  202,  361. 
Willich,  August:    108,  109, 

no,   in,  254,  265. 
Pioneer  Brigade :    1 10. 
Regimental    and    other    organ- 
izations : 

United  States:  33d  U.  S. 
Col.  Inf.,  271;  79th  U.  S. 
Col.  Inf.,  271. 
Illinois:  2ist  Inf.,  154. 
Indiana :  4th  Cav.,  252 ;  6th 
Inf.,  135,  139;  7th  Inf.,  10; 
I5th  Inf.,  135;  i7th  Inf., 
135;  22d  Inf.,  135;  29th 
Inf.,  135;  32d  Inf.,  135; 
34th  Inf.,  135;  37th  Inf., 
135;  38th  Inf.,  135;  39th 
Inf.,  135;  40th  Inf.,  135; 
42d  Inf.,  135 ;  44th  Inf.,  135, 
189;  sist  Inf.,  135;  57th 
Inf.,  135;  58th  Inf.,  135; 
72d  Inf.,  135 ;  73d  Inf.,  135 ; 
75th  Inf.,  135;  79th  Inf., 
53,  54,  57-  58,  73,  76,  81,  94, 
97,  99,  104,  105,  115,  122, 
135,  136,  137,  H9,  162,  175, 
182,  185,  189,  192,  195,  228, 
240,  242,  244,  250,  254,  257, 
300,  317,  331,361,  363;  79th 
Inf.,  Co.  E,  139,  140;  79th 
Inf.,  Co.  I,  54,  55,  105,  115, 
149,  339,  353-4;  8ist  Inf., 
53;  82d  Inf.,  53,  135;  86th 
Inf.,  95,  135,  189,  228;  87th 
Inf.,  53 ;  88th  Inf.,  53 ;  8gth 
Inf.,  53;  loist  Inf..  135. 
Kansas:  ist  Kans.  Col.  Inf., 

271. 
Kentucky:    5th  Inf.,  139;  9th 


Inf.,  99,  115,  189;  nth  Inf., 
99,  115;  I7th  Inf.,  189; 
Louisville  Legion,  139. 

Louisiana:  ist  Louis.  Na- 
tive Guard  (Col.),  271. 

Maine:  ist  Me.  Heavy  Art., 
350. 

Massachusetts :  54th  Inf. 
(Col.),  271. 

Michigan  :  22d  Inf.,  196. 

Minnesota:    ist  Inf.,  350. 

New  Hampshire :  5th  Inf., 
350. 

Ohio:  igth  Inf.,  99,  115,  149, 
189,  251,  252;  2ist  Inf., 
196;  35th  Inf.,  356;  89th 
Inf.,  196. 

Pennsylvania:  I4ist  Inf., 
350. 

South  Carolina:  ist  Inf. 
(Col.),  271. 

Tennessee:  ist  Tenn.  Bat- 
talion, 252;  3d  East  Tenn. 
Cav.,  254. 

Army  Organizations    (Confed- 
erate) : 

Corps  (Infantry) : 
Buckner,    Simon    B. :     160, 

167,  170,  173,  195. 
Cheatham,   Benj .   F. :    207, 

315. 

Hardee,  Wm.  J. :    107,  no. 
Hill,  Daniel  H. :    173,  207. 
Hood,  John  B. :    173,  176. 
Lee,-  Stephen  D. :    315. 
Longstreet,      James :       39, 

1 66,    170,    173,    178,    179, 

207. 
Polk,  Leonidas:     173,   179, 

207. 
Stewart,      Alexander      P. : 

315- 
Walker,    William    H.    T.: 

173- 
Corps  (Cavalry)  : 

Forrest,  Nathan  B. :  47, 
157,  173,  174,  179,  200, 
310,  314,  315. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


399 


Morgan,  John :    47. 
Wheeler,  Joseph :    169,  173, 

207,  211,  266. 
Divisions : 
Anderson,      Patton :       195, 

209,  224. 
Armstrong,        Frank       C. 

(Cav.):    173- 
Bate,  William  B. :   224. 
Breckinridge,      John      C. : 

76,    107,    109,    no,    114, 

119,    120,    122,    173,    178, 

179,  182,  207,  209. 
Cheatham,   Benj.   F. :     108, 

III,      122,     173,     175,     177, 
179,   2O7,  209,   224. 

Cleburne,  Patrick  R. :    107, 

1 10,    in,    173,    177,    179, 

207,  209,  223. 
Gist,  S.  R. :    173,  179. 
Hindman,      Thomas       C. : 
.      173,    178,    179,    181,    184, 

185,  187,  188,  194,  207. 
Hood,  John  B. :  173,  207. 
Johnson,  Bushrod  R. :  173, 

176,    179,    181,    184,    185, 

1 88,  207,  209. 
Johnson,  Edward:    315. 
Kershaw,  Joseph  B. :     179, 

181,  184,  195. 
Law,      Evander      Mclver : 

173,  176,  179,  181,  184. 
Liddell,  St.  John  R. :  173, 

179,  207. 
Martin,  William  T.  (Cav.)  : 

173- 
McCown,    John    P. :     107, 

no,   in. 
McLaws,    Lafayette:     173, 

178,  179,  207. 

Pegram,  John  (Cav.)  :  173. 
Pickett,    George    E. :     120, 

350. 
Preston,      William:       173, 

178,  179,  195,  207,  209. 
Stevenson,  Carter  L. :   223. 
Stewart,      Alexander      P. : 


173,    175,    179,    207,    209, 

224. 
Walker,    William    H.    T.: 

173,  175,  179,  207,  223. 
Wharton,  John  A.  (Cav.)  : 

173- 
Withers,    Jones    M. :     107, 

in. 

Brigades : 

Adams,  Daniel  W. :    316. 
Anderson,  James :    195. 
Anderson,  Patton :    209. 
Bate,  William  B. :  209. 
Brown,  John  C. :   223. 
Cockrell,  Francis  M. :    316. 
Gumming,  Alfred :    223. 
Deas,  Zach  C. :    194,  195. 
Donelson,  Daniel   S. :    122. 
Govan,  Daniel  C. :   223. 
Gracie,     Archibald :       195, 

209. 

Kelly,  John  H. :   195. 
Lowrey,  Mark  P. :    223. 
Maney,   George:    223,  316. 
Scott,     John     S.     (Cav.)  : 

208. 

Smith,  J.  A. :    223. 
Trigg,  Robert  C. :    195- 
Wise,  Henry  A.:    278. 
Wright,  Marcus  J. :    175. 
Regiments,     Artillery,     Cav- 
alry, etc. : 

Georgia  :    2ist  Inf.,  350. 
North  Carolina:    26th  Inf., 

350. 
Tennessee:    8th  Inf.,   122; 

i6th  Inf.,  122. 
Texas  :    ist  Inf.,  350. 
Carnes's  Battery:    175,  364. 
Dent's   Battery:    195. 
Garrity's  Battery :    195. 
Washington    Light    Artil- 
lery :    120. 

Athens   (Tenn.)  :    266. 
Atlanta   (Ga.)  :  39,  40,  84,  299, 

300,  303,  305,  306,  307,  308. 
Atlanta:    battles  of,  300;  num- 
bers and  losses,  349. 


40O 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Atlanta  Campaign,  The:  Chap. 
XI,  pp.  283-304;  character  of 
country  traversed,  77,  84; 
breastworks  and  fortifica- 
tions encountered,  79,  85; 
courtesies  shown  each  other 
by  combatants,  94-6;  con- 
dition of  Confederacy  at  be- 
ginning of,  284-296;  Sher- 
man appointed  to  command 
of  Military  Division  of  Mis- 
sissippi, 297;  gathering  of 
troops  and  supplies  at  Chat- 
tanooga, 297-8;  strength  of 
Sherman's  army,  298 ; 
strength  of  Johnston's  army, 
298;  Johnston's  tactics,  298; 
Sherman's  tactics,  299;  no 
one  great  battle  fought,  299; 
but  many  smaller  ones,  299; 
troops  constantly  under  fire, 
300;  Federal  losses  in  cam- 
paign, 301,  351 ;  Confederate 
losses,  301 ;  losses  of  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  301 ; 
campaign  showed  futility  of 
assaulting  fortified  lines,  301 ; 
assault  of  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, 301-2;  campaign  ex- 
hausting to  vitality  of 
troops,  303 ;  illustration  of 
severity  of  fighting  on  the 
skirmish  line,  331-2. 

Augusta,  siege  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  346. 

Avery,  Capt.  William  L. :    238. 

Badeau,  Gen.  Adam:    injustice 

to  Gen.  Thomas,  328-9. 
Baird,  Gen.  Absalom :   239. 
Baker,  Wat :    96. 
Balaklava:    charge  at,  350. 
Baldwin,    Col.    Philemon    P. : 

in. 
Ball's  Bluff:    battle  of,  16,  21, 

2.r 
Banks,  Gen.  Nathaniel  P.:    44, 

125,  297. 


Bareford,  Mr. 


254- 


Barksdale,  E. :    278. 

Battle:  how  it  appeared  to  a 
soldier,  76;  difficulty  of  see- 
ing all  the  combatants,  76; 
maneuvering  for  position,  77 ; 
developing  the  enemy,  77; 
surprises,  77;  night  attacks, 
77;  flanking,  78;  private  sol- 
dier's preparation  for  battle, 
78;  the  skirmishers,  78; 
charging  a  battery,  79;  lying 
charging  a  battery.  79;  lying 
still  under  artillery  fire,  80; 
bayonet  charges,  81-2;  posi- 
tion of  officers,  82 ;  those 
specially  aimed  at,  82;  dif- 
ference between  shooting  of 
veteran  and  recruit,  83 ;  sen- 
sation of  being  specially 
aimed  at,  83-4;  radical 
changes  in  methods  of  fight- 
ing in  last  year  of  war,  84; 
the  fortifications  encountered 
in  last  year  of  war,  85 ;  fu- 
tility of  attacking  by  direct 
assault,  86;  how  advance  on 
fortifications  made,  88;  in- 
trenching under  fire,  88; 
danger  in  battle  of  being  hit 
by  cannon  balls,  89;  danger 
from  musket  balls,  89;  mine1 
explosions,  89;  the  inspiring 
motives  in  battle,  89-92;  a 
batterv  in  action,  91 ;  skulk- 
ers and  cowards,  92-3; 
amenities  of  war,  93-96. 

Battles  of  Civil  War:  numbers 
and  losses,  348-9. 

Battles  of  Mexican  War: 
numbers  and  losses,  341. 

Battles  of  Revolutionary  War: 
numbers  and  losses,  343-7. 

Battles  of  War  of  1812 :  num- 
bers and  losses,  342. 

Bayonet  charges :    81. 

Bean's  Station   (Tenn.)  :    245. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


401 


Beatty,  Gen.  Samuel:  118,  202, 
267. 

Beaufort,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  345. 

Beaurcgard,  Gen.  P.  G.  T. : 
46,  305,  308,  309. 

Bell,  John :    50. 

Bcllaire  (Oh.)  :    10,  13. 

Bemis  Heights,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  344. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P. :    282. 

Bennington,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Big    Shanty    (Ga.)  :     305,   330, 

333- 

Blackford  Co.   (Ind.)  :    132. 

Blackstocks,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Blair,  Gen.  Frank  P. :    298. 

Bliicher,  Gen. :    171. 

Blue  Bird  Gap  (Ga.)  :    168. 

Boston   (Mass.)  :    22. 

Boydton  Plank  Road,  battle 
of :  numbers  and  losses,  349. 

Boynton,  Gen.  Henry  V. :  356, 
357,  358. 

Bragg,  Gen.  Braxton :  ap- 
pointed to  command  of  Con- 
federate Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, 47 ;  his  invasion  of 
and  retreat  from  Kentucky, 
52,  98,  loo ;  his  controversy 
with  Gen.  Breckinridge,  122; 
superseded  by  Gen.  Johns- 
ton, 297 ;  his  subsequent  un- 
popularity in  the  South,  292. 
See  Army  of  Tennessee  and 
its  Battles  and  Campaigns.  . 

Brandy  wine,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Brannan,  Gen.  John  M. :    183. 

Breastworks:  79,  85-6.  See 
Fortified  Lines. 

Breckinridge,  Gen.  John  C. : 
50.  51,  122. 

Bridgeport    (Ala.)  :     158,    161, 

l62,    211,    212,    214,    2l6,    217, 

313- 
26 


Brier  Creek,  battle  of:    num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Brock,  Francena  Howe :    67. 

Brotherton    field    (Chickamau- 
ga):    178. 

Brotherton  house  (Chickamau- 
ga)  :    175,  360,  363. 

Brown,  Albert  G. :    278. 

Brown,  Gov.  Joseph :    293. 

Brown,  Orderly :    149. 

Brozvn  Co.  (Ind.)  :    54,  132. 

Buchanan,  Pres.  James :  27, 
101. 

Buckner,  Gen.  Simon  B. :  169, 
188. 

Buell,  Gen.  Don  Carlos :  his  de- 
partment merged  into  De- 
partment of  the  Mississippi, 
45  J  appointed  to  command  of 
left  wing  of  Halleck's  army, 
45 ;  his  advance  to  east  Ten- 
nessee, 46;  distrust  of  in  the 
North,  47 ;  reorganizes  army 
at  Louisville,  99;  marches  in 
pursuit  of  Bragg,  100;  su- 
perseded by  Rosecrans,  101 ; 
value  of  his  discipline,  102; 
hostility  of  Halleck  to,  102; 
criticisms  of  his  military 
abilities,  102-3 ',  his  timely 
arrival  at  Shiloh,  103.  See 
Army  of  the  Cumberland; 
Battles  of  Perryville  and 
Shiloh. 

Bull  Gap   (Tenn.)  :    257. 
Bull   Run:    first   battle   of,    13, 

15,  16,  31,  35. 

Bull  Run :    second  battle  of,  45. 
Bunker  Hill,  battle  of:    num- 
bers and  losses,  343. 
Burnside,    Gen.    Ambrose    E. : 
supersedes  McClellan  in  com- 
mand of  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac,   124;    is    superseded  by 
Hooker,     124;     his     contro- 
versy with  Halleck,  160.    See 
Battles     of     Fredericksburg, 


4O2 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Roanoke  Island ;  Knoxville, 
siege  of. 

Butler,  Gen.  Benjamin  F. :  271. 

"Butternuts"  of  Indiana  and 
Ohio:  130,  136. 

Calhoun  (Tenn.)  :    266. 

Camdcn,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  346. 

Cameron,  Simon :    15,  16,  25. 

Camp  fires :    75. 

Camp  guards :   62. 

Camp,  life  in :  laying  out 
camp,  56 ;  tents,  56-7 ;  dog- 
tents,  57;  shebangs,  57; 
daily  routine  of  camp  life, 
58;  roll-call,  58;  rations,  58; 
cooking,  59,  60;  exchanges 
at  picket  stations,  59;  drills 
and  inspections,  61 ;  dress 
parade,  61 ;  close  of  day  du- 
ties, 6l ;  camp  guard,  62 ; 
picket,  62 ;  pay  day,  63 ;  mail, 
64;  newspapers  in  the  army, 
65 ;  literature  in  the  army, 
65 ;  the  sutler,  66 ;  amuse- 
ments, 66;  gambling,  66; 
drunkenness,  67 ;  hospitals, 
67;  contrabands,  69. 

Camp,  March  and  Battle: 
Chap.  Ill,  pp.  56-96. 

Campbell  Hospital :  67. 

Campbell's  Station  (Tenn.)  : 
266. 

Canby,  Gen.  Edward  R. :  311. 

Cannon  balls :  danger  of  being 
hit  by,  89. 

Carriers  Ford :  battle  of,  13. 

Catholic  Sisters  of  Mercy:   68. 

Cat  left's  Gap  (Ga.)  :    168. 

Catoosa  Springs  (Ga.)  :    300. 

Cedar  Creek,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  349. 

Champion  Hill,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  348. 

Chancellor  smile,  battle  of :  126, 
366;  numbers  and  losses,  348. 

Chandler,  Matthew:    265,  332. 


Chandler,  Senator  Zachariah : 
16. 

Chantilly,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  348. 

Charging  a  battery :    79. 

Charging  breastworks :    79. 

Charleston,  siege  of  (in  Rev.)  : 
numbers  and  losses,  345. 

Charlestoum  (Tenn.)  :  266,  267. 

Charlotte,  battle  of :  numbers 
and  losses,  346. 

Chase,  Salmon  P. :    18,  42,  43. 

Chattahoochee  river :   305. 

Chattanooga  (Tenn.)  :  156, 
T57.  I58,  159,  160,  161,  162, 
164,  167,  168,  170,  174,  186, 
197,  198,  203,  204,  212,  213, 
242,  243,  244,  250,  251,  256, 
267,  296,  297,  298,  308,  313, 
333,  364;  revisited  in  1899, 
361. 

Chattanooga,  Campaign  and  the 
Battle  of  Chickamauga : 
Chap.  VII,  pp.  156-209.  See 
Chattanooga,  Siege  and  Bat- 
tles of. 

Chattanooga,  battles  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  348.  See 
Chattanooga,  Siege  and  Bat- 
tles of. 

Chattanooga  creek  (Tenn.)  : 
223. 

Chattanooga,  Siege  and  Battles 
of:  Chap.  VIII,  pp.  210-241; 
establishment  of  Federal 
lines  and  fortifications  after 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  210; 
surrounding  of  town  by 
Bragg's  army,  211;  difficulty 
of  getting  supplies,  211; 
short  rations,  212;  visit  of 
Jetierson  Davis,  212;  critical 
situation  of  Federal  army, 
212 ;  Gen.  Thomas's  reply  to 
Grant's  message,  213 ;  Fed- 
eral garrison  harassed  by 
Confederate  batteries  and 
sharpshooters,  213 ;  playing 


GENERAL    INDEX 


403 


of  "Dixie,"  213;  coming  of 
Gen.  Hooker,  214;  Gen. 
Rosecrans  superseded  by 
Gen.  Thomas,  214;  arrival  of 
Gen.  Grant,  215;  prepara- 
tions for  Federal  advance, 
215-16;  Bragg  sends  Long- 
street  to  East  Tennessee, 
216;  Grant's  order  to  Thom- 
as to  attack  Missionary 
Ridge  issued  and  recalled, 
216;  arrival  of  Gen.  Sher- 
man, 217;  Grant's  proposed 
plan  of  battle,  217;  capture 
of  Orchard  Knob,  218;  Sher- 
man's attack  on  north  end  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  219; 
Hooker's  attack  on  Lookout 
Mountain,  220;  repulse  of 
Sherman,  221 ;  Grant's  or- 
ders for  simultaneous  ad- 
vance on  Nov.  25  of  troops 
of  Sherman,  Thomas  and 
Hooker,  221-2;  Federal  and 
Confederate  movements  dur- 
ing forenoon  of  Nov.  25, 
222;  comparative  strength  of 
opposing  armies,  223-4 ; 
character  of  Missionary 
Ridge  and  its  defenses,  224; 
critical  situation  of  Gen. 
Sherman,  225 ;  Grant  orders 
assault  of  ridge  by  Thomas's 
troops,  225 ;  only  a  demon- 
stration to  relieve  Sherman 
intended,  226;  assault  by  the 
troops  of  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland begun,  227 ;  rifle  pits 
at  base  of  ridge  taken,  227; 
without  further  orders  troops 
begin  ascent  of  the  ridge, 
228 ;  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
taken,  230;  Bragg's  retreat, 
230 ;  erroneous  explanations 
of  supposed  small  Federal 
losses,  231-2;  desperate  and 
heroic  fighting  of  assaulting 
troops,  232;  modifications  of 


Grant's  original  plan  of  bat- 
tle, 233 ;  Grant  underesti- 
mated Thomas  and  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  233 ;  num- 
bers and  losses,  234-6;  con- 
troversy as  to  whether 
Grant's  order  for  the  assault 
contemplated  the  storming  of 
the  ridge  or  only  the  taking 
of  the  rifle  pits  at  the  base, 
236-240;  the  part  taken  by 
Wood's  division  and  the  79th 
Ind.,  240;  present  appear- 
ance of  battle-fields  about 
Chattanooga,  358-9,  361-3. 

Chattanooga  National  Ceme- 
tery: 361. 

Chattanooga  Valley  (Tenn.)  : 
217. 

Cheat  river  (W.  Va.)  :    13. 

Cheatham,  Gen.  Benjamin  F. : 
316. 

Chemung  (N.  Y.),  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  345. 

Cherry  Valley  massacre :  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Chicago  (Ills.)  .    283. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of :  diffi- 
culties preceding,  156,  157, 
158;  the  advance  to  Tullaho- 
ma,  157;  movements  preced- 
ing occupation  of  Chattanoo- 
ga, 158-159;  vain  appeals  of 
Rosecrans  to  Washington  au- 
thorities for  aid,  159-161 ;  ad- 
vance from  Tullahoma  to 
Chattanooga,  161 ;  evacuation 
of  Chattanooga  by  Bragg, 
162 ;  historical  accounts  of 
the  battle,  163 ;  movements  of 
Federal  army  after  evacua- 
tion of  Chattanooga,  164; 
Halleck's  plans,  165 ;  the  dan- 
ger discovered  by  Halleck 
and  Rosecrans,  165-6; 
Bragg's  situation  and  plans, 
166-7 ;  critical  situation  of 
Army  of  the  Cumberland, 


404 


GENERAL    INDEX 


167-8;  how  Bragg  and  his 
subordinates  neglected  their 
opportunity,  168-170;  Bragg's 
attempt  to  cut  off  Rosecrans 
from  retreat  to  Chattanooga, 
170-1 ;  Bragg's  re-enforce- 
ments, 170;  efforts  of  Rose- 
crans to  concentrate  his 
army,  171-2;  position  of  Fed- 
eral and  Confederate  troops 
on  morning  of  Sept.  19, 
172-4;  each  commander  ig- 
norant of  position  of  the 
other,  173-4;  opening  of  the 
battle,  174-5;  the  fighting  on 
the  iQth,  175-7;  the  position 
of  the  Federal  and  Confed- 
erate troops  on  morning  of 
the  2Oth,  178-9;  stripping  the 
right  of  the  Federal  army  to 
reenforce  the  left,  179-80; 
position  and  danger  of  Fed- 
eral right,  180-1 ;  opening  of 
battle  on  morning  of  2Oth, 
181 ;  attack  on  Federal  left, 
181-2;  the  break  in  the  Fed- 
eral right  and  how  it  was 
caftsed,  183-6;  Rosecrans 
narrowly  escapes  capture, 
goes  to  Chattanooga  and  or- 
ders Thomas  to  assume  com- 
mand, 185-6 ;  narrow  escape 
of  Federal  army  from  an- 
nihilation, 186-7 ;  the  Con- 
federate attack  on  Snodgrass 
Hill  and  its  repulse,  188-91 ; 
Confederates  gain  position  in 
rear  of  the  hill,  191 ;  the 
coming  of  Gen.  Granger, 
192 ;  charge  of  Whitaker  and 
Mitchell's  brigades,  193 ;  con- 
tinued Confederate  assaults 
on  Snodgrass  Hill  and  their 
repulse,  193-5 ;  Federal  army 
retires  to  Rossville,  196; 
causes  of  the  disaster  to  the 
Federal  army,  197-200;  vin- 
dication of  men  of  20th  and 


2ist  corps,  201-2;  numbers 
and  losses,  204-9,  348,  352; 
present  appearance  of  battle- 
field, 359-36i;  363-4- 

Chickamauga  creek  (Ga.)  :  173, 
174,  179,  217,  221. 

Chickamauga  Memorial  Asso- 
ciation :  357. 

Chickamauga  and  Chattanooga 
National  Military  Park: 
origin  of  plan  of,  356;  Fed- 
eral legislation  for,  357 ;  di- 
mensions of  park,  357-8; 
present  appearance  of  old 
battle-fields,  358-9;  monu- 
ments and  markers,  360-1. 

Christian  Commission :   67. 

Christmas  in  the  army:    252. 

Cincinnati  (O.)  :    98. 

Cincinnati  Commercial :  65, 
252. 

Cincinnati  Gazette :    65. 

Clay,  Henry :    5. 

Cleburne,  Gen.  Patrick  R. :  273, 
275>  3J6,  319;  memorial  on 
arming  negroes,  273,  280;  his 
death,  316. 

Cleveland  (Tenn.)  :  249,  250, 
265,  267. 

Cloud  house  (Chickamauga)  : 
179,  200. 

Coffee:  as  medium  of  ex- 
change, 64. 

Coldazer,  O.  M. :    260. 

Cold  Harbor,  battle  of:  86; 
numbers  and  losses,  348. 

Columbia  (Tenn.)  :  156,  314, 
317- 

Committee  on  Conduct  of  the 
War:  22,  23,  26. 

Concord,  battle  of :  numbers 
and  losses,  343. 

Confederacy,  southern :  See 
South,  The. 

Confederate  money :  64. 

Confederate  "ye\\" :    91. 

Contrabands:  69. 

Cooking  in  the  army :   59,  60. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


405 


Cooper,  Maj.  George  E. :   303. 
Corinth    (Miss.)  :    capture    of, 

46. 

Cowards,   constitutional :    93. 
CowPens,  battle   of :    numbers 

and  losses,  346. 
Crab  Orchard  (Ky.)  :    100. 
Crawfish   Spring    (Chickamau- 

ga)  :    172,  173,  36o,  363- 
Crawfish  Spring  road  (Chicka- 

mauga)  :    188. 
Cnttendcn,  John  J. :    52. 
Crittenden,    Gen.    Thomas    L. : 

99,    101,    109,    164,    165,    186, 

198,  214. 

Cromwell,  Oliver :    27. 
Cumberland,    Army    of :      See 

Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
Cumberland,    Department    of : 

214,  259. 
Cumberland  Gap  (Tenn.)  :    47, 

102,  243,  245. 
Cumberland     mountains:     158, 

161,  162. 

Cumberland  river:    100,  135. 
Curtis,  Gen.  S.  R. :    41. 

D  alt  on  (Ga.)  :  164,  165,  273, 
305. 

Dana,  Charles  A. :    187,  239. 

Danbury,  battle  of :  numbers 
and  losses,  344. 

Dandridge   (Tenn.)  :    246,  258. 

Dangers  in  battle :  89. 

Davis,  Jefferson:  32,  132,  212, 
253,  276,  304,  305,  309;  his 
egotism,  38 ;  his  propensity 
to  boast,  38;  divulging  Con- 
federate plans  in  his  speeches, 
38-9 ;  visit  to  Gen.  Hood,  39 ; 
visit  to  Bragg  during  siege 
of  Chattanooga,  212 ;  views 
on  question  of  arming  ne- 
groes, 277 ;  flees  from  Rich- 
mond, 282 ;  his  financial  the- 
ories, 286-7;  becomes  un- 
popular in  the  South,  292. 


Davis,  Gen.  Jefferson  C. :  98, 
186. 

Davis,  Theodore  R. :    241. 

Decatur  (Ala.)  :    307,  309. 

Democrats  in  army:  51,  127; 
Douglas  Democrats,  51. 

Dennison,  Gov.  William  :    19. 

Deserters:  frequency  of  deser- 
tions in  1863,  127,  131,  132, 
137,  141 ;  how  protected  in 
North,  131-2;  letters  to  sol- 
diers encouraging,  131 ;  ex- 
ecution of  a  deserter,  137 ; 
proportion  of  regulars  and 
volunteers,  340 ;  many  wrong- 
fully so  reported,  340. 

Developing  the  enemy :    77. 

Diary:  extracts  from,  139-155; 
250-267. 

Dick,  Col.  George:  95. 

Diogenes :    262. 

Disease  in  army :  68,  105,  137, 
141 ;  what  diseases  most 
prevalent,  339;  total  deaths 
from,  339 ;  deaths  from  in 
Co.  I,  79th  Ind.,  339. 

Dodse,  Gen.  Granville  M. :  298. 

.Do^-tents  :   57,  145,  148.     • 

Douglas,  Stephen  A. :  50 ;  loy- 
alty of  him  and  his  follow- 
ers, 51. 

Draft:  opposition  to  in  North, 
131 ;  number  of  drafted  men 
in  actual  service,  340. 

Dress  parade:    61. 

Drills:    61. 

Drunkenness  in  army :    67. 

Dry  Creek  valley   (Ga.)  :    199. 

Duck  river:    156,  158,  314,  315. 

Dug  Gap   (Ga.)  :    168. 

Dumont,  Col.  Ebenezer :    10. 

Dyer  field  (Chickamauga)  : 
"185,  186,  187,  188. 

East  Tennessee :  54,  58,  72, 
102,  159,  167,  192,  243,  245, 
246,  247,  249,  258,  259;  char- 
acter of  country,  243,  266; 


406 


GENERAL    INDEX 


primitive  character  of  peo- 
ple, 245. 

East  Tennessee  Campaign, 
The:  Chap.  IX,  pp.  242-267; 
beginning.  242 ;  hardships, 
242-4;  scarcity  of  clothing, 
243 ;  difficulty  of  getting  pro- 
visions, 243 ;  continual  march- 
ing, 245 ;  a  little  side  cam- 
paign, 246-9. 

Eaton,  John :    149. 

Edinburg  (Ind.)  :    132. 

Elliott,  Gen.  Washington  L. : 
298. 

Ellis,  Capt.  William  B. :   262. 

Emancipation  proclamation : 
foreshadowed  in  September, 
1862,  128;  issued  January  I, 
i&6r  128;  hostility  to  in 
North,  127;  hostility  to  of 
soldiers  in  Federal  armies, 
127;  chanere  of  attitude  in 
North  and  South,  268;  proc- 
lamation for  logical  war 
measure,  269. 

End  of  an  Unimportant  Mili- 
tary Career:  Chap.  XIII.  pp. 
330-334- 

England:  excitement  over 
Trent  affair,  22. 

Eutaw  Springs,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Evansville  (Ind.)  :    52. 

Fair  Oaks,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  348. 

Falmouth  (Va.)  :   151. 

Farragut,  Admiral  David  G. : 
41. 

Fishing  Creek,  battle  of;  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Fitz-Jerrold,  Mrs. :    252. 

Five  Forks,  battle  of:   365. 

Flanking:    78,  88. 

Flat  Creek  valley  (Tenn.)  : 
245. 

Florence  (Ala.)  :    310,  311. 


Foote,  Commodore  Andrew 
H.:  41. 

Foraging:    74. 

Forrest,  Gen.  Nathan  B. :  47. 
310,  311,  314. 

Fort  Boone,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Fort  Clinton,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Fort  Donelson,  capture  of:  31, 
41,  48. 

Fort  Griswold,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Fort  Henry,  capture  of:   41. 

Fort  Lafayette :    23. 

Fort  Mercer,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Fort  Mifflin,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Fort  Ninety-Six,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Fort  Schuyler,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Fort  Sumter :  firing  on,  2,  3, 
251- 

Fort  Warren :  22. 

Fort  Washington,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  344. 

Fort  Wood :  218,  219,  358. 

Fortified  lines :  advancing 
against,  88;  futility  of  at- 
tacking by  direct  assault,  86, 
301.  See  Breastworks. 

Fortress  Monroe :  33. 

Fout,  Fred :    254. 

Fox,  Lt.-Col.  William  F. :    208, 

343,  35i- 

Frankfort  (Ky.)  :    too. 
Franklin,  Gen.  William  B. :   25. 
Franklin  (Ind.)  :    2,  8,  54,  132, 

334;  raising  first  company  in, 

8-9. 
Franklin    (Tenn.)  :     314,    315, 

317. 

Franklin,  battle  of:  54,  312, 
318-19;  numbers  and  losses, 
349- 


GENERAL    INDEX 


407 


Franklin  road  (Stone's  River)  : 

107. 

"Franklin  Tigers" :   9. 
Fredericksburg,  battle  of:    124, 

126,   154,  365;    numbers  and 

losses,  348. 

Fremont,  Gen.  John  C. :   44. 
Further    Development    of    the 

Great  Conflict :    Chap.  II,  pp. 

15-55. 

Gadsden  (Ala.)  :   305. 
Gaines's  Mill,  battle  of:    num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 
Gallatin  (Tenn.)  :    100. 
Gambling  in  army :    66. 
Garesche,   Lt.    Col.   Julius   P. : 

"5- 

Garnett,  Gen.  Robert  S. :    13. 

Gaylesville   (Ala.)  :    305. 

Georgia,  state :  40,  87,  165,  166, 
170,  292,  307,  308,  309,  313, 
361,  362. 

Germantoivn,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of :  charge  of 
Pickett's  division,  120,  350; 
effect  of  in  North  and  South, 
283 ;  numbers  and  losses,  348, 
350,  353- 

Gilbert,  Gen.  Charles  C. :   99. 

Glasgow  (Ky.)  :    100. 

Glass's  Mill  (Chickamauga)  : 
172. 

Glenn,  widow,  house  (Chicka- 
mauga) :  172,  177,  178,  360. 

Gordon,  Gen.  John  B. :   94. 

Gosney,  Richard  M. :   267. 

Goldsborough  (N.  C.)  :    32. 

Goldsborough,  Commodore 
Louis  M. :  41. 

Grand  reviews  at  Louisville: 
97,  105. 

Granger,  Gen.  Gordon :  199, 
226,  236,  237,  238,  242 ;  at  bat- 
tles of  Chickamauga,  192-3 ; 
appointed  to  command  of  4th 
corps,  formed  by  consolida- 


tion of  2Oth  and  21  st  corps, 
214;  superseded  by  Gen. 
Howard,  298. 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S. :  listens 
to  Lincoln's  military  plans, 
26 ;  his  opinion  of  Stanton, 
28-9;  ill  treatment  by  Hal- 
leek,  31 ;  capture  of  Fort 
Henry,  41 ;  of  Fort  Donelson, 
41 ;  temporarily  shelved  by 
Halleck,  45 ;  dissatisfaction 
with  in  North  after  battle  of 
Shiloh,  48;  begins  to  be  fa- 
mous, 48;  Lincoln's  friend- 
ship for,  49;  regret  for  as- 
sault at  Cold  Harbor,  86;  in- 
curs displeasure  of  Halleck, 
126;  appointed  to  command 
of  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  214;  underesti- 
mates Thomas  and  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  233 ;  ap- 
pointed Lieut.-General,  297 ; 
appointed  general-in-chief, 
297;  first  views  of  Sherman's 
proposed  march  to  the  sea, 
307-8;  dissatisfaction  with 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  321-2; 
strength  of  his  army  in  Rich- 
mond campaign,  337-8.  See 
Army  of  the  Potomac ;  Rich- 
mond Campaign ;  Shiloh ; 
Siege  and  Battles  of  Chatta- 
nooga. 

Greeley,  Horace :  at  first  fa- 
vored peaceable  secession,  2; 
correspondence  with  Lincoln 
on  emancipation  proclama- 
tion, 128. 

Greenbacks:  during  the  war, 
64. 

Green  Spring,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Grider,  Col.  Benjamin  C. :    119. 

Guilford,  Ct.  H.,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Gulf  of  Mexico:    306. 


408 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Halleck,  Gen.  Henry  W. :  ap- 
pointed general-in-chief,  27; 
estimate  of  his  character,  30- 
34;  McClellan's  opinion  of, 
30;  his  ill  treatment  of 
Grant,  31;  of  Sherman,  32; 
appointed  to  command  of  De- 
partment of  Virginia,  32;  of 
Department  of  the  Mississip- 
pi, 45 ;  his  advance  on  Cor- 
inth, 46;  his  orders  to  Pope, 
46;  hostility  to  Buell,  102; 
outwitted  by  Grant,  125 ; 
hostility  to  Rosecrans,  126; 
seeks  to  shift  blame  for 
Rosecrans's  defeat  at  Chicka- 
mauga  on  Burnside,  160;  an- 
swer to  Rosecrans's  appeal 
tor  aid  in  Chattanooga  cam- 
paign, 160-1 ;  his  plans  prior 
to  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
165  ;  discovers  perilous  situa- 
tion of  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, 166;  his  ignorance  of 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
203 ;  is  instrumental  in  with- 
holding Grant's  order  for  re- 
moval of  Thomas,  322. 

Hall's  Ford  (Chickamauga)  : 
360. 

Hampton   Roads :     41. 

Hancock,  Columbus :    254,  265. 

Hanging  Rock  (S.  C),  battle 
of:  numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Hanna,  Bayless  W. :    132. 

Hardee,  Gen.  Wm.  J. :  107,  HO, 
273- 

Harlem  Plains,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Harper's  Weekly :  241 ;  its  in- 
fluence in  the  war,  3-4;  pre- 
dictions as  to  coming  gen- 
erals, 123. 

Harpeth  river :    318,  319. 

Harrison's  Landing :    43. 

Hendricks,  Thomas  A. :    51. 

Hermitage  (Tenn.)  :    101. 

Herriot,  Capt.  George :    149. 


Hiawassee  river:    251,  266. 

Higginson,  Col.  T.  W. :    271. 

Hill,  Gen.  Daniel  H. :  161,  168, 
169. 

Hilton  Head  (S.  C.)  :  270. 

Hindman,  Gen.  Thomas  C. : 
168.  169,  187,  188,  194. 

Hobkirk's  Hill,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  346. 

Holt,  Joseph  (Judge  Adv. 
Gen.)  :  130. 

Homesickness  in  army :  68. 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B. :  super- 
sedes Johnston  in  command 
of  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
304;  relieved  of  command  of 
that  army,  324.  See  Hood's 
Invasion  of  Tennessee ;  At- 
lanta Campaign. 

Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee: 
Chap.  XII,  pp.  3057329-  Jef- 
ferson Davis  visits  Hood, 
305 ;  Hood's  movements  after 
surrender  of  Atlanta,  305 ; 
Sherman's  plan  of  marching 
to  the  sea,  305-6;  Grant's 
view  of  it,  307-8;  Thomas 
left  to  take  care  of  Hood, 
309;  Hood's  plans,  309-10; 
the  troops  left  for  Thomas, 
311-13;  Schofield  given  com- 
mand of  troops  in  front,  314; 
Hood's  attempt  to  cut  off 
Schofield's  retreat  to  Nash- 
ville, 314;  narrow  escape  of 
Schofield's  troops  at  Spring 
Hill,  315-17;  battle  of  Frank- 
lin, 318-19;  Schofield's  army 
arrives  at  Nashville,  319; 
Hood's  army  also  arrives, 
319;  authorities  at  Washing- 
ton alarmed,  319;  Grant 
urges  Thomas  to  give  battle 
at  once,  320;  impossibility  of 
doing  so,  320;  the  pressure 
brought  to  bear  on  Thomas, 
321-2;  his  firmness  of  pur- 
pose, 321 ;  orders  given  to  re- 


GENERAL    INDEX 


409 


lieve  Thomas  of  command, 
322;  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
323-4;  fortunate  results  of 
victory,  326;  estimate  of 
Thomas's  character,  326-8; 
Badeau's  aspersions  on 
Thomas,  328. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Joseph :  86,  127, 
150,  151,  152,  153,  215,  219, 
222,  224,  226,  236,  265 ;  su- 
persedes Burnside  in  com- 
mand of  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, 124;  is  superseded  by 
Meade,  125;  joins  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  in  command 
of  nth  and  I2th  army  corps, 
214 ;  the  "battle  among  the 
clouds,"  220;  takes  command 
of  2Oth  corps  formed  by  con- 
solidation of  nth  and  I2th 
corps,  298.  See  battles  of 
Chattanooga  and  Chancel- 
lorsville. 

Hospitals:  general,  67,  68; 
field,  68,  332. 

House  Mountain  (Tenn.)  :  244. 

Hoivard,  Gen.  Oliver  O. :  86, 
242 ;  supersedes  Granger  in 
command  of  4th  army  corps, 
265,  298. 

Howe,  Capt.  Eliakim :    I. 

Howe,  Capt.  Nathan :    i. 

Howe,  Otis :    i. 

Howe,  Col.  Thomas:    I. 

Hubbardton,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Hunter,  Andrew  :   277,  279. 

Hunter,  Gen.  David:  45,  271. 

Hunter,  Walter:    140. 

Huntzinger,   Lieut.    Wm.    H. : 

317. 

Hurlbut,  Gen.  Stephen  A.: 
166. 

Illinois,  state:  65,  127,  129; 
treasonable  political  orders 
there  in  1863,  130;  condition 


in    1867.    130;    loo-day    men 
tendered  by,  284. 
Indiana  Sanitary  Commission : 

7- 

Indiana,  state:  5,  6,  50,  53,  65, 
98,  127,  129,  136,  260,  336; 
early  opposition  in  to  Lin- 
coln, i ;  troops  furnished  in 
Civil  War,  6;  effect  of  Lin- 
coln's first  call  for  troops,  8; 
per  cent,  of  fighting  popula- 
tion in  Federal  armies,  8; 
lack  of  preparation  for  war, 
20 ;  situation  there  in  1862, 
50;  vote  of  Presidential  elec- 
tion in  1860,  50 ;  early  hos- 
tility there  to  prosecution  of 
war,  51 ;  Confederate  inva- 
sion of  in  1862,  52;  disloyal 
political  orders  there,  130-2 ; 
legislature  of  refuses  to  re- 
ceive Gov.  Morton's  message 
and  L.anks  Gov.  Seymour  for 
his,  132 ;  protests  of  Indiana 
soldiers  in  the  field  to- legis- 
lature in  1863,  134;  raided 
by  Gen.  John  Morgan,  135 ; 
Indiana  "Butternuts,"  136 ; 
condition  in  1863,  141 ;  pub- 
lic sentiment  there'  in  1864, 
283 ;  loo-day  troops  tendered 
by,  284;  muster  rolls  pub- 
lished by,  336. 

Indianapolis  (Ind.)  :  2,  6,  7,  9, 
10,  16,  51,  52,  53,  54,  97,  283. 

Iowa,  state:  tender  of  loo-day 
men  by,  284. 

Israel,  John :    265. 

Jackson,     President     Andrew  ? 

101. 

Jacobs,  William :    155. 
James  river :   43. 
Jamestown     Ford,     battle1    of: 

numbers  and  losses,  346. 
Jays  Mill  (Chickamauga)  :  173, 

360. 
Jeleff,  Frank:    149. 


4io 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Johnson,  Gen.  Richard  W. : 
no. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel :    261. 

Johnson  Co.  (Ind.)  :  2,  54,  132. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Albert  Sidney: 
41- 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E. :  24, 
32,  43,  79,  84,  167,  170,  273, 
276,  297,  298;  supersedes 
Bragg  in  command  of  Army 
of  Tennessee,  297;  is  super- 
seded by  Hood,  304.  See 
Atlanta  Campaign. 

Kansas,  state:    271. 

Kelly,  Col.  Benjamin  F. :    10. 

Kelly  field  (Chickamauga)  : 
172,  179. 

Kelly  house  (Chickamauga)  : 
178,  360. 

Kenesaw  Mountain  (Ga.)  :  55, 
330. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  battle  of: 
86,  95,  299,  301,  333;  num- 
bers and  losses,  302. 

Kentucky,  state :  4,  40,  47,  50, 
53,  100,  101,  104,  105,  243, 
310,  319,  362 ;  invasion  of  by 
Bragg,  52;  situation  there  in 

1862,  52;  military  operations 
there    in     1862,     98;    march 
through    in    1862,    104;    dis- 
loyal political  orders  there  in 

1863,  130. 

Kettle  Creek,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Kilpatrick,   Gen.  Judson:    311. 

King,  Col.:    19. 

Kings  Mountain,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Kirk,  Gen.  Edward  N. :  in, 
117. 

Knefler,  Col.  Frederick:  54, 
97,  115,  182,  185,  228,  229. 

Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle : 
130,  132. 

Knoxville    (Tenn.)  :    160,    242, 


245,  250,  251,  254,  255,  257, 

265,  266,  267. 
Knoxville,  siege  of:   242. 
Knoxville   Whig:    251. 

Lafayette  (Ga.)  :  165,  166,  178, 
305,  309- 

Lafayette  road  (Chickamau- 
ga) :  167,  170,  171,  172,  173, 
174,  176,  177,  178,  181. 

Lander,  Col.  Frederick  W. :  10. 

Lavergne  (Tenn.) :  106,  117, 
122,  142. 

Lawrence,  Henry  C. :  241. 

Lee,  Maj.  Pollok  B. :    181,  182. 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E. :  84,  124, 
125,  129,  159,  166,  168,  283, 
304,  365,  367;  views  on  ques- 
tion of  arming  negroes,  277, 
278,  280. 

Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  (Chick- 
amauga) :  169,  172,  174,  360, 

363- 

Lenoir  Station    (Tenn.)  :    266. 

Lexington,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  343. 

Light  Brigade :  percentage  of 
losses  in  charge  at  Balaklava, 
350. 

Lincoln,  President  Abraham : 
election  as  President,  i ; 
passes  through  Indianapolis, 
2;  calls  for  troops,  2,  52; 
Gov.  Magoffin's  response  to 
call  on  Kentucky,  4;  efforts 
to  familiarize  himself  with 
military  movements,  25 ; 
Stanton's  early  opinions  of 
and  subsequent  relations  to, 
27,  29;  McClellan's  letter  to, 
36;  issues  proclamation  for 
special  Thanksgiving  in  1862, 
42;  clings  to  McClellan,  43; 
his  friendship  for  Grant,  49; 
his  letter  to  Horace  Greeley. 
128;  issue  of  emancipation 
proclamation,  128,  129;  op- 
position to  of  radical  ele- 


GENERAL   INDEX 


411 


ment  in  Republican  party, 
128;  opposition  majorities 
against  in  fall  of  1862,  129; 
writes  Rosecrans  a  kind  let- 
ter, 160. 

Literature  in  the  army :  65, 
253,  259,  263,  264. 

Little  river :    250. 

Little  Tennessee  river :  246, 
247,  249,  250. 

Logan,  Gen.  John  A. :  298,  301, 
322,  326. 

Long  Island,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Long  roll :  effect  of  on  army, 
il. 

Longstreet,  Gen.  James :  39, 
76,  179,  181,  188,  193,  199, 
209,  216,  242,  243,  246,  258, 
266,  364. 

Lookout  Creek  (Tenn.)  :   220. 

Lookout  Mountain  (Tenn.)  : 
158,  162,  168,  210,  211,  212, 
213,  220,  221,  222,  225,  333, 
356,  357;  appearance  in  1899, 
358,  361,  362. 

Lookout  Mountain,  battle  of: 
See  Chattanooga,  Siege  and 
Battles  of. 

Lookout  Valley  (Tenn.)  :  212, 
216. 

Loomis, :   252. 

London  (Tenn.)  :   265,  266. 

Louisville  (Ky.)  :  47,  52,  53, 
64,  67.  97,  98,  100,  102,  105, 
137,  141,  158. 

Lying  still  under  artillery  fire : 
80-1. 

Lytle  station  (Chickamauga)  : 
363- 

Mac  on  (Ga.)  :   40. 
Magoffin,  Gov.  Beriah :  4,  50. 
Malingering  in  army:    69. 
Manassas,  battle  of :    numbers 

and  losses,  348. 
Mar  thorough  (Mass.)  :    I. 
Mail,  receiving  in  army :  64. 


March,  the :  breaking  camp, 
69;  baggage,  70;  what  the 
soldiers  carried,  70;  the 
start,  71 ;  picturesque  ap- 
pearance of  marching  col- 
umn, 71 ;  distance  traveled 
per  day,  71 ;  discomforts  on, 
72;  swearing  mule-drivers, 
72 ;  how  monotony  of  march 
relieved,  73;  foraging,  73-4; 
going  into  camp  at  night,  75 ; 
camp-fires,  75 ;  camping  in 
enemy's  country,  104. 

Maryland,  state :    40. 

Maryville  (Tenn.)  :  246,  254, 
255,  256. 

Mason,  James  M. :    seizure  of, 

22. 

Massachusetts,  state:  271. 
Meade,  Gen.  George :  125. 
Memminger,  Christopher  G. : 

287. 

Memphis  and  Charleston   rail- 
road :   47. 
Merrimac:     destruction    of   by 

Monitor,  41. 
Mexican   War:     numbers    and 

losses,  341. 
Militia:    in  the  North  prior  to 

war,  18. . 

Mill  Spring:  battle  of,  41,  104. 
Miller,  Col.  John  F. :    120. 
Mine  explosions :    89. 
Mine  Run,  battle  of;  numbers 

and  losses.  348. 
Minix,  William :    155. 
Minty,    Gen.    Robert    H.    G. : 

172. 
Missionary    Ridge:     159,    2IO, 

211,    212,    213,    217,    219,    221, 
222,    226,    227,    228,    233,    234, 

356,  357,  358.  361. 
Missionary    Ridge :    battle    of. 

See  Chattanooga,  Siege  and 

Battles  of. 
Mississippi,     Department     of : 

creation  of,  45. 


412 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Mississippi,  Military  Division 
of :  214,  297. 

Mississippi  river  :    41,  310. 

Mississippi  Valley :    50. 

Missouri  river :    312. 

Missouri,  state :  40,  271,  306, 
308,  312;  disloyal  political 
orders  there  in  1863,  130. 

Mobile  (Ala.)  :    160,  297. 

Money  during  the  war: 
greenbacks,  64;  Confederate, 
64;  coffee  as  medium  of  ex- 
change, 64. 

Monitor:  destruction  by  of  the 
Merrimac,  41. 

Monmouth:   battle  of,  344. 

Montreal,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  343. 

Moores  Creek,  battle  of;  num- 
bers and  losses,  343. 

Morgan,  Gen.  John :  6,  47,  135, 
136,  160.  See  Morgan  Raid. 

Morgan  Raid  in  Indiana  and 
Ohio:  6,  135,  283. 

Morgantown  (Tenn.)  :    250. 

Morristown  (Tenn.)  :  245,  258. 

Morton,  Gov.  Oliver  P. :  16, 
18,  42;  governor  of  Indiana 
at  outbreak  of  war,  his  sa- 
gacity and  energy,  5 ;  power 
as  a  political  speaker,  6;  care 
for  Indiana  soldiers,  7 ;  kind- 
ness to  Confederate  prison- 
ers, 7;  his  vigilance,  7;  re- 
sponse to  first  call  for  troops, 
8;  raising  and  forwarding 
troops  in  1862,  53;  legisla- 
ture of  1863  refuses  to  re- 
ceive his  message,  132 ;  passes 
bill  to  strip  Morton  of  mili- 
tary power,  134. 

Mossy  Creek  Station  (Tenn.)  : 
257^  260. 

Mount  Vernon   (Ky.)  :  100. 

Munfordsville  (Ky.)  :   98. 

Murfreesboro  (Tenn.)  :  101, 
106,  107,  109,  no,  117,  121, 
125.  136,  137.  138,  139,  156, 


313 ;  camp  life  there  in  1863, 

123-155- 

Musgroves  Mills,  battle  of : 
numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Musket  balls :  danger  of  being 
hit  by  in  battle,  89. 

McAfee  Church  (Chickamau- 
ga)  :  173,  179,  192. 

McClellan,  Gen.  George  B. : 
succeeds  Gen.  Scott  as  gen- 
eral-in-chief,  16;  takes  charge 
of  defenses  at  Washington, 
15 ;  his  inspection  of  Ohio 
state  arsenal,  19 ;  work  of  or- 
ganizing the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  20,  35 ;  deprived  of 
authority  as  general-in-chief, 
26:  his  despatch  to  Stanton, 
35 ;  his  letter  to  Lincoln,  36 ; 
estimate  of  his  character,  34- 
7;  hostility  of  Stanton  and 
Chase,  43 ;  Lincoln  clings  to, 
43;  the  Peninsular  cam- 
paign, 43-4;  again  takes 
charge  of  defenses  at  Wash- 
ington, 45 ;  distrusted  by  the 
North,  47;  superseded  in 
command  of  Army  of  the 
Potomac  by  Burnside,  124. 

McClernand,  Gen.  John  A. :  45. 

McClure,  Alexander  K. :    49. 

McCook,  Gen.  Alexander 
McD. :  99.  109,  no,  164,  165, 

171,  183,  186,  198. 
McCullagh,  J.  B. :    65. 
McDowell,  Gen.  Irvin :   25,  44. 
McFarland's      Gap      (Tenn.)  : 

196,  210. 
McGee's  Ford   (Tenn.)  :    246; 

foraging  expedition  to,  246-9. 
McLemore's  Cove  (Ga.)  :    166, 

172,  174. 

McMinnville  (Tenn.)  :   59,  156, 

158- 
McPheeters,    Surgeon    J.    G. : 

334- 

McPherson,  Gen.  James  B. : 
298,  301. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


413 


Nashville  (Tenn.)  :  31,  67,  101, 
102,  104,  105,  106,  107,  117, 
118,  142,  156,  157,  158,  211, 

214,  252,  307,  309,  311,  312, 

313,  314,  319,  320,  322;  camp 
life  there,  104,  105;  mortal- 
ity there,  105. 

Nashville,  battle  of:  322-4; 
importance  of  victory,  326 ; 
numbers  and  losses,  324,  349. 

Nashville  turnpike  (Stone's 
River)  :  107,  108,  109,  112. 

Ncgley,  Gen.    James   S. :     186, 

200. 

Negro  Soldiers  in  the  Civil 
War:  Chap.  X,  pp.  268-282; 
changes  of  sentiment  in 
North  and  South  on  ques- 
tions of  emancipation  and 
arming  of  slaves,  268;  value 
of  slave  labor  to  Confeder- 
acy, 269;  emancipation  proc- 
lamation, 269;  opposition  in 
North  to  enrolling  negroes 
in  Federal  armies,  270;  en- 
rollment of  negro  soldiers  in 
northern  armies,  270-1 ;  Fed- 
eral legislation  on  subject, 

'  ,272 ;  early  opposition  in  Fed- 
eral armies  to  arming  the  ne- 
groes, 272;  vindictive  feel- 
ing in  South  against  Federal 
enlistment  of  negro  troops, 
272 ;  change  of  sentiment  in 
the  South  on  question  of 
arming  negroes,  273 ;  pro- 
ceedings of  Confederate 
Army  of  Tennessee  in  1864 
on  Cleburne's  memorial,  273 ; 
objects  set  forth  in  the  me- 
morial, 274-5 !  the  memorial 
suppressed  by  Confederate 
authorities,  276 ;  continued 
agitation  in  the  South  of 
ouestion  of  arming  the  ne- 
groes, 276;  Jefferson  Davis 
and  Gen.  Lee  finally  become 
converted  to  the  idea,  277; 


Confederate  legislation  on 
subject,  278-280;  defects  in 
legislation,  280-1 ;  legislation 
too  late,  281 ;  failure  to  get 
negro  volunteers  and  draft 
ordered,  282;  collapse  of 
Confederacy  stops  the  draft, 
282. 

Negroes:  in  camp,  69;  as  sol- 
diers, 265.  See  Contrabands ; 
Negro  Soldiers. 

Nelson,  Gen.  William :    98. 

New  England:    51. 

New  Haven,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

New  Hope  Church :  battle  of, 
86,  88,  299. 

New  York  City:  draft  riots 
there  in  1863,  129. 

New  York,  state :    129. 

New  York  Tribune :  65. 

New  Orleans  (La.):  41,  271; 
capture  of,  41. 

Newburg  (Ind.)  :  sacking  of 
by  Confederates,  52. 

Nezvmarket  (Tenn.)  :  245,  257, 
258,  260. 

Newtown,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  345. 

Nezvs papers  in  the  army:  65, 
260. 

Nickajack  Trace  (Tenn.)  :  162. 

Night  attacks:    77. 

Noddles  Island,  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  343. 

Norfolk    (Va.)  :     166. 

North,  The :  election  of  Lin- 
coln, I ;  effect  of  firing  on 
Fort  Sumter,  2 ;  public  sen- 
timent in  at  beginning  of 
war,  3-4;  effect  of  Bull  Run 
defeat,  15;  the  cry  of  "On 
to  Richmond,"  16;  apparent 
that  war  would  not  blow 
over  in  sixty  days,  16;  Fed- 
eral government  forced  to 
rely  on  volunteer  armies,  17; 
call  for  500,000  volunteers, 


GENERAL    INDEX 


17;  difficulty  of  equipping 
men,  18;  lack  of  munitions 
of  war,  18,  20;  magnitude  of 
work  of  organizing  armies, 
20;  value  of  McClellan's 
services  in  organizing,  20; 
finding  generals  for  the  ar- 
mies, 21 ;  West  Point  offi- 
cers, 21 ;  seizure  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  22;  Seward's 
diplomacy,  22 ;  investigation 
of  Ball's  Bluff  disaster,  23, 
24;  inactivity  of  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  24;  resignation 
of  Cameron  and  appointment 
of  Stanton  as  Secretary  of 
War,  25 ;  Lincoln  as  com- 
mander-in-chief,  25 ;  want  of 
competent  head  of  armies, 
26;  character  and  influence 
of  Stanton,  Halleck  and  Mc- 
Clellan,  27-36;  great  success 
of  northern  armies  in  early 
part  of  1862,  40-1 ;  order  dis- 
continuing recruiting,  42 ; 
subsequent  disasters  in  that 
year,  43-45 ;  North  becomes 
distrustful  of  McClellan  and 
Buell,  47;  hostility  in  North 
to  Grant,  48;  Sherman 
thought  to  be  crazy,  48,  50; 
situation  in  Kentucky,  50; 
situation  in  Indiana,  50-1 ; 
President  Lincoln's  call  in 
1862  for  300,000  volunteers, 
52 ;  Gov.  Morton's  efforts  to 
raise  Indiana's  quota,  53; 
darkest  period  in  the  war, 
123;  dissatisfaction  in  1863, 
126-7;  opposition  to  eman- 
cipation and  draft,  128;  dis- 
satisfaction of  radical  element 
in  Republican  party,  128; 
slavery  question  in,  128;  op- 
position majorities  in  fall  of 
1862,  129;  organization  of 
disloyal  political  orders,  130- 
i ;  change  of  attitude  of 


North  on  question  of  eman- 
cipation and  arming  negroes, 
268-9 ;  the  emancipation 
proclamation,  269 ;  early  op- 
position in  North  to  enroll- 
ing negroes  In  Federal  ar- 
mies, 270;  Federal  legisla- 
tion on  subject,  271-2;  or- 
ganization of  Federal  negro 
regiments,  271-2;  number  of 
men  in  northern  armies  in 
1864,  284;  tender  of  loo-day 
men  by  governors  of  north- 
ern states,  284;  public  senti- 
ment and  resources  of  the 
North  at  beginning  of  1864, 
284. 

North  Carolina,  state:  41,  165, 
292,  293,  336,  362;  Confed- 
erate muster  rolls  published 
by,  336. 

Northwestern  Confederacy : 
scheme  for,  51. 

Numbers  and  Losses :  in  Revo- 
lutionary War,  343-7 ;  in 
War  of  1812,  342;  in  Mexi- 
can War,  341 ;  in  Civil  War, 
348-9.  See  Statistics.  For 
losses  in  particular  battles, 
see  these  titles. 

Officers  in  batjtle:    82. 

Ohio,  army  of.     See  Army,  etc. 

Ohio,  Department  of:    214. 

Ohio  river :  50,  52,  98,  135,  306, 
309,  310,  319. 

Ohio,  state:  52,  65,  127,  129, 
136;  lack  of  preparation  for 
war,  18-20;  organization  of 
disloyal  political  orders,  130; 
raided  by  Gen.  John  Morgan, 
J35 !  public  sentiment  in  1864, 
283 ;  loo-day  men  tendered 
bv,  284. 

Opdycke,  Col.  Emerson:  318. 

Orchard  Knob  (Chattanooga)  : 
218,  219,  221,  223,  226,  357, 
361,  362. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


415 


Oriskany,  battle  of:    numbers 

and  losses,  344. 
Oylcr,  Lt.-Col.    Samuel   P.:    9, 

10,   53,   54,  81,  97,    140,    195, 

260. 

Packard,  Marcus  A.  O. :    133. 
Palmer,    Gen.    John    M. :     214, 

298. 
Paoli,  battle  of :    numbers  and 

losses,  344. 

Parker,  Maj.  George  W. :  259. 
Paulus   Hook    (N.    J.),   battle 

of:    numbers  and  losses,  345. 
Pay  Day  in  army :    63. 
Pea  Ridge,  battle  of:  41. 
Peace  at  any  price  platform  at 

Chicago  in  1864 :    37,  283. 
Pearson,    Judge    Richard    M. : 

293- 

Pemberton,  Gen.  John  C. :  125. 

Peninsular  Campaign  :    30,  43. 

Pennsylvania,  state :  49,  129 ; 
invasion  of  by  Gen.  Lee,  125. 

Perkins,  Samuel  E. :   2. 

Perrvville:  battle  of.  100;  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Petersburg  (Va.)  :    166. 

Petersburg:  battles  of,  89; 
numbers  and  losses,  349. 

Philippi  (Va.)  :  10,  n,  12. 

Philippi,  battle  of:    10. 

Picket  duty:  n,  150;  ex- 
changes at  picket  stations,  59 ; 
responsibility  and  dangers  of, 
62-3 ;  courtesies  between 
Federal  and  Confederate 
pickets,  94-5. 

Picketfs    Mill,    battle    of:    86, 

95,  299- 
Pigeon  Mountain    (Ga.)  :    167, 

168. 

Pikeville  (Tenn.)  :   60. 
Pittsburg  Landing.    See  Shiloh. 
Poe  field  (Chickamauga)  :  178, 

179. 
Poe     house      (Chickamauga)  : 

360. 


Polk,  Gen.  Leonidas:  107,  169, 
170,  179,  181,  182,  275. 

Pope,  Gen.  John :  appointed  to 
command  of  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia, 44;  his  extraordinary 
address  to,  44;  appointed  to 
command  of  center  of  Hal- 
leek's  army,  45 ;  his  pursuit 
of  Beauregard,  46.  See  Army 
of  Virginia ;  Bull  Run,  sec- 
ond battle. 

Poor  Man's  Valley  (Tenn.)  : 
245- 

Port  Hudson :    125. 

Port  Royal,  battle  of;  numbers 
and  losses,  345. 

Porter,  Gen.  Fitz-John :    37. 

Potomac,  Army  of :  See  Army, 
etc. 

Potomac  river:    15,  42. 

Price,  Gen.  Sterling:    41. 

Prices  in  Confederacy :    287. 

Princeton,  battle  of;  numbers 
and  losses,  344. 

Pulaski  (Tenn.)  :    314. 

Pulaski  Co.  (Ky.)  :   104. 

Putnam,  Gen.  Israel :    10. 


Quaker  Hill,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,.  345. 

Quebec,  battle  of ;  numbers  and 
losses,  343. 


Raccoon  Mountain  (Ga.)  :  158. 
Ransom,  Capt.  J.  S. :   238. 
Rapidan  river:  338. 
Rappahannock  river:    124,  125, 

151- 

Rations  in  the  army :   58. 
Rawlins,  Gen.  John  A. :    320. 
Ray,  Martin  M. :    52. 
Rebellion:    first  outbreak.    See 

Further  Development  of  the 

Great  Conflict. 
Rebellion  records :    method  of 

citation,  335. 


416 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Reconnaissance  in  force :    77. 

Recruiting,  order  discontinu- 
ing in  1862:  42. 

Reed's  bridge  (Chickamauga)  : 
171. 

Reid,  Whitelaw:    65. 

Republican  party :  distrust  of 
McClellan,  37;  opposition  of 
radical  element  to  Lincoln, 
128. 

Resaca,  battle  of :  299. 

Revisiting  Chattanooga  and 
Chickamauga,  Chap.  XV,  pp. 
356-367. 

Revolutionary  War :  numbers 
and  losses  in  battles  of,  343-7. 

Rich  Man's  Valley  (Tenn.)  : 
245- 

Richmond  (Ky.)  :  battle  of,  98. 

Richmond  (Va.)  :  16,  32,  33, 
39,  43,  84,  159,  282,  295,  297, 
338 ;  evacuation  of,  282 ; 
prices  there  during  the  war, 
287. 

Richmond  Campaign :  charac- 
ter of  country  traversed,  84 ; 
losses  in,  352.  See  Virginia 
campaign. 

Ring  gold  (Ga.)  :    165. 

Ritter,  Capt.  Eli  F. :  361,  362, 
363. 

Roanoke  Island:    battle  of,  41. 

Robinson,  Lieut.  James  I. :   143. 

Rocky  Face  Ridge,  battle  of: 
84,  94,  299. 

Rocky  Mount  (S.  C),  battle 
of:  numbers  and  losses,  346. 

Rome  (Ga.)  :    164. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  William  S. : 
appointed  to  command  of 
Department  of  the  Cumber- 
land, 101 ;  popularity  with  his 
soldiers,  103 ;  incurs  displeas- 
ure of  Halleck,  126;  vain 
appeals  to  Washington  au- 
thorities for  aid  in  Chatta- 
nooga camoaign,  159;  an- 
swers of  Lincoln,  Stanton 


and  Halleck,  160;  superseded 
by  Gen.  Thomas,  214;  kindly 
feeling  of  soldiers  of  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  214;  es- 
timate of  his  character,  215. 
See  battles  and  campaigns  of 
Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

Rossville  (Ga.)  :  173,  196,  199, 
200,  202,  210,  222,  225,  362. 

Rousseau,     Gen.     Lovell     H. : 

1 60. 

Rutherford     Creek      (Tenn.)  : 

315. 
Rutledge  (Tenn.)  :    245,  262. 

Sanitary  Commission :    67. 
San  Jacinto  (war  vessel)  :    22. 
Saratoga,  battle   of:     numbers 

and  losses,  344. 
Savannah  (Ga.)  :    33. 
Savannah,  battle  of:   numbers 

and  losses,  345. 
Savannah,  siege  of  (in  Rev.)  : 

345- 

Saxton,  Gen.  Rufus :    270. 
Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.:    257, 

258,   259,  265,  298,  310,  314, 

315,  H7,  322. 
Scotland:  261. 
Scott,  Gen.  Winfield:  15,  16, 

30. 

Scottsville  (Ky.)  :    100. 
Secret   disloyal    orders    in    the 

North :    130-1. 
Seddon,  James  A. :    276. 
Seeing   Real  War:    Chap.    IV, 

pp.  97-I05- 
Selma  (Ala.)  :   309. 
Sequatchie     Valley     (Tenn.)  : 

161,  162,  211. 

Seven  Days'  Battles:  43;  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Sevierville   (Tenn.)  :    254. 

Seu-ard,  William  H. :    10,  22. 

Seymour,  Gov.  Horatio:  129, 
130,  133- 

Shebangs:    57. 

Shelbyville  (Tenn.)  :    156. 


GENERAL   INDEX 


417 


Sheppard,  Wesley  T. :  191,  192, 

193- 

Sheridan,  Gen.  Phil.  H. :  90, 
116,  117,  185,  186,  199,  200, 
214,  228,  236,  237,  238,  239, 
240,  365. 

Sherman,  Gen.  William  T. : 
definition  of  war,  14;  Hal- 
leek's  insulting  treatment  of, 
32-3 ;  early  prediction  of 
number  of  soldiers  required, 
50;  his  tactics  in  Atlanta 
campaign,  88,  300;  appointed 
to  command  of  Military  Di- 
vision of  the  Mississippi, 
297;  plan  for  march  to  the 
sea,  305-6 ;  correspondence 
on  subject  with  Grant,  307- 
8;  starts  on  the  march,  309. 
See  Atlanta  Campaign ;  Bat- 
tles of  Chattanooga ;  Hood's 
Invasion  of  Tennessee;  Shi- 
loh. 

Shiloh,  battle  of :  41,  103 ;  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Sill,  Gen.  Joshua  W. :    117. 

Silver  Springs  (Tenn.)  :    101. 

Six  months  in  Camp  at  Mur- 
f  reesboro :  Chap.  VI,  pp. 
I23-I55- 

Skirmishers  in  battle :    78. 

Skulkers:    75,  92. 

Slavery  question :  in  the  North, 
16,  128;  views  of  soldiers  on, 
146. 

Slidell,  John:    seizure  of,  22. 

Smith,  Gen.  Andrew  J. :  45, 
306,  310,  320. 

Smith,  Gen.  Charles  F. :    31. 

Smith,  Gen.  Kirby:  47,  98. 

Snodgrass  Hill  (Chickamau- 
ga)  :  76,  186,  187,  189,  190, 
191,  193,  194,  199,  201,  364. 

Snodgrass  house  (Chickamau- 
ga)  :  187,  192,  360. 

Soldiers:  private  soldier's  prep- 
aration for  battle,  78;  fra- 
ternal feeling  between  Fed- 

27 


eral  and  Confederate  sol- 
diers during  the  war,  94-6, 
366;  dissatisfaction  of  north- 
ern with  slow  prosecution  of 
war,  126.  156;  sacrifices  of 
southern,  291 ;  development 
of  efficiency  of  both  Federal 
and  Confederate,  355 ;  brav- 
ery of  those  on  both  sides, 
365,  366;  early  reconciliation 
between  those  of  North  and 
South,  366. 

Somerset  (Ky.)  :    100,  104. 

Sons  of  Liberty:    130,  136,  284. 

South,  The :  inferiority  to 
North  in  men  and  resources, 
38;  great  yield  of  political 
generals,  38;  meddlesome  in- 
terference of  Jefferson  Davis 
with  Confederate  generals, 
38;  change  of  attitude  of 
South  on  question  of  eman- 
cipation and  arming  the  ne- 
groes, 268,  273;  vindictive 
feeling  inspired  by  enrolling 
negroes  in  Federal  armies, 
272;  agitation  and  legislation 
on  enrolling  negroes  in  Con- 
federate armies,  272-282;  be- 
f inning  of  decline  of  Con- 
sderacy,  283 ;  condition  at 
beginning  of  1864,  284;  Con- 
federate financial  system, 
284-8;  prices  in  the  South  in 
1864,  287;  the  funding  act, 
288 ;  Confederate  currency, 
288 ;  condition  of  agricultural 
regions,  288-9;  destitution  in 
South  in  1864,  289;  difficulty 
of  raising  recruits  for  armies, 
290 ;  sweeping  conscription 
acts,  290,  292;  difficulty  of 
providing  supplies  for  ar- 
mies, 291 ;  destructive  tend- 
ency of  doctrine  of  seces- 
sion, 291 ;  opposition  in 
South  to  martial  law  and  im- 
pressment laws,  292-3;  com- 


4i8 


GENERAL    INDEX 


plaints  of  military  despotism, 
293-4;  Confederate  armies  in 
1864,  296. 

South  Carolina,  state:  40,  270, 
362. 

S  pence, :    140. 

Spottsylvania,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  348,  351. 

Springfield,  battle  of :  numbers 
and  losses,  345. 

Spring  Hill  (Tenn.)  :  156,  310, 
3J4,  3i5>  3i6;  narrow  escape 
of  Schofield's  army  at,  310, 
317- 

St.  Louis  (Mo.)  :    16,  312,  320. 

Standing  in  line  of  battle :    137. 

Stanley,  Gen.  David  S. :  315, 
318. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M. :  succeeds 
Cameron  as  Secretary  of 
War,  25 ;  his  influence  in 
conduct  of  the  war,  26;  es- 
timate of  his  character,  27- 
30;  Grant's  opinion  of,  28-9; 
his  treatment  of  Sherman, 
32-3 ;  his  hostility  to  Mc- 
Clellan,  35,  43 ;  hostility  to 
Rosecrans,  126;  answer  to 
Rosecrans's  appeal  for  aid, 
160;  his  dispatch  to  Grant 
concerning  Gen.  Thomas,  320. 

Statistics:  The  Story  Told  by 
The,  Chap.  XIV,  pp.  335~ 
355- 

Statistics  of  War :  sources  of 
information,  335-6 ;  number 
enlisted  in  Federal  armies, 
337 ;  number  enlisted  in  Con- 
federate armies,  337 ;  dimen- 
sions of  an  army  of  100,000, 
337 ;  numbers  killed  in  battle 
in  Federal  and  Confederate 
armies,  338;  numbers  died  of 
disease  in  Federal  and  Con- 
federate armies,  339;  num- 
bers of  drafted  men  in  serv- 
ice, 340;  proportion  of  regu- 
lars to  volunteers,  340;  de- 


sertions, 340;  losses  in  Revo- 
lutionary War,  343-7;  losses 
in  Mexican  War,  341 ;  great- 
est loss  of  general  officers  at 
battle  of  Franklin,  349;  re- 
markable percentage  of  losses 
in  Civil  War,  350-1 ;  average 
percentage  of  losses  in  killed 
and  died  of  wounds,  351 ; 
statistics  of  Co.  I,  79th  Ind., 
353-4- 

Steedman,  Gen.  James  B. :  193. 

Stephens,  Alexander:    293. 

Stevens's  Gap  (Ga.)  :    168,  169. 

Stevenson  (Ala.)  :    159,  213. 

Stewart,  Gen.  Alexander  P. : 
273- 

Stillwater,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  344. 

Stinnett,  Lindsay:  188. 

Stone,  Gen.  Charles  P. :  23,  24, 

Stone's  river:  107,  108,  109, 
no,  116,  118,  148. 

Stone's  River,  Battle  of:  Chap. 
V,  pp.  106-122;  76,  77,  80; 
the  advance  from  Nashville, 
106;  Bragg  makes  stand  at 
Murf reesboro,  106 ;  descrip- 
tion of  the  battle-field,  106-7 ; 
position  of  opposing  lines, 
107-8;  Rosecrans's  and 
Bragg's  plans  of  battle,  108- 
9;  faulty  position  of  Mc- 
Cook's  lines,  109;  movements 
of  Federal  army  on  morning 
of  Dec.  31,  109-10;  Bragg 
opens  battle,  no;  Johnson's 
division  surprised  and  rout- 
ed, no;  Confederate  attack 
on  Davis's,  Sheridan's  and 
Negley's  divisions,  in;  new 
Federal  line  of  battle  formed, 
112-13;  desperate  fighting  of 
Rousseau's,  Negley's  and 
Palmer's  divisions,  113;  Con- 
federate assaults  on  the  tem- 
porary new  line,  113-14; 
Beatty's  brigade  becomes 


GENERAL    INDEX 


419 


Federal  right,  114;  Rose- 
crans's  coolness  in  battle, 
115;  the  battle  in  the  cedar 
thickets,  116;  formation  of 
permanent  new  line,  and 
Confederate  assaults  upon  it, 
116-17;  results  of  first  day's 
fighting,  117;  the  New 
Year's  eve  council  of  war 
and  Gen.  Thomas's  answer, 
118;  movements  on  Jan.  i, 
118;  formation  of  Federal 
lines  on  Jan.  2,  118-19; 
Breckinridge's  assault  and 
repulse  on  that  day,  119-120; 
retreat  of  Bragg  and  Fed- 
eral occupation  of  Murfrees- 
boro,  120;  striking  features 
of  battle,  121 ;  numbers  and 
losses,  121-2.  348. 

Stoncman,  Gen.  George  D. : 
151,  298. 

Stono  Ferry,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Stony  Point,  battle  of :  num- 
bers and  losse's,  345. 

Stragglers  in  army:   74-5. 

Strawberry  Plains  (Tenn.)  : 
244,  245,  249,  251,  253. 

Sullivan's  Island,  battle  of : 
numbers  and  losses,  343. 

Summerville  (Ga.)  :    164,  165. 

Sunbury  (Ga.),  battle  of: 
numbers  and  losses,  345. 

Surprises  by  hostile  army :    77. 

Sutlers  in  army :   59,  66. 

Sweetwater  (Tenn.)  :    250. 

Tappan,    battle    of:     numbers 

and  losses,  345. 
Taylor,  Gen.  Richard :    125. 

Taylor,  Lieut.  :    154. 

Tennessee,     Army     of.       See 

Army,  etc. 

Tennessee,  Department  of :  214. 
Tennessee  river:    157,  158,  162, 

211,  212,  217,  309.   310,  311. 

Tennessee,  state :    39,  47,   100, 


252,  260,  307,  310,  313,  362. 
See  East  Tennessee. 

Tennessee  Valley:    161,  362. 

Tents:  shape  and  construc- 
tion, 56-7. 

Terrell,  Adj. -Gen.  William  H. 
H.:  336- 

Thomas,  Gen.  George  H. :  ap- 
pointed to  command  of  right 
wing  of  Halleck's  army,  45 ; 
declines  appointment  as  suc- 
cessor to  Buell,  99;  appoint- 
ed to  command  of  cente'r  of 
Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
101 ;  his  familiarity  with  de- 
tails, 103 ;  succeeds  Rose- 
crans  in  command  of  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  214; 
takes  command  of  troops  in 
Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi  in  Sherman's  ab- 
sence, 309";  how  harassed  by 
Grant  and  Washington  au- 
thorities prior  to  battle  of 
Nashville,  320-2;  orders  di- 
recting Generals  Schofield 
and  Logan  to  relieve  him  of 
command,  322 ;  his  generosity 
to  Grant,  327 ;  estimate  of  his 
character,  327-8 ;  affection 
for  him  of  soldiers  of  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  328; 
Badeau's  aspersions  on  his 
character,  328.  See  Battles 
and  Campaigns  of  Army  of 
the  Cumberland ;  Battles  of 
Mill  Spring  and  Nashville; 
Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennes- 
see. 

Three  Months'  Picnic,  The: 
Chap.  I,  pp.  1-14. 

Three  Months'  Service:  ex- 
citement consequent  on  elec- 
tion of  Lincoln,  i ;  rumors  of 
secession,  i ;  feeling  in  In- 
diana, i ;  Lincoln  stops  at 
Indianapolis  on  his  way  to 
Washington,  2;  firing  on 


42O 


GENERAL    INDEX 


Fort  Sumter  and  its  effect  on 
the  North,  2;  Gov.  Morton 
of  Indiana,  5 ;  his  efforts  in 
behalf  of  the  Union  cause, 
5-8;  the  call  to  arms  in  In- 
diana, 8;  raising  of  the  first 
company  in  Franklin,  Ind., 
9-10;  organization  of  7th 
Ind.  Inf.,  10 ;  regiment  goes 
to  West  Virginia,  10;  the 
battle  of  Philippi,  10;  inci- 
dents of  three  months'  serv- 
ice, 11-12;  battle  of  Car- 
rick's  Ford,  13 ;  the  disaster 
at  Bull  Run  and  its  effect  on 
the  North,  13 ;  benefit  of  ex- 
perience gained  in  the  three 
months'  service,  14. 

Thruston,  Col.  Gates  P. :    199. 

Treason  trials  at  Indianapolis, 
Ind.:  283. 

Trent  affair:   22. 

Trenton,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  344. 

Tullahoma  (Tenn.)  :  156,  157, 
162. 

Tullahoma  campaign :    157. 

Turchin,  Gen.  John  B. :  239. 

Turenne,  Marshal :    21. 

Tuscumbia  (Ala.)  :   305. 

"Uncle  John" :  73. 
Under  fire :   sensation  of  being, 
83- 

Vance,  Gov.  Zebulon  B. :    293. 

Van  Cleve,  Gen.  Horatio  P. : 
118,  198. 

Vicksburg  (Miss.)  :  41,  48,  123, 
125,  126,  145,  154,  159,  283. 

Vicksburg,  assault  on:  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Viniard  field  (Chickamauga)  : 
176. 

Virginia,  Army  of :   44,  45. 

Virginia  Campaign :  88,  89. 
See  Richmond  Campaign. 


Virginia,  Department  of :    32. 

Virginia,  state:  i,  44,  165,  246, 
258,  276,  279,  280,  362. 

Volunteer  armies :  govern- 
ment forced  to  depend  on,  17. 

Wade,  Senator  Benjamin:  ap- 
pointed chairman  of  Com- 
mittee on  Conduct  of  the 
War,  22;  early  opposition  to 
Grant,  48. 

Walden  Ridge :   158,  161,  213. 

Walker,  Gen.  William  H.  T.: 
273- 

War  of  1812:  numbers  and 
losses,  342. 

War  trace  (Tenn.)  :    156. 

Washburne,  Elihu  B. :  friend- 
ship for  Grant,  49. 

Washington,  D.  C. :  2,  12,  15, 
20,  24,  30,  31,  33,  34,  35,  43, 
45,  67,  101,  125,  157,  159,  164, 
165,  214,  296,  319,  320,  322. 

Washington,  George :  40. 

Wauhatchie  (Tenn.)  :    216. 

Waxhaws,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  345. 

Webster  (Va.)  :    10,  n. 

Wellington,  Duke  of:    171. 

West  Virginia,  state':  10,  40, 
65- 

White  Plains,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Whitemarsh,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  344. 

Wildcat  (Ky.)  :    100,  104. 

Wilder,  Gen.  John  T. :  171. 

Wilderness,  battle1  of :  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Wilkes,  Capt.  Charles:   22. 

Wilkinson  turnpike  (Stone's 
river)  :  107,  108. 

Williamsburg,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  348. 

Willich,  Gen.  August:  no,  in, 
117,  246. 


GENERAL    INDEX 


421 


Wilson,  Gen.  James  F. :  32,  33, 

308,  313,  314,  315,  320. 
Winchester  (Tenn.)  :    157,  158. 
Winchester,  battle  of :   90,  185 ; 

numbers  and  losses,  349. 
Wisconsin,     state:     tender     of 

loo-day  men  by,  284. 
Wise,  Gen.  Henry  A. :    278. 
Wood,  Gen.   Thomas  J. :    183, 

184,  214,  226,  237,  238,  239. 


Wyoming  Massacre: 
and  losses,  345. 


numbers 


Yorkiown,  battle  of:  numbers 
and  losses,  346. 

Youngs  House,  battle  of:  num- 
bers and  losses,  345. 

Zollicoffer,  Gen.  Felix  K. :    41. 


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